# Dobbs

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · November 25, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11209111

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael Van Dobbs v. Chad Youker, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** November 25, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11209111

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

MICHAEL VAN DOBBS, # 15, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 3:25-cv-01172
)
CHAD YOUKER, et al., ) JUDGE CAMPBELL
) MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Michael Van Dobbs, who is currently in the custody of the Williamson County Jail
in Franklin, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint alleging violations of his civil rights. (Doc. No. 1).
Plaintiff’s Complaint is now before the Court for initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A.
I. FILING FEE
Plaintiff filed an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”)
(Doc. No. 2). Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner
bringing a civil action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing fee required by
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). From a review of Plaintiff’s IFP Application and supporting documentation,
it appears that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources from which to pay the full filing fee in
advance. Therefore, his IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) will be granted.
Under § 1915(b), Plaintiff nonetheless remains responsible for paying the full filing fee.
The obligation to pay the fee accrues at the time the case is filed, but the PLRA provides prisoner-
plaintiffs the opportunity to make a “down payment” of a partial filing fee and to pay the remainder
in installments. Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby assessed the full civil filing fee of $350, to be paid
as follows:
(1) The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust fund account at the institution where he now
resides is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, “20 percent of the
greater of – (a) the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s account; or (b) the average monthly

balance in Plaintiff’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
(2) After the initial filing fee is fully paid, the trust fund officer must withdraw from
Plaintiff’s account and pay to the Clerk of this Court monthly payments equal to 20% of all deposits
credited to Plaintiff’s account during the preceding month, but only when the amount in the
account exceeds $10. Such payments must continue until the entire filing fee is paid in full.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
(3) Each time the trust account officer makes a payment to this court as required by this
Order, he or she must print a copy of the prisoner’s account statement showing all activity in the

account since the last payment made in accordance with this Order and submit it to the Clerk along
with the payment. All submissions to the Court must clearly identify Plaintiff’s name and the case
number as indicated on the first page of this Order, and must be mailed to: Clerk, United States
District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED send a copy of this Order to the administrator of inmate
trust fund accounts at the Williamson County Jail to ensure that the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate
trust account complies with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining to the payment of the filing
fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement, the custodian of his inmate
trust fund account MUST ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to his new place of
confinement for continued compliance.
II. SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT
Plaintiff has filed a document titled “Supplemental Complaint and Emergency Motion for
Injunctive Relief.” (Doc. No. 7).

“On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a
supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the
date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Plaintiff did not file a motion
seeking leave to supplement his Complaint. The Court therefore will not consider the purported
supplemental complaint in screening the Complaint.
If Plaintiff wishes to file an amended complaint, he may do so “once as a matter of course”
either before Defendants have submitted a responsive pleading or motion to dismiss or within
21 days after a responsive pleading or motion to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). If Plaintiff
wishes to file a supplemental complaint, he must file a motion for leave to do so. Any amended or

supplemental complaint must comply with the Court’s Local Rules governing amended pleadings.
Specifically, the amended or supplemental complaint must “restate the entirety of the pleading
with amendments incorporated, rather than merely reciting the amended sections.” M.D. Tenn.
L.R. 15.01(b).
III. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT
A. PLRA Screening Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and
summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman,

838 F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept
a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.
Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
B. Factual Allegations and Claims
Plaintiff names 17 Defendants1 and alleges that each Defendant is employed by the
Williamson County Sheriff’s Office. (Doc. No. 1 at 2−7). Plaintiff alleges that Williamson County
Sheriff’s Office deputies seized his and other inmates’ Bibles on or about January 18, 2025.
(Id. at 7). Documents attached to the Complaint indicate that Plaintiff and other inmates were
provided access to tablets with electronic copies of the Bible, but these tablets were not available

to inmates at night. (See id. at 15−17). Plaintiff alleges that he was denied access to a Bible
“for months.” (Id. at 8). Captain Youker describes the lack of access to a Bible at night as
“an [oversight] on our end when we implemented the digital religious material on the tablets.”
(Id. at 20).
C. Analysis
Construing the Complaint’s allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts supporting viable claims under the First Amendment, the

1 The named Defendants are Captain Chad Youker, Deputy Burdick, Deputy Mathis, Deputy Fairchild,
Deputy Crow, Deputy Perry, Sergeant Fearing, Lieutenant Gray, Lieutenant Obermyer, Lieutenant
Lindquist, Lieutenant Driskill, Deputy Redman, Deputy Wilson, Deputy O’Brien, Deputy Varni, Deputy
Bedford, and Deputy Fox.
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”),2 and Tennessee state law.
These claims shall proceed against Captain Youker in his individual and official capacities. The
Complaint does not state a claim for which relief may be granted against any other Defendant,
so all other claims will be dismissed.
1. Captain Youker

“The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment . . . provides that ‘Congress shall make
no law...prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].’” Maye v. Klee, 915 F.3d 1076, 1083
(6th Cir. 2019) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I). “In any free exercise claim, the first question is
whether the belief or practice asserted is religious in the plaintiff’s own scheme of things and is
sincerely held.” Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Where a plaintiff makes this threshold
showing, the Court must consider whether a regulation that “impinges on inmates’ constitutional
rights . . . is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
If not, “the inquiry ends, and the prisoner prevails.” Cavin v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 927 F.3d 455,
461 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). If so, then the Court balances “(1) whether the prisoner

possesses alternative avenues for exercising his religion; (2) whether accommodating the prisoner
would affect ‘guards and other inmates’ or ‘the allocation of prison resources generally’; and
(3) whether ‘obvious, easy alternatives’ exist that suggest ‘the regulation is not reasonable.’” Id.
(quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89−91 (1987)).
RLUIPA provides broader protection for the religious liberty of incarcerated individuals
than the First Amendment. Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 296 (6th Cir. 2010). To state a claim
under RLUIPA, a prisoner must (1) “demonstrate that he seeks to exercise religion out of a
sincerely held religious belief” and (2) “show that the government substantially burdened that

2 The Complaint does not cite RLUIPA directly, but Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief
does (Doc. No. 7 at 1), and the facts alleged in the Complaint are sufficient to state a claim under RLUIPA.
religious exercise.” Cavin, 927 F.3d at 458 (quotation marks omitted). If the prisoner satisfies these
elements, then the burden shifts to the government to show “that the burden furthers ‘a compelling
government interest’ and ‘is the least restrictive means’ of doing so.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-1(a)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges facts from which the Court may infer that he has a sincerely held

belief that reading and studying the Bible is part of his religious practice. (See Doc. No. 1 at 15).
Plaintiff also alleges facts from which the Court may infer that Captain Youker created and ordered
implementation policies prohibiting inmates at the Williamson County Jail from possessing
physical Bibles and preventing inmates from accessing electronic copies of religious texts during
certain hours. (See Doc. No. 1 at 17, 20). A reasonable factfinder could conclude that these policies
constitute a substantial burden on Plaintiff’s religious practice, and that is sufficient for Plaintiff’s
First Amendment and RLUIPA claims to proceed past screening. See Brown v. Page, No. 2:20-cv-
00070, 2021 WL 288754, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 27, 2021) (finding plaintiff had stated viable First
Amendment and RLUIPA claims based on restricted access to Bible). These allegations also allow

the Court to reasonably infer that the policies implemented by Captain Youker violate Tennessee’s
statute requiring inmate access to a Bible during non-working hours. Tenn. Code. Ann.
§ 41-21-211 (“Each inmate shall be provided with a Bible, which the inmate may be permitted to
peruse in the inmate’s cell at such times as the inmate is not required to perform prison labor.”).
Because Plaintiff alleges facts from which the Court may infer that these alleged violations
were a result of official policies, his claim may proceed against Captain Youker in his official
capacity, which is functionally a claim against Williamson County itself. See Alkire v. Irving,
330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003). The First Amendment and state-law claims will also proceed
against Captain Youker in his individual capacity, but any individual-capacity RLUIPA claim will
be dismissed. See Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 569−70 (6th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA does not
permit money damages against prison officials in their individual capacities).
2. All Other Defendants
Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants are employed by the Williamson County Sheriff’s
Office. (Doc. No. 1 at 2−6). Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against these Defendants are

therefore redundant to the official-capacity claims against Captain Youker, and they will
accordingly be dismissed. See Jackson v. Shelby County Gov’t, No. 07-6356, 2008 WL 4915434,
at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 2008) (affirming grant of summary judgment as to redundant official-
capacity claims).
Plaintiff has failed to state an individual-capacity claim for which relief may be granted
against any Defendant other than Captain Youker. As explained above, RLUIPA does not authorize
individual-capacity claims for damages. Haight, 763 F.3d at 569−70. As to the First Amendment
claims, Plaintiff has not alleged facts from which the Court may infer that any of these Defendants
were involved in the alleged decision to ban physical Bibles at the Williamson County Jail or the

alleged decision to deny access to electronic religious materials at night. He has therefore failed to
state a claim against these Defendants for which relief may be granted based on the First
Amendment or Tennessee law. See Abu-Joudeh v. Schneider, 954 F.3d 842, 850 (6th Cir. 2020)
(“To prevail in a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant was
personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations.”).
IV. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
“[A]n indigent’s right to appointed counsel . . . exists only where the litigant may lose his
physical liberty if he loses the litigation.” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981).
The appointment of counsel for a civil litigant is a matter within the discretion of the district court
and will occur only under exceptional circumstances. Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604−05
(6th Cir. 1993). Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated exceptional circumstances that require the
appointment of counsel. He asserts that the appointment of counsel is necessary “for a fair trial
and fear of further retaliation.” (Doc. No. 5 at 1). But he does not explain why the risk of unfair
trial or retaliation is greater in this case than in any other civil action brought by a pro se

incarcerated individual. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 5) will be
denied without prejudice.
V. MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO Motion”).
(Doc. No. 11). “Each motion for a TRO must be accompanied by a separately filed affidavit or
verified written complaint, a memorandum of law, and a proposed order.” M.D. Tenn. L.R.
65.01(b). Plaintiff’s TRO Motion is not accompanied by a memorandum of law or a proposed
order. (Doc. No. 11). The TRO Motion includes an “Affidavit,” but it is not made under penalty of
perjury as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Because the TRO Motion does not comply with these

requirements, it will be denied without prejudice.
Additionally, a TRO motion may not be granted unless “specific facts in an affidavit or a
verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result
to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney
certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). “If the movant is not represented by counsel, the pro se moving party must
certify in writing the efforts made to give notice of the request for a TRO and the reasons why
notice should not be required.” M.D. Tenn. L.R. 65.01(c). Here, the TRO Motion does not comply
with either prong of Rule 65(b)(1). For this reason, too, it will be denied without prejudice.
VI. MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTION
The Court construes Plaintiff’s Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief (Doc. No. 7) as a
motion for preliminary injunction. Captain Younker must respond to this Motion on or before the
deadline to file a responsive pleading or motion to dismiss. The Court will rule on the Motion in
due course once it is fully briefed.

VII. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED.
The Complaint states viable claims against Captain Youker under the First Amendment,
RLUIPA, and Tennessee Code § 41-21-211. The First Amendment and state-law claims SHALL
PROCEED against Captain Youker in his individual and official capacities. The RLUIPA claim
SHALL PROCEED against Captain Youker only in his official capacity.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send the plaintiff a service packet (a blank summons (AO 440)
and USM 285 form) for Captain Youker. Plaintiff MUST complete the service packet and return
it to the Clerk’s Office within 30 DAYS of the entry of this order. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of this case. Upon return of the properly completed service packet, the Clerk is
DIRECTED to issue summons to the U.S. Marshals Service for service on the defendant. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(b) and 4(c)(3).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), this action is REFERRED to the
Magistrate Judge to enter a scheduling order for the management of the case, to dispose or
recommend disposition of any pre-trial, non-dispositive motions, to issue a Report and
Recommendation on all dispositive motions, and to conduct further proceedings, if necessary,
under Rule 72(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and the Local Rules of Court. Despite the issuance of process,
the Magistrate Judge may sua sponte recommend the dismissal of any claim for the reasons set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
All claims against all Defendants other than Captain Youker are DISMISSED for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate these
Defendants on the docket.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 5) is DENIED without prejudice.
Plaintiff’s TRO Motion (Doc. No. 11) is DENIED without prejudice.
Captain Youker SHALL respond to Plaintiff’s Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief
(Doc. No. 7) on or before the deadline to file a responsive pleading or motion to dismiss.
It is so ORDERED.
Gx Cle
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11209111. Public record. Not legal advice.