# Opinion

> District Court, C.D. California · November 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11211420

## Case

- **Full name:** Ivan V. V. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** November 24, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting “the decision of whether to remand for 4 || further proceedings turns upon the likely utility of such proceedings”

## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10 WESTERN DIVISION
11 IVAN V. V.,1 ) ) Case No. 2:25-cv-03245-JDE
Plaintiff, )
12 ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
13 v. ) ) ORDER

)
14 FRANK BISIGNANO,2 )
Commissioner of Social Security, )
15 )
Defendant. )
16 )
17
18 On April 11, 2025, Plaintiff Ivan V. V. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint
19 seeking review of the denial of his application for disability insurance benefits
20 (“DIB”). The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s opening brief (Dkt. 17), the
21 Commissioner’s answering brief (Dkt. 24), Plaintiff’s reply (Dkt. 25), and the
22 Administrative Record (Dkt. 12 “AR”). The matter now is ready for decision.
23

24
1 Plaintiff’s name has been partially redacted in accordance with Fed. R. Civ.
P. 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration
25 and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
26
2 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7,
27 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank
Bisignano is substituted for Carolyn Colvin as the defendant.
28
1 I.
2 BACKGROUND
3 Plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB on September 16, 2022,
4 alleging disability commencing on November 5, 2011.3 AR 17, 299, 306. After
5 Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and on reconsideration (AR 154,
6 162, 166, 170, 174), an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a telephonic
7 hearing on January 20, 2023. AR 37-65. Plaintiff, represented by counsel, and
8 a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. AR 44, 57.
9 On October 2, 2024, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled. AR
10 17-31.4 The ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
11 during the period from his alleged onset date of November 5, 2011, through his
12 date last insured of December 31, 2015, and suffered from severe impairments
13 of: lumbar spondylosis and facet arthropathy, post laminectomy syndrome and
14 bilateral SI joint dysfunction, knee arthralgia, umbilical hernia by history,
15 asthma, sensorineural hearing loss in the bilateral ears with tinnitus, and major
16 depression. AR 21. The ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
17

18 3 Plaintiff also filed an application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).
AR 300. On February 12, 2024, Plaintiff’s SSI application was denied at the initial
19 level, due to Plaintiff’s income level. AR 189.
20 4 Plaintiff previously filed an application for DIB in June 2017. AR 77, 281. In
a decision dated August 15, 2018, an ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled from the
21 alleged onset date, February 15, 2007, through the date last insured, December 31,
22 2015. AR 17, 77-88, 281. The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision
on December 11, 2018. AR 92-97. There is no indication Plaintiff further appealed
23 the denial of the 2017 application. AR 17. In the present case, the ALJ determined
that the previous ALJ’s decision was “not final and binding,” as Plaintiff “rebutted
24
the presumption of continuing non-disability” by showing a changed circumstance.
25 AR 20 (citing Acquiescence Ruling 97-4(9) and Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691 (9th
Cir. 1988)). If an ALJ is aware of the denial of a claimant’s prior application for DIB
26
benefits but accepts an alleged onset date during a previously-adjudicated period and
27 considers evidence of disability from that prior period, then “it is appropriate for the
Court to treat the ALJ’s actions as a de facto reopening.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d
28
503, 510 (9th Cir. 2001).
1 combination of impairments that met or equaled a listed impairment. AR 24.
2 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity
3 (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work,5 with the following limitations:
4 [He] could stand and/or walk 2 hours in an eight-hour workday
5 with normal breaks; he could sit 6 hours in an eight-hour workday
6 with normal breaks; he needed to use a hand held cane for all
7 ambulation; he could occasionally climb ramps and stairs; he
8 could never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; he could
9 occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl; he was able to
10 perform work tasks that do not require fine hearing discrimination
11 and allow for face-to-face communication of directions; he needed
12 to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, heat and
13 humidity, wetness, vibration, uneven terrains, fumes, odors, dusts,
14 gases, poor ventilation and pulmonary irritants; he could have no
15 exposure to unprotected heights or hazardous moving machinery;
16 and he was limited to simple and routine tasks.
17 AR 26. The ALJ found Plaintiff had no past relevant work. AR 29. The ALJ
18 determined that through the date last insured, considering Plaintiff’s age,
19 education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of the VE, there were
20 jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff
21 could have performed. AR 26. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was
22 not disabled from the alleged onset date, November 5, 2011, through
23 December 31, 2015, the date last insured. AR 31.
24

25 5 “Sedentary work” is defined as: [Li]fting no more than 10 pounds at a time
and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.
26
Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount
27 of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are
sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary
28
criteria are met.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).
1 The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the
2 ALJ’s decision the agency’s final decision. AR 1-6.
3 II.
4 LEGAL STANDARDS
5 A. Standard of Review
6 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may review a decision to deny
7 benefits. The ALJ’s findings and decision should be upheld if they are free
8 from legal error and supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a
9 whole. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (as
10 amended); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial
11 evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as
12 adequate to support a conclusion. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028,
13 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). It is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.
14 Id. To assess whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the court “must
15 review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that
16 supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion.”
17 Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). “If the evidence can
18 reasonably support either affirming or reversing,” the reviewing court “may
19 not substitute its judgment” for that of the Commissioner. Id. at 720-21; see
20 also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Even when the
21 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, [the court]
22 must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably
23 drawn from the record.”), superseded by regulation on other grounds as stated
24 in Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021).
25 Lastly, even if an ALJ errs, the decision will be affirmed if the error is
26 harmless (Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115), that is, if it is “inconsequential to the
27 ultimate nondisability determination,” or if “the agency’s path may reasonably
28 be discerned, even if the agency explains its decision with less than ideal
1 clarity.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (citation omitted); Smith, 14 F.4th at
2 1111 (even if the “modest burden” of the substantial evidence standard is not
3 met, “we will not reverse an ALJ’s decision where the error was harmless”).
4 B. The Five-Step Sequential Evaluation
5 When a claim reaches an ALJ, the ALJ conducts a five-step sequential
6 evaluation to determine at each step if the claimant is disabled. See Ford v.
7 Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2020); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1110.
8 First, the ALJ considers if the claimant currently works at a job that
9 meets the criteria for “substantial gainful activity.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1110. If

10 not, the ALJ proceeds to a second step to determine whether the claimant has a
11 “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination
12 of impairments that has lasted for more than twelve months. Id. If so, the ALJ
13 proceeds to a third step to assess whether the claimant’s impairments render the
14 claimant disabled because they meet or equal any of the listed impairments in
15 the Social Security Regulations at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
16 See Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 2015).
17 If the claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal a “listed impairment,”
18 before proceeding to the fourth step the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC, that
19 is, what the claimant can do on a sustained basis despite the limitations from
20 her impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Social
21 Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996). After assessing
22 the RFC, the ALJ proceeds to the fourth step to determine if, in light of the
23 claimant’s RFC, the claimant can perform past relevant work as actually or
24 generally performed. See Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 2016). If
25 the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to a fifth and
26 final step to determine whether there is any other work, in light of the
27 claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, that the claimant can
28 perform and that exists in “significant numbers” in either the national or
1 regional economies. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1100-01 (9th Cir.
2 1999); 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(a). A claimant who can do other work is not
3 disabled; a claimant who cannot do other work and meets the duration
4 requirement is disabled. See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1099; see also Woods v.
5 Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 788 n.1 (9th Cir. 2022) (summarizing the steps and
6 noting that “[t]he recent [2017] changes to the Social Security regulations did
7 not affect the familiar ‘five-step sequential evaluation process.’”).
8 The claimant generally bears the burden at steps one through four to
9 show she is disabled or meets the requirements to proceed to the next step and
10 bears the ultimate burden to show he is disabled. See, e.g., Ford, 950 F.3d at

11 1148; Molina, 674 F.3d at 1110; Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th
12 Cir. 1995). However, at Step Five, the ALJ has a limited burden of production
13 to identify representative jobs that the claimant can perform and that exist in
14 “significant” numbers in the economy. See Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1161
15 (9th Cir. 2012); Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100.
16 III.
17 DISCUSSION
18 Plaintiff raises two issues (Dkt. 17 at 4 (native pagination)):
19 Issue No. 1: Whether the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s
20 symptoms and testimony; and
21 Issue No. 2: Whether the ALJ erred in analyzing Plaintiff’s RFC.
22 A. The ALJ Failed to Properly Evaluate Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony
23 1. Applicable Law
24 When a disability claimant produces objective medical evidence of an
25 underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain
26 or other symptoms alleged, absent evidence of malingering, the ALJ must
27 provide “specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant’s
28 testimony regarding the severity of the claimant’s symptoms.” Treichler v.
1 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation
2 and internal quotations omitted); Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th
3 Cir. 2004); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). “The standard isn’t
4 whether [the federal] court is convinced, but instead whether the ALJ’s
5 rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi,
6 53 F.4th 489, 500 (9th Cir. 2022). “This standard is ‘the most demanding
7 required in Social Security cases.’” Smith, 14 F.4th at 1112 (quoting Moore v.
8 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also
9 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014) (“This [standard] is not
10 an easy requirement to meet.”).
11 The ALJ’s findings “must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing
12 court to conclude the [ALJ] rejected [the] claimant’s testimony on permissible
13 grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony.” Moisa, 367
14 F.3d at 885 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
15 “General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what
16 testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s
17 complaints.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722 (citation and internal quotations
18 omitted); see also SSR 16-3p (findings “must contain specific reasons for the
19 weight given to the individual’s symptoms, be consistent with and supported
20 by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the individual and any
21 subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual’s
22 symptoms”). But, if the ALJ’s assessment of the testimony is reasonable and is
23 supported by substantial evidence, it is not the court’s role to “second-guess” it.
24 Smartt, 53 F.4th at 500 (citing Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th
25 Cir. 2001)). The ALJ’s finding may be upheld even if not all the reasons for
26 rejecting the testimony are upheld. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
27 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004).
28 / / /
1 2. Plaintiff’s Testimony
2 Plaintiff alleged disability due to back pain, bulging discs, hearing
3 problems, diminished vision, knee problems, and breathing problems. AR 411.
4 He reported experiencing constant pain and numbness in his legs and feet. AR
5 51-52, 449. Regarding the period between 2011 and 2015, Plaintiff testified that
6 he needed to be off his feet every two to three hours. AR 51. Plaintiff stated
7 that he used a cane, back brace, knee brace, and TENS unit daily. AR 53-54.
8 Plaintiff testified that he would rest two to three hours a day to reduce his pain
9 but sometimes his “back would give out” and he “would [be] bedridden for
10 three days or more.” AR 54-56. Plaintiff also reported suffering from hearing
11 loss, emotional problems, depression, and difficulty being in group settings.
12 AR 46, 49, 56. Plaintiff testified that he received epidural cortisone shots, but
13 his pain was “always” present. AR 55.
14 3. The ALJ’s Decision
15 The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity,
16 persistence and limiting effects of his reported symptoms were not entirely
17 consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. AR 27.
18 The ALJ explained that “[m]ost of the treatment for [Plaintiff’s] back was
19 conservative, with pain medication and physical therapy, … [which] was only
20 occasionally augmented with more invasive medial branch blocks and radio-
21 frequency ablation.” Id. The ALJ also found that the examination records did
22 not substantiate Plaintiff’s “testimony that he always used a cane prior to the
23 date last insured.” Id.
24 4. Analysis
25 An ALJ may rely on conservative treatment in analyzing the severity of
26 subjective allegations. See Parra, 481 F.3d at 751 (“evidence of ‘conservative
27 treatment’ is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding severity of
28 an impairment”). Here, the finding that Plaintiff received only conservative
1 treatment for low back pain is not supported by substantial evidence. During
2 the relevant time period, in addition to being treated with prescription pain
3 medication (hydrocodone and gabapentin), physical therapy, and a TENS unit,
4 Plaintiff received bilateral SI ligament trigger point steroid injections (July
5 2013), bilateral medial branch blocks (March 2014), and radio-frequency
6 ablations (June 2014 and July 2014). AR 27, 616, 976-80, 981-90, 1508-09,
7 1518-19, 1631, 1846, 1919. Courts have rejected characterization of these types
8 of treatment together as conservative. See Martinez v. Berryhill, 2018 WL
9 1415163, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2018) (rejecting an ALJ’s characterization
10 of radiofrequency ablation as conservative); Arthur C. v. Saul, 2019 WL
11 5420445, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2019) (finding that treatment consisting of
12 pain medication, epidural steroid injections, medical branch blocks and
13 radiofrequency ablations not conservative and collecting similar cases); Green
14 v. Astrue, 2012 WL 6574762, at *5 (D. Az. Dec. 17, 2012) (questioning an
15 ALJ’s characterization of treatment as conservative where it included medial
16 branch blocks and steroid injections); see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015, n.20
17 (expressing doubt that “shots to the neck and lower back qualify as
18 ‘conservative’ medical treatment”). Although the ALJ noted that “the record
19 contained little evidence of additional branch block or ablation procedures”
20 during the relevant period, the Court finds that the ALJ’s characterization of
21 Plaintiff’s treatment as conservative was not a clear and convincing reason for
22 discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. AR 27.
23 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s response to treatment was “noted to be
24 ‘good’” and Plaintiff’s pain was controlled with medication. Dkt. 24 at 11. The
25 ALJ, however, did not cite improvement with treatment as a reason for finding
26 Plaintiff’s testimony not credible. The Court may consider only those reasons
27 relied upon by the ALJ, not the Commissioner’s post hoc rationalizations. See
28 Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 2009) (the
1 Court “review[s] the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and factual findings
2 offered by the ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what
3 the adjudicator may have been thinking.”). Moreover, the record reveals that
4 while Plaintiff reported some improvement after receiving steroid injections,
5 medical branch blocks, radiofrequency ablations, and prescription opioid pain
6 medication, the improvement was only temporary. AR 54-55, 616, 979, 984,
7 988, 1508, 1631, 1661. Indeed, as the ALJ noted, Plaintiff continued to undergo
8 procedures to treat low back pain even after the date last insured. AR 22, 1904
9 (bilateral medial branch radio frequency ablation), 1905 (medial branch block),
10 1909 (bilateral sacroiliac joint injection). “[A] few short-lived periods of
11 temporary improvement” do not constitute clear and convincing reasons for
12 rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. See, e.g., Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1018; Salcido v.
13 Saul, 2019 WL 2516875, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2019) (finding ALJ
14 improperly discredited plaintiff’s subjective statements because her reported
15 improvement with physical therapy, acupuncture, and trigger injections
16 provided only “temporary relief”); Strange v. Colvin, 2016 WL 226376, at *7
17 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017) (“[T]emporary relief is not a valid reason to find
18 plaintiff less than credible.”).
19 Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and limitations
20 were not consistent with the medical record. AR 27. The ALJ noted that while
21 Plaintiff testified that “he always used a cane prior to the date last insured,” 6
22 the examination records indicated that Plaintiff had “a normal or near normal
23 gait, and he was not using an assistive device.” Id. The ALJ also cited records
24 indicating that Plaintiff “occasionally used a cane for gait and transfers,”
25
26
6 Contrary to the ALJ’s recitation, Plaintiff did not testify that “he always used
27 a cane prior to the date last insured” (AR 27); rather, he testified he used a cane
“daily during that time frame,” without specifying how often each day he used a cane
28
or whether he used a cane for ambulating, standing, or only certain activities. AR 53.
1 “reported walking ‘okay,’” “had a slow, casual gait, without antalgia,” “walked
2 without an assistive device,” “had an independent, but slowed gait,” and
3 “reported he could walk up several flights of stairs.” AR 27. Although objective
4 medical evidence is a useful factor to consider in evaluating the intensity and
5 persistence of symptoms, the lack of corroborating medical evidence cannot
6 provide the sole basis for rejecting subjective symptom testimony. See Trevizo
7 v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 679 (9th Cir. 2017); see also SSR 16-3p (“We will
8 not evaluate an individual’s symptoms based solely on objective medical
9 evidence unless that objective medical evidence supports a finding that the
10 individual is disabled.”).
11 Defendant avers “the ALJ reasonably considered Plaintiff’s activity level
12 in evaluating his complaints.” Dkt. 24 at 13. But, it is not apparent that the ALJ
13 relied on Plaintiff’s daily activities as a reason for discounting his symptom
14 testimony. The Court does not consider Defendant’s post hoc rationalizations.
15 See Bray, 554 F.3d at 1225. In the decision, the ALJ simply noted that in July
16 2012, Plaintiff’s “activity level was diminished, but he was independent with his
17 activities of daily living and occasionally used a cane for gait and transfers.”
18 AR 27, 1852. Moreover, Defendant’s suggestion that Plaintiff’s occasional use
19 of a cane in July 2012 is undermined by the ALJ’s RFC assessment, as the ALJ
20 explicitly found that Plaintiff “needed to use a hand held cane for all
21 ambulation.” AR 26. Therefore, Plaintiff’s daily activities did not provide a
22 clear and convincing reason for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony.
23 Accordingly, the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s subjective symptom
24 testimony is not supported by substantial evidence.
25 B. Remand Is Appropriate.
26 The Court has the discretion to remand the matter for further
27 proceedings. See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000).
28 Where further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose or
1 || where the record has been fully developed, a court may direct an immediate
2 || award of benefits. See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004);
3 || Harman, 211 F.3d at 1179 (noting “the decision of whether to remand for
4 || further proceedings turns upon the likely utility of such proceedings”). Remand
5 || for further proceedings is appropriate when “outstanding issues must be
6 || resolved before a proper disability determination can be made” and it is not
7 ||clear from the record that the claimant is disabled. See Bunnell v. Barnhart,
8 || 336 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2003).
9 Here, there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a proper
10 || disability determination can be made. The ALJ’s failure to properly evaluate
11 || Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony leaves questions about his ability to
12 || perform work-related activities on a regular and continuing basis. As further
13 ||administrative review could remedy the ALJ’s error, a remand for further
14 ||administrative proceedings, rather than an award of benefits, is warranted
15 ||here. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 495 (remanding for an immediate award
16 || of benefits is appropriate in rare circumstances). Accordingly, the Court
17 ||remands on an “open record.” Id.; Bunnell, 336 F.3d at 1115-16. The parties
18 address the issues raised in Plaintiff's opening brief (Dkt. 17) and any
19 || other issues relevant to resolving Plaintiff's claim of disability on remand.
20 IV.
21 ORDER
22 Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), IT THEREFORE IS
23 || ORDERED that Judgment be entered reversing the decision of the
24 ||Commissioner of Social Security and remanding this matter for further
25 ||administrative proceedings consistent with this Pe
© | Dated: November 24, 2025 Lie Me □□
27 HN D. EARLY
28 United States Magistrate Judge
12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11211420. Public record. Not legal advice.