# Thundathil

> District Court, M.D. Florida · October 21, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210496

## Case

- **Full name:** Christina D. Thundathil v. United States of America, Bay Care Health Care d/b/a Winter Haven Hospital, City of Winter Haven, Police of Winter Haven, Polk County Board of County Commissioners, and Polk County Sheriff Grady Judd
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** October 21, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210496

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that Bivens is “solely concerned with deterring the unconstitutional acts of individual officers”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

CHRISTINA D. THUNDATHIL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-1564-MSS-SPF

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
BAY CARE HEALTH CARE D/B/A
WINTER HAVEN HOSPITAL,
CITY OF WINTER HAVEN,
POLICE OF WINTER HAVEN,
POLK COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, and
POLK COUNTY SHERIFF GRADY JUDD,

Defendants.
________ /

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) and Application to Proceed in
District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form), construed by the Court as a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2). Upon due consideration, the undersigned
recommends that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed without prejudice, and her motion be
denied without prejudice.
I. Background
Plaintiff attempts to sue Defendants United States of America (“United States”), Bay
Care Health Care d/b/a Winter Haven Hospital1 (“BayCare”), City of Winter Haven
(“Winter Haven”), Police of Winter Haven (“Winter Haven Police”), Polk County Board of

1 It appears that Plaintiff is referencing BayCare Healthcare System, a private health system operating
in Central Florida, but it is not entirely clear. See BAYCARE, https://baycare.org/ (last visited Oct. 17,
2025).
County Commissioners (“Polk County Commissioners”), and Polk County Sheriff Grady
Judd (“Sheriff Judd”) for purportedly inferior medical treatment and ostensibly illegal
interactions with Winter Haven Police beginning in 2023, including around the time of
Plaintiff’s suicide attempt in 2024. (Doc. 1).2
Plaintiff seeks damages for alleged violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; the
Veterans Affairs (“VA”) Claims Confidentiality Statute, 38 U.S.C. §§ 5701, 7332; the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d, et seq.; the
judicial recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455; several criminal statutes including 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519,
1001, 242; the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b),
2671-80; the statute that permits remedies for conspiracies to interfere with civil rights, 42
U.S.C. § 1985; Title VII of the Voting Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., the Rehabilitation Act
42 U.S.C. § 504; Florida’s Baker Act, Fla. Stat. § 394.4633; Florida’s Health Information

Privacy Law, Fla. Stat. § 456.057; and Florida’s patient’s rights statute, Fla. Stat. § 394.459.4
(Doc. 1).

2 Plaintiff has filed at least two other cases in this District against the United States, the VA, and the
VA Secretary for ADA violations in one instance and the President and VA Secretary for civil rights
violations in the other. Thundathil v. United States of Am, et al., No. 8:24-cv-399, at (Doc. 1) (M.D. Fla.
Feb. 13, 2024); Thundathil v. Trump, et al., No. 6:18-cv-2231, at (Doc. 1) (M.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2018). It
is unclear how much overlap exists between the instant case and the prior ones because the complaints
were deficient in those matters as well. See Thundathil, No. 8:24-cv-399, at (Docs. 5, 6); Thundathil,
No. 6:18-cv-2231, at (Doc. 5).
3 The Florida Mental Health Act, often referred to as the Baker Act, sets forth the procedures for the
involuntary commitment and examination of those afflicted with a mental illness. See Anderson v.
Snyder, 389 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1086 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (citing Fla. Stat. § 394.463(1)). For simplicity,
the Court refers to this statute as the Baker Act.
4 The Complaint also cites Fla. Stat. § 456.45, but the Court was unable to locate any such statute.
Florida’s Mental Competency database (MECOM) is also claimed to have been violated, but it is
unclear at this juncture precisely what that means to Plaintiff.
II. In Forma Pauperis
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court may, upon a finding of indigency, authorize the
commencement of an action without requiring the prepayment of fees or security therefor. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). When an application to proceed in forma pauperis is filed, the court must

review the case and dismiss it sua sponte if the court determines the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). The phrase
“fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” has the same meaning as the nearly
identical phrase in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d
1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The language of section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we will apply Rule 12(b)(6) standards in
reviewing dismissals under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).”); Azar v. Nat'l City Bank, 382 F. App’x
880, 884 (11th Cir. 2010).

The pleadings of a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted
by an attorney and must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972);
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). But a court does not have
“license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain
an action.” GJR Investments v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998),
overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Where a district court
determines from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are baseless or the legal
theories are without merit, the court may conclude a case has little or no chance of success
and dismiss the complaint before service of process. Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th

Cir. 1993).
When considering whether a litigant is indigent under section 1915, the only
determination to be made by the district court is whether the statements in the affidavit satisfy
the requirement of poverty. Martinez v. Krisi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir.
2004). In making this determination, the district court must compare the litigant’s assets and

liabilities. Thomas v. Chattahoochee Jud. Cir., 574 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014). “[C]ourts
will generally look to whether the person is employed, the person’s annual salary, and any
other property or assets the person may possess.” Schneller v. Prospect Park Nursing & Rehab.
Ctr., 2006 WL 1030284, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2006) (citation omitted). Courts may also
consider the income of a party’s spouse and joint assets when determining a party’s motion
to proceed in forma pauperis. See, e.g., Jones v. St. Vincents Health Sys., 2007 WL 1789242, at *1
(M.D. Fla. June 19, 2007) (denying the plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis because
the plaintiff’s total monthly household income, which was derived primarily from the
spouse’s income, exceeded joint monthly expenses).

A litigant need not show he or she is “absolutely destitute” to qualify for indigent
status. Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307. Rather, an application needs only to show that the litigant,
because of poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs while providing necessities
for the litigant and any dependents. Id. “In other words, the statute is not to be construed
such that potential litigants are forced to become public charges or abandon their claims
because of the filing fee requirements.” Id.
In the affidavit in support of her application, Plaintiff attests to a total monthly income
of approximately $4500, comprised of disability benefits. (Doc. 2 at 2). Plaintiff reports that
Nissan owes her $197 and DVA Travel owes her over $500. (Id. at 3). Regarding Plaintiff’s

monthly liabilities, Plaintiff attests to monthly expenses totaling $3626.27. (Id. at 4-5). While
Plaintiff is likely not entitled to in forma pauperis status, the Court proceeds with its analysis of
the Complaint pursuant to section 1915 because it is due to be dismissed.
II. Pleading Deficiencies
The Complaint constitutes an impermissible shotgun pleading. Complaints that

violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or 10(b) “are often disparagingly referred to as
‘shotgun pleadings.’” See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th
Cir. 2015). Rule 8 requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading
standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Rule 10 further
provides that “[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited
as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

The Eleventh Circuit has recognized four basic types of shotgun pleadings: (1) a
complaint that contains multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all
preceding counts; (2) a complaint that is replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts
not obviously connected to any particular cause of action; (3) a complaint that fails to separate
into different counts each cause of action or claim for relief; and (4) a complaint that asserts
multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are
responsible for which acts or omissions or which of the defendants the claim is brought
against. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-23. “The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun
pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the
defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each
claim rests.” Id. at 1323.
The Complaint embodies these deficiencies. The fifty-four-page pleading is primarily
a stream of consciousness narration of Plaintiff’s grievances against Defendants and other

unnamed parties. (Doc. 1). While the first couple of pages describe the parties and the basis
of the Court’s jurisdiction and venue, the next fifty-two pages are a rambling account of
Plaintiff’s experiences with Defendants and other third parties, her opinions of Defendants
and certain other groups of people, portions of her medical records and summaries of
Plaintiff’s health struggles, and copy-and-pasted text from federal and state statutes,
constitutional provisions, and cases. (Id.).
The Complaint also does not separate into different counts each cause of action or
claim for relief. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. For example, while it appears that there is at
least an attempt to organize the claims with headings, it does little to help. (Doc. 1). Many

of the bolded and underlined headings refer to multiple statutes at once, like “HIPAA
Violation of 42 U.S.C. 1320d Basis for Medical Malpractice Conspiracy,” but the following
paragraphs discuss other laws and facts that lack sufficient context to determine which laws
and facts are relevant. (Id. at 3). In another example, a heading seems to indicate that the
following section concerns religious discrimination, but what follows are claims that certain
of the Defendants apparently forced their religion on Plaintiff and several pages about alleged
wrongdoing related to her medical records. (Id. at 25-30). There does not appear to otherwise
be an attempt to organize the pleading much less number the paragraphs.
Finally, the pleading asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants without
specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions or which of
the defendants the claim is brought against. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. For instance, there
is a claim for medical malpractice, but it is entirely unclear whether this claim is brought
against all Defendants or just BayCare and, if it is meant to target all Defendants, how the
other Defendants were responsible.

At base, the Complaint does not plead the alleged facts or causes of action in separately
numbered paragraphs and instead scatters the claims and allegations throughout the pleading.
Consequently, the Complaint does not constitute the type of “short and plain statement”
required and leaves the reader “guess[ing] at precisely what [she is] claiming.” Holbrook v.
Castle Key Ins. Co., 405 F. App’x 459, 460 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting Byrne v.
Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1128 (11th Cir. 2001)). Such deficiencies fail to give Defendants
adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.
Yeyille v. Miami Dade Cty. Pub. Sch., 643 F. App’x 882, 884 (11th Cir. 2016).
That Plaintiff is proceeding pro se does not excuse her failure to comply with the basic

pleading requirements set forth in Rules 8 and 10. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113
(1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be
interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”); Waldman v.
Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curium) (noting that, while “[a] pro se
pleading is held to a less stringent standard than a pleading drafted by an attorney[, it] must
still suggest that there is at least some factual support for a claim”) (citation omitted).
III. Failure to State a Claim
Notwithstanding the above deficiencies, the Complaint fails to state a claim under
many of the statutes cited and sues Defendants who are either immune or cannot be found

liable. First, the majority of the statutes do not appear to provide a private right of action.
The VA Claims Confidentiality Statute, 38 U.S.C. § 5701, requires VA benefits records to
remain confidential and privileged and should not be disclosed absent a specific exception.
Though section 7332 provides that “a failure to comply with the confidentiality provisions of
this statute or any regulation issued pursuant to that statute is subject to criminal sanctions[.]”
Morris v. Nicholson, 2007 WL 2905346, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2007) (citing 38 U.S.C. §

7332(g)). The threshold matter, however, is that neither section 5710 nor section 7332 creates
a private right of action for damages. See id (finding that “[n]othing in section 5710 or section
7332 suggests a congressional purpose of providing a private individual with a remedy in the
form of an action for damages”) (citation omitted); Tilley v. Weiser, 2006 WL 1084270, at *3
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2006) (holding that section 1507 does not establish a cause of action for
the wrongful release of medical records).
The same is true for Plaintiff’s HIPAA claim concerning the privacy of her health
information. Brown v. Columbus Police Dep’t, 2024 WL 345862, at *3 (11th Cir. July 18, 2024)

(“HIPAA contains no express provision creating a private cause of action” because “HIPAA
is to be enforced by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and Congress has not
created a private right of action to enforce it.”) (citations omitted). Nor does it appear that
Plaintiff can assert claims under 28 U.S.C. § 455 because, while this section permits a party
to seek a judge’s recusal, it does not create a private cause of action. Makere v. Early, 2022
WL 20509771, at *4 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2022) (citing Owen v. Cole, 2021 WL 1293087, at *2
(S.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2021); Cohee v. McDade, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084 (S.D. Ill. 2006); In re
Bernard, 31 F.3d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 1994); Church of Scientology Int'l v. Kolts, 846 F. Supp. 873,
881-82 (C.D. Cal. 1994)).
The Complaint also attempts to enforce various criminal statutes like, 18 U.S.C. §§
1519, 1001, and 242, but neither do these create private causes of action. See Smith v. JP
Morgan Chase, 837 F. App’x 769, 770 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming the district court's finding
that 18 U.S.C. § 1519 does not afford a private cause of action and the dismissal of the case

for failure to state a claim); Lichtenberg v. Sec'y of the Navy, 627 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir.
2015) (per curiam) (“Section 1001 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code is a criminal statute prohibiting
knowingly making false or fraudulent statements or concealing information in a matter within
federal jurisdiction. . . . It does not provide a civil cause of action.”) (citation omitted); Cuyler
v. Scriven, 2011 WL 861709, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2011) (finding that section 242 did “not
give rise to a private cause of action”) (citations omitted). The same is true for Florida’s
Health Information Privacy Law, Fla. Stat. § 456.057 does not create a private cause of action.
See Harrod v. Express Scripts, Inc., 2017 WL 11615769, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 2017)
(finding that Fla. Stat. § 456.057 did not create a private cause of action) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the above discussed statutes.
Second, the Complaint seemingly fails to state a claim against all Defendants under
section 1983. Section 1983 “affords a ‘civil remedy’ for deprivations of federally protected
rights caused by persons acting under color of state law.” Pollitz v. Halifax Health, 2015 WL
4987732, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2015) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981),
abrogated on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986)). “To state a claim
under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that a person, under color of state
law, deprived her of a right protected under the Constitution or laws of the United States.”
Rodriguez v. City of Miami, Fla., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (citation omitted)

(emphasis added). However, as the Eleventh Circuit has explained:
The Eleventh Amendment bars damages suits against a state in federal court
absent a waiver of immunity by the state or a valid congressional override.
Congress has not abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity for purposes
of section 1983 suits for damages, and Florida has not waived its immunity
with regard to such suits. The Eleventh Amendment bar also applies to
damages actions brought against state officials in their official capacities
because a judgment against the official in such a suit imposes liability on the
entity that he represents and is effectively a suit against the state itself.

Wusiya v. City of Miami Beach, 614 F. App’x 389, 393 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985); Gamble v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 779 F.2d 1509,
1512, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986)). More specifically on the latter point, “[q]ualified immunity
shields public officials from liability for civil damages when their conduct does not violate a
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged action.” See
Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d
473, 480 (11th Cir. 2016)). “To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must ‘plead[ ] facts
showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right
was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).
Finally, while section 1983 applies only to state actors, Bivens grants victims of a
constitutional violation by a federal official the right to relief against that official in federal
court. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Kelly v. Serna, 87
F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
Here, Defendants Winter Haven, Winter Haven Police, and Polk County
Commissioners, are immune from Plaintiff’s 1983 claims because Plaintiff seeks only
damages. See Wusiya, 614 F. App’x at 393 (citations omitted). And Sheriff Judd, in his
individual capacity, may be entitled to qualified immunity from suit. Echols, 913 F.3d at 1319
(citation omitted). Likewise, section 1983 does not apply to federal actors like the Unites
States, and “a plaintiff may not bring a Bivens action against a federal agency[.]” Horne v. Soc.
Sec. Admin., 359 F. App’x 138, 143 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 71 (2001); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994)). Because Plaintiff names no
individual federal officers, she fails to state a Bivens claim. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71 (stating

that Bivens is “solely concerned with deterring the unconstitutional acts of individual
officers”).
BayCare is also unlikely to be able to be liable under section 1983 because it is not a
state actor. See Pollitz, 2015 WL 4987732, at *4 (citation omitted); see also Guardino v. Halifax
Health, 2019 WL 469122, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2019) report and recommendation adopted,
2019 WL 462811 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2019) (An “action in accordance with a state’s
involuntary commitment laws is not enough to transform an entity into a ‘state actor’ for
purposes of a section 1983 claim.”). More generally, to the extent the Complaint relies upon
section 1983 to enforce a violation of the Baker Act against Defendants, this is also ineffective.

A plaintiff “may not maintain a section 1983 claim based on a violation of Florida’s Baker
Act, as the Baker Act is not a federal constitution or law of the United States.” Constantino v.
Madden, 2003 WL 22025477 *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr.1, 2003) (citing Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d
1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002)). As such, the Complaint fails to state a section 1983 or Bivens
claim.
Finally, the pleading does not support a Privacy Act claim against Winter Haven,
Winter Haven Police, Polk County Commissioners, Sheriff Judd, and BayCare because these
are not part of the federal government. “In certain circumstances, the Privacy Act allows an
individual to bring a civil action against a government agency if that agency refuses to correct

inaccurate information in its records. However, this private right of action only applies to
federal agencies.” Hankerson v. United States, 594 F. App’x 608, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing 5
U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1); Schwier v. Cox 340 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir.2003)). The definition of
“agency” does not include state entities or private parties. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1); Lee v. Monroe
Cnty. Detention Ctr., 2020 WL 6264704, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2020) (“Because the Privacy

Act does not authorize a cause of action against a state agency or state actor, Plaintiff's claim,
to the extent made under § 552a(b) should be dismissed.”); Rabalais v. Ware, 2018 WL 722832,
at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2018) (finding individual defendants could not be held liable under
the Privacy Act because it only applies to the federal government).5
In light of the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) be denied without prejudice and her Complaint (Doc. 1) be
dismissed without prejudice. It is further recommended that Plaintiff be allowed to file an
amended complaint, which should set forth the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction and the
factual allegations establishing a claim for relief in this forum. See Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428

F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Ordinarily, a party must be given at least one opportunity
to amend before the district court dismisses the complaint.”).
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:
1. Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) be denied without
prejudice.
2. Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to
amend.

5 There are a handful of other statutes and common law causes of action, like the FTCA, Title VII,
the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, negligence, and medical malpractice, that are also cited in the
Complaint. However, the pleading issues leave the Court unable to reach any substantive findings on
whether a claim has been stated under these causes of action. See GJR Investments, 132 F.3d at 1369
(A court does not have “license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in
order to sustain an action.”).
3. Plaintiff be allowed to file an amended complaint that sets forth factual
allegations establishing a claim for relief and to file a renewed request to proceed in forma
pauperis.°
4, Plaintiff be advised that failure to file an amended complaint may result in
dismissal of this case with prejudice and without further notice.
IT IS SO REPORTED in Tampa, Florida, on October 21, 2025.
4 “L—

SEAN P. FL Fe ~
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO PARTIES
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and
Recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections to the proposed findings
and recommendations or request an extension of time to do so. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 11th
Cir. R. 3-1. Failure of any party to timely object in accordance with the provisions of §
636(b)(1) waives that party’s right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
the unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and
Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

° Plaintiff is encouraged to consult the “Litigants Without Lawyer” guidelines on the Court’s website,
located at http://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/litigants-without-lawyers.
13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210496. Public record. Not legal advice.