# Striegel

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · November 25, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11209048

## Case

- **Full name:** Nathan Ferris Striegel v. Ms. Peterson, Kitchen Staff, Omega Center; Sgt. Couler, Omega Center; and Sgt. Windstein, Omega Center
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** November 25, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11209048

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment to prison officials when the prisoner alleged that he was often served food contaminated with foreign objects
- finding that evidence of “extreme pain from loose and infected teeth, which caused blood to seep from his gums, swelling, and difficulty sleeping and eating” constituted a serious medical need that would have been obvious to a layperson

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

NATHAN FERRIS STRIEGEL PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 6:24-cv-06078

MS. PETERSON, Kitchen Staff, Omega
Center; SGT. COULER, Omega Center; and DEFENDANTS
SGT. WINDSTEIN, Omega Center

ORDER
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation filed on July 23, 2024, by the
Honorable Mark E. Ford, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.
(ECF No. 7). Plaintiff Nathan Ferris Striegel (“Plaintiff”) filed an objection. (ECF No. 9). The
Court finds the matter ripe for consideration.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in connection with his
time at the Omega Supervision Sanction Center (“Omega Center”). (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges
that on May 19, 2024, he bit into a piece of metal while eating dinner served by Defendant Peterson
at the Omega Center. Plaintiff alleges that the metal “hurt [his] mouth” and that he requested
medical care. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Windstein “looked in [Plaintiff’s] mouth” and “said
he did not see no blood to put in a sick call[.]” (ECF No. 1, at 9). Plaintiff alleges that his mouth
“hurt” and that he “clearly need[ed] to be seen by [a] medical” professional at the time of the
incident. (ECF No. 1, at 9). Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants denied Plaintiff medical care after
he bit the piece of metal. (ECF No. 1, at 8). Plaintiff does not describe the metal object or any
injury to his mouth. He does not indicate in his complaint whether he placed a sick call to have
his mouth examined.
Plaintiff asserts claims of denial of medical care and cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment against all Defendants in their official and personal capacities. (ECF No.
1, at 4-6). Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $1 million dollars.
(ECF No. 1, at 17).
On July 23, 2024, Judge Ford conducted a preservice screening of Plaintiff’s complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and issued the instant Report and Recommendation. (ECF No.
7). Judge Ford makes three recommendations. First, he recommends that the Court dismiss

Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against all Defendants. Second, he recommends that the Court
dismiss Plaintiff’s claim that there was a foreign object (metal) in his food pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim. Third, he recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s
denial of medical care claim pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1).1 On August 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a
timely objection to Judge Ford’s recommendations. (ECF No. 10).
II. DISCUSSION
The Court may designate a magistrate judge to hear pre- and post-trial matters and to
submit to the Court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). Within fourteen days of receipt of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, “a
party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); accord Local Rule 72.1(VII)(C). After conducting an appropriate review
of the report and recommendation, the Court may then “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge . . . or recommit the matter to
the magistrate judge with instructions.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

1 Judge Ford also recommends that the Clerk be directed to place a 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) strike flag on the case for
future judicial consideration and that the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this
dismissal would not be taken in good faith. (ECF No. 7, at 6).
“[T]he specific standard of review depends, in the first instance, upon whether or not a
party has objected to portions of the report and recommendation.” Anderson v. Evangelical
Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1015 (N.D. Iowa 2018). Generally,
“objections must be timely and specific” to trigger de novo review. Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d
356, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1990). The Court applies a liberal construction when determining whether
pro se objections are specific. Hudson v. Gammon, 46 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 1995). “When
conducting a de novo review, the district court makes its own determinations of disputed issues

and does not decide whether the magistrate’s proposed findings are clearly erroneous.” Branch v.
Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). The Court will conduct a de novo
review in this case because Plaintiff filed timely and specific objections to the Report and
Recommendation. (ECF No. 10).
The Court will begin by addressing the recommendations for Plaintiff’s official capacity
claims. The Court will then address Plaintiff’s claim that there was a metal object in his food and
Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claim.2
A. Official Capacity Claims
Judge Ford recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against
all Defendants because these claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff does not address

this recommendation in his objection. Nevertheless, the Court has conducted a de novo review
and agrees with Judge Ford that Plaintiff’s official capacity claims are barred by sovereign
immunity.

2 The Court notes that Plaintiff states in his objections that he tried to submit evidence, but it was returned. (ECF No.
9, at 2). At this stage of litigation, the Court need not consider Plaintiff’s evidence to determine whether Plaintiff’s
complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted because the Court accepts all of the factual allegations
contained in Plaintiff’s complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. The Court also notes that Plaintiff objects to the time frame he had to file his objections to the Report and
Recommendations. Plaintiff states that he received the Report and Recommendations on August 2, 2024—seven days
before the August 9, 2024, deadline for objections. (ECF No. 9, at 2). The Court notes that Plaintiff timely filed his
objections on August 7, 2024.
Plaintiff brings official capacity claims against all Defendants in their role as employees of
the Omega Center. A defendant may be sued under § 1983 in his individual or official capacity, or
both. See Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998). Official capacity claims are
“functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing governmental entity.” Veatch v. Bartels
Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010). Thus, an official capacity claim against the
Defendant employees of the Omega Center is essentially a claim against the Omega Center, an
Arkansas state agency. See Fegans v. Norris, 351 Ark. 200, 206, 89 S.W.3d 919, 924 (2002).

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits “brought in federal court against a state, state agency,
or state officials acting in their official capacities,” unless Congress has abrogated the state’s
immunity, the state has waived its immunity, or the Ex Parte Young doctrine applies. Gordon v.
Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas, 168 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1153 (E.D. Ark. 2016)
(citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996)). None of these exceptions apply in
Plaintiff’s case. See Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 493 (8th Cir. 1991) (“Congress did not abrogate
constitutional sovereign immunity when enacting … section 1983.”). Accordingly, the Court finds
that Plaintiff’s official capacity claims are barred by sovereign immunity and must be dismissed.
B. Metal Object in Food
Plaintiff alleges that he bit a piece of metal while eating food he was served by Defendant

Peterson at the Omega Center. Plaintiff further alleges that the metal “hurt [his] mouth.” (ECF
No. 2, at 8). In his Report and Recommendation, Judge Ford finds that Plaintiff only alleged an
isolated incident of finding a foreign object in his food, which does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. Accordingly, Judge Ford recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
Plaintiff objects, asserting that he stated in his complaint that he did bite the metal and
consequently hurt his mouth and tooth. (ECF No. 9, at 1). Plaintiff also asserts that he “did not
know what kind of metal it was or where it came from” because Defendant Peterson took it away
to take photos and make a report. (ECF No. 9, at 1).
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Hamm
v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1985). A state may violate the Eighth
Amendment “if they fail to provide prisoners with reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter, and
sanitation.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the Eighth Amendment gives prisoners the right to
“nutritionally adequate food.” Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 449 (8th Cir. 1992). However,

“the fact that the food occasionally contains foreign objects . . . does not amount to a constitutional
deprivation.” Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1575; see Wishon, 978 F.2d at 449 (holding that the district court
did not err by granting summary judgment to prison officials when the prisoner alleged that he was
often served food contaminated with foreign objects).
Plaintiff does not allege in his complaint, or assert in his objections, anything more than
that he was served food that contained a piece of metal on one occasion. Finding a foreign object
in one’s food once does not amount to a constitutional deprivation. See Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1575;
see Wishon, 978 F.2d at 449. Accordingly, the Court agrees with Judge Ford’s finding that Plaintiff
failed to allege a constitutional violation on this claim.
C. Denial of Medical Care

Judge Ford finds that Plaintiff failed to allege facts establishing that he had an objectively
serious medical need because he did not provide details about his alleged injury, because the facts
did not indicate that his need for medical attention was obvious to a layperson, and because he did
not claim that he suffered detrimental effects to his mouth due to the lack of medical attention.
Plaintiff objects, arguing that he did state in his complaint that he hurt his “mouth and
tooth” after biting the metal. (ECF No. 9, at 1). Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant Windstein’s
inspection of Plaintiff’s mouth and subsequent denial of immediate medical care should not be
relied upon because Defendant Windstein is not a “[doctor,] nurse or dentist.” (ECF No. 9, at 1).
Rather, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Windstein violated his right to medical care by instructing
him to “put in a sick call when [he] clearly . . . needed to be seen by medical.” (ECF No. 9, at 1).
The Eighth Amendment prohibition of the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment
includes the deprivation of medical care. See Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 914 (8th Cir.
2011). To prevail on a claim for deprivation of medical care, “an inmate must show that the prison
official was deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s serious medical needs. This requires a two-

part showing that (1) the inmate suffered from an objectively serious medical need, and (2) the
prison official knew of the need yet deliberately disregarded it.” Id. (omitting internal citations).
A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for
a doctor’s attention.” Id. (citing Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1995)).
Considering both Plaintiff’s complaint and objections, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s medical need
was not a serious one. See e.g., Hartsfield v. Colburn, 371 F.3d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding
that evidence of “extreme pain from loose and infected teeth, which caused blood to seep from his
gums, swelling, and difficulty sleeping and eating” constituted a serious medical need that would
have been obvious to a layperson). In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges only that he “hurt” his mouth,

providing no further details about the extent or severity of his alleged injury. (ECF No. 1, at 8).
Plaintiff does not detail his injury in his objections beyond that he hurt his “mouth and tooth.”
(ECF No. 9, at 1).
Additionally, the fact that Defendant Windstein—a lay person—inspected Plaintiff’s
mouth and concluded that no medical attention was necessary supports the finding that Plaintiff’s
need was not a serious medical need. Plaintiff objects that Defendant Windstein was not a
“[doctor,] nurse, or dentist.” (ECF No. 9, at 1). However, the standard of a serious medical need
is either “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment” or “one that is so
obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” See
Schaub, 638 F.3d at 914. The fact that Defendant Windstein is not a “[doctor,] nurse, or dentist”
makes him a layperson. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations that his mouth and tooth
only “hurt,” and that Defendant Windstein saw nothing obviously wrong, without more, do not
rise to the level of a serious medical need. Accordingly, the Court agrees with Judge Ford’s finding
that Plaintiff failed to allege facts to support his denial of medical care claim.

III. CONCLUSION
Upon de novo review of all specific objections, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections
and adopts the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 7) in toto. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No.
1) is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to place a § 1915(g) strike flag on the case for future
judicial consideration. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from
this dismissal would not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 25th day of November, 2025.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11209048. Public record. Not legal advice.