# ROBERT LEE JACKSON v. DAVID STEVENS, et al.

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · November 21, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11209278

## Case

- **Full name:** ROBERT LEE JACKSON v. DAVID STEVENS, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** November 21, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11209278

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting district court can dismiss without granting leave to amend where a complaint is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for “total implausibility”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

ROBERT LEE JACKSON,

Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:25-cv-209
v.
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
DAVID STEVENS, et al., Magistrate Judge Bowman

Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
In her April 29, 2025, Report and Recommendation (R&R, Doc. 7, #40)
Magistrate Judge Bowman recommends that the Court dismiss this action. While
Jackson’s complaint is not subject to screening under § 1915(e), the Magistrate Judge
recommends the Court dismiss the lawsuit sua sponte for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because it is frivolous, or alternatively, for failure to state a claim. (Id.).
Plaintiff objected. (Objs., Doc. 9). For the reasons stated more fully below, the Court
OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (Doc. 9) and ADOPTS the R&R’s conclusions,
albeit for somewhat different reasons, and DISMISSES this matter WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Robert Lee Jackson is proceeding pro se. He filed this suit on April 3,
2025, naming the United States, the State of Ohio, the Hamilton County Prosecutors
Office, “Chief Prosecutors” Joseph Deters and David Stevens, the “Cincinnati Police
law Enforcement Officers,” and the “Appellate Court of Appeals” as defendants. (Doc.
1, #4). Jackson titles his action a “Civil Rights Lawsuit” and lists ten claims. (Id.). As
best the Court can tell, these claims are for: (1) unjust conviction and imprisonment,
citing 28 U.S.C. § 2518; (2) defamation, citing 28 U.S.C. § 4101; (8) violation of
Miranda rights; three related requests to delete all (4) Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction (ORDC) “Penal Numbers,” (5) police reports, and
(6) indictment information—presumably what Jackson considers his criminal
history; (7) corrupt activity, citing Ohio Revised Code § 2923.31; (8) “Altered Falsified
Records Tampering,” citing Ohio Revised Code §§ 2913.42, 2921.12, 5703.26, and 18
U.S.C. § 1519; (9) conspiracy, citing Ohio Revised Code § 2923.01; and (10) conspiracy
(federal), citing 18 U.S.C. Ch. 19. Ud.). To establish subject matter jurisdiction,
Jackson checked three boxes on the complaint form: 28 U.S.C. § 1343(8) (civil rights
jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 federal question jurisdiction); and the fill in the blank
option, which he did not fill in. Ud. at #2). And in terms of relief, Jackson asks for
money damages and makes what appears to be a request to delete his criminal
record.! Ud. at #7 (CHR 4311-118 Congress (2024-2025) Entry Motion Deletions
Offenses, Penal Conviction[;] 0.6 M 4hundred thousand dollars”’)). Aside from
attaching various documents, Jackson alleges no facts regarding these claims. The
attachments include (1) documents relating to his 2018 appeal of an Ohio state court
“unlawful conviction felony case,” (id. at #8-13), and (2) his Hamilton County

Court assumes Jackson is referring to the DELETE Act, H.R. 4311, 118th Cong. (2023)
(DELETE Act), an unenacted federal bill “[t]lo establish a centralized system to allow
individuals to request the simultaneous deletion of their personal information across all data
brokers, and for other purposes.” This bill has also been reintroduced in the current Congress.
See DELETE Act, H.R. 2612, 119th Cong. (2025).

Juvenile Court Records, marked up with handwritten comments disputing much of
the listed information, (id. at #15—-19).
The day that Jackson filed his Complaint, he also filed five other motions: a
Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2), a Motion for Writ of Execution
(Doc. 3), a Motion for Writ of Certiorari (Doc. 4), a Motion for Entry of Judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 (Doc. 5), and a Motion under the DELETE
Act (Doc. 6). However, despite requesting in forma pauperis status, Jackson also paid
the filing fee. (Doc. 1-2, #21).
Jackson is proceeding pro se, so the matter was referred under this Court’s
Cincinnati General Order 22-02 to a Magistrate Judge. But because Jackson had paid
the filing fee (leading the Magistrate Judge to deny his Motion for Leave to Proceed
in forma pauperis as moot (Doc. 8)), his Complaint was not subject to screening under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Magistrate Judge nonetheless recommends dismissing the
case sua sponte, with prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or
alternatively, for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 7, #37). The Magistrate Judge bases
this recommendation on the Court’s ability to dismiss frivolous lawsuits under Apple
v. Glenn. Ud. (citing 183 F.3d 477 (6th Cir. 1999))).
In her recommendation, the Magistrate Judge understands Jackson as
“assert[ing| federal and state civil rights claims against defendants and ask[ing] the
Court to delete his prior offenses and convictions.” Ud. at #39). But the Magistrate
Judge finds that, even liberally construing his allegations, Jackson fails to state any
viable claims. (/d.). First, she observes that Jackson “fails to include any supporting

factual allegations that would allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged.” (Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007))).

Indeed, she notes that Jackson makes no mention of any of the defendants beyond
naming them in the caption. (Id.).
Then, the Magistrate Judge finds that even if Jackson had alleged facts about
the defendants, his claims nonetheless fail for two reasons. (Id. at #39–40). First, “[t]o
the extent that [Jackson] seeks money damages for alleged constitutional violations
stemming from his criminal conviction, his § 1983 claims are barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).” (Doc. 7, #39). Heck held that for a plaintiff to

“recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment … [that]
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized
to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus.” 512 U.S. at 486–87. Jackson alleges no such facts related to
his conviction or sentence here. (Doc. 7, #40). Second, the Magistrate Judge finds that

Jackson’s complaint is time-barred. (Id.). “A civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
is governed by Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury
claims.” (Id. (collecting cases)). Because Jackson’s complaint appears to be based on
events that occurred in 2018—i.e., the appeal of the previous Ohio state court case—
the Magistrate Judge found he did not bring suit within the requisite two-year period.
(Id.).
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends the case be dismissed with
prejudice for failing to state a claim for relief. (Id.). Additionally, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a), the Magistrate Judge advises that any appeal of an Order adopting the

R&R would not be taken in good faith and therefore recommends denying Jackson
leave to appeal in forma pauperis. (Id.). And, because the Magistrate Judge
recommends the matter be dismissed, she also denied Jackson’s Motion for Writ of
Execution (Doc. 3) and Motion for Writ of Certiorari (Doc. 4). (Doc. 8, #42).
The R&R advised Jackson that he had 14 days to serve and file specific written
objections. (Doc. 7, #41 (citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985))). So, Jackson
needed to object by May 13, 2025, which he did, (Doc. 9).

In his Objections, Jackson raises seven issues: (1) his lawsuit is not frivolous
because it pertains to civil rights violations; (2) the damages sought are appropriate
because defendants have done things that outweigh the things Jackson has done;
(3) the statute of limitations is five years and Jackson was released from
incarceration on April 20, 2020; (4) he asks to receive the District Court’s
recommendation, or in the alternative, be placed on the Supreme Court’s docket,

because the Magistrate Judge may be prejudiced against him; (5) there are issues
with his criminal history records; (6) his 2018 case was not heard properly on appeal;
and (7) he again asks for his criminal history to be expunged under the DELETE Act.
(Id. at #45–46).
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), “district courts review a[]
[report and recommendation] de novo after a party files a timely objection.” Bates v.
Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 1:22-cv-337, 2023 WL 4348835, at *1 (S.D. Ohio

July 5, 2023). But that de novo review requirement extends only to “any portion to
which a proper objection was made.” Id. (quotation omitted). In response to such an
objection, “the district court may accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge
with instructions.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3)) (cleaned up).
By contrast, if a party makes only a general objection, that “has the same

effect[] as would a failure to object.” Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 932
F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). A litigant must identify each issue in the report and
recommendation to which he objects with sufficient clarity for the Court to identify
it, or else the litigant forfeits the Court’s de novo review of the issue. Miller v. Currie,
50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The objections must be clear enough to enable the
district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.”).
That said, Jackson is proceeding pro se. A pro se litigant’s pleadings should be

construed liberally and are subject to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Franklin v. Rose,
765 F.2d 82, 84–85 (6th Cir. 1985). But pro se litigants still must comply with the
procedural rules that govern civil cases. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113
(1993). And “[t]he liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient
treatment of substantive law, and the liberal standards that apply at the pleading
stage do not apply after a case has progressed to the summary judgment stage.”
Johnson v. Stewart, No. 08-1521, 2010 WL 8738105, at *3 (6th Cir. May 5, 2010)
(citations omitted).

For any unobjected portions of an R&R, “the advisory committee notes to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) suggest that the Court still must ‘satisfy itself
that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation.’” Redmon v. Noel, No. 1:21-cv-445, 2021 WL 4771259, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 13, 2021) (collecting cases).

LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Magistrate Judge recommends sua sponte dismissal with prejudice. By
this she means the Court should dismiss the whole case on the merits, such that
Jackson could neither (1) seek leave to amend, or (2) file another case advancing these
claims. But “[g]enerally, a district court may not sua sponte dismiss a complaint
where the filing fee has been paid unless the court gives the plaintiff the opportunity
to amend the complaint.” Apple, 183 F.3d at 479 (emphasis in original) (citing Benson

v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1017 (6th Cir. 1999)). And here Jackson has paid a filing
fee.
So the Court must start with a basic question—can the Court sua sponte
dismiss the case without providing Jackson leave to amend despite Jackson having
paid? Yes, but only in certain circumstances. As particularly relevant here, even if a
plaintiff has paid a filing fee, “a district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a

complaint [without leave to amend] for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the allegations of a
complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of
merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Jd. (emphasis added) (citing Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (collecting cases)); see also Bardes v. Bush, No.
23-3272, 2023 WL 9318039, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2023) (noting district court can
dismiss without granting leave to amend where a complaint is dismissed under Rule
12(b)(1) for “total implausibility”). A complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).2 But,
because “a federal court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction is powerless to render a
judgment on the merits|,]’... [that] dismissal... ought to be without prejudice.”
Bardes, 2023 WL 9318039, at *2 (emphasis added) (quoting Thompson v. Love’s
Travel Stops & Country Stores, Inc., 748 F. App’x 6, 11 (6th Cir. 2018)).
Against that backdrop, the Court largely agrees with the R&R’s conclusions,
but has some quibbles with the analytical framework. To start, while the Magistrate
Judge cited Apple as the basis for the sua sponte review, the R&R’s analysis instead
focuses on whether Jackson “failfed] to state a claim for relief.” (Doc. 7, #40). But
failure to state a claim is the standard that applies to dismissal under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1), the rule on which Apple rests. The Court

Nettzke v. Williams, the Supreme Court defined frivolousness while considering in forma
pauperis complaints (ones where the plaintiff has not paid a filing fee). 490 U.S. at 325. But
the Sixth Circuit has applied Neitzke’s formulation of frivolousness in the Apple v. Glenn
context (i.e., in cases involving fee-paid plaintiffs) numerous times. See Clark v. United
States, 74 F. App’x 561, 562 (6th Cir. 2003); Hassink v. Mottl, 47 F. App’x 753. 754-55 (6th
Cir. 2002); Forbush v. Zaleski, 20 F. App’x 481, 481-82 (6th Cir. 2001); Odom v. Martin, 229
F.3d 1158, 2000 WL 1176888, at *1—2 (6th Cir. 2000) (Table).

does not believe that sua sponte dismissal under 12(b)(6) would be appropriate at this
stage. See Bardes v. Bush, No. 1:22-cv-290, 2023 WL 2364664, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Mar.
6, 2023), modified on appeal, 2023 WL 9318039. So, the Court will review the

Complaint (Doc. 1) for subject matter jurisdiction and, because Jackson objected to
the R&R, (Doc. 9), the Court will conduct that review de novo. It turns out, though,
that this difference matters only at the margins—the Court agrees that it should sua
sponte dismiss the case but does so for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, rather than
on the merits. And the Court, in contrast to the R&R’s recommendation, dismisses
without prejudice.
To recap, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims that are “totally

implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open
to discussion.” Apple, 183 F.3d at 479. That is an apt description of Jackson’s
Complaint here. To start, it is factually frivolous. Jackson’s central claim—that the
United States, Ohio, county prosecutors, and judges conspired to deny him his civil
rights—is “fanciful.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. And while there admittedly are not
many “baseless” facts in the Complaint, id. at 327, that is only because the Complaint

is largely devoid of any facts at all.
Beyond factual frivolousness, the Complaint is also legally frivolous because it
is “based on … indisputably meritless legal theor[ies].” Id. at 327. First, as the R&R
explains, for Jackson to assert money damages based on a wrongful conviction or
imprisonment, he needs to have been wrongfully convicted or imprisoned, which he
does not allege. (Doc. 7, #39–40); see Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Second, his request that
the Court delete his criminal record appears to be based on the DELETE Act, an
unenacted bill (which does not “delete” criminal records) introduced in Congress. See
supra note 1. And third, all Defendants in this case are legally improper as they have

either absolute immunity from Jackson’s claims or are not legal entities capable of
being sued. See Jenkins v. Tennessee, 22 F. App’x. 381, 382 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327–28) (“Claims that lack an arguable or rational basis in law
include claims for which the defendants are clearly entitled to immunity and claims
of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.”).
As to this latter point, the Court addresses each defendant one by one. The
United States cannot be sued as “[j]urisdiction over any suit against the Government

requires a clear statement from the United States waiving sovereign immunity[.]” El-
Bey v. United States, No. 1:21-cv-574, 2022 WL 394379, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2022)
(quoting United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:21-cv-574, 2022 WL 2835003 (S.D. Ohio
July 20, 2022)). Nor can Ohio be sued as “[a]bsent an express waiver, the Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution bars suit against a State or one of its

agencies or departments in federal court regardless of the nature of the relief sought.”
Id. (collecting cases). And “the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office … is [not] a legal
entity that is capable of being sued.” Henry v. Allen, 1:13-cv-701, 2013 WL 9839229,
at *4 (S.D Ohio Dec. 20, 2013). Jackson’s claims against “The Cincinnati Police law
Enforcement Officers” similarly fail as he has not named individual officers and “[a]
police department is not a juridical entity subject to suit under Ohio law.” Schaffner
v. Pell, No. 2:10-cv-374, 2010 WL 2572777, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 21, 2010). The claims
against the “Appellate Court of Appeals” fail for the same reason. El-Bey, 2022 WL
394379, at *5. Finally, “Chief Prosecutors” Joseph Deters and David Stevens enjoy

prosecutorial immunity. Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1443 (6th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976)) (“Absolute or ‘quasi-judicial’
immunity derived from common-law immunity accorded to judges has been extended
to prosecutors when the prosecutorial activity is ‘intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process.’”). So, both forms of relief Jackson seeks are
legally barred, and he cannot sue any of the named defendants. His blunderbuss
approach of listing ten claims all predicated on the same basic facts (or lack thereof)

does not make his suit any less legally frivolous.
In sum, the Court concludes that this is one those “rare[] circumstances” where
the Complaint is “totally implausible,” warranting sua sponte dismissal under
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Apple, 183 F.3d at 480. Moreover, in
such circumstances, the Court need not provide Jackson an opportunity to amend, id.
at 479, so the Court declines to do so here. That said, because the Court dismisses on

jurisdictional grounds, the dismissal is without prejudice. Bardes, 2023 WL 9318039,
*2.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court largely ADOPTS the R&R’s conclusions but
based on different reasoning. (Doc. 7). In short, the Court OVERRULES Jackson’s
Objections (Doc. 9) and DISMISSES this matter WITHOUT PREJUDICE under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Moreover, because the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court DENIES
all other pending motions as MOOT. The Court further CERTIFIES, under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal of this Opinion and Order would not be made in
good faith, and DENIES Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Of course, as
Plaintiff is not proceeding in this Court in forma pauperis, he retains the right to seek
directly from the Sixth Circuit leave to appeal in forma pauperis in that court.
Finally, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment aad to TERMINATE this
case on its docket.
SO ORDERED.

November 21, 2025
DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11209278. Public record. Not legal advice.