# Ibrahim

> District Court, E.D. New York · November 20, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11209202

## Case

- **Full name:** Tarek Ibrahim v. Z Restaurant, Diner and Lounge, Inc., Adel Fathelbab, and Adam Fathelbab
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** November 20, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11209202

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------- x
TAREK IBRAHIM, :
:
Plaintiff, :
: MEMORANDUM & ORDER
-against- :
: 20-CV-05967 (ENV) (PK)
Z RESTAURANT, DINER AND LOUNGE, INC., :
ADEL FATHELBAB, and ADAM FATHELBAB, :
:
Defendants. :
-------------------------------------------------------------- x
VITALIANO, D.J.

On December 8, 2020, plaintiff Tarek Ibrahim (“Tarek”) commenced this action against
defendants Z Restaurant, Diner and Lounge, Inc. (“Z Restaurant”), Adel Fathelbab (“Adel”), and
Adam Fathelbab (“Adam”), alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the
New York Labor Law (“NYLL”). Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Defendants filed a motion for partial
summary judgment on September 15, 2022. Mot., Dkt. No. 37-11. That motion was referred to
Magistrate Judge Peggy Kuo. On February 7, 2025, Magistrate Judge Kuo issued a report and
recommendation (the “R&R”) recommending that defendants’ motion be denied in full. R&R,
Dkt. No. 40. In response, defendants timely filed an objection to the portion of the R&R
recommending the denial of their motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claims
under FLSA and NYLL. Defs.’ Obj., Dkt. No. 43.
For the following reasons, the Court overrules defendants’ objection and adopts the R&R
in its entirety as the opinion of the Court.
Background1
In or around January 2017, Tarek was hired to be the night-shift kitchen manager for
Parkview Diner, a restaurant owned and operated by Adel and Adam, a father-and-son team,
through the corporate entity known as Z Restaurant. Adam Decl., Dkt. No. 37-9, at ¶¶ 1-2; Adel

Dep. Tr., Dkt. No. 38-5, at 8:11-9:7. While it is undisputed that Tarek remained employed at
Parkview Diner until March 2020, see Adam Decl. ¶ 4; Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Interrogs. No. 13,
Dkt. No. 38-10, the circumstances surrounding Tarek’s departure from Parkview Diner are
vigorously disputed by the parties.
For his part, Tarek fires off a barrage of charges that are not always internally consistent.
For example, Tarek contends that he was terminated due to complaints he had made concerning
his wages. See Tarek Dep. Tr., Dkt. No. 38-4, at 100:7-12. He claims to have complained to Adel
and Adam about their failure to pay him minimum wage and to compensate him for overtime on
three separate occasions in February and March 2020. Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Interrogs. No. 10. But
he also denied making any minimum wage complaints in his deposition. Tarek Dep. Tr. 96:16-

97:5. Tarek makes other claims as well that are less clearly related to his wage and hour
grievances. Specifically, Tarek testified in his deposition that around the time his employment
ended, he had demanded that Adel return to him all the money that Adel had allegedly been
deducting from his paychecks and investing on his behalf in a new, and possibly fictitious, business
venture. Id. at 55:20-57:15, 79:22-80:15. Soon after making all of these complaints, according to
Tarek, he was fired by Adel, who informed him that he was no longer “welcome” at Parkview
Diner. Id. at 72:5-7. Tarek allegedly told Adel during a follow-up phone call that same day that

1 The facts set forth here are drawn from the declarations, exhibits, and Rule 56.1 statements and
counterstatements of fact submitted by the parties.
he felt like he was being treated like a “criminal.” Id. at 80:24-81:7.
Adel and Adam enter the fray with a starkly different story. They claim that they never
fired Tarek, who, they say, left on his own accord. See Adel Dep. Tr. 149:21-24. They do
acknowledge, however, that due to the financial hardship created by the societal restrictions

imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic, they could not continue his employment on the same
terms as before. See Adam Dep. Tr., Dkt. No. 38-6, at 102:19-103:8. At no time prior to the
COVID-19 pandemic, they assert, did Tarek ever complain about wages during his tenure at the
Parkview Diner. Id. at 91:2-92:15; Adel Dep. Tr. 130:3-132:7. Not missing a beat, Adel and
Adam say that they, following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, offered to continue Tarek’s
employment at a reduced rate of pay but that Tarek declined their offer and decided to leave to
collect Medicaid benefits. Adel Dep. Tr. 139:13-140:5. In fact, rather than the acrimonious parting
of ways that Tarek describes, Adel alleges that Tarek gave Adel a thermometer as a gift after his
departure because Adel had told Tarek that he had COVID and could not find a thermometer
anywhere. Id. at 142:14-18, 146:21-147:7.

Legal Standards
When reviewing a report and recommendation, a district court “may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In the absence of any objections, the district court need only be satisfied
that there is no clear error on the face of the record. See Dafeng Hengwei Textile Co. v. Aceco
Indus. & Com. Corp., 54 F. Supp. 3d 279, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). However, where an objection
has been made to any of the magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations, the district court
judge must “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly
objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). To be proper, objections must be timely and specific.
Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP, No. 24-1103, 2025 WL 3007285, at *3 (2d Cir. Oct. 28,
2025). While an objection may of course “repeat arguments that were previously raised,”
objections that are “nonspecific or merely perfunctory responses” are improper and accordingly
reviewed only for clear error. Id. at *4-5 (quoting Miller v. Brightstar Asia, Ltd., 43 F.4th 112,

120 (2d Cir. 2022)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, objections “generally may not
raise new arguments not previously made before the magistrate judge.” Id. at *3.
On de novo review of a summary judgment motion, the Court must resolve all ambiguities
and draw all permissible factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
See Borley v. United States, 22 F.4th 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2021). The Court will grant summary
judgment only in the absence of a genuine dispute as to material fact and upon a showing that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Discussion
In their singular objection, Adel and Adam focus on the R&R’s recommendation that their
motion for summary judgment on Tarek’s retaliation claims under FLSA and NYLL be denied.

Having conducted a de novo review, the Court concludes that this objection cannot be sustained,
as there is a genuine dispute as to the material facts underlying Tarek’s retaliation claims.
“Because the FLSA and NYLL retaliation provisions are ‘nearly identical,’ claims under
both statutes are analyzed using the same” three-step framework. Perry v. High Level Dev.
Contracting & Sec. LLC, No. 1:20-CV-02180 (AMD)(PK), 2022 WL 1018791, at *9 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 16, 2022) (quoting Torres v. Gristede's Operating Corp., 628 F. Supp. 2d 447, 471 n.18
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)). To satisfy the first of those steps, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case
“by showing (1) participation in protected activity known to the defendant . . . ; (2) an employment
action disadvantaging the plaintiff; and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and
the adverse employment action.” Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 2010).
Then, “the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a ‘legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the employment action.’” Id. (quoting Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir.
2000)). Lastly, if the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to make

a showing that the defendant’s proffered reason is simply a pretext for taking the adverse action.
Id. at 53-54. Here, there are triable issues of material fact as to each part of the prima facie case
that Tarek must make at the first step of the framework. Even when filtered through the remaining
two steps of the framework, there is a genuine dispute of material fact between the parties’ versions
of events, thereby making summary judgment inappropriate.
As to Tarek’s prima facie case, there is a factual dispute right at the start as to whether
Tarek made any “protected complaints.” To qualify as a “protected complaint,” the complaint in
question must be “sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in
light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for
their protection.” Pierre v. Air Serv Sec., No. 14 CV 5915 (MKB) (ST), 2016 WL 11396816, at

*11 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2016) (quoting Kassman v. KPMG LLP, 925 F. Supp. 2d 453, 472
(S.D.N.Y. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). While “mere ‘abstract grumblings’ will not
pass muster,” an “explicit invocation” of the relevant statutes or “illegality” is unnecessary. Dunn
v. Sederakis, 143 F. Supp. 3d 102, 112-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Valerio v. Putnam Assocs.,
Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 44 (1st Cir.1999)). Whether Tarek’s final complaint about his “investment” was
sufficiently clear to count as a “protected complaint” is debatable. But the three other complaints
that Tarek allegedly made in February and March 2020 would certainly meet the criteria for
“protected complaints” if the description Tarek provides in his interrogatory responses is accurate.2
Since Adel and Adam contest the factual existence of each of these three complaints, see Adel
Dep. Tr. 130:3-132:7; Adam Dep. Tr. 91:2-92:15, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to
this element of Tarek’s prima facie case.

Similarly, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether an adverse employment
action occurred. Courts consider this part of the prima facie case satisfied when a retaliatory action
“‘might have dissuaded a reasonable worker’ from bringing complaints similar to those lodged by
the plaintiff.” Dunn, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 114 (quoting Mullins, 626 F.3d at 53). “Termination is
undoubtedly an adverse employment action.” Perry, 2022 WL 1018791, at *10. While Tarek
contends that he was fired, see Tarek Dep. Tr. 72:5-7, 101:3-15, Adel and Adam maintain that
Tarek left voluntarily after declining their offer to stay on at a decreased salary, see Adel Dep. Tr.
139:13-140:5. Consequently, a genuine dispute of material fact remains as to this facet of Tarek’s
prima facie case as well.
Furthermore, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether a causal connection

exists between Tarek’s complaints and his termination. Generally, a causal connection can be
established through: (1) “evidence of retaliatory animus directed against a plaintiff by the
defendant”; or (2) a “showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the
adverse action.” Mullins, 626 F.3d at 53 (first quoting Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203, 207 (2d
Cir. 1991); and then quoting Manoharan v. Columbia Univ. Coll. of Physicians & Surgeons, 842
F.2d 590, 593 (2d Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). On the one hand, Tarek alleges

2 The only time Tarek ever refers to these three other complaints is in his interrogatory responses.
Pla.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Interrogs. No. 10. In their objection, Adel and Adam raise for the first time
a concern about the validity of Tarek’s interrogatory responses. Defs.’ Obj. 5. Because Adel and
Adam could have made this argument before the magistrate judge but failed to do so, the Court
will not consider it now. See Nambiar, 2025 WL 3007285, at *3.
that his unwarranted termination came scarcely a month after he first started making complaints
in February 2020 and that Adel’s tone during the conversation about Tarek’s termination was
markedly hostile. Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Interrogs. No. 10; Tarek Dep. Tr. 72:5-7, 80:24-81:7. On
the other hand, Adel claims that the exchange about Tarek’s departure was nothing but cordial and

that Tarek even brought him a thermometer as a gift shortly afterwards. Adel Dep. Tr. 146:21-
147:7. Given this conflict in the two accounts, there is also a genuine dispute of material fact as
to this part of Tarek’s prima facie case.
Finally, viewed through the filter of the remaining two steps of the analytical framework,
there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the justification given by Adel and Adam
for ending Tarek’s employment was true or simply a sham. Whereas Adel and Adam insist that
Tarek’s departure was due to the exigent business circumstances presented by the COVID-19
pandemic, see Adam Dep. Tr. 102:19-103:14, Tarek, not implausibly, asserts that the economic
downturn caused by the pandemic was just an easy excuse that Adel and Adam seized upon to
cover up the real reason for his termination, see Tarek Dep. Tr. 74:19-75:7, 100:7-12. Once again,

therefore, a genuine dispute of material fact exists that cannot be resolved at the summary judgment
stage.
Since Adel and Adam did not object to any of the R&R’s other recommendations and
findings, the remainder of the R&R is reviewed for clear error. In accordance with the applicable
clear-error standard of review, see Dafeng, 54 F. Supp. 3d at 283, the Court has undertaken a
careful review of the remainder of the R&R, which recommends the denial of the rest of
defendants’ summary judgment motion, and has found it to be correct, well-reasoned, and free of
any clear error. The Court, therefore, adopts it as the opinion of the Court.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Kuo’s R&R in its entirety
as the opinion of the Court. The parties are referred to Magistrate Judge Kuo for the further pretrial
management of this case.

So Ordered.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
November 4, 2025

/s/ Eric N. Vitaliano
ERIC N. VITALIANO
United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11209202. Public record. Not legal advice.