# Opinion

> District Court, M.D. Florida · November 25, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210841

## Case

- **Full name:** Vanessa Tamiche Navarro v. Pamela Bondi, in her official capacity as Attorney General, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** November 25, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210841

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that a court may limit a defendant’s right to counsel of his choice for many reasons including “the demands of its calendar,” or “fairness”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

VANESSA TAMICHE NAVARRO,

Petitioner,

v. Case No: 8:25-cv-3213-KKM-NHA

PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity
as Attorney General, et al.,

Respondents.
___________________________________
ORDER
Petitioner and noncitizen Vanessa Tamiche Navarro was scheduled to
appear for an Order of Supervision (OSUP) check-in appointment at the U.S.
Immigration and Customs (ICE) Enforcement Tampa Field Office on Friday,
November 21, 2025, at 7:00 a.m. See Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 5–11. Tamiche
Navarro’s retained counsel communicated to members of the ICE Tampa Field
Office that she had a conflict and could not attend her client’s appointment,
but ICE declined to reschedule. Id. ¶¶ 13–18. The day before her appointment,
Tamiche Navarro moved this Court for a Temporary Restraining Order
“restraining Respondents from requiring Petitioner to appear” without counsel
and requiring ICE to reschedule the OSUP appointment. Mot. for TRO (Doc.
2-1) at 1, 8.
Tamiche Navarro’s scheduled appointment time passed before the
motion was assigned to me, and so I directed her to explain whether her

request for emergency relief was moot. (Doc. 5). In response, Tamiche Navarro
filed a second motion, this time requesting a TRO “restraining Respondent
from finding Petitioner noncompliant with ICE OSUP Standards for refusing
to appear at the November 21, 2025 OSUP appointment without counsel,”

requiring ICE to reschedule the appointment, and “[o]rder[ing] that
Petitioner’s OSUP status remain unchanged pending the rescheduled
appointment.” 2d. Mot. for TRO (Doc. 6) at 8. For the following reasons, I deny
the motion.

To obtain a TRO, a movant must demonstrate “(1) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered
if the relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm
the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that the entry of the relief

would serve the public interest.” Schiavo ex. rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d
1223, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citation modified). The third and
fourth factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party,” but in all
cases the “the first two factors . . . are the most critical.” Nken v. Holder, 556

U.S. 418, 434 (2009). A TRO is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be
granted unless the movant clearly establishe[s] the burden of persuasion as to
each of the four prerequisites.” Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts, B.V. v.
Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation modified)
(citing McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998)).

On the first factor, “a petitioner must demonstrate a substantial
likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the causes of action he has asserted.”
Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1134 (11th Cir. 2005).
This means that “injunctive relief must relate in some fashion to the relief

requested in the complaint,” id., and cannot “deal[] with a matter lying wholly
outside the issues in the suit,” Kaimowitz v. Orlando, 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th
Cir. 1997) (per curiam); see Gomez v. United States, 899 F.2d 1124, 1127 (11th
Cir. 1990) (“Litigants are not entitled to greater temporary remedies pending

litigation than they would be entitled to as the ultimate prevailing party.”).
Here, Tamiche Navarro’s complaint requests injunctive relief enjoining
Respondents from requiring her to attend the scheduled appointment, ordering
Respondents to reschedule the appointment, and directing Respondents to

“[m]aintain [her] current OSUP supervision status pending the rescheduled
appointment.” Compl. at 6 (Prayer for Relief). The complaint does not
contemplate Tamiche Navarro failing to appear, nor does it seek relief related
to alleged consequences from doing so. But her second motion now asks to bar

ICE from deeming her “noncompliant” for failing to appear. 2d. Mot. for TRO
at 3. Because the complaint does not squarely request that relief, I cannot
award Tamiche Navarro a “greater temporary remed[y] . . . than [she] would
be entitled to as the ultimate prevailing party.” Gomez, 899 F.2d at 1127.

In any event, Tamiche Navarro fails to convince that she has a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits or that she faces an impending,
irreparable harm. Because she cannot satisfy the “most critical” factors
necessary for preliminary relief, I do not address the final “merge[d]” factors.

First, Tamiche Navarro does not address this Court’s jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g),1 which provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to
hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision
or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,

or execute removal orders.” Section 1252(g) is a “discretion-protecting
provision” designed to prevent the “deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence
prolongation of removal proceedings.” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 487 (1999). “When ‘asking if a claim is barred by

§ 1252(g), courts must focus on the action being challenged.’ ” Camarena v.

1 She also does not discuss 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which precludes review of “any
other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland
Security the authority for which is specified . . . to be in the discretion of the Attorney
General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” The Attorney General has discretion
to revoke an OSUP. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2) (“The Executive Associate
Commissioner shall have authority, in the exercise of discretion, to revoke release
and return to Service custody an alien previously approved for release under the
procedures in this section.”); but see Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 154
(W.D.N.Y. 2025) (“[W]hile courts cannot question the discretion that is exercised [to
revoke an OSUP], they can address the process used to exercise that discretion.”).
Dir., Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 988 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 964 F.3d

1250, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2020)). In the present context, courts differentiate
“between the decision to revoke an OSUP and a failure to follow procedures”
in doing so. See, e.g., Barrios v. Ripa, No. 1:25-CV-22644, 2025 WL 2280485, at
*5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025); see also Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR,

2025 WL 1895479, at *3–5 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025) (holding that § 1252(g) did
not strip the Court of jurisdiction to evaluate whether the government
complied with OSUP revocation procedures).
Here, Tamiche Navarro seeks prospective relief barring ICE from finding

her noncompliant with the OSUP and from adjusting her OSUP status. She
also seeks an order obligating ICE to reschedule her check-in appointment. In
my view, this three-headed request “runs headlong into § 1252(g).” Camarena,
988 F.3d at 1273. Although it appears speculative whether ICE intends to alter

or revoke Tamiche Navarro’s OSUP based on her failure to appear, whether to
do so amounts to a “decision . . . by the Attorney General to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g);
see Barrios, 2025 WL 2280485, at *4 (finding “that § 1252(g) deprives [the

Court] of subject-matter jurisdiction over Respondents’ decision to revoke the
OSUP”); see also Espinoza-Sorto v. Agudelo, No. 1:25-CV-23201-GAYLES,
2025 WL 3012786, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2025) (“ICE’s decision to revoke
Petitioner’s OSUP, a necessary step to execute his removal order, . . . clearly

fall[s] under the purview of § 1252(g).”); see also Gupta v. McGahey, 709 F.3d
1062, 1065 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (finding that “[s]ecuring an alien while
awaiting a removal determination constitutes an action taken to commence
proceedings”). This Court likely lacks jurisdiction to grant the specific relief

requested here.
Second, and to the extent that Tamiche Navarro’s request avoids
§ 1252(g) as a “substantive review of the underlying legal bases for [the
government’s] discretionary decisions and actions,” Madu v. U.S. Atty. Gen.,

470 F.3d 1362, 1368 (11th Cir. 2006), her claim is doubtful on the merits.
Tamiche Navarro argues that ICE violated due process and her rights to
counsel under 8 U.S.C. § 1362 and 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) by refusing to reschedule
her OSUP check-in appointment. See 2d. Mot. for TRO at 5–6. Section 1362

provides aliens the “privilege of being represented (at no expense to the
Government)” by counsel “[i]n any removal proceedings before an immigration
judge.” And DHS regulations likewise provide aliens “the right to be
represented by an attorney” “[w]henever an examination is provided for” in

Title 8, Chapter I of the Code of Federal Regulations.2 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b).

2 Tamiche Navarro claims that “DHS regulations specify that counsel may appear at
any interview unless expressly excluded” and that “OSUP check-ins are not excluded
Indeed, although aliens are entitled to due process of law in deportation
hearings under the Fifth Amendment, the Eleventh Circuit has long held that

“ ‘an alien must show substantial prejudice’ to prevail ‘on a due process
challenge to a deportation proceeding.’ ” Priva v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 34 F.4th 946,
954 (11th Cir. 2022).
But assuming that Tamiche Navarro’s OSUP check-in qualifies as either

a “removal proceeding[]” or “examination” under the above standards,3 she
inadequately alleges either a constructive denial of her rights or resulting
“substantial prejudice.” Instead, ICE’s refusal to reschedule is analogous to the
denial of a continuance. Even in the criminal context, though, “a denial of a

continuance request will not always amount to a Sixth Amendment violation
of a paying defendant’s choice of counsel.” United States v. Coleman, 256 F.
App’x 263, 265 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); see Freza v. Att’y Gen. United
States, 49 F.4th 293, 299 (3d Cir. 2022) (reviewing for abuse of discretion “[t]he

question of whether the denial of a continuance constitutes a violation of [an
alien’s] due process and statutory right to counsel” under 8 U.S.C. § 1362); cf.

under the regulation.” 2d. Mot. for TRO at 5; see also Ex. B (Doc. 6) at 20 (arguing
that an alien “may be accompanied by counsel ‘in any interview’ before DHS unless
specifically exempted”). 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) does not use the specific “interview”
language Tamiche Navarro attributes to it, nor does it speak to (non) exemptions.

3 Although I need not decide this question to determine that Tamiche Navarro is not
entitled to emergency relief, I observe that she provides no authority extending either
provision to the OSUP check-in appointment context.
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006) (recognizing that a
court may limit a defendant’s right to counsel of his choice for many reasons

including “the demands of its calendar,” or “fairness”).
On the facts presented here, ICE’s decision appears to be a reasonable
effort to manage its supervisory responsibilities. In July 2025, based on
Tamiche Navarro’s “pending Application to Register Permanent Residence or

Adjust Status (Form I-485),” ICE scheduled her appointment for November. 2d
Mot. for TRO ¶¶ 12, 14; see 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(a)(1) (OSUP may “require[] that
the alien report to a specified officer periodically and provide relevant
information under oath as directed”). Counsel, based in South Florida, did not

ask ICE to reschedule until November 10, less than two weeks before the in-
person appointment in Tampa. 2d Mot. for TRO ¶ 17. ICE declined because
they “see a lot of aliens every day and are not in the position to constantly move
appointment dates.” Ex. B. (Doc. 6) at 20. Even so, Tamiche Navarro could still

consult with her attorney beforehand and appear with another representative.
ICE expressly gave her the latter option. See Ex. A. (Doc. 6) at 12 (“Please note
that ICE’s inability to reschedule the appointment . . . does not negate your
client’s right to legal representation”); see also Ex. B. (Doc. 6) at 20 (“You are

more than welcome to send another attorney or representative in her place”).
ICE’s decision not to reschedule at the last minute did not constitute an abuse
of discretion or prejudicial violation of Tamiche Navarro’s rights.
Finally—and fatally to the TRO request—Tamiche Navarro does not
show “that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted.”

Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1225. Although she can seek injunctive relief to prevent
future injury, Tamiche Navarro must still “establish standing by
demonstrating that, if unchecked by the litigation, the defendant’s allegedly
wrongful behavior will likely occur or continue, and that the threatened injury

is certainly impending.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000) (citation modified); see also Elend v.
Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1207 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The binding precedent in this
circuit is clear that for an injury to suffice for prospective relief, it must be

imminent.”). Thus, “possible future injury” will not suffice for standing.
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
Tamiche Navarro alleges, at most, a speculative risk of “possible future
injury.” Her complaint and operative motion discuss the risk of appearing at

her check-in without counsel, but those risks are moot and cannot support
standing. See 2d. Mot. for TRO at 6–7. Looking forward, Tamiche Navarro
claims that because she did not appear, she “faces being held outside of ICE
OSUP Compliance unless this Court intervenes and restrains Respondents

from holding Ms. Tamiche Navarro noncompliant.” Id. at 3. Tamiche Navarro
fails to explain what specific harms attach to OSUP noncompliance. And she
does not allege that ICE will penalize her for noncompliance, let alone that it
will do so imminently. Nor did ICE promise as much. In declining counsel’s

demand to reschedule, ICE Officer Angel Gonzalez wrote that Tamiche
Navarro’s failure to attend “could result in significant consequences.” Ex. A
(Doc. 6) at 12–13. That language accords with the fact that the Attorney
General’s decision to revoke an OSUP is discretionary, not mandatory. See 8

C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2). And even then, “the alien will be notified of the reasons for
revocation of his or her release” and “will be afforded an initial informal
interview promptly . . . to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the
reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” Id. § 241.4(l)(1). Ultimately,

absent verified allegations or evidence that Tamiche Navarro faces “certainly
impending” harm, emergency relief is not warranted, and Tamiche Navarro’s
complaint must be dismissed for lack of standing.
Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:

1. Tamiche Navarro’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without
prejudice. She may file an amended complaint no later than
December 9, 2025.
2. Tamiche Navarro’s Second Motion for a Temporary Restraining

Order (Doc. 6) is DENIED.
3. Tamiche Navarro’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
(Doc. 2) is DENIED as moot.
4. Tamiche Navarro is directed to serve the Complaint and a copy of
this Order on Respondents by December 2, 2025.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on November 25, 2025.

pate Kinki Mizelle
United States District Judge

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210841. Public record. Not legal advice.