# Sosa

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · December 1, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11212333

## Case

- **Full name:** Jonathan Sosa v. The Village of Des Plaines, Village of Des Plaines Police Department, Officers Delollo, Pena and Sgt. Boniac and The Cook County States' Attorney
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** December 1, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11212333

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the purpose of the “incorporation by reference” doctrine is “to prevent parties from surviving a motion to dismiss by artful pleading or by failing to attach relevant documents”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JONATHAN SOSA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) No. 25-cv-11285
)
THE VILLAGE OF DES PLAINES ) Honorable Judge Thomas M. Durkin
VILLAGE OF DES PLAINES ) Magistrate Judge David Weisman
POLICE DEPARTMENT, OFFICERS )
DELOLLO, PENA and SGT, BONIAC )
and THE COOK COUNTY )
STATES' ATTORNEY )
Defendants. )

DES PLAINES DEFENDANTS’
12(c) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

NOW COME Defendants, the CITY OF DES PLAINES, incorrectly sued as the VILLAGE
OF DES PLAINES and the VILLAGE OF DES PLAINES POLICE DEPARTMENT, and
OFFICERS DELOLLO and PENA and SGT BONIAC (collectively hereinafter, the “Des Plaines
Defendants” unless otherwise referred to individually), by and through one of their attorneys,
DEBORAH ANNE OSTVIG of SCHAIN, BANKS, KENNY & SCHWARTZ, LTD., and
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) present their Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings and state as follows:
Pertinent Claims Alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint
Plaintiff filed a four-count Complaint against the Des Plaines Defendants and purports to
set forth the following claims for relief:
Count I Violation of 42 USC §1983
Count II Punitive Damages
Count III Pendent State Claim: Wrongful Arrest
Count IV Second Pendent State Claim: Malicious Prosecution
In his Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully arrested by the Des Plaines
Defendants in violation of his constitutional rights. [Plaintiff’s Complaint, DKT No. 1.]
Defendants deny these allegations. However, contrary to Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff refused to
identify himself and attempted to leave while detained when Defendant Officer Dilollo

encountered him with an open alcohol container in a public place. [See Defendants’ Affirmative
Defenses.] Additionally, the force used by the Defendants was not excessive. [Id.] As a result, this
Court should grant Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(c).
PREFATORY STATEMENT
Under Rule 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).
“Like Rule 12(b) motions, courts grant a Rule 12(c) motion only if ‘it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff[s] cannot prove any facts that would support [their] claims for relief.’” N. Ind. Gun
& Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir.1998) (quoting Craigs, Inc.
v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 12 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir.1993)). Thus, to succeed, the moving party

must demonstrate that there are no material issues of fact to be resolved. N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor
Shows, Inc., 163 F.3d at 452. (citations omitted). The facts are viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, but facts set forth in the complaint that undermine the plaintiffs’ claims
are not ignored. Id. In other words, when assessing the facial plausibility of a claim, the court
draws all reasonable inferences and facts in favor of the non-movant but does not need to accept
as true any legal assertions. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. Flynn, 863 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2017).
The pleadings referenced in Rule 12(c) include the complaint, the answer, and any written
instruments attached as exhibits. N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc., 163 F.3d at 452–53.
“Written instruments” include documents such as affidavits, letters, contracts, and loan
documentation. Id. at 453. Videos attached in support of a defendant’s affirmative defenses may
also be considered by the court in a Rule 12(c) context. Romero v. Vill. of Alsip, 1:24-CV-02175,
2025 WL 885691, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2025) (slip copy). Moreover, the court “may take
into consideration documents incorporated by reference to the pleadings.” Milwaukee Police

Ass'n, 863 F.3d at 640; see also 188 LLC v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 300 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that the purpose of the “incorporation by reference” doctrine is “to prevent parties
from surviving a motion to dismiss by artful pleading or by failing to attach relevant documents”).
The motion challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th
Cir.1997). Judgment is warranted if the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their
claims that would entitle them to relief. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 128 F.3d at 1080. The essence
of the motion is not that the plaintiffs have pleaded insufficient facts, it is that even assuming all
of the facts are accurate, they have no legal claim. Payton v. Rush–Presbyterian–St. Luke’s Med.
Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1999).

ARGUMENT
I. THE DES PLAINES DEFENDANTS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO
ARREST PLAINTIFF FOR OBSTRUCTION AND POSSESSION/
DRINKING IN PUBLIC PLACES

Plaintiff makes state law claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, as well as a Section
1983 claim for false arrest. Plaintiff’s claims fail because the evidence demonstrates that
Defendant Dilollo had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
Under Illinois law, an essential element of a plaintiff’s malicious prosecution and false
arrest claims is that the arrests, imprisonment, or prosecution be undertaken without probable
cause. Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1980). See also, Ross v. Mauro Chevrolet, 369
Ill.App.3d 794, 798 (1st Dist. 2006)(a plaintiff has to show that he was unreasonably restrained
without probable cause); Burghardt v. Remiyac, 207 Ill.App.3d 402, 406 (2nd Dist. 1991) and
Howard v. Firmand, 378 Ill.App.3d 147, 149 (1st Dist. 2007)(probable cause is a condition
precedent for a malicious prosecution claim). Thus, proof of the actual existence of probable cause

is an absolute bar to the action. Romero, WL 885691, at *3; Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., Ill., 705
F.3d 706, 713–14 (7th Cir. 2013); Terket, 623 F.2d at 31; Ross, 369 Ill.App.3d at 798; Burghardt,
207 Ill.App.3d at 406; Howard, 378 Ill.App.3d at 149. Moreover, if the defendants had probable
cause to believe that a plaintiff was guilty of a crime, their allegedly malicious motives are
immaterial. Terket, 623 F.2d at 31, citing Magnus v. Cock Robin Ice Cream Co., 52 Ill.App.3d
110, 9 Ill.Dec. 769, 367 N.E.2d 203 (1st Dist. 1977). The same rules apply in an action under
Section 1983. Terket, 623 F.2d at 31, citing Hunter v. Clardy, 558 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1977);
Beauregard v. Wingard, 362 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1966). See also Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442
F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir.2006).
Under Plaintiff’s state law and Section 1983 claims, police officers possess probable cause

to arrest when the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they have
reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the
suspect had committed an offense. Mustafa, 442 F.3d at 547 (quoting Kelley, 149 F.3d at 646);
Johnson v. Target Stores, Inc., 341 Ill.App.3d 56, 72-3 (1st . Dist. 2003)(to establish probable cause
in a malicious prosecution matter the facts must lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
believe or to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested committed the
offense charged); Ross, 369 Ill.App.3d at 798 (probable cause is established when the defendant
officers have reasonable grounds to believe that an offense was committed by a plaintiff.).
Probable cause is not evaluated by the court based upon the facts as an omniscient observer would
perceive them but instead is determined by the facts as they would have appeared to a reasonable
person in the position of the arresting officer. Id. (quoting Kelley, 149 F.3d at 646; citing Woods
v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 987 (7th Cir.2000). See also Johnson v. Target Stores, Inc., 341
Ill.App.3d at 72-3; Ross, 369 Ill.App.3d at 798. Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that he

was arrested without probable cause. McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 2009).
Additionally, when the evidence includes a videotape of the relevant events, the Court should not
adopt the nonmoving party’s version of the events when that version is blatantly contradicted by
the videotape. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379–80, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
See also Williams v. Brooks, 809 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2016); Williams v. Norfolk Southern
Corporation, 919 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2019).
As Officer Dilollo’s body camera video shows, based on the totality of the circumstances,
it was reasonable for Officer Dilollo to arrest Plaintiff for possession/drinking in public places and
obstruction. (See Ex. B attached to Des Plaines Defendants Answer and Affirmative Defenses.)
Plaintiff admitted that he was drinking on the Metra train and admitted to having an open alcohol

container in a public place. Moreover, when asked for identification, Plaintiff refused to provide
his identification. When asked his name and date of birth, Plaintiff refused to give them to Officer
Dilollo. Moreover, although Officer Dilollo told Plaintiff he was detained, Plaintiff attempted to
walk away from Officer Dilollo. These facts are sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff, and this Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.
II. THE DES PLAINES DEFENDANTS' USE OF FORCE WAS REASONABLE
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.

A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force when effectuating an arrest is
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. Avina v. Bohlen, 882
F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir.
2010)). An officer’s determination of the appropriate level of force to use must be measured from
the “perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” Muhammed v. City of Chicago, 316 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2002) citing Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)(the facts of the matter should

not be viewed with hindsight’s distorting lens).
An officer who has the right to arrest an individual also has the right to use some degree of
physical force or threat of force to effectuate the arrest, Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. But that right is
circumscribed by the Fourth Amendment's insistence on reasonableness. Stainback v. Dixon, 569
F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2009). For example, “an officer may not knowingly use handcuffs in a way
that will inflict unnecessary pain or injury on an individual who presents little or no risk of flight
or threat of injury.” Id. (citing Herzog v. Vill. Of Winnetka, Ill., 309 F.3d 1041, 1043 (7th Cir.
2002)). If the undisputed material facts establish that the officer acted reasonably under the
circumstances, the court must resolve the issue as a matter of law, rather than allow a jury to
“second-guess” the officer’s action. Id. (citing Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2003)).

Analysis of excessive-force claims is an objective one based on the information the officers had at
the time. Id.
Here, Officer Dilollo’s body camera video shows that on the Metra platform, Plaintiff
voluntarily went to his knees when he was informed that the Officers would be taking his
backpack. Contrary to his claims, the Officers brought Plaintiff to his feet, removed his backpack,
and released the handcuffs to do so. Additionally, the body camera footage shows that Plaintiff
refused to leave the squad car upon arrival at the Des Plaines Police Department. Moreover,
contrary to his claims, he was not dragged into the police station; he walked in under his own
power. Additionally, the Officers used appropriate force when they removed his necklace, ring,
belt, watch, outer shirt, and shoes. Lastly, Plaintiff was carried to another unpadded cell when he
refused to walk. Based on all these facts, the Defendants’ force was reasonable under the
circumstances, and this Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.
III. THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY.

Qualified immunity “protects government officials ’from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.’” Armstrong v. Daily, 786 F.3d 529, 538 (7th Cir.
2015) citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. at 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). To determine if the
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, courts ask two questions: (1) whether “the
facts alleged show the municipal employee’s conduct violated a constitutional right,” and (2)
whether “it would be clear to a reasonable [municipal employee] that his conduct was unlawful in
the situation he confronted.” Armstrong, 786 F.3d at 538 citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
201–02, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), modified on other grounds by Pearson, 555
U.S.at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808 (allowing courts discretion to conduct two-step inquiry in sequence
better suited to particular case); accord, Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 580 (7th
Cir.2012). Here, the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate that the Individual Defendants should have known that his detainment and

arrest and the force used violated his constitutional rights. As such, this Court should dismiss
Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.
VI. BECAUSE THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS ARE NOT LIABLE TO THE
PLAINTIFF, THE CITY OF DES PLAINES IS NOT LIABLE TO THE
PLAINTIFFS.

Under Illinois Law, a municipality is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or
omission of its employee where the employee is not liable. See 745 ILCS 10/2-109; 745 ILCS
10/2-302; 65 ILCS 5/1-4-6. As Plaintiff has failed to prove his claims against the Individual
Defendants, he failed to prove his claims against the City of Des Plaines. Thus, this Court should
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant the City of Des Plaines.
WHEREFORE, Defendants CITY OF DES PLAINES, incorrectly sued as the VILLAGE
OF DES PLAINES and the VILLAGE OF DES PLAINES POLICE DEPARTMENT, and
OFFICERS DELOLLO and PENA and SGT BONIAC respectfully request that this Court grant
their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) and
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.
Respectfully Submitted,

CITY OF DES PLAINES, incorrectly sued as
the VILLAGE OF DES PLAINES and the
VILLAGE OF DES PLAINS POLICE
DEPARTMENT, and OFFICERS
DELOLLO and PENA, and SGT BONIAC

Michael E. Kujawa, ARDC# 6244621 By: s/Deborah A. Ostvig
Deborah A. Ostvig, ARDC# 6287031 One of Their Attorneys
Schain, Banks, Kenny & Schwartz, Ltd.
70 W. Madison Street, Suite 5400
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Phone: (312) 345-5700 / Fax: (312) 345-5701
mkujawa@schainbanks.com
dostvig@schainbanks.com
K:\566 - Sosa\Pleadings\MJP\Defendants' MJP.docx

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11212333. Public record. Not legal advice.