# HORNE

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · November 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210160

## Case

- **Full name:** Cheyanne Horne v. UPMC d/b/a UPMC Corporate Services, UPMC Health Plan, Inc., UPMC Magee-Women's Hospital
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** November 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH
CHEYANNE HORNE, )
)
Plaintiff, ) 2:24-CV-01497-MJH
)

)
vs. )
)

UPMC d/b/a UPMC CORPORATE )
SERVICES, UPMC HEALTH PLAN, INC., )
UPMC MAGEE-WOMEN'S HOSPITAL,

Defendants,

OPINION
Plaintiff, Cheyanne Horne, brings the within action for employment discrimination and
retaliation against Defendants, UPMC Health Plan, Inc. (“Health Plan”), UPMC d/b/a UPMC
Corporate Services (“UPMC”), and UPMC Magee-Women’s Hospital (“Magee”). (ECF No. 23).
Against the Health Plan, Ms. Horne asserts claims for Gender Discrimination under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) (Count I), Discrimination under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) (Count III), and
Retaliation under the ADA and PHRA (Count IV). Against all Defendants, she asserts
Retaliation under the PDA (Count II). Against the Health Plan and UPMC, she asserts a claim
for Failure to Accommodate under the ADA and the PHRA (Count V). Against UPMC, she
asserts a claim for Sex and Caregiver Discrimination under Title VII and the PHRA (Count VI).
Finally, against Magee and UPMC, she asserts a claim for Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
Retaliation and Interference (Count VII).
Magee moves to dismiss Counts II and VII. (ECF No. 27). The Health Plan moves to
dismiss Counts II, III, IV, and V. (ECF 28). UPMC moves to dismiss Counts II, V, VI, and VII.
(ECF No. 29). These motions are now ripe for decision.
Upon consideration of Ms. Horne’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 23), Magee’s Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 26), the respective briefs (ECF Nos. 27, 43, and 44), and for the following
reasons, Magee’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
Upon consideration of Ms. Horne’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 23), Health Plan’s

Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 28), the respective briefs (ECF Nos. 33, 43, and 46), and for
the following reasons, Health Plan’s Partial Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
Upon consideration of Ms. Horne’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 23), UPMC’s Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 29), the respective briefs (ECF Nos. 30, 43, and 45), and for the following
reasons, UPMC’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
I. Introductory Background
Ms. Horne has alleged seven claims against the three former employers. Her
employment timeline with these defendants is alleged as follows:
• On February 4, 2019, Ms. Horne began working for UPMC.1 (ECF No. 23 at ¶ 6).
• On August 14, 2021, Ms. Horne left UPMC and began a new remote position

with the Health Plan as a Clinical Operations Representative. Id. at ¶ 26.
• On January 30, 2022, Ms. Horne left the Health Plan and returned to UPMC as an
Account Representative Senior (“ARS”) with UPMC. Id. at ¶ 58.
• On January 6, 2024, Ms. Horne began a moonlighting position as a Health Unit
Coordinator with Magee in the Emergency Room while she maintained her
position with UPMC. Id. at ¶ 95. Ms. Horne’s moonlighting position was
contingent on her full-time position with UPMC. Id. at ¶ 103.

1 Ms. Horne’s Amended Complaint does not identify a position title with UPMC during this time
period.
• On March 19, 2024, Ashley Hanson notified Ms. Horne that the ARS position
with UPMC was being eliminated. Id. at ¶ 101.
• On April 23, 2024, Ms. Horne’s employment with UPMC and her moonlighting
position with Magee ended. Id. at ¶ 113.

II. Relevant Standard
When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.

Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)).
The Supreme Court clarified that this plausibility standard should not be conflated with a
higher probability standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556); see also Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir.
2014). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations of a complaint must be
enough to raise a right to relief [*5] above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A
pleading party need not establish the elements of a prima facie case at this stage; the party must
only “put forth allegations that ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of the necessary element[s].’” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir.
2009) (quoting Graff v. Subbiah Cardiology Assocs. Ltd., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44192, 2008
WL 2312671 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2008)); see also Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780,

790 (3d Cir. 2016).
Nonetheless, a court need not credit bald assertions, unwarranted inferences, or legal
conclusions cast in the form of factual averments. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d
902, 906 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997). The primary question in deciding a motion to dismiss is not whether
the plaintiff will ultimately prevail; but rather, whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to
establish the facts alleged in the complaint. Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000). The
purpose of a motion to dismiss is to “streamline[] litigation by dispensing with needless
discovery and factfinding.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L.
Ed. 2d 338 (1989).
III. Health Plan’s Motion to Dismiss

A. Relevant Background

Ms. Horne alleges that, on August 14, 2021, the Health Plan hired her for a remote job as
a Clinical Operations Representative. She was pregnant at the time she was hired. (ECF No. 23
at ¶¶ 25- 26). Ms. Horne alleges that, on August 19, 2021, she was admitted to the hospital and
diagnosed with a condition related to pregnancy, Hyperemesis Gravidarum (“HG”). Id. at ¶ 27.
The Health Plan allegedly provided Ms. Horne with medical accommodations for her pregnancy-
related condition. Id. at ¶ 29. On September 21, 2021, Ms. Horne’s supervisor allegedly “berated
her for missing so much work” and asked her to resign “to focus on her pregnancy” and
threatened her with termination if she did not. Id. at ¶¶ 35-36. Thereafter, Ms. Horne lodged a
complaint about her supervisor to Human Resources. Id. at. ¶ 41. Due to her HG condition, Ms.
Horne requested short term disability leave. Id. at ¶¶ 129, 165. Ms. Horne alleges that she was
not permitted to return to work, because the Health Plan would not accommodate her HG, and
she remained on leave until January 28, 2022, at which time she began to look for a new

position. Id. at ¶ 55. Ms. Horne was hired by UPMC, and on January 30, 2022, she began her
Account Representative job with UPMC. Id. at ¶ 58.
On June 8, 2022, Ms. Horne filed a charge of discrimination against Health Plan with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and with the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission (“PHRC”). Id. at ¶ 65. In the 2002 EEOC and PHRC charge, Ms. Horne
completed the box, “discrimination based on,” by inserting the word “sex.” She specifically
pleads:
1. I began my employment with the Respondent [Health Plan] on February 4,
2019. I currently work as an Account Representative Sr. for Corporate Services.
My previous Supervisor was Karen Sinopoli, Supervisor of Call Center Clinical
Operations. My current supervisor is Ashley Hansen. Supervisor for Billing. On
or about August 12, 2021, I started working for UPMC Health Plan Clinical
Operations and was transferred January 28. 2022. After I applied and interview
for this transferred to her current position. [sic]

2. I informed the Respondent [Health Plan] of my disability and requested a
reasonable accommodation. The Respondent [Health Plan] would not enter into
the interactive process with me. On or about September Ms. Sinopoi called me on
my personal cell phone and told me that I had to resign or take a leave of absence.

3. I believe that I was discriminated against based on my pregnancy, in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act when the Respondent [Health Plan] would not
enter the interactive process.

(ECF No. 34-2).

B. Analysis

1. PDA Retaliation (Count II) and Retaliation under the ADA and PHRA
(Count IV)
The Health Plan argues that Counts II and IV, which allege retaliation, are beyond the
scope of Ms. Horne’s 2022 EEOC and PHRC charge. Specifically, the Health Plan contends that
the 2022 charge did not allege retaliation under either Title VII or the ADA.
Ms. Horne maintains, that while she does not use the word “retaliation,” she alleges

events which, read fairly and plainly, constitute claims of retaliation under the ADA and Title
VII. Ms. Horne asserts that, the 2022 Charge alleges that she informed Health Plan of her
disability and requested accommodation, that Health Plan refused to enter the interactive process,
and that in retaliation she was pressured to resign or take leave immediately after disclosing her
pregnancy and disability and accommodation request. The Health Plan counters that
“retaliation” appears nowhere, either expressly or implicitly.
Under the Third Circuit “relevant test,” a claim is administratively exhausted where it is
either: (1) fairly within the scope of the EEOC charge, or (2) reasonably within the scope of the
investigation arising from that charge. Simko v. United States Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 207 (3d
Cir. 2021); Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1984). The two-pronged exhaustion

analysis is “fact-specific,” and courts must examine the EEOC charge and the unexhausted claim
“on a case-by-case basis.” Simko, 992 F.3d at 207 (citing Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018,
1024 (3d Cir. 1997)). The original charge is the “touchstone” of the exhaustion analysis. Id. at
210 (citing Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1296 (3d Cir. 1996)).
Where a charge does not allege retaliation, a retaliation claim cannot be included in a
subsequent lawsuit. Brandon v. UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, 2023 WL 3093415 at *3 (W.D.
Pa. April 26, 2023) (Horan, J.); Rogan v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 777, 788 (W.D. Pa.
2000); Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F. 2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1984).
Here, a fair reading of Ms. Horne’s 2022 EEOC and PHRC charge does not support that
it encompassed retaliation under either Title VII or the ADA. Ms. Horne’s 2022 EEOC and
PHRC charge referenced sex discrimination, pregnancy, and Title VII. The charge does not
mention retaliation or aver facts that would support retaliatory conduct. Furthermore, Ms.

Horne has not otherwise alleged that the EEOC investigated retaliation in response to Ms.
Horne’s charge, such that the Health Plan would have been placed on notice of any retaliation
claims.
Accordingly, the Health Plan’s Motion to Dismiss claims against it in Counts II and IV
will be granted.
2. Discrimination under the ADA and PHRA (Counts III and V).
The Health Plan next argues that Counts III and V, which allege disability discrimination
and failure to accommodate in violation of the ADA and PHRA, are beyond the scope of Ms.
Horne’s EEOC and PHRC charge. Specifically, the Health Plan contends that the 2022 charge
does not reference the ADA and does not allege that Ms. Horne had a disability unrelated to

pregnancy.
Ms. Horne contends that the 2022 EEOC and PHRC charge alleged that she informed the
Health Plan of her disability and requested accommodation, and the Health Plan refused to enter
the interactive process.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k), covers
discrimination based upon pregnancy-related medical conditions. The PDA specifically provides
that employers may not discriminate in the way they treat pregnancy-related inability to work. It
does so through its second clause, which states that “women affected by pregnancy ... shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work.” Id.; see also Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575
U.S. 206, 226–28, 135 S.Ct. 1338, 191 L.Ed.2d 279 (2015)
Here, Ms. Horne’s Amended Complaint belies the alleged intended scope of her 2022
EEOC and PHRC charge. In her Amended Complaint, she alleges the “disability” to which the

June 2022 charge refers, is “HG,” a pregnancy related condition. (ECF No. 23 at ¶¶ 126, 139).
The Amended Complaint further avers that:
144. The adverse employment action was directly connected with Ms. Horne’s
pregnancy due to Defendants being fully aware of her condition. Defendant
UPMC Health Plan decided to terminate Ms. Horne instead of accommodating
her and the symptoms of her pregnancy.

145. On June 8, 2022, Ms. Horne dual filed a Charge of Discrimination with the
EEOC and PHRC, alleging Defendants discriminated against her due to her
pregnancy and pregnancy-related disability.

Id. at ¶¶ 144-145; See also AC ¶¶ 130-31 (“[Defendant’s] adverse employment action against
Ms. Horne was directly connected with her pregnancy.”). While the 2022 EEOC and PHRC
charge uses terms such as “reasonable accommodation” and “interactive process,” Ms. Horne’s
charge is using these terms in relation to her condition of pregnancy and her pregnancy-related
affliction, HG. Nowhere in the 2022 EEOC and PHRC charge is the ADA or PHRA referenced,
whereas Ms. Horne specifically mentions Title VII. Thus, even with a generous reading of her
2022 charge, the scope of said charge does not encompass claims for disability discrimination in
violation of the ADA or PHRA.
Accordingly, the Health Plan’s Motion to Dismiss claims against it in Counts III and V
will be granted.
IV. UPMC’s Motion to Dismiss
A. Relevant Background
Ms. Horne alleges that, on January 20, 2022, she accepted a position with UPMC as an
Account Representative Senior. (ECF No. 23 at ¶ 58). Ms. Horne alleges she gave birth to a
child on March 14, 2022 and was later diagnosed with “post-partum HG,” such that she was on
maternity leave until April 22, 2022, and then she took a medical leave until June 16, 2022. In

addition, Ms. Horne alleges that UPMC knew that she had a diagnosis of Chronic Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (CPTSD), and that she requested that her supervisors inform her of
the subject matter of meetings in advance of meetings that she was asked to attend. Id. at ¶¶ 69,
179-80. Further, Ms. Horne next avers that she requested and was approved for FMLA leave for
the period of February 19, 2024 to April 19, 2024 due to bronchitis and an ear infection. Id. at ¶¶
96-97, 205. Ms. Horne alleges that UPMC eliminated the Account Representative Senior
position while she was still on this FMLA leave, and that, because her position had been
eliminated during her absence, she was terminated on April 23, 2024 upon expiration of her
FMLA leave. Id. at ¶ 113.
B. Analysis

1. Retaliation under the PDA (Count II)
UPMC identifies two alleged adverse actions against Ms. Horne in Count II: “interfering
with transfer requests” and the elimination of the Account Representative Senior position during
her FMLA leave and her eventual termination in April 2024.
As regards the interference claim, UPMC asserts two reasons for dismissal. First, UPMC
argues that the Amended Complaint does not allege that a timely charge of interference was ever
filed with the EEOC and PHRC. Second, UPMC contends that the Amended Complaint avers
insufficient allegations to support a plausible interference claim. As regards her retaliation
claim, related to her April 23, 2024 employment termination, UPMC maintains that the
Amended Complaint does not allege a basic element for a retaliation claim, namely that a
decisionmaker knew about any protected activity. Ms. Horne does not address these arguments
in her responses.
Before a claimant may file a Title VII civil action in federal court, he or she must exhaust

all administrative remedies with the Equal Employment Commission (the “EEOC”). 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a threshold issue for discrimination
claims. Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1295 n.3 (3d Cir. 1996). “A complaint does not state a
claim upon which relief may be granted unless it asserts the satisfaction of the precondition to
suit specified by Title VII: prior submission of the claim to the EEOC for conciliation or
resolution.” Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1997).
Here, as a fundamental requisite to Ms. Horne’s Count II claim for PDA retaliation, the
Amended Complaint does not allege that a timely charge of discrimination was filed with the
EEOC or PHRC with regard to either the 2021/2022 denials of transfer requests or her 2024 job
termination. In the her only operative EEOC and PHRC charge, filed by Ms. Horne in 2022,

and as averred in the Amended Complaint, Ms. Horne does not reference retaliation or denials of
transfer requests within her claims. Further, the 2022 charge pre-dated the 2024 job termination
issue; thus, the 2022 charge clearly did not address this claim. Therefore, under the allegations
of the Amended Complaint, and in consideration of the 2022 EEOC and PHRC charge, Ms.
Horne has not adequately pleaded that she has exhausted her administrative remedies as to
claims against UPMC in Count II of the Amended Complaint.
Accordingly, UPMC’s Motion to Dismiss the claims against it in Count II will be
granted.
2. ADA and PHRA Failure to Accommodate (Count V)
Ms. Horne alleges that UPMC knew that she had a diagnosis of CPTSD and that her
supervisors failed to accommodate her request for them to inform her of the subject matter of
meetings in advance of any meeting with her. (ECF No. 23 at ¶¶ 69-71, 179-82). UPMC argues
that the Amended Complaint does not allege the time for when this occurred or that Ms. Horne

filed a timely charge with the EEOC or the PHRC encompassing this claim. Again, Ms. Horne
does not address these arguments in her responses.
Here, under the authorities cited above with regard to administrative exhaustion, the
Amended Complaint does not establish that Ms. Horne filed an EEOC or PHRC charge against
UPMC with regard to her claim of failure to accommodate. The 2022 EEOC and PHRC filing
make no reference to CPTSD. This 2022 filing does not name UPMC as respondent, and, as
noted above, the 2022 charge primarily referenced Title VII discrimination. Therefore, under the
allegations of the Amended Complaint, and in consideration of the 2022 EEOC and PHRC
charge, Ms. Horne has not adequately pleaded that she exhausted her administrative remedies in
Count V of the Amended Complaint.

Accordingly, UPMC’s Motion to Dismiss claims against it in Count V will be granted.
3. Sex and Caregiver Discrimination under Title VII and PHRA (Count VI)
UPMC next argues that the Amended Complaint does not allege that Ms. Horne filed a
timely charge with the EEOC or the PHRC that encompassed the allegations and claims of sex
and caregiver discrimination under Title VII and PHRA against UPMC in Count VI. Again, Ms.
Horne does not address these arguments in her responses.
Here, under the authorities cited above for administrative exhaustion, the Amended
Complaint does not establish that Ms. Horne met the statutory requirements by having filed an
EEOC or PHRC charge against UPMC with regard to sex and caregiver discrimination. The
2022 EEOC and PHRC charge makes no reference to the factual allegations referenced within
Count VI as against UPMC. The 2022 EEOC and PHRC filing makes no reference to caregiver
discrimination. This 2022 filing does not name UPMC as respondent, and it primarily references
Title VII discrimination. Therefore, under the allegations of the Amended Complaint and in

consideration of the 2022 EEOC and PHRC charge, Ms. Horne has not adequately pleaded that
she has exhausted her administrative remedies as regards UPMC in Count VI of the Amended
Complaint.
Accordingly, UPMC’s Motion to Dismiss against it in Count VI will be granted.
4. FMLA Retaliation and Interference (Count VII)
a. FMLA Retaliation
The Amended Complaint alleges that Ms. Horne requested and was approved for FMLA
leave for the period of February 19, 2024 to April 19, 2024 due to bronchitis and an ear
infection. (ECF No. ¶¶ 96-97, 205). It also alleges that UPMC eliminated the Account
Representative Senior position while she was still on FMLA leave. Id. at ¶ 206.

UPMC argues that it is not unlawful to terminate an employee’s employment while the
employee is on an approved FMLA leave, so long as it was not because the employee took the
leave. UPMC further maintains that the Amended Complaint alleges a legitimate reason for Ms.
Horne’s termination, i.e. the Account Representative Senior position was eliminated during the
period of her leave.
In her opposition brief, Ms. Horne does not argue in of support of her retaliation claim.
Instead, her entire argument is that the FMLA entitles her to reinstatement at the conclusion of
her leave.
To bring an FMLA retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) she invoked the right to
FMLA-qualifying leave, (2) she suffered an adverse employment decision, and (3) the adverse
action was causally related to her invocation of rights.
Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 301–02 (3d Cir. 2012). Under

Department of Labor regulations, an employee, “has no greater right to reinstatement or to other
benefits and conditions of employment than if the employee had been continuously employed
during the FMLA leave period.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a).
Here, the Amended Complaint admits that Ms. Horne’s UPMC job was eliminated. Ms.
Horne has not alleged that said job elimination was related in any way to her invocation of
FMLA or that Ms. Horne’s job would not have been eliminated had she not taken FMLA leave.
Without such allegations, Ms. Horne fails to plead facts to support the causation element for her
claim. Thus, Ms. Horne cannot sustain an FMLA retaliation claim.
b. FMLA Interference
UPMC argues that Amended Complaint admits that notwithstanding the elimination of

the Account Representative Senior position during her FMLA leave, Ms. Horne was not
terminated until after she completed her FMLA leave. Therefore, UPMC contends that Ms.
Horne cannot allege that she was denied the right to take FMLA leave. Ms. Horne argues that
FMLA entitles her to reinstatement at the conclusion of her leave.
In order to prove a claim for FMLA interference, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) he or she
was an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) the defendant was an employer subject to the
FMLA’s requirements; (3) the plaintiff was entitled to FMLA leave; (4) the plaintiff gave notice
to the defendant of his or her intention to take FMLA leave; and (5) the plaintiff was denied
benefits to which he or she was entitled under the FMLA.” Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 191–
92 (3d Cir. 2014).
Here, UPMC’s arguments are well taken. The Amended Complaint does not allege that
Ms. Horne was denied benefits under the FMLA. The adverse employment action at issue

occurred on April 23, 2024, i.e. when Ms. Horne was terminated because her position had been
eliminated on March 19, 2024. Ms. Horne’s FMLA expired on April 19, 2024, and her
termination occurred after her FMLA leave expired. Therefore, there was no denial of FMLA
benefits that would support a claim of FMLA interference.
Accordingly, UPMC’s Motion to Dismiss against it in Count VII will be granted.
V. Magee’s Motion to Dismiss
A. Relevant Background
Ms. Horne alleges that she was hired on January 6, 2024 into a “moonlighting” job for
Magee as a Health Unit Coordinator in the Emergency Room, while also continuing to work for
UPMC. (ECF No. 23 at ¶ 95). Ms. Horne requested and was granted FMLA leave from her

UPMC position for the period of February 19, 2024 through April 19, 2024. On February 20,
2024, while on FMLA leave from UPMC, Ms. Horne interviewed with Magee for a Nursing
Assistant job. UPMC Magee offered Ms. Horne the job on March 6, 2024, and she accepted the
offer. Id. at ¶¶ 98-100. However, on March 12, 2024 Ms. Horne retracted her acceptance, “due
to personal reasons.” Id. On March 19, 2024, while Ms. Horne was on FMLA leave from UPMC,
UPMC informed her that the UPMC position of Account Representative Senior had been
eliminated. Id. at ¶¶ 101-02. Ms. Horne alleges that “because [her] moonlighting position was
contingent on her full-time position with [UPMC], the elimination of her position meant she
would also lose her moonlighting position.” Id. at ¶ 103.
In addition to references to events in 2024, Ms. Horne tangentially alleges that Magee
terminated her because she reported pregnancy discrimination by the Health Plan in 2021-2022.
Based on said alleged facts, Ms. Horne also asserts a claim for interference and retaliation in
violation of the FMLA. Id. at ¶¶ 198-210. Ms. Horne concludes: “Defendants UPMC Magee and

UPMC Corporate interfered and retaliated against Ms. Horne for exercising her rights under the
FMLA by terminating her employment in the midst of her FMLA leave. Id. at ¶ 206.
B. Analysis
1. Count II-PDA Retaliation
Magee contends that Count II does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
because the Court cannot infer from the Amended Complaint that Ms. Horne’s April 2024
Magee job termination resulted from either her 2022 pregnancy discrimination complaint against
a Health Plan supervisor, or from her June 2022 EEOC and PHRC filing against the Health Plan.
Magee maintains that the Amended Complaint does not allege that Magee knew about Ms.
Horne’s 2021-2022 pregnancy complaints; and thus, there can be no causal connection between

any 2024 adverse employment action and her alleged 2022 protected activities. Without
addressing these specific arguments, Ms. Horne argues that she engaged in extensive protected
activity throughout her employment.
“Courts analyze PDA claims as sex discrimination under Title VII.” Brown v. Aria
Health, Civ. A. No. 17-1827, 2019 WL 1745653, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2019) (citation
omitted). Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision provides that “an employer may not ‘discriminate
against’ an employee ‘because,’ among other things, the employee ‘has opposed any ... unlawful
employment practice.’” Peifer v. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 106 F.4th 270, 279 (3d Cir. 2024)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). “To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, therefore, a
plaintiff must show that (1) ‘she engaged in a protected activity,’ (2) ‘she suffered an adverse
employment action,’ and (3) ‘there was a causal connection between the participation in the
protected activity and the adverse action.’” Id. (quoting Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ.,
851 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2017)). A causal link may be established either by:

(1) temporal proximity; or (2) other circumstantial evidence in the record as a whole—such as a
pattern of antagonism or inconsistent explanations—that permits an inference of
causation. Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280–81 (3d Cir.2000). Though
“there is no bright line rule as to what constitutes unduly suggestive temporal proximity,” courts
have held that a causal link cannot be inferred by long temporal gaps. See LeBoon v. Lancaster
Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 233 (3d Cir. 2007) (rejecting three-month gap);
Malobabich v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 2:12-CV-1483, 2013 WL 1182237, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 21,
2013) (rejecting two years); Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 198 (3d Cir. 2015)
(rejecting ten-month gap); Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2007) (rejecting five-
month gap).

Here, the Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege a causal link between the alleged
2021-2022 protected activity and the alleged 2024 adverse employment action. First, any causal
link that could be established by temporal proximity facially fails. In the Amended Complaint,
Ms. Horne alleges that, in 2021, she reported a Health Plan’s supervisor’s remark about her
pregnancy to the Health Plan’s HR Department, and that in June 2022, she filed a charge against
Health Plan with the EEOC and PHRC. Said events occurred in distant temporal proximity to
her alleged termination in April 2024. In the Amended Complaint, Ms. Horne does not allege
that Magee knew of the above alleged 2021/2022 protected activity from when she was
employed with the Health Plan. Without such nexus, the Amended Complaint does not plausibly
infer that Ms. Horne’s April 2024 termination by Magee was in retaliation for a 2021 complaint
about her Health Plan supervisor, or in retaliation for her June 2022 EEOC and PHRC Charge of
pregnancy discrimination against the Health Plan. Moreover, a retaliation claim against Magee
strains logic where, in 2024, two years after the alleged protected activities, Magee offered Ms.

Horne a Nursing Assistant position, which she accepted and then later retracted. And, as regards
the termination of her moonlighting position at Magee, the Amended Complaint concedes that
said action was tied to the termination of her UPMC employment due to the unrelated
elimination of the Account Representative Senior position by UPMC. Therefore, the Amended
Complaint does not state a claim against Magee for PDA retaliation.
Accordingly, Magee’s Motion to Dismiss claims against it in Count II will be granted.
2. Count VII- FMLA Retaliation and Interference
Magee argues that Ms. Horne does not allege any facts that would support a causal
connection between her FMLA leave with UPMC and any retaliatory action by Magee. Further,
Ms. Horne does not allege that Magee had any role in her job elimination with UPMC, which

was the operative trigger for the elimination of her moonlighting job with Magee. More
fundamentally, Magee maintains that the facts, as alleged in the Amended Complaint, do not
establish that Ms. Horne was eligible for FMLA by virtue of her employment with Magee
because, she had not been employed by Magee in the moonlighting position for the requisite
period of time to meet statutory FMLA eligibility. Ms. Horne does not directly address Magee’s
arguments in her response.
Only an “eligible employee” is entitled to take FMLA leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a)(1). An
“‘eligible employee’ means an employee who has been employed--(i) for at least 12 months by
the employer with respect to whom leave is requested under section 2612 of this title; and (ii) for
at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month period. 29
U.S.C. § 2611 (2)(A).
Here, Ms. Horne’s Amended Complaint does not plead facts to establish that she was an
eligible employee for FMLA leave as a Magee employee. Ms. Horne’s Amended Complaint

avers that she began her job with Magee on January 6, 2024 and that she was terminated by
Magee in April 2024. Such interval of Magee employment does not meet the statutory
requirements for FMLA eligibility. Further, as discussed above, Ms. Horne’s causal connection,
with regard to any FMLA claim against Magee, is implausible, where she was offered a Nursing
Assistant Job by Magee while she was on FMLA leave a to her employment with UPMC.
Finally, as discussed above, Ms. Horne’s moonlighting position was only terminated because of
the neutral reason that, when she was no longer employed with UPMC, she was no longer
eligible to maintain her moonlighting position. Thus, because Ms. Horne was not statutorily
eligible to invoke any FMLA benefit with Magee, and because the Amended Complaint does not
allege a plausible nexus between any FMLA leave and any adverse employment action by

Magee, she cannot support any FMLA interference or retaliation claim.
Accordingly, Magee’s Motion to Dismiss claims against it in Count VII will be granted.
VI. Conclusion and Amendment
When a court grants a motion to dismiss, the court “must permit a curative amendment
unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Great Western Mining & Mineral Co.
v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 174 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). Further,
amendment is inequitable where there is “undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, [or] unfair
prejudice.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Amendment is
futile “where an amended complaint ‘would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.’” MU. v. Downingtown High Sch. E., 103 F. Supp. 3d 612, 631 (E.D. Pa. 2015)
(quoting Great Western Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 175).
Ms. Horne’s 2022 EEOC and PHRC charge governs a large swath of Defendants’
challenges to her Amended Complaint and deficiencies discussed within this Opinion. Because
the Court has found that such claims were not within the scope of the 2022 charge, amendment
as to such claims would be futile. The only remaining claim to survive is Count I against the
Health Plan.
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes as follows:
1. Health Plan’s Motion to Dismiss, Count II, III, IV, and V, will be granted. Any
amendment as to those counts will be deemed futile.
2. UPMC’s Motion to Dismiss, Counts II, V, VI, and VII, will be granted. UPMC will
be dismissed. Any Amendment as to those counts will be deemed futile.
3. Magee’s Motion to Dismiss, Counts II and VII, will be granted. Magee will be
dismissed. Any amendment as to Magee will be deemed futile.
A separate order will follow directing Health Plan to answer Count I of the Amended
Complaint.
DATED this 26" day of November, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
Deprhpe Yor
MARILYN J. HORA
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11210160. Public record. Not legal advice.