# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. New York · November 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210656

## Case

- **Full name:** Amazon.com Services LLC v. New York State Public Employment Relations Board et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** November 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210656

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming dismissal of request for injunction where a state court had already granted plaintiffs “all of the injunctive relief requested in the present case” (emphasis added)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------

AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
25-CV-5311(EK)(MMH)
-against-

NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS BOARD et al.,

Defendants,

-and-

AMAZON LABOR UNION NO. 1
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS,

Defendant-Intervenor.

-----------------------------------

ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
In September 2025, New York amended its State
Employment Relations Act. See S. 8034-A, 2025-2026 Legis.
Session (N.Y. 2025) (enacted). The amendment extended the state
law’s coverage to entities like the plaintiff — Amazon.com
Services LLC — whose labor relations had previously been subject
only to federal oversight. Amazon filed suit, arguing that the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., preempts
the state’s newly conferred oversight powers.
Amazon now seeks to enjoin any enforcement of the
amendment. For the following reasons, the motion for a
preliminary injunction is granted.

I. Background
The Court draws the following facts from the complaint
and the parties’ declarations and exhibits. See Real Est. Bd.
of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 786 F. Supp. 3d 788, 815
(S.D.N.Y. 2025) (“In deciding a motion for preliminary
injunction, a court may consider the entire record . . . .”).1
All facts discussed herein are undisputed unless otherwise
noted. See Charette v. Town of Oyster Bay, 159 F.3d 749, 755
(2d Cir. 1998) (party seeking preliminary injunction “is not
entitled to have the court accept its untested representations
as true if they are disputed”).
A. The NLRA and SERA
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) is “a

comprehensive code passed by Congress to regulate labor
relations in activities affecting interstate and foreign
commerce.” Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235, 238
(1967). Specifically, the NLRA guarantees employees the right
to self-organize, collectively bargain, engage in concerted
activities, and refrain from all such activities. 29 U.S.C.

1 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order
accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal
quotation marks.
§ 157. The NLRA also prohibits both employers and labor
organizations from engaging in unfair labor practices. Id.
§ 158. The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) has
exclusive jurisdiction to administer the NLRA. See Wis. Dep’t
of Indus., Lab. & Hum. Rels. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 291

(1986) (NLRA enforcement is “a role Congress reserved
exclusively for the [NLRB].”).
Historically, the New York State Employment Relations
Act (“SERA”) provided similar protections to laborers who were
not covered by the NLRA — such as, agricultural workers and non-
employee contractors. Compl. ¶ 26, ECF No. 1. And the State
Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”) served as a state
analogue to the NLRB. Id. ¶ 27. But SERA “expressly excluded
from [the] PERB’s jurisdiction employees covered by the NLRA.”
Id. ¶ 26; N.Y. Lab. Law § 715 (McKinney 1968) (“The provisions

of this article shall not apply to: (1) employees . . .
protected by the provisions of the [NLRA] . . . .”).
B. The SERA Amendment
On September 5, 2025, New York enacted the SERA
Amendment, which eliminated SERA’s exception for “employees
. . . protected by the provisions of the [NLRA].” Compl. ¶ 28;
S. 8034-A (N.Y. 2025), ECF No. 1-1.2 Instead, SERA now

2 Page numbers in citations to record documents other than briefs refer
to ECF pagination.
presumptively applies to NLRA-covered employees. The only
exception it allows is for cases in which the NLRB “successfully
asserts jurisdiction over any employer, employees, trades, or

industries pursuant to an order by the federal district court.”
Id. Upon signing the bill into law, Governor Hochul explained
that — in her view — “the Trump administration has failed to
prioritize a strong [NLRB]”; PERB Chair Connick (a defendant
here) added that the “PERB stands ready to fill the void.” Id.
¶ 28 n.2 (citing Press Release, Office of the Governor (Sep. 6,
2025).3
As a result of the SERA Amendment, parallel provisions
of SERA and the NLRA now apply to many of the same employees.
See id. ¶ 32 (comparing SERA and NLRA definitions of “an unfair
labor practice”). Amazon also contends, though the state
disputes, that SERA and the NLRA “diverge[] in critical

respects,” meaning certain employers are subject to conflicting
requirements. Compare id. ¶¶ 37-42 (describing differences in
the two statutes), with Defs.’ PI Opp’n 20-22, ECF No. 30
(citing PERB case law interpreting SERA “consistently with the
NLRA”).

3 Available at https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-signs-
legislation-strengthen-and-expand-worker-and-labor-protections (last accessed
November 25, 2025).
C. The JFK8 Charge
On September 15, the Amazon Labor Union No. 1
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“ALU”) filed a charge
with the PERB alleging unfair labor practices at Amazon’s JFK8

fulfillment center on Staten Island (the “JFK8 Charge”). ECF
No. 1-2. Specifically, the ALU alleges that its vice president,
Brima Sylla, was pretextually disciplined for “low productivity”
and ultimately fired, all in retaliation for his union
activities. Id. at 8-9. The PERB served the JFK8 Charge on
Amazon on September 17 and issued a notice of conference for
October 13. La Rocca Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 14-2; Notice of
Conference, ECF No. 1-3. At the time the ALU filed the JFK8
Charge, substantially similar charges were already pending
before the NLRB. Compl. ¶¶ 48-49.
D. The Instant Action
Following receipt of the JFK8 Charge, Amazon filed

this action. The company alleges that the SERA Amendment is
(1) facially unconstitutional because it is preempted by the
NLRA as determined in the Supreme Court’s decisions in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) and Lodge
76, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S.
132 (1976); (2) unconstitutional as applied to Amazon under
Garmon; and (3) facially unconstitutional because it violates
the Due Process Clause’s fair-notice requirement. Compl. ¶¶ 55-
82.
On September 23, Amazon filed a motion for a temporary

restraining order (“TRO”) and eventual preliminary injunction,
which would enjoin Defendants from enforcing SERA against
employers or employees covered by the NLRA.4 ECF No. 14. The
Honorable Orelia E. Merchant, acting as the Miscellaneous Duty
Judge, denied Amazon’s motion for a TRO the same day.5 ECF No.
17. However, in a parallel action pending in Albany, New York,
the Honorable Glenn T. Suddaby granted an administrative stay of
any matters brought before the PERB that may implicate the
NLRB’s jurisdiction, pending resolution of a motion for a
preliminary injunction in that case. Order, NLRB v. State of
New York, No. 25-CV-1283 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 26, 2025), Dkt. No. 16.
The ALU then moved to intervene, ECF No. 26, and the
Court granted that motion. See Order Granting ALU’s Motion to

Intervene, Docket Order dated Oct. 22, 2025.
II. Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must
establish (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a

4 Amazon’s proposed order, ECF No. 14, also requests that the Court
“declar[e]” the SERA Amendment unconstitutional. But Amazon has since made
clear that it is not seeking “a preliminary declaratory judgment.” Amazon’s
Suppl. Letter-Br. 6, ECF No. 47.
5 Judge Merchant concluded that Amazon had not met the “stringent”
requirements for an ex parte TRO. ECF No. 17, at 2.
likelihood of irreparable harm absent relief; (3) that the
balance of equities supports an injunction; and (4) that the
public interest favors an injunction. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). When the government is a
party to a lawsuit, the final two factors merge. New York v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 969 F.3d 42, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2020).

A. Amazon Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits of its
Preemption Claim
The Supremacy Clause establishes that federal law is
the “supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S.
Const. art. VI, cl. 2. “This means that when federal and state
law conflict, federal law prevails and state law is preempted.”
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 584 U.S. 453, 471
(2018). Here, Amazon has established that the SERA Amendment is
likely preempted by the NLRA, as determined in Garmon and its
progeny.
In Garmon, the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen an
activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the
States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive
competence of the [NLRB].” 359 U.S. at 245. This rule
“prevents States not only from setting forth standards of

conduct inconsistent with the substantive requirements of the
NLRA, but also from providing their own regulatory or judicial
remedies for conduct prohibited or arguably prohibited by the
Act.” Gould, 475 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added).
In Garmon, Justice Frankfurter justified the broad

preemption in this arena:
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the
activities which a State purports to regulate are
protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,
or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due
regard for the federal enactment requires that state
jurisdiction must yield. To leave the States free to
regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of
federal regulation involves too great a danger of
conflict between power asserted by Congress and
requirements imposed by state law.

Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
Here, no party disputes that SERA, as amended, covers
activity that is also subject to Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA.
Instead, the state argues that “historically unique
circumstances justify exceptions to Garmon preemption here.”
Defs.’ PI Opp’n 11. It points to two circumstances in
particular: the current lack of a quorum at the NLRB and the
perceived threat to the board members’ for-cause removal
protection.
The obvious problem is that the Supreme Court’s clear
pronouncements include no “unique circumstances” exception. And
lower courts “cannot and will not invent an exception to Supreme
Court doctrine.” U.S. ex rel. Best v. Barbarotta, No. 12-CV-
6218, 2013 WL 308972, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2013).6 Moreover,
even if we could, the “circumstances” the state points to here
have not (yet) come to fruition.
First, the reasoning of Garmon itself precludes

reliance on the NLRB’s loss of a quorum. That case highlighted
the need for exclusive federal procedures as well as the
exclusive application of federal substantive law. The Court
invoked Congress’s creation of “a centralized administrative
agency” — the NLRB — “armed with its own procedures,” 359 U.S.
at 242; see also id. at 242-43 (“Congress evidently considered
that centralized administration of specially designed procedures
was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive
rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to
result from a variety of local procedures . . . .”).
The quorum requirement is precisely one such

procedure. And when Congress mandated a quorum, it obviously
envisioned the possibility that the NLRB might lack one from
time to time, thus inhibiting action.7 In this instance,

6 Two Justices have expressed some interest in curtailing Garmon’s
reach. See Glacier Nw., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Loc. Union No. 174,
598 U.S. 771, 785 (2023) (Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
Still, district courts are bound to follow Garmon “[u]ntil and unless the
Supreme Court itself overrules or limits” it. Perez v. Greiner, 296 F.3d
123, 125 n.4 (2d Cir. 2002).
7 At a more general level, Garmon makes clear that even the NLRB’s
explicit refusal to act — with or without a quorum — is not a basis for the
state to exercise power. In Garmon itself, the NLRB “had declined to
exercise its jurisdiction,” and yet the state courts of California were still
precluded from acting. 359 U.S. at 238. This observation may be complicated
moreover, the state has provided no basis to conclude that the
lack of a quorum will endure indefinitely. See, e.g., Daniel
Wiessner, US Senate Panel Approves Two Trump NLRB Nominees,
Tables a Third,” Reuters (Oct. 9, 2025).8
Second, while the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415 (2025), may indicate that for-

cause removal protections’ days are numbered, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly cautioned that lower courts should respect its
“prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Mallory v.
Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122, 136 (2023).9
The state and the ALU make two further arguments that
merit only passing discussion. First, the state contends that
Amazon should be judicially estopped from relying on Garmon
because Amazon previously won an administrative stay of certain
NLRB proceedings in the Fifth Circuit on a finding that the

agency’s exercise of jurisdiction was likely unconstitutional.

— slightly — by a later amendment to the NLRA: in 1959, Congress amended the
statute to permit states to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes when the
NLRB “by rule of decision or by published rules” declines jurisdiction
because “the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently
substantial.” 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1959). There has been no such
declination here, notwithstanding the State’s argument to the contrary.
Defs.’ Suppl. Letter-Br. 2-3. In point of fact, the NLRB has affirmatively
sought to protect its jurisdiction from the PERB. See generally NLRB v.
State of New York, No. 25-CV-1283 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 26, 2025) (challenging the
SERA Amendment).
8 Available at https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-senate-panel-
approves-two-trump-nlrb-nominees-tables-third-2025-10-09 (last accessed Nov.
25, 2025).
9 The Fifth Circuit’s issuance of a preliminary injunction finding that
removal protections for NLRB members and ALJs are likely unconstitutional,
see Defs.’ PI Opp’n 15, is even less predictive, and certainly has not “ended
the uniform administration of the NLRA.” Id.
See Defs.’ PI Opp’n 17-19. But judicial estoppel only applies
when, among other things, there exists “a true inconsistency
between the statements in the two proceedings.” Simon v.
Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1997). In the

prior action, Amazon argued that NLRB members are
unconstitutionally insulated from removal. See Ex. E – W.D.
Tex. / 5th Cir. Filings and Orders 30, ECF No. 30-6. Here,
Amazon argues that the SERA Amendment is preempted by the NLRA.
The two positions are not in direct contradiction.
Second, the ALU asserts that “permitting Garmon
preemption when the [NLRB] cannot meaningfully regulate runs
afoul of modern-day 10th Amendment doctrine under Murphy v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n.” Proposed Br. of Proposed
Intervenor ALU in Opp’n to Prelim. Inj. 2 (“ALU PI Opp’n”), ECF
No. 31-1. Murphy is inapposite. The law at issue in that case

could not be understood “as anything other than a direct command
to the States,” meaning it was not a valid form of preemption.
584 U.S. at 479-80. No such command exists here.
Because the Court finds that Amazon is likely to
succeed on its claim that the SERA Amendment is preempted under
Garmon, we need not reach Amazon’s Machinists and void-for-
vagueness arguments. See Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort
Berthold Rsrv. v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984)
(“It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint . . . that this
Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the
necessity of deciding them.”).10
B. Amazon Is Likely to Suffer Irreparable Harm
“A showing of irreparable harm is the single most

important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.” Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559
F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2009). Irreparable harm is “a continuing
harm which cannot be adequately redressed by final relief on the
merits and for which money damages cannot provide adequate
compensation.” Kamerling v. Massanari, 295 F.3d 206, 214 (2d
Cir. 2002) (per curiam). “The standard for preliminary
injunctive relief requires a threat of irreparable harm, not
that irreparable harm already have occurred,” see Mullins v.
City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 2010) — although such
threat must be “actual and imminent,” not “remote” or
“speculative.” Wabtec, 559 F.3d at 118.

Amazon has established that it is likely to suffer
irreparable harm absent injunctive relief enjoining Defendants’
enforcement of the SERA Amendment. “In the Second Circuit, it
is well-settled that an alleged constitutional violation
constitutes irreparable harm.” Gallagher v. N.Y. State Bd. of

10 The Court also need not “separately address [Amazon’s] as-applied
claim[]” because the parties seem to agree, at least implicitly, that it is
“better read as [a] facial objection[.]” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,
573 U.S. 149, 155 n.3 (2014); see Defs.’ PI Opp’n (declining to specifically
address Amazon’s as-applied challenge).
Elections, 477 F. Supp. 3d 19, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (collecting
cases). And it is undisputed that Amazon is subject to the
allegedly unconstitutional law at issue here, even if
enforcement is currently stayed. Moreover, were proceedings

related to the JFK8 claims to advance in parallel before the
PERB and the NLRB, Amazon could be exposed to “the specter of
inconsistent rulings.” Pl.’s PI Br. 8, ECF No. 14-1. “Courts
in the Second Circuit have routinely found,” albeit in slightly
different contexts, that “the risk of inconsistent judgments
. . . constitutes irreparable harm.” Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Q
Pharmacy RX, Inc., No. 23-CV-9085, 2024 WL 3823491, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2024) (collecting cases).
The state responds that “in the earlier-filed NLRB v.
State of New York et al., No. 25 Civ. 01283 (N.D.N.Y.), [the]
PERB . . . agreed to hold in abeyance any matters . . . that may

implicate the NLRB’s jurisdiction until a decision is
rendered . . . on the NLRB’s preliminary injunction motion.”
Defs.’ PI Opp’n 24. Because this administrative stay
“effectively grants Amazon’s requested relief until at least
December 2025,” id., the state argues that Amazon is not facing
imminent harm. In other words, the state effectively claims
that Amazon’s motion is moot.
But a temporary stay pending decision on a motion for
a preliminary injunction is not interchangeable with the relief
sought here, i.e., a preliminary injunction. Cf. People v.
Seneci, 817 F.2d 1015, 1017 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal
of request for injunction where a state court had already
granted plaintiffs “all of the injunctive relief requested in

the present case” (emphasis added)). Moreover, the state’s
attempt to avoid a preliminary injunction based on a stay it
voluntarily stipulated to also calls to mind the principle that
“voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not make
a case moot.” E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Invista B.V., 473
F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2006). As Amazon notes, “courts routinely
reject such attempts to toggle enforcement on and off.” Pl.’s
Reply Br. 10, ECF No. 37 (citing Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Duffy,
784 F. Supp. 3d 624, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)). Accordingly, Amazon
has sufficiently established a likelihood of irreparable harm.
C. The Balance of the Equities Weighs in Amazon’s Favor
When the government is a party, the balance-of-
equities and public-interest factors merge. New York, 969 F.3d

at 58-59. Defendants assert two interests that weigh against
granting a preliminary injunction: (1) it “would deprive New
Yorkers of any forum to assert their collective bargaining
rights during the pendency of this entire lawsuit”; and
(2) Defendants have sought discovery about the “extent of [the
NLRB’s] functioning.” Defs.’ PI Opp’n 24-25.11 But these
asserted interests merely rehash the state’s merits arguments,
which the Court rejected above. See Section II.A, supra.

Furthermore, while “the [s]tate has an interest in
administering its laws without interference by federal equitable
power, that interest is diminished when the laws at issue likely
impinge a federal constitutional right. . . . [And] the public
interest is well served by the correction of this constitutional
harm.” A.H. by & through Hester v. French, 985 F.3d 165, 184
(2d Cir. 2021). The balance of the equities therefore favors
relief.
D. No Bond Is Required
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a court may
issue a preliminary injunction “only if the movant gives
security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the
costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been

wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
While Rule 65(c)’s bond requirement appears mandatory on its
face, the Second Circuit has held that district courts have
“wide discretion to set the amount of a bond, and even to
dispense with the bond requirement,” such as “where there has

11 Defendants also argue that “Amazon’s inequitable litigation conduct
establishing judicial estoppel . . . tips the balance of the equities against
Amazon.” Defs.’ PI Opp’n 25. But the Court rejected Defendants’ judicial
estoppel argument in Section II.A, supra.
been no proof of likelihood of harm.” Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v.
Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 136 (2d Cir. 1997).
Here, the state does not allege that Defendants — the

only parties who would be enjoined or restrained — would suffer
financial harm from a wrongful injunction.12 Indeed, the state
has not requested that Amazon post bond. Accordingly, no bond
will be imposed at this time. See Vans, Inc. v. MSCHF Prod.
Studio, Inc., 88 F.4th 125, 143 (2d Cir. 2023) (“[W]here the
party opposing an injunction does not request security, the
district court does not err in failing to order it.”).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Amazon’s request for
preliminary injunctive relief is granted. Defendants are hereby
enjoined from enforcing the SERA Amendment.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee
ERIC KOMITEE
United State

s District Judge

D ated: November 26, 2025
Brooklyn, New Yor

k

12 While Defendant-Intervenor ALU argues that it would be collaterally
harmed by an injunction, ALU’s PI Opp’n 25, it does not contend that it would
be subject to the injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) (referring to harm
to “any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained” (emphasis
added)).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210656. Public record. Not legal advice.