# Edwards

> District Court, E.D. North Carolina · October 27, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210249

## Case

- **Full name:** Doniesha Edwards v. TransUnion LLC
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** October 27, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210249

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining Congress enacted predecessor statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) “to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none of the ordinary financial disincentives to filing meritless claims”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 4:25-CV-173-FL
DONIESHA EDWARDS,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND
RECOMMENDATION
TRANSUNION LLC,
Defendant.

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and
for frivolity review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). [DE-1, -2]. For the
reasons that follow, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for failure to state a
claim and that the application to proceed in forma pauperis be denied as moot.
I. Standard of Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court shall dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages
from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iHii); see Adams v. Rice,
40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining Congress enacted predecessor statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
“to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none of the ordinary financial
disincentives to filing meritless claims”). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either
law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d
391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations
are ‘so nutty,’ ‘delusional,’ or ‘wholly fanciful’ as to be simply ‘unbelievable.’”). A claim lacks an
arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490

U.S. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional
scenarios.” Id. at 327-28.
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This is necessary “in order to ‘give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]’” Bell Atl. Corp. v,
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). At the
pleading stage, “while a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Jd.
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level ....’” Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
In the present case, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant
are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972). This court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se
litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id; Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the
principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits; the district
courts are not required “to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
II. Analysis
Plaintiff, Doneisha Edwards, filed the instant complaint alleging that Defendant,

Transunion LLC, violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, specifically 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b) and
1681s-2(b), by failing to conduct a reasonable investigation and failing to maintain possible
accuracy. [DE-1] at 4. Plaintiff alleges that she disputed multiple errors on her credit report and
Transunion “still verified the errors.” /d. Plaintiff seeks $25,000 in damages. Jd.
The purpose of the FCRA is to ensure “fair and accurate credit reporting.” 15 U.S.C. §
1681(a)(1). To this end, the FCRA imposes certain duties and procedures on various entities
operating in the consumer reporting industry, including credit reporting agencies, furnishers of
credit information to credit reporting agencies, and users of consumer reports. See 15 U.S.C. §
1681, et seg. A credit reporting agency is required to prepare consumer credit reports that reflect
the “maximum possible accuracy” of the information concerning the individual about whom the
report relates. Jd. § 168le(b). In interpreting FCRA claims, the Fourth Circuit has held that “a
consumer reporting agency violates § 1681le(b) if (1) the consumer report contains inaccurate
information and (2) the reporting agency did not follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum
possible accuracy.” Wallace v. Equifax Info. Servs., Inc., No. 5:23-CV-279-BO-RN, 2024 WL
218622, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 19, 2024) (quoting Dalton v. Cap. Associated Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d
409, 415 (4th Cir. 2001)). Information on a credit report is inaccurate if it is “patently incorrect”
or “misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be expected to have an adverse
effect.” Id. Additionally, “‘a consumer who brings a § 1681i failure to reinvestigate claim must
first show that his ‘credit file contains inaccurate or incomplete information.’” Jd. (quoting Hinton
v. Trans Union, LLC, 654 F. Supp. 2d 440, 451 (E.D. Va. 2009)). Courts, including this one, have
applied “the same understanding of ‘inaccurate’ in analyzing § 1681le and § 1681i claims.” Jd.
(quoting Shaw v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 891 F.3d 749, 756 (9th Cir. 2018)).
As an initial matter, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) sets forth the duties of “furnishers of

information.” As one court explained, under § 1681s-2(b), if a consumer notifies a credit reporting
agency that they dispute the completeness or accuracy of particular information and the agency
notifies the person who furnished the information of the consumer’s dispute, the furnisher must
investigate the claim, report the results of the investigation to the agency, notify any other credit
reporting agencies to which the furnisher had provided that information of the incompleteness or
inaccuracy, and revise the information accordingly. Hampton v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV
DLB-22-1712, 2023 WL 6200009, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 22, 2023). However, here, based on the
few allegations in the complaint, Transunion does not appear to be a “furnisher” but rather is a
“credit reporting agency.” Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 15 U.S.C. §
1681s-2(b).
Liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint, it appears that Plaintiff intended to bring claims
under § 168le(b) and § 16811. However, the complaint contains only general allegations that
Transunion “failed to conduct a reasonable investigation” and “failed to maintain possible
accuracy” after Plaintiff “disputed multiple errors on [her] credit report[.]” [DE-1] at 4. The
complaint lacks sufficient factual matter necessary to “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and, thus, violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. See Brown v. Equifax Inc.,
No. 5:19-CV-78-BO, 2019 WL 1810976, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 24, 2019) (dismissing case where
it was “indisputable that the complaint contains only cursory allegations of violations of [FCRA]
without supporting factual content”); Green v. TransUnion, No. 2:22-cv-01546-RMG-MHC, 2023
WL 11941017, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar 30, 2023) (“The allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint does [sic]
little more than repeat the language of the statute, and does [sic] not provide any factual allegations
showing that her credit file contains inaccurate or incomplete information’’) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted); cf Johnson v. Experian Info. Sols., No. 5:23-CV-687-M, 2024 WL

4281446, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 1, 2024) (allowing § 1681i claim to proceed where plaintiff
provided detail about the purported inaccuracies, including that creditor offered him an
accommodation to the payment schedule that credit report did not reflect), adopted by, 2024 WL
4063555 (E.D.N.C. Sep. 5, 2024). Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff attempts to assert a claim
under § 1681i(a)(5)(A) for failure to remove inaccurate information from her credit report, the
complaint fails to allege that Plaintiff suffered any injury caused by the failure to delete an
inaccurate item. See Mathews v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., No. 1:24CV71, 2024 WL 898697, at *2
(M.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2024) (finding that a complaint alleging that defendants failed to “remove all
inaccurate reporting” from his credit report but contained “no factual matter to support that
Plaintiff suffered any injury” from the inaccurate reporting, failed to state a claim under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681i(a)(5)(A)), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Mathews v. Experian Info. Sols.
Inc., 2024 WL 1532116 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2024). Accordingly, the complaint should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim and that the application to proceed in forma pauperis
be denied as moot.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on
Plaintiff. You shall have until November 10, 2025, to file written objections to the Memorandum
and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is,
make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to
which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the
Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the

magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Local
Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D.N.C.
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by
the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and
Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding
district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and
Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by
the foregoing deadline will bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or
judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation.
See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).
Submitted, the 2+ day of October, 2025.

United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210249. Public record. Not legal advice.