# Alaniz

> District Court, S.D. Texas · December 1, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11212202

## Case

- **Full name:** Joe Anthony Alaniz v. Harris County, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** December 1, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11212202

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- declining to find ratification in case where officer shot fleeing suspect in back
- declining to find ratification where officer detained suspect and struck his knee
- finding “the quickness with which the officers resorted to tackling” plaintiff to weigh “against a finding of reasonableness”
- declining to find ratification where officer told protesters to leave intersection

## Opinion text

December 01, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

JOE ANTHONY ALANIZ, § CIVIL ACTION NO
Plaintiff, § 4:22-cv-01991
§
§
vs § JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
§
§
HARRIS COUNTY, et al, §
Defendants. §
OPINION AND ORDER
ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This action arises from the arrest of Plaintiff Joe
Anthony Alaniz during a protest of the death of George
Floyd. He alleges that Defendants Harris County and
Mark Cannon, a deputy with the Harris County Sheriff’s
office, violated his civil rights when arresting him.
The motion by Harris County for summary judgment is
granted. Dkt 97. The motion by Cannon for summary
judgment is granted in part and denied in part. Dkt 98.
1. Background
Alaniz has or had a brain tumor, making him prone to
seizures. Dkt 104-1 at 3 (Alaniz declaration). He thus
wears an emergency medical alert disability bracelet on
each wrist and often rides his bicycle for therapeutic
purposes. Dkt 104-1 at 3–5.
On May 29, 2020, Alaniz was riding his bicycle in the
downtown area of Houston when he came across a crowd
gathered to protest the recent death of George Floyd.
Dkt 97-4 at 1–2 (internal affairs report). Alaniz stopped
and began filming the incident on his cell phone, streaming
it to Facebook Live. See Dkt 104-5 (cell phone video).
Numerous law enforcement officers, including Cannon,
had been deployed to keep protestors off the nearby
highway and maintain order. See Dkt 98-6 at 6–7 (Oritz
deposition).
Additional video footage from the bodycam of Sergeant
Ana Ortiz shows a contentious encounter between police
and protestors. Dkt 104-6; see also Dkt 104-3 (Cannon
bodycam. Multiple protesters were taken to the ground and
arrested as officers tried to control the crowd. See Dkt
104-6 at 19:57–20:02.
Alaniz asserts that he wasn’t participating in the
protest. See Dkt 104-1 at 3 (Alaniz declaration). Video
instead shows him standing with his bicycle behind officers
filming on his phone. Dkt 104-6 at 20:02:00–10. Ortiz
approached him and told him to move because he was
standing behind officers. Id at 20:03:27–41. Alaniz walked
his bike across the street as he continued to film. Id at
20:03:41–20:04:11.
About seven minutes later, Ortiz ordered Alaniz to
move with the protesters being cleared from the area. Id
at 20:11:15–32. The following then occurred:
o Cannon approached and said, “Do you want to
move your bike or do you want to go with me?”
Id at 20:11:32–40.
o Cannon pointed, directing Alaniz to walk
across the nearby field. Ibid.
o Alaniz walked into the field with his bike. But
he stopped after several steps and continued
filming. Id at 20:11:40–51.
o Officers told him to keep moving. Ibid.
o Alaniz responded, “Relax, I’m not doing
anything.” Id at 20:12:10–15. Ortiz told Alaniz
to move forward multiple times. Id at 20:12:19–
35.
o Cannon then ordered Alaniz to “get on [his]
bike and drive.” Id at 20:12:35–37.
o Alaniz began walking with his bike while
continuing to film. Id at 20:12:35–40.
o Cannon began to count down from five seconds.
Ibid. Alaniz said, “Hold on,” and, “I’m moving.”
Dkt 104-5 at 1:22–30.
o Cannon attempted to handcuff Alaniz and took
him to the ground. Ibid.
o Multiple officers then assisted placing Alaniz
in handcuffs. Dkt 104-3 at 20:12:41–20:13:15.
Alaniz was then transported to the Harris County
Joint Processing Center. Id at 20:16:40–20:17:10. A bicycle,
wallet, and other property belonging to Alaniz were left at
the scene. Dkt 104-1 at 5. No arrest report was generated,
and he was never arraigned. Upon release, Alaniz went to
the hospital and was diagnosed with a “right
acromioclavicular [shoulder] separation.” Dkt 103 at 112
(medical records).
Alaniz filed a complaint with the Internal Affairs
Disciplinary Committee of the Harris County Sheriff’s
Office in June 2020. The Disciplinary Committee
investigated the incident. It partially sustained Alaniz’s
complaint against Cannon, who was reprimanded for
leaving Alaniz’s property at the scene. Dkt 104-4 at 18–19
(letter of reprimand).
Alaniz filed his original complaint in state court in May
2022. He alleged claims under §1983 against Cannon and
Ortiz, along with Sheriff Ed Gonzalez and Deputy Vanessa
Esqueda, for false arrest, excessive force, and failure to
protect from excessive force. Dkt 1-1 at ¶¶61–65. He also
asserted similar claims against Harris County, including
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id
at ¶¶66–71.
Defendants removed. Dkt 1. Cannon moved to dismiss.
Dkt 8. Alaniz amended his complaint. Dkt 12.
Defendants then moved to dismiss all claims against
them. Dkts 15 (Harris County), 16 (Gonzalez) & 19
(Cannon). Alaniz filed no opposition. The motions were
thus granted, and the first amended complaint was
dismissed without prejudice. Dkt 23.
Alaniz filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion
to amend. Dkts 25 & 29. The motion to amend was granted,
but the claims against Esqueda and Ortiz were later
dismissed again for failure to serve them. Dkts 28 & 35.
Alaniz then filed a second amended complaint. Dkt 39.
Defendants again moved to dismiss all claims. Dkts 42
(Harris County), 44 (Gonzalez) & 45 (Cannon). Alaniz
requested that video footage of the incident not be
considered in resolving the motions to dismiss. Dkt 63
(objection by Plaintiff to video supplement to pleadings). It
wasn’t. The motion to dismiss by Harris County was denied
as to the Monell claims under §1983 but granted as to
claims under the ADA and §§1981, 1982 and 1985, which
were dismissed with prejudice. Dkt 54 (minute entry). The
motion to dismiss by Cannon was denied. Dkt 80 (order).
All claims against Gonzalez were dismissed—the official
capacity claims with prejudice, and the individual capacity
claims without prejudice. See Dkts 54 & 80 at 14–15. And
during a motion hearing in April 2025, Alaniz stipulated to
the withdrawal of his claim under §1983 to the extent
proceeding under the First Amendment. Dkt 121 (minute
entry).
Now pending are motions for summary judgment by
Cannon and Harris County. Dkts 97 & 98.
2. Legal standard
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires a court to enter summary judgment when the
movant establishes that “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” A fact is material if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Sulzer
Carbomedics Inc v Oregon Cardio-Devices Inc, 257 F3d 449,
456 (5th Cir 2001), quoting Anderson v Liberty Lobby Inc,
477 US 242, 248 (1986). And a dispute is genuine if the
“evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Royal v CCC & R Tres
Arboles LLC, 736 F3d 396, 400 (5th Cir 2013), quoting
Anderson, 477 US at 248.
The summary judgment stage doesn’t involve weighing
the evidence or determining the truth of the matter. The
task is solely to determine whether a genuine issue exists
that would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for
the nonmoving party. Smith v Harris County, 956 F3d 311,
316 (5th Cir 2020). Disputed factual issues must be
resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Little v Liquid
Air Corp, 37 F3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir 1994). All reasonable
inferences must also be drawn in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Connors v Graves, 538 F3d 373,
376 (5th Cir 2008).
The moving party typically bears the entire burden to
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. Nola Spice Designs LLC v Haydel Enterprises Inc,
783 F3d 527, 536 (5th Cir 2015); see also Celotex Corp v
Catrett, 477 US 317, 322–23 (1986). But when a motion for
summary judgment by a defendant presents a question on
which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to proffer summary judgment
proof establishing an issue of material fact warranting
trial. Nola Spice, 783 F3d at 536. To meet this burden of
proof, the evidence must be both “competent and
admissible at trial.” Bellard v Gautreaux, 675 F3d 454, 460
(5th Cir 2012).
3. Motion for summary judgment by Cannon
Alaniz asserts two claims under §1983 against Cannon
in his individual capacity for excessive force and false
arrest. Dkt 39 at ¶77. Cannon seeks summary judgment on
his affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Dkt 98.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects
government officials ‘from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” Pearson v Callahan, 555 US
223, 231 (2009), quoting Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800,
818 (1982). The availability of qualified immunity
ultimately “turns only upon the objective reasonableness of
the defendant’s acts.” Thompson v Upshur County, 245 F3d
447, 457 (5th Cir 2001) (emphasis in original).
“A qualified immunity defense alters the typical
summary judgment burden of proof in that once the
defense is pleaded by an official, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact
issue as to whether the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct
violated clearly established federal law.” Hunt v Pierson,
730 F Appx 210, 215–16 (5th Cir 2018), citing Brown v
Callahan, 623 F3d 259, 253 (5th Cir 2010). The plaintiff
bears the burden of negating qualified immunity, but all
inferences are drawn in his favor. Brown, 623 F3d at 253.
Even so, “a plaintiff’s version of the facts should not be
accepted for purposes of qualified immunity when it is
blatantly contradicted and utterly discredited by video
recordings.” Hanks v Rogers, 853 F3d 738, 744 (5th Cir
2017) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
a. Excessive force
i. Violation of a constitutional right
“A violation of the Fourth Amendment ‘occurs when a
seized person suffers an injury that results directly and
only from a clearly excessive and objectively unreasonable
use of force.’” Spiller v Harris County, 113 F4th 573, 576
(5th Cir 2024), quoting Joseph ex rel Joseph v Bartlett,
981 F3d 319, 332 (5th Cir 2020). “Determining whether
force was excessive or unreasonable is a ‘necessarily fact-
intensive’ and case-specific inquiry.” Spiller, 113 F4th
at 576 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
The parties don’t dispute that Alaniz was injured due
to a use of force. At issue is whether that force was clearly
excessive, with the excessiveness itself being objectively
unreasonable. Whether force is reasonable depends on the
Graham factors, being (i) the severity of the crime at issue,
(ii) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and (iii) whether the suspect
is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight. Hanks, 853 F3d at 745, quoting Graham v Connor,
490 US 386, 396 (1989). Whether the force deployed was
justified is viewed from “the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene,” taking account of the “individual
interests and the governmental interests at stake.” Barnes
v Felix, 605 US 73, 79 (2025) (citations omitted).
Applying the Graham factors and viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to Alaniz, the record contains
disputed issues of material fact as to the reasonableness of
Cannon’s force. Summary judgment is thus inappropriate.
As to severity, the alleged crime was “not severe.” See
Dkt 98 at 20 (Cannon motion). Indeed, it’s unclear whether
any crime was committed at all. In any event, resisting
arrest and/or disobeying a reasonable order to move are
misdemeanors. See Tex Penal Code §38.03; Tex Penal Code
§42.03. And misdemeanors don’t typically support the use
of force. See Trammell v Fruge, 868 F3d 332, 340 (5th Cir
2017). This factor weighs in favor of Alaniz’s argument that
the use of force by Cannon against him was unreasonable.
As to dangerousness, the parties dispute whether
Alaniz posed an immediate threat to the safety of himself
or others. When considering reasonableness, courts must
account for the fact that police officers make split-second
judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving. Graham, 490 US at 396–97. Courts are
thus to “consider the totality of the circumstances as
perceived by a reasonable officer on the scene.” Hatcher v
Bement, 676 F Appx 238, 243 (5th Cir 2017) (internal
quotation omitted).
Cannon emphasizes the tense and chaotic evening in
question. Alaniz admits that he remembered people yelling
at police and multiple protestors being taken to the ground.
Dkt 98-5 at 16, 21 (Alaniz deposition). Ortiz testified that
she was concerned about the safety of motorists, protestors,
and law enforcement that day. Dkt 98-6 at 7 (Ortiz
deposition). Protestors had also been “aggressive” and
“throwing stuff” at officers, thus heightening safety
concerns in general. Id at 12.
Even so, the videos at the time of arrest show that
Alaniz was standing in an open field, filming with his cell
phone, and walking his bike in the direction he’d been
ordered to move. See Dkts 104-5 & 104-6. He wasn’t
immediately adjacent to the street. And he neither verbally
nor physically threatened the officers. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Alaniz, it’s not clear
that a reasonable officer would have perceived immediate
danger warranting force.
As to resistance, fact issues also remain regarding both
Alaniz’s resistance and the proportionality of Cannon’s
response. Officers may “consider a suspect’s refusal to
comply with instructions during a traffic stop in assessing
whether physical force is needed to effectuate the suspect’s
compliance.” Deville v Marcantel, 567 F3d 156, 167 (5th Cir
2009). However, “officers must assess not only the need for
force, but also ‘the relationship between the need and the
amount of force used.’” Ibid.
The parties dispute the extent to which Alaniz
complied with Cannon’s order. The videos show that
Cannon ordered Alaniz to “get on your bike and drive.”
Dkt 104-6 at 20:12:35–37. Alaniz did begin walking in the
direction Cannon ordered him to go. In Alaniz’s view, this
meant he was complying with Cannon’s order. Dkts 105
at 36 & 104-4 at 3. But Cannon argues that he arrested
Alaniz not because he wasn’t moving at all, but because
Alaniz didn’t get on his bike. Dkt 104-2 at 127 (Cannon
deposition). Given the uneven nature of the rocky field and
what was going on around them, it’s unclear whether
riding the bicycle was even possible. Material fact issues
thus remain in this regard.
Most significantly, the parties dispute whether (and if
so, to what extent) Alaniz resisted Cannon’s attempt to
detain and cuff him. Alaniz admits that he “pulled away
from Deputy Cannon” during the attempted cuffing.
Dkt 95-1 at 4. But Alaniz maintains that even if he did pull
his arm away, it constituted passive resistance at most.
Dkt 105 at 34. Use of force isn’t justified where an
individual’s conduct amounts to mere passive resistance.
See Hanks, 853 F3d at 746 (determining plaintiff’s initial
refusals to follow instructions were “at most, passive
resistance” and didn’t justify use of force). Indeed, in
Goodson v City of Corpus Christi, 202 F3d 730, 740 (5th Cir
2000), the Fifth Circuit held that fact issues precluded
summary judgment where the plaintiff pulled his arm
away from arresting officers and was then tackled to the
ground.
But even if Alaniz did pull his arm away from Cannon
in a way justifying some use of force, a fact question
remains regarding the reasonableness of the speed in
which Cannon resorted to taking Alaniz all the way to the
ground. Trammell, 868 F3d at 342 (finding “the quickness
with which the officers resorted to tackling” plaintiff to
weigh “against a finding of reasonableness”).
Taken in the light most favorable to Alaniz, a
reasonable jury could conclude that Cannon’s use of force
was excessive and objectively unreasonable under the
circumstances.
ii. Clear establishment of that right
In a prior excessive-force case, the Fifth Circuit has
said that the second prong of the qualified immunity
analysis is better understood as encompassing “two
separate inquiries: whether the allegedly violated
constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of
the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the
defendants was objectively unreasonable in light of that
then clearly established law.” Tarver v City of Edna,
410 F3d 745, 750 (5th Cir 2005). “If officers of reasonable
competence could disagree as to whether the plaintiff’s
rights were violated, the officer’s qualified immunity
remains intact.” Ibid. Said another way, an officer “cannot
be said to have violated a clearly established right unless
the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any
reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have
understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff v Rickard,
572 US 765, 778–79 (2014).
The same factual disputes prevent finding—at least at
the summary-judgment stage—that Cannon’s conduct did
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known. For
example, in Trammell v Fruge, the plaintiff’s “only physical
resistance to being tackled was his attempt to pull his arm
away.” 868 F3d at 341. The plaintiff was “neither
aggressive nor violent toward officers” and was suspected
of “only a minor offense.” Id at 342. Because a reasonable
jury could conclude the officers’ force was excessive,
summary judgment based on qualified immunity was
inappropriate. Ibid. Likewise instructive is Goodson v City
of Corpus Christi, 202 F3d at 730. Police there ordered the
plaintiff to put his hands on the police car. Id at 734. An
officer then grabbed the plaintiff’s arm, prompting the
plaintiff to pull his arm away, with officers then tackling
him to the ground. Ibid. The Fifth Circuit held on summary
judgment that a fact question remained as to the
reasonableness of force under the circumstances. Id at 740.
Trammell and Goodson are both fair warning that such
conduct may be unconstitutional. For the crime at issue
here wasn’t severe—if existent at all—and no threat of
violence or aggression was apparent from Alaniz. His
physical resistance amounted at most to pulling his arm
away. Yet Cannon responded by taking him quickly and
forcefully to the ground, injuring Alaniz’s shoulder. To be
clear, a jury may yet find that Cannon’s use of force was
reasonable. But it can’t be found reasonable as a matter of
law, given the disputed issues of material fact.
As such, Cannon isn’t entitled to qualified immunity on
the claim for excessive force. Summary judgment will thus
be denied in that respect.
b. False arrest
Alaniz claims that Cannon also violated his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from false arrest. Cannon
argues that he had probable cause to detain Alaniz and is
thus entitled to qualified immunity. Dkt 98 at 14.
To assert a valid claim under §1983 for false arrest,
Alaniz must show that Cannon “did not have probable
cause to arrest him.” Anokwuru v City of Houston, 990 F3d
956, 963 (5th Cir 2021), quoting Haggerty v Texas Southern
University, 391 F3d 653, 655 (5th Cir 2004) (citation
omitted). “[T]he existence of probable cause for any offense,
including one not charged, is sufficient to defeat a §1983
false arrest claim.” Shemwell v Cannon, 352 F Supp 3d 690,
701 (ND Tex 2019), citing Devenpeck v Alford, 543 US 146,
153–54 (2004). “Probable cause exists when the totality of
the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s
knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a
reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had
committed or was committing an offense.” Haggerty,
391 F3d at 655–56 (quotation omitted).
Pertinent here, Cannon is entitled to qualified
immunity if “a reasonable officer in his position could have
believed that, in light of the totality of the facts and
circumstances of which [he] was aware, there was a fair
probability that [the suspect] had committed or was
committing an offense.” Id at 656, citing Glenn v City of
Tyler, 242 F3d 307, 313 (5th Cir 2001). The Fifth Circuit in
Club Retro LLC v Hilton explained the clearly-established
prong in this regard this way:
The Fourth Amendment right to be free
from false arrest—arrest without probable
cause—was clearly established at the time
of [plaintiffs’] arrests. Nonetheless, “[e]ven
law enforcement officials who ‘reasonably
but mistakenly conclude that probable
cause is present’ are entitled to immunity.”
Thus, plaintiffs must allege facts
permitting an inference that defendants
lacked arguable (that is, reasonable but
mistaken) probable cause for the arrests.
568 F3d 181, 206–07 (5th Cir 2009) (citations omitted).
Cannon argues that he had probable cause that Alaniz
was committing the offense of resisting arrest. Dkt 98
at 28. Texas Penal Code §38.03 defines the crime of
resisting arrest and provides in part:
(a) A person commits an offense if he
intentionally prevents or obstructs a
person he knows is a peace officer or a
person acting in a peace officer’s presence
and at his direction from effecting an
arrest, search, or transportation of the
actor or another by using force against the
peace officer or another.
(b) It is no defense to prosecution under
this section that the arrest or search was
unlawful.
In Texas, the act of resisting can supply probable cause
for the arrest itself. Ramirez v Martinez, 716 F3d 369, 376
(5th Cir 2013). And the “great weight of Texas authority
indicates that pulling out of an officer’s grasp is sufficient
to constitute resisting arrest.” Ibid (collecting cases). In
Ramirez, the plaintiff admitted that he “pulled his arm out
of [the officer’s] grasp” during the attempted arrest. Id
at 377. And so, because the officer could reasonably
conclude that a plaintiff committed the offense of resisting
arrest by pulling his arm away, he was entitled to qualified
immunity. Ibid.
The same is true here. Alaniz argues that Cannon
lacked any probable cause for his arrest. Dkt 105 at 41. But
Alaniz admits that he “pulled away from Deputy Cannon
as he tried to cuff [Alaniz].” Dkt 95-1 at 4. Per Ramirez, this
act of pulling away from Cannon during arrest, however
minor, is enough for him to reasonably believe probable
cause existed.
Cannon also argues that he had probable cause that
Alaniz was disobeying a reasonable order to move. Dkt 98
at 28. Given the finding that Cannon had at least arguable
probable cause as to resisting arrest, whether it also
existed for disobeying a reasonable order to move needn’t
be analyzed.
Cannon is entitled to qualified immunity on the claim
for false arrest. Summary judgment will thus be granted in
that respect.
4. Motion for summary judgment by Harris
County
Alaniz asserts §1983 liability against Harris County
for failure to discipline, failure to train, and ratification of
Cannon’s conduct. Dkt 39 at ¶¶78, 87–120. Harris County
seeks summary judgment as to all claims. Dkt 97.
For a municipality to be liable under §1983, there must
be an underlying constitutional violation. See Pineda v City
of Houston, 291 F3d 325, 328 (5th Cir 2002). Almost all of
the arguments by Alaniz against Harris County focus on
false arrest. It has been determined above that there is no
constitutional violation as to false arrest. Related claims
against Harris County must therefore be dismissed on that
basis. Even so, all of Alaniz’s claims against Harris County
will be addressed briefly.
Municipal liability under §1983 doesn’t extend merely
on a respondeat superior basis. Monell v Department of
Social Services, 436 US 658, 691 (1978). The plaintiff must
show “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy
maker can be charged with actual or constructive
knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose
‘moving force’ is that policy (or custom).” Pineda, 291 F3d
at 328. “The ‘official policy’ requirement was intended to
distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees
of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal
liability is limited to action for which the municipality is
actually responsible.” Doe v Edgewood Independent School
District, 964 F3d 351, 364–65 (5th Cir 2020) (emphasis in
original), quoting Pembaur v Cincinnati, 475 US 469, 479
(1986).
a. Unconstitutional policy or practice
Alaniz maintains that Harris County is liable for
unconstitutional policies by failing to discipline officers for
arrests made without probable cause, and by “permitting
and encouraging” excessive force. Dkt 105 at 22, 47–48.
Such contention is untenable because Alaniz fails to
establish an official policy or custom, causation, or
demonstrate knowledge by the policymaker.
As to an official policy, a plaintiff may plead one of two
types of policies. One is “a policy statement formally
announced by an official policymaker.” Zarnow v City of
Wichita Falls, 614 F3d 161, 168 (5th Cir 2010). The other
is “a practice so persistent and widespread as to practically
have the force of law.” Ratliff v Aransas County, 948 F3d
281, 285 (5th Cir 2020) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Alaniz nowhere links his claim to an official written
policy. In fact, Harris County highlights that it had
appropriate written policies regarding use of force and
arrest procedures in place. See Dkt 97-11 (Harris County
Sheriff’s Office Department Policies). And to establish an
official custom, one act alone is not enough; there must be
a “persistent and widespread practice.” Pineda, 291 F3d
at 329. When considering whether a series of incidents
amounts to an official pattern or custom, the “size of a
police department may [also] be relevant.” Peterson v City
of Fort Worth, Texas, 588 F3d 838, 851 (5th Cir 2009).
In Peterson, the Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s
theory because it lacked factual development. Ibid.
Specifically, the court held twenty-seven complaints over
four years insufficient to establish an official custom of
excessive force because the plaintiff failed to provide
evidence as to the size of the police department or the
number of total arrests made in the relevant period. Id
at 851–52; see also Pineda, 291 F3d at 329: “Eleven
incidents each ultimately offering equivocal evidence of
compliance with the Fourth Amendment cannot support a
pattern of illegality in one of the Nation’s largest cities and
police forces.”
Regarding false arrest, Alaniz argues that Harris
County has a policy to review all arrests and yet has never
taken disciplinary action against an officer for arresting
without probable cause. Dkt 105 at 47–48. That failure to
discipline, he says, is the “moving force” behind his injury.
Id at 48. He relies on Exhibit H to show “dozens” of
examples of individuals arrested without probable cause.
Dkts 105 at 47 & 105-1 (exhibit H). And he says that there’s
“not a single instance” of Harris County “disciplining,
training, or retraining its officers” for false arrest. Dkt 105
at 26. In his view, this failure to discipline amounts to an
official, unconstitutional policy.
Harris County objects to the admission of Exhibit H on
hearsay grounds. Dkt 107 at 2; see Dkt 105-1 (Exhibit H).
But counsel for Plaintiff provided a declaration attesting
that the records were derived from the Harris County
Clerk’s office website, establishing authenticity. Dkt 105-1
at 4–5. And, though hearsay, these records appear to fall
within the public-records exception of Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(8). Exhibit H is thus likely admissible.
Even so, Alaniz hasn’t provided necessary context for
Exhibit H to demonstrate that arrests without probable
cause amount to an official custom. He provides neither
evidence of the total number of arrests between 2018 and
2020, nor the size of the police department. Without such
evidence, and as a matter of law, the unexplained “dozens”
of cases he cites cannot amount to an official policy. In
addition, to show that there is not a single instance of
Harris County disciplining its officers after false arrest, he
cites only to Harris County’s own written policies, which
include proper arrest procedures. Dkt 105 at 26. This isn’t
enough to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether failure
to discipline its officers for false arrest is attributable to
Harris County as an official custom.
Regarding excessive force, Alaniz makes the bare
allegation in his “undisputed facts” section that “[Harris
County] has a practice, custom, culture, procedure, and
training of permitting and encouraging excessive force
against suspects, inmates, and persons in their custody.”
Dkt 105 at 22. In support, he again cites to Exhibit H,
which includes only purported arrests without probable
cause. It’s thus irrelevant to the excessive force
accusations. He also cites to Harris County’s written
policies at Exhibit I, which state, “In every situation, the
use of force will be avoided if reasonably possible.” See
Dkt 104-7 at 36. But Alaniz provides no evidence of a
custom regarding excessive force that could be said to
override this written policy.
As to policymaker, a city cannot be liable for an
unwritten custom unless “[a]ctual or constructive
knowledge of such custom” is attributable to a city
policymaker. Webster v City of Houston, 735 F3d 838, 841
(5th Cir 1984). Alaniz hasn’t provided evidence of such
knowledge. He states simply that Ed Gonzalez was the
policymaker at the time, while citing to Webster for the
proposition that “the course of conduct warrants the
attribution to the [City’s] governing body of knowledge that
the objectionable conduct is the expected, accepted practice
of city employees.” Dkt 105 at 48–49, citing 735 F2d at 842.
This in no way connects the actual or constructive
knowledge of any custom (much less add to any proof that
such a custom exists).
As to causation, Alaniz says that the putative custom
of failing to discipline offers the “moving force behind the
pervasive practice by Harris County Sheriff’s officers.”
Dkt 105 at 48. This is also too tenuous to sustain his claim.
For aside from conclusory statements, he provides no
evidence that his injury arose from any failure of Harris
County to discipline other officers. Dkt 105 at 48.
Summary judgment will be entered on behalf of Harris
County as to the Monell theory with respect to
unconstitutional policy or practice.
b. Failure to train
The Supreme Court observes, “A municipality’s
culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous
where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick v
Thompson, 563 US 51, 61 (2011). But a decision by a local
government not to train certain employees about their
legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may in some
circumstances rise to the level of an official government
policy for purposes of §1983. Id at 61–62.
To state such a claim, a plaintiff must plead that (i) the
training procedures of the municipality’s policymaker were
inadequate; (ii) the policymaker was deliberately
indifferent in adopting the training policy; and (iii) the
inadequate training policy directly caused the plaintiff’s
injury. Conner v Travis County, 209 F3d 794, 796 (5th Cir
2000), quoting Baker v Putnal, 75 F3d 190, 200 (5th Cir
1996).
As to inadequate training, municipal liability doesn’t
attach merely because “a particular officer may be
unsatisfactorily trained” or “an otherwise sound program
has occasionally been negligently administered.” City of
Canton v Harris, 489 US 378, 390–91 (1989). The Fifth
Circuit directs with the first element that the focus must
be on the adequacy of the training program in relation to
the tasks the particular officer must perform. Snyder v
Trepagnier, 142 F3d 791, 798 (5th Cir 1998), quoting City
of Canton, 489 US at 390. And so to defeat a motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff must allege with
specificity how the training program is defective in this
regard. Roberts v City of Shreveport, 397 F3d 287, 293
(5th Cir 2005).
Alaniz appears to contend that Harris County failed to
adequately train as to (i) arrest without probable cause,
(ii) use of excessive force, and (iii) recognizing emergency
medical bracelets. Dkt 105 at 45–47. Such vague and
conclusory allegations can’t sustain his claims. Alaniz also
fails to identify specific deficiencies in the training
programs.
With respect to false arrest, Alaniz cites only to the fact
that Cannon said he wasn’t comfortable with the Fourth
Amendment. Dkt 105 at 47. But it’s undisputed that
Cannon did receive training that satisfied state standards.
See Dkts 97 at 16–17 & 97-6 (Cannon training records).
“[I]f training of police officers meets state standards, there
can be no cause of action for a failure to train absent a
showing that this legal minimum of training was
inadequate to enable officers to deal with the ‘usual and
recurring situations’ faced by jailers and peace officers.”
O’Neal v City of San Antonio, 344 F Appx 885, 888 (5th Cir
2009), quoting Benavides v County of Wilson, 955 F2d 968,
973 (5th Cir 1992). Regardless, that an officer expressed
discomfort with the Fourth Amendment doesn’t show that
the training program itself is defective. See City of Canton,
489 US at 390–91: “That a particular officer may be
unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten
liability on the city, for the officer’s shortcomings may have
resulted from factors other than a faulty training
program.”
With respect to excessive force, Alaniz doesn’t even
argue that the training is inadequate.
With respect to training regarding medical bracelets,
Alaniz cites no legal authority demonstrating an obligation
for such training or that such training is necessary to
enable officers to “respond properly to the usual and
recurring situations with which they must deal.” See
Dkt 105 at 46; Benavides, 955 F2d at 973, quoting City of
Canton, 489 US at 391.
Alaniz thus fails to identify any specific training
program or show how it is inadequate.
As to deliberate indifference, Alaniz also fails to meet
his burden. This is “a stringent standard of fault,” one
“requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a
known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick
563 US at 61 (citation omitted). “Thus, when city
policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a
particular omission in their training program causes city
employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the city
may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the policymakers
choose to retain that program.” Ibid. A municipality’s
deliberate indifference typically requires a plaintiff to
allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations by
untrained employees. Id at 62.
Only as to false arrest does Alaniz even attempt to
provide any evidence of a pattern of purported
unconstitutional conduct. See Dkt 105-1 (Exhibit H). But
even if Exhibit H is accepted as true, it doesn’t reveal any
information about the training that involved officers
received or its inadequacy. It’s also not sufficiently specific
to show that any training itself was inadequate. And in line
with other determination above about pattern, given the
number of arrests that Harris County makes year over
year, Alaniz purporting to point to “dozens” of arrests
without probable cause over multiple years can’t sustain
the allegation that policymakers were deliberately
indifferent to the constitutional rights of its citizens.
If a plaintiff can’t allege a pattern, “it is still possible to
establish deliberate indifference through the single-
incident exception.” Hutcheson v Dallas County, 994 F3d
477, 482 (5th Cir 2021) But that exception is “extremely
narrow” and requires the plaintiff to “prove that the highly
predictable consequence of a failure to train would result
in the specific injury suffered.” Ibid. Such exception is
generally reserved for cases where the municipality
provided no training at all. Id at 483. That isn’t the
situation here. Cannon received extensive training
regarding arrest procedures, search and seizure, use of
force, and first aid. See Dkt 97-6 (Cannon training records).
As to causation, Alaniz again hasn’t shown that
inadequate training was the “moving force” in his injury.
His assertions are conclusory and fail to demonstrate a
causal connection between the purported lack of training
and his injury. Dkt 105 at 46.
Alaniz fails to carry his burden as to all three elements
of his failure-to-train theory. Summary judgment will be
entered in favor of Harris County on such claim.
c. Ratification
Alaniz further alleges that Harris County is liable
because it ratified the “unconstitutional practice of
unlawful arrest without probable cause” by failing to
discipline officers for such conduct. Dkt 105 at 51.
The Fifth Circuit limits the theory of ratification to
“extreme factual situations.” Peterson, 588 F3d at 848.
Under such precedent, this case can’t be considered an
extreme situation. Compare Grandstaff v City of Borger,
767 F2d 161, 168 (5th Cir 1985) (finding ratification where
officers “poured” gunfire onto a truck and killed innocent
occupant), with Snyder, 142 F3d at 798 (declining to find
ratification in case where officer shot fleeing suspect in
back); Peterson, 588 F3d at 848 (declining to find
ratification where officer detained suspect and struck his
knee); World Wide Street Preachers Fellowship v Town of
Columbia, 591 F3d 747, 755 (5th Cir 2009) (declining to
find ratification where officer told protesters to leave
intersection).
And regardless, ratification requires the approval of a
policymaker, not mere acquiescence or failure to discipline,
as Alaniz argues here. See Benfer v City of Baytown, Texas,
120 F4th 1272, 1287 (5th Cir 2024), citing Allen v Hays,
65 F4th 736, 749 n 10 (5th Cir 2023) (cleaned up):
“Ratification can suffice for Monell liability only if the
authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision
and the basis for it.”
Summary judgment will thus be entered in favor of
Harris County on the ratification claim.
5. Conclusion
The motion by Defendant Harris County for summary
judgment is GRANTED. Dkt 97.
The claims against it are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The motion by Defendant Deputy Mark Cannon for
summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART. Dkt 98.
It is GRANTED as to the claim for false arrest, which is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
It is DENIED as to the claim for excessive force.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on December 1, 2025, at Houston, Texas.

BE.
Hon Charles Eskrifige
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11212202. Public record. Not legal advice.