# Opinion

> District Court, N.D. New York · October 29, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210450

## Case

- **Full name:** Towanda B. 0/b/o A.N.B. v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** October 29, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TOWANDA B. 0/b/o A.N.B.,
Plaintiff,
V. 5:24-CV-1022
(AJB/DJS)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:
OLINSKY LAW GROUP HOWARD D. OLINSKY, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
250 South Clinton Street
“| Ste. 210
Syracuse, New York 13202
U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. JASON P. PECK, ESQ.
OFFICE OF REG’L GEN. COUNSEL KRISTINA D. COHN, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant
Office of Program Litigation — Office 2
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
DANIEL J. STEWART
“| United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER!
Currently before the Court in this Social Security action are Plaintiff's Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

1 This matter was referred to the undersigned for a report-recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and
N.D.N.Y.LR. 72.3(€).

Dkt. Nos. 14 & 16. Plaintiff has filed a Reply. Dkt. No. 17. For the reasons set forth
below, it is recommended that Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings be
granted, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings be denied, and the
Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff disability benefits be remanded for further
proceedings.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
A.N.B. is a minor child and her mother applied for supplemental security income
(“SSI”) on her behalf on October 13, 2021. Dkt. Nos. 10 & 13, Admin. Tr. (“Tr.”), p.
106. Plaintiff's application was initially denied on February 2, 2022. Tr. at p. 115.
“| Plaintiff, thereafter, requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),
which was held on October 16, 2023. Tr. at pp. 1294-1308. On November 1, 2023, the
ALJ issued a written decision finding claimant was not disabled under the Social
Security Act. Tr. at pp. 19-25. On June 27, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's
request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
Tr. at pp. 1-7.

B. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ’s November 1, 2023 decision made the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law. First, the ALJ found that claimant was a newborn/young infant on
October 13, the date that the SSI application was filed, and was an older infant/toddler

at the time of the ALJ’s decision. Tr. at p. 20. Next, the ALJ found that claimant had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application date. Jd. The ALJ then
found that claimant’s asthma was a severe impairment. /d. The ALJ also found that
claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. 1
(the “Listings”). Tr. at pp. 20-21. At the next step, the ALJ found that claimant did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that functionally equals the severity
of the Listings. Tr. at pp. 21-25. As part of this analysis, the ALJ considered the
claimant’s limitations in each of six functional domains. Jd. The ALJ found that she
had “no limitation” with regard to (1) acquiring and using information, (2) attending and
completing tasks, (3) interacting and relating with others, (4) moving and manipulating
objects, and (5) caring for herself. Jd. The ALJ found that claimant had a marked
limitation in health and physical well-being. /d. Because Plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that resulted in either marked limitations in
two domains of functioning or an extreme limitation in one domain of functioning, the

ALJ found that claimant was not disabled. Tr. at p. 25.
II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standard of Review
A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo
whether an individual is disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wagner v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner’s
determination will be reversed only if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it
was not supported by substantial evidence. See Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986
(2d Cir. 1987) (“Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied
“) correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a
finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of
the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal
principles.”); accord Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983), Marcus v.
Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979). “Substantial evidence” 1s evidence that
amounts to “more than a mere scintilla,” and has been defined as “such relevant evidence
“las a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than
one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld. Rutherford
v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
“To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial

evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both
sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that
which detracts from its weight.” Williams on behalf of Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d
255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988). If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s
finding must be sustained “even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiffs

position and despite that the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ
from the [Commissioner’s].” Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). In other words, this Court must afford the Commissioner’s determination
considerable deference, and may not substitute “its own judgment for that of the
[Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de

novo review.” Valente v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d
Cir. 1984).
B. Standard to Determine Disability of a Child
To qualify for social security income, a child under the age of eighteen must have
“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which results in marked and
“| severe functional limitations and which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C). The Social Security Regulations provide a three-step
sequential analysis to determine whether a child is disabled and therefore eligible for
SSI. Hamedallah ex rel. E.B. v. Astrue, 876 F. Supp. 2d 133, 140 (N.D.N.Y. 2012).

First, the ALJ is to consider whether the child is engaged in “substantial gainful
activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b). Second, the ALJ considers whether the child has a
medically determinable impairment that is severe. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c). Third, if the
ALJ finds a severe impairment, he must then consider whether the impairment medically
or functionally equals a disability in the Listings. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c)-(d).

There are three separate ways by which a claimant may establish that his
impairment is medically equivalent to a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(b).
First, a claimant who has an impairment described in the listed impairments, but “do[es]
not exhibit one or more findings specified in the particular listing, or ... [does] exhibit
4) all of the findings, but one or more of the findings is not as severe as specified in the
particular listing,” may establish medical equivalence by demonstrating other findings
related to his impairment “that are at least of equal medical significance to the required
criteria” of the listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(b)(1). Second, a claimant who
has an impairment not described in the listed impairments may establish medical
equivalence by demonstrating findings related to his impairment that “are at least of
equal medical significance” to those of a “closely analogous listed impairment[ ].” 20
C.F.R. § 416.926(b)(2). Third, a claimant who has a combination of impairments, none
of which are described in the listed impairments, may establish medical equivalence by
demonstrating findings related to his combination of impairments that “are at least of
equal medical significance to those of a[n] [analogous] listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. §

416.926(b)(3).
To demonstrate functional equivalence to a disability, the child must exhibit a
“marked” limitation in two of six functional domains, or an “extreme” limitation in one
functional domains. The domains are 1) the child’s ability to acquire and use
information, 2) the child’s ability to attend and complete tasks, 3) the child’s ability to

interact and relate with others, 4) the child’s ability to move about and manipulate
objects, 5) the child’s ability to care for himself, and 6) the child’s health and physical
well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(b)(1).
A child has a “marked” limitation if the impairment “interferes seriously with
4) [the child’s] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.926(e)(2)(i). An “extreme” limitation exists when the impairment “interferes very
seriously with [the child’s] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete
activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(e)(3)(i).
Il. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks relief based on the purported failure of the ALJ to properly
evaluate the opinion evidence, develop the record, and evaluate the claimant’s
symptomology. Dkt. No. 14, Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 6-13; see also Dkt. No. 17.
Defendant contends no errors were made that warrant remand. Dkt. No. 16, Def.’s Mem.
of Law at pp. 5-12.
A. ALJ’s Review of the Opinion Evidence

1. State Agency Medical Consultants
An ALJ has a legal obligation “to adequately explain his reasoning in making the
findings on which his ultimate decision rests, and in doing so must address all pertinent
evidence.” Calzada v. Astrue, 753 F. Supp. 2d 250, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Compliance
with this obligation permits a reviewing court to “judge the adequacy of [the ALJ’s]

conclusions.” Rivera v. Sullivan, 771 F. Supp. 1339, 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Where an
ALJ fails to provide a rationale for a particular determination, the evidence in the record
must permit a reviewing court to “glean the rationale of the ALJ’s decision.” Monguer
v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1983). Consequently, if a review of the record
“) does not allow the reviewing court to understand the ALJ’s reasoning, remand is
warranted. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Astrue, 814 F. Supp. 2d 168, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(remanding for ALJ to explain rationale more clearly).
“The revised regulations for evaluating opinion evidence place substantial
emphasis on both supportability and consistency and require the ALJ to explain the
analysis of each of those factors.” Balotti v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 605 F. Supp. 3d 610,
“1621 (S.D.N.Y. 2022). “To analyze supportability, the ALJ must conduct ‘an inquiry
confined to the medical source’s own records that focuses on how well a medical source
supported and explained their opinion.’” Ayala v. Kijakazi, 620 F. Supp. 3d 6, 30
(S.D.N.Y. 2022) (quoting Vellone v. Saul, 2021 WL 319354, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29,
2021)). The persuasiveness of a medical opinion from a medical source or prior

administrative finding depends on its relevancy to the objective medical evidence and
the source’s supporting explanations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. “On the other hand, to
analyze consistency, the ALJ must conduct ‘an all-encompassing inquiry focused on
how well a medical source 1s supported, or not supported, by the entire record.’” Ayala

v. Kijakazi, 620 F. Supp. 3d at 30 (quoting Vellone v. Saul, 2021 WL 319354, at *6).
That analysis of the record is not sufficiently detailed in the ALJ’s decision.
The ALJ found the prior medical findings of the state agency medical consultants
persuasive. Tr. at p. 24. In support of that finding he noted:
Their findings were well supported with explanations and references to the
medical record. Their findings are consistent with the record as a whole for
the reasons discussed above. This includes an opinion from the claimant’s
pediatrician, noted below.
7d. (internal citations omitted).
“Although an ALJ’s assessment of supportability need not be overburdensome,
a clear explanation of how supportability was assessed is necessary.” Philip B. v.

Comm □□ of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 5454787, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 540372 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2025) (internal citation
omitted). Here, the ALJ’s finding that the opinions at issue were well supported was
entirely conclusory. “Both supportability and consistency in part require comparison of
the medical opinions with other medical sources. A conclusory analysis of these factors
precludes the Court from undertaking meaningful review of the ALJ’s decision.”
Melissa S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 1091608, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2022)
(internal citations omitted).
Defendant supports the ALJ’s conclusion with significant discussion of record
evidence that would justify a conclusion that the findings were well supported and
consistent with the record. Def.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 6-8. The evidence relied on to

do so, however, was by and large not discussed by the ALJ in actually rendering the
decision, or at least in concluding that the prior administrative medical findings
(““PAMFs’”’) were persuasive. See Tr. at p. 24. The Court cannot affirm the decision
based on Defendant’s post-hoc rationale. Paige G.P. v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 2027634,
*3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2024), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Paige
P. v. Comm ’r of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 2023502 (N.D.N.Y. May 6, 2024); Beth Marie N.
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 6065309, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6065945 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2023). The Court,
therefore, recommends finding that the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the opinions of
the state agency medical consultants insofar as it did not comply with the statutory
requirements.
Error is harmless where proper analysis would not have altered the ALJ’s
conclusion and “the substance of the [regulation] was not traversed.” Scott A.C. v.
Kijakazi, 2022 WL 2965585, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. July 27, 2022). However, an ALJ
commits reversable error when his or her decision “fail[s] to assess and articulate”

medical opinions of record. Johnathan W. v. Saul, 2021 WL 1163632, at *7 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 26, 2021). Remand is required if the ALJ does not appropriately “explain the
supportability or consistency factors.” Rivera v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2020 WL
8167136, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

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Jennifer G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 8435991, at *9-10 (remanding where the
AL] failed to “meaningfully discuss” the consistency of the medical opinions).
As noted above, the ALJ failed to properly engage in an analysis of the PAMFs,
making it impossible to decipher his rationale and assess whether the error was harmless.
4) Scott A.C. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 2965585, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. July 27, 2022) (finding
harmless error where court could “glean the ALJ’s consideration” of the supportability
and consistency factors). “The ALJ is required to provide rationale in the written
decision sufficient to allow this Court to conduct an adequate review of his findings.”
Shanaye S.M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL 1988672, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. May 6, 2019)
(citing cases). Because the ALJ failed to do so for the PAMFs, the Court does not
believe the error identified with respect to those opinions can be found harmless and,
therefore, remand is recommended.
2. Dr. Campbell
Plaintiff also objects to the ALJ’s findings regarding the opinion of Dr. Megan
Campbell. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 10-11. The Court recommends finding no error

with respect to the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Campbell’s opinion. The ALJ concluded,
based on Dr. Campbell’s opinion, that Plaintiff had a marked limitation in the domain
of health and physical well-being. Tr. at p. 25. Dr. Campbell’s opinion noted no or mild
loss in every other domain category. Tr. at pp. 1290-1292. In asserting error on the part
of the ALJ, Plaintiff argues only that “[a]dequate discussion of consistency might have

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revealed” consistency with other reports in the record and that “[t]his should have
prompted a [different] conclusion.” Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 10. Even were there an
error with regard to the consistency analysis, these arguments would not be sufficient to
warrant remand. First, such conclusory arguments about what might have happened are
“)not an appropriate basis for relief. Heather P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL
4347338, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2024); Cynthia A. E. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023
WL 9116628, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2023), report and recommendation adopted sub
nom. Cynthia E. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 8432332 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2023).
Second, these arguments are clearly aimed at the manner in which the ALJ weighed the
evidence before him. However, this Court should not second-guess the ALJ’s weighing
“lof the evidence. See Marion A. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL 13499951, at *11
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2019).
3. Development of the Record
The Court also does not find that the ALJ failed to develop the record. See Pl.’s
Mem. of Law at p. 11. “[W]here there are no obvious gaps in the administrative record,

and where the ALJ already possesses a ‘complete medical history,’ the ALJ is under no
obligation to seek additional information in advance of rejecting a benefits claim.” Rosa
v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 79 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41,
48 (2d Cir. 1996)). _—_— Plaintiff's counsel “has not established beyond conclusory
assertions that the record was insufficient for the ALJ to make his determination.”

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Kaliegh O. on behalf of S.S.T. v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 4054098, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.
24, 2018) (internal citation omitted).
B. The ALJ’s Evaluation of the Claimant’s Symptomology
Plaintiff also objects to the ALJ’s evaluation of the claimant’s symptomology.
Mem. of Law at pp. 11-13. Specifically, she argues that the ALJ erred in his
conclusions regarding the consistency of testimony from Plaintiff about her child’s
asthma. /d. at p. 12.
While Plaintiff contends that the “ALJ did not reference Plaintiff's need to go to
Claimant’s daycare to perform treatment or Plaintiff's testimony regarding Claimant’s
inability to sit still to calm down,” id., the record suggests to the contrary. The ALJ did
specifically note claimant’s daily treatments. Tr. at p. 22. He did not state that they
took place at daycare, but it is unclear why this fact matters. Similarly, the ALJ
specifically noted that the claimant becomes easily upset, id., which seems to address
the same concerns as Plaintiff's reliance on the inability to sit still. The ALJ is obligated
to “carefully consider all the evidence presented by claimants regarding their

symptoms.” Debra T. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL 1208788, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Mar.
14, 2019) The ALJ’s determinations in this regard are generally afforded significant
deference, see Shari L. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 561563, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2022),
and the record here raises no questions that warrant further consideration upon remand,

13

other than to note that a fresh consideration of the PAMFs may be relevant to this
analysis.
IV. CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY, it is
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt.
No. 14) be GRANTED, and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(Dkt. No. 16) is DENIED; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that Defendant’s decision denying Plaintiff disability
benefits be REVERSED and the matter be REMANDED pursuant to section four for
“| further proceedings; and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this Report-
Recommendation and Order on the parties.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14) days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed

with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan vy.
Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human
Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIv. P.

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72 & 6(a).
Dated: October 29, 2025
Albany, New York
ole
U.SMMfagistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210450. Public record. Not legal advice.