# Erazo

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · October 30, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210486

## Case

- **Full name:** Lisa J. Erazo v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner, Social Security Administration
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** October 30, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210486

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming RFC without medical opinion evidence
- holding that the parties must focus their attention on claimant's condition at the time she last met insured status requirements
- explaining claimant has the burden of establishing the existence of a disability on or before the expiration of her insured status

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

LISA J. ERAZO PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 25-5109

FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner
Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Lisa J. Erazo, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial
review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner)
denying her claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (DIB) under the
provisions of Title II of the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review, the Court must
determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the
Commissioner's decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I. Procedural Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her current application for DIB on January 10, 2022, alleging an
inability to work since December 1, 2017, due to diabetes, muscle atrophy in the left upper and
lower extremities, anemia, bursitis of the hips, high blood pressure, insomnia, post-traumatic stress
disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, anxiety and depression. (Tr. 80, 185). For DIB purposes,
Plaintiff maintained insured states through March 31, 2020. (Tr. 23, 192). An administrative
telephonic hearing was held on February 1, 2024, at which Plaintiff appeared with counsel and
testified. (Tr. 43-73).
By written decision dated April 12, 2024, the ALJ found that during the relevant time
period, Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Tr. 25).
Specifically, the ALJ found that through the date last insured Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: a tremor in the dominant right upper extremity, diabetes mellitus, an anxiety

disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. However, after reviewing all of the evidence
presented, the ALJ determined that through the date last insured Plaintiff’s impairments did not
meet or equal the level of severity of any impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments found in
Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Tr. 26). The ALJ found that through the date last
insured Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to:
[P]erform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except as follows: the
claimant can frequently handle, finger, and feels with the dominant right upper
extremity. The claimant can perform simple and repetitive tasks with detailed, but
not complex, instructions, can use judgment to make simple work related decisions,
and no more than occasional changes in a routine work setting. The claimant must
work in a facility with a restroom and would require 2 extra unscheduled 5 minutes
bathroom breaks during the work day.

(Tr. 29). With the help of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that through the date last insured
Plaintiff could perform work as a floor waxer, an assembler, and a cleaner. (Tr. 34).
Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, who
denied that request on March 21, 2025. (Tr. 1-6). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action. (ECF
No. 2). Both parties have filed appeal briefs, and the case is before the undersigned for report and
recommendation. (ECF Nos. 10, 12).
The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments are
presented in the parties’ briefs, and are repeated here only to the extent necessary.
II. Applicable Law:
The Court reviews “the ALJ’s decision to deny disability insurance benefits de novo to
ensure that there was no legal error that the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole.” Brown v. Colvin, 825 F. 3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2016). Substantial

evidence is less than a preponderance, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it
adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154
(2019). We must affirm the ALJ’s decision if the record contains substantial evidence to support
it. Lawson v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 962, 964 (8th Cir. 2015). As long as there is substantial evidence in
the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the court may not reverse it simply because
substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because
the court would have decided the case differently. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir.
2015). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions
from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, we must affirm
the ALJ’s decision. Id.

It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden
of proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one
year and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari,
274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act defines “physical
or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). A Plaintiff must show that her disability,
not simply her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.
The Commissioner’s regulations require him to apply a five-step sequential evaluation
process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial
gainful activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental
impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an

impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past
relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy
given her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Only if the final stage is
reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light
of her residual functional capacity. Id.
III. Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability determination is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff argues the following issues on appeal:
A) The ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record; and B) The ALJ erred in determining
Plaintiff’s RFC. The Court will consider each of these arguments.

A. Insured Status and Relevant Time Period:
To have insured status under the Act, an individual is required to have twenty quarters of
coverage in each forty-quarter period ending with the first quarter of disability. 42 U.S.C. §
416(i)(3)(B). Plaintiff last met this requirement on March 31, 2020. Regarding Plaintiff’s
application for DIB, the overreaching issue in this case is the question of whether Plaintiff was
disabled during the relevant time period of December 1, 2017, her alleged onset date of disability,
through March 31, 2020, the last date she was in insured status under Title II of the Act.
In order for Plaintiff to qualify for DIB, she must prove that on or before the expiration of
her insured status she was unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which is expected to last for at least twelve months
or result in death. Basinger v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1166, 1168 (8th Cir. 1984) (explaining claimant
has the burden of establishing the existence of a disability on or before the expiration of her insured
status). Records and medical opinions from outside the insured period can only be used in “helping

to elucidate a medical condition during the time for which benefits might be rewarded.” Cox v.
Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that the parties must focus their attention on
claimant's condition at the time she last met insured status requirements); Turpin v. Colvin, 750
F.3d 989, 993 (8th Cir. 2014) (explaining the ALJ need “only consider the applicant's medical
condition as of his or her date last insured”).
B. Duty to Develop the Record:
The ALJ has the duty to fully and fairly develop the record, even where the Plaintiff is
represented by counsel. If a physician's report of a claimant's limitations is stated only generally,
the ALJ should ask the physician to clarify and explain the stated limitations. See Vaughn v.
Heckler, 741 F. 2d 177, 179 (8th Cir. 1984). Furthermore, the ALJ is required to order medical

examinations and tests if the medical records presented do not provide sufficient medical evidence
to determine the nature and extent of a claimant's limitations and impairments. See Barrett v.
Shalala, 38 F. 3d 1019, 1023 (8th Cir. 1994). The ALJ must develop the record until the evidence
is sufficiently clear to make a fair determination as to whether the claimant is disabled. See Landess
v. Weinberger, 490 F. 2d 1187, 1189 (8th Cir. 1974). In addition, a claimant must show not only
that the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record, but she must also show that she was
prejudiced or treated unfairly by the ALJ's failure. See Onstad v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1232, 1234
(8th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by failing to fully and fairly develop the medical record
regarding Plaintiff’s alleged impairments and that that ALJ should have ordered additional
consultative evaluations. (ECF No. 10, pp. 2-7).
Initially, the Court notes Plaintiff has failed to establish that the medical records presented

did not provide sufficient medical evidence to determine the nature and extent of her limitations
and impairments prior to the expiration of her insured status. See Barrett v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1019
at 1023. While the ALJ has an independent duty to develop the record in a social security disability
hearing, the ALJ is not required “to seek additional clarifying statements from a treating physician
unless a crucial issue is undeveloped.” Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004).
Likewise, the ALJ is not required to order a consultative evaluation of every alleged
impairment; she simply has the authority to do so if the existing medical sources do not contain
sufficient evidence to make an informed decision. See Matthews v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 422, 424 (8th
Cir. 1989). Thus, the proper inquiry for this Court is not whether a consultative examination should
have been ordered; rather, it is whether the record contained sufficient evidence for the ALJ to

make an informed decision. See Id. After reviewing the entire 3,562-page administrative record,
the Court finds nothing which establishes the record was inadequate for the ALJ to make her
decision. The medical record includes treating physician records prior to, during and after the
relevant time period; non-examining medical consultant opinions; physical exam reports; objective
testing to include laboratory tests results, x-rays and MRIs and case analysis.
Further, Plaintiff must not only show the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record,
but that she was prejudiced or treated unfairly by the ALJ’s alleged failure to develop the record.
Plaintiff has made no demonstration that any further record development would have changed the
outcome of the ALJ’s determination.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the record was not fully developed
and that she was prejudiced by any perceived failure to develop the record.
C. The RFC determination:
In this matter, the ALJ determined that through the date last insured, Plaintiff retained the

RFC to perform medium work with limitations. (Tr. 29). Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in this RFC
determination. (ECF No. 10, p. 7). However, after review, the Court finds substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ's RFC determination.
Prior to Step Four of the sequential analysis in a disability determination, the ALJ is
required to determine a claimant's RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). RFC is the most a
person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). It is assessed using
all relevant evidence in the record. Id. This includes medical records, observations of treating
physicians and others, and the claimant’s own descriptions of her limitations. Guilliams v.
Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005); Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th
Cir. 2004). Limitations resulting from symptoms such as pain are also factored into the assessment.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held
that a “claimant’s residual functional capacity is a medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d
700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). “Because a claimant’s RFC is a medical question, an ALJ’s assessment
of it must be supported by some medical evidence of the claimant’s ability to function in the
workplace.” Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619 (8th Cir. 2007). However, there is no requirement
that an RFC finding be supported by a specific medical opinion. See Myers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d
521, 526-27 (8th Cir. 2013) (affirming RFC without medical opinion evidence). Furthermore, this
Court is required to affirm the ALJ's RFC determination if that determination is supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir.
2000).
Based upon this standard and a review of Plaintiff's records and allegations in this case, the
Court cannot find Plaintiff has demonstrated having any greater limitations than those found by

the ALJ prior to the expiration of her insured status. While Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s
reasoning when discussing the evidence, Plaintiff does not point to any evidence in the record that
the ALJ should have considered, but failed to consider, in calculating Plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ
provided a thorough summary of Plaintiff's medical records and subjective complaints in this
matter. (Tr. 25-32). In her opinion, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's alleged impairments and
discounted those she found were not credible. Id. The ALJ considered the results of objective
diagnostic tests and examination findings and discussed these in the hearing decision. Id. The ALJ
also considered the findings of non-examining medical consultants and considered Plaintiff's
testimony and function reports in assessing her RFC. Id. The Court recognizes that medical records
dated after the expiration of her insured status reveal Plaintiff was diagnosed and treated for

impairments – to include neuropathy of the lower extremities- that may have resulted in a more
limited RFC finding. However, after reviewing the record as a whole, the Court finds Plaintiff
failed to meet her burden of showing a more restrictive RFC through her date last insured. See
Perks v. Astrue, 687 F. 3d 1086, 1092 (8th Cir. 2012) (burden of persuasion to demonstrate RFC
and prove disability remains on claimant). Accordingly, the Court finds there is substantial
evidence of record to support the ALJ’s RFC findings for the time period in question.
D. Hypothetical Question to the Vocational Expert:
After thoroughly reviewing the hearing transcript along with the entire evidence of record,
the Court finds that the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the vocational expert fully set forth the
impairments which the ALJ accepted as true, and which were supported by the record as a whole.
Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Court finds that the
vocational expert's opinion constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion that
Plaintiff's impairments did not preclude her from performing work as a floor waxer, an assembler
or a cleaner through her date last insured. Pickney v. Chater, 96 F.3d 294, 296 (8th Cir. 1996)
(testimony from vocational expert based on properly phrased hypothetical question constitutes
substantial evidence).
V. Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends affirming the ALJ's decision, and
dismissing Plaintiff's case with prejudice. The parties have fourteen days from receipt of our
report and recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal
questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific
to trigger de novo review by the district court.
DATED this 30th day of October 2025.

/s/_( Asst _Cometeck
HON. CHRISTY COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210486. Public record. Not legal advice.