# West

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · November 21, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11207261

## Case

- **Full name:** Christina West v. Board of Trustees of Alabama Agricultural & Mechanical University d/b/a Alabama A & M University
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** November 21, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
CHRISTINA WEST, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Civil Action No. 5:24-cv-529-CLS
)
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF )
ALABAMA AGRICULTURAL )
& MECHANICAL )
UNIVERSITY d/b/a )
ALABAMA A & M )
UNIVERSITY, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This action is before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed by
defendant, the Board of Trustees of Alabama Agricultural & Mechanical University
(“AAMU”). Doc. no. 21. Upon consideration of the pleadings, briefs, and evidentiary
submissions, and for the reasons stated below, the court concludes that the motion is
due to be granted in part and denied in part.
I. ABANDONED CLAIMS
As an initial matter, plaintiff abandoned her claim of sex discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Count I of the
Amended Complaint (doc. no. 12)), as well as her claims asserted under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Counts III, IV, and V). See doc.
no. 25 (Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment), at 2. Accordingly, defendant’s motion is due to be granted as to those

claims.
II. TITLE VII RETALIATORY DISCHARGE CLAIM
Plaintiff’s sole remaining claim is asserted under Title VII for retaliatory

discharge (Count II of the Amended Complaint). To state such a claim, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an
adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected
activity and the adverse action. See Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir.

2008). “To survive summary judgment, the employee must present a story, supported
by evidence, that would allow a reasonable jury to find that the employer engaged in
unlawful retaliation against the employee.” Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84

F.4th 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 2023). As explained below, the court finds that genuine
issues of material fact preclude summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s
remaining claim.
A. Factual Background

Plaintiff worked for AAMU on two occasions. She was first hired as a full-time
bus driver, effective September 15, 2021.1 She resigned that position on November

1 Doc. no. 22-16.
2
16, 2021, a scant two months after beginning her first stint of employment.2 She
contends that Marshall Chimwedzi, who was the head of the Transportation

Department, made inappropriate comments to her.3 According to defendant, during
the brief time that plaintiff initially worked for AAMU, she had attendance and
scheduling issues.4 Note well, however, that her first tenure with AAMU is not at

issue for purposes of the present motion.
Plaintiff was rehired by AAMU as a part-time bus driver during July of the
following year, 2022.5 Thereafter, Tyrone Brown, who supervised the bus drivers,
began communicating with plaintiff about her availability for work.6 That was an

issue because plaintiff then was employed as a bus driver by the City of Huntsville
until September 2, 2022; and so, her availability to work for AAMU was limited until
that date.7 Brown told plaintiff that she would be scheduled for twenty hours during

the week following the end of her employment with the City, and that he would
increase her hours as a driver for AAMU thereafter.8
While not entirely clear, it appears that plaintiff reported to work on September

2 Id. at ECF 19, 21.
3 Doc. no. 22-2 (Plaintiff dep.) at 98-103.
4 Doc. no. 22-16, at ECF 18.
5 Id. at ECF 23.
6 Doc. no. 22-8 (Aug. 12, 2022 text messages between plaintiff and Brown); doc. no. 22-2
(Plaintiff dep.) at 232-33.
7 Doc. no. 22-2 (Plaintiff dep.), at 232-33.
8 Doc. no. 22-9 (Sept. 2, 2022 text messages between plaintiff and Brown).
3
6, 2022, but she did not work her shift because too many drivers had been scheduled.9
Plaintiff and another female driver received training to drive a new bus on September

7, 2022.10 Plaintiff also worked on September 8th. She reported to work on
September 9th, but again was sent home for lack of work.11
On September 12th, the ending time of plaintiff’s next scheduled shift (i.e., the
shift beginning on September 14, 2022) was changed from 2:30 p.m. to 9:30 p.m.12

Plaintiff informed Chimwedzi that, due to a previous personal commitment, she was
not available to work a shift that ended as late as 9:30 p.m.13
Chimwedzi sent plaintiff a text message the following day, September 13, 2022,

asking her to confirm whether she would work a revised schedule of 10:30 a.m. to
9:30 p.m. on September 14th.14 Plaintiff reminded him that she was not available to
work as late as 9:30 p.m. on any date during the week beginning on September 14,

2022, but told him she could work her originally scheduled 10:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.
shifts.15 Chimwedzi responded: “No you either have to work as assigned or you
don’t.”16 Plaintiff replied: “So you’re taking me off tomorrow too because I can’t
9 Doc. no. 22-2 (Plaintiff dep.), at 134.
10 Id. at 136-37.
11 Id. at 137-39.
12 Doc. no. 22-1 (Chimwedzi dep.), at 84.
13 Doc. no. 22-2 (Plaintiff dep.), at 173-74.
14 Doc. no. 22-10 (Sept. 13, 2022 text messages between Chimwedzi and plaintiff).
15 Id.
16 Id.
4
work a shift I wasn’t available for?”17 Chimwedzi responded: “Either you work as
scheduled or not.”18 Plaintiff testified in deposition that two male employees refused

to work the night shift, but were not taken off the schedule as she was.19
On September 14, 2022, plaintiff sent an email message to Dr. Lynda Batiste,
who was AAMU’s Interim Vice President of Business and Finance.20 One of Dr.

Batiste’s duties was to oversee the Transportation Department. Plaintiff asked Dr.
Batiste to call her “to discuss the events that have recently taken place in the
transportation dep[artmen]t.”21 Suggestively, she stated that the topic she wanted to
discuss was “of a sensitive nature.”22

Chimwedzi held a meeting with the bus drivers on September 15th.23 During
the meeting, he asked the drivers to complete a form indicating their availability.
Plaintiff requested that Chimwedzi “add an addendum that . . . everyone had to be

available for any shift, and that anybody that became unavailable would lose their
hours,” like she had.24 Plaintiff did not submit an availability form to Chimwedzi

17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Doc. no. 22-2 (Plaintiff dep.), at 167-69.
20 Doc. no. 22-11.
21 Id. (alteration supplied).
22 Id.
23 Doc. no. 22-2 (Plaintiff dep.), at 142.
24 Id. at 141.
5
during the meeting, but did so the following day.25
Around that same date, plaintiff met with Dr. Batiste.26 Plaintiff testified during

deposition that she “discussed the situation with [Chimwedzi] taking [her] off the
schedule and taking [her] hours indefinitely.”27 She also told Dr. Batiste that
Chimwedzi communicated differently with men and women, and that he spoke to
women in a condescending tone.28 Plaintiff told Dr. Batiste that “the way that . . .

Chimwedzi handles the schedule is different — between men and women.”29 When
asked about that meeting during deposition, Dr. Batiste testified that plaintiff talked
to her about plaintiff’s “issue with scheduling conflicts,” but she did not complain that

women were required to work night shifts while men were not.30
On September 21st, plaintiff sent another email to Dr. Batiste, in which she
stated:

Hello, Dr. Batiste,
I’m reaching out with an update. Since we last spoke, that same day last
Friday evening, as I was leaving for the day, Tyrone [i.e., Tyrone Brown,
plaintiff’s supervisor], advised me that I would not be put on the
schedule until I signed the availability form. I did sign it, however, I was
then told I am to remain part time and as such will not be able to get
25 Id. at 203-04.
26 Id. at 215-16.
27Id. at 217 (alterations supplied).
28 Doc. no. 22-2 (Plaintiff dep.), at 220.
29 Id. at 217-18.
30 Id. at 29-30.
6
more than 25 hrs a week. I said ok and left.
Sunday, Tyrone called me to tell me what my schedule would be for this
week and yes, initially it was 20 hrs. And NO ONE has been scheduled
an evening shift this week. My schedule was then changed again adding
an additional 6 hrs. I have not said anything to Marshall [Chimwedzi]
nor has he said anything to me. This is disturbing as per our
conversation; I left a full time job with benefits that I need due [to] a
medical condition and now am being told that not only will I NOT be
full time to receive said benefits, but that I’m also being restricted in the
number of hours I can work. I feel like I’m being forced to quit. How
should I proceed?
Doc. no. 22-13 (alterations supplied). The record does not contain a response from
Dr. Batiste.
The following day, plaintiff forwarded a copy of her previous email to Dr.
Batiste with an additional message, which stated:
So sorry to bother you again . . . It would appear as though the drivers
have appointed me to contact you in regards to meeting specifically with
you. I am honestly not sure what this meeting is about. But I’ve been
asked to please request a drivers ONLY meeting with you. If that is
possible what ever the date and time I will relay to the group. Thanks in
advance for your time.
Id. Dr. Batiste responded to the latter message, and asked plaintiff how many drivers
were in the group. Plaintiff replied that “there’s 4 or 5 for sure.”31 There is no
indication in the record presented to this court whether a meeting of the group of
drivers and Dr. Batiste was ultimately held.
31 Doc. no. 22-13.
7
During the following weeks, the number of hours for which plaintiff was
scheduled decreased from 35.65 for the week of September 26, to 17.68 hours for the

week of October 3, 2022, and to 9.82 hours for the week of October 10, 2022.32
On October 17th, plaintiff encountered Dr. Wims (President of AAMU) on
campus.33 Plaintiff introduced herself and asked to speak with him about the
Transportation Department.34 Dr. Wims told plaintiff to direct her concerns to Dr.

Batiste.35 The next day, plaintiff sent another email message to Dr. Batiste, in which
she stated:
Hello Dr. Batiste, and good afternoon. I happen[ed] to run into Mr Mims
[sic] and I said I would like to speak with him. He asked was it in
reference to what’s going on in our office. I said yes, and he redirected
me to you. As per my last email to you, I spoke of my being denied full
time status. Which has not changed. I have been completely available
for work. I have been on time, in uniform and done whatever I have
been asked to do. I receive great feedback from both the students and
faculty I’ve worked with. So, as you can see, I love my job. I just am
trying to be treated fairly. I am also willing to work in the office when
needed, and provide training to other drivers as I have experience with
both. I had also been working with Tyrone to better streamline the
training/driver development.
I want to be at AAMU for the long term with no issues. So I’m doing
what I can to make the situation better.
Thank you for your time.
32 Doc. no. 22-1, at ECF 64-66.
33 Doc. no. 22-2 (Plaintiff dep.), at 226,
34 Id.
35 Id.
8
Doc. no. 26-4 (alterations supplied). Dr. Batiste did not respond to the email.
However, she testified during deposition that she “would have had a conversation, of

course [,] with Marshall [Chimwedzi] in regards to anything received.”36
The following day, October 19, 2022, at the conclusion of plaintiff’s shift,
Chimwedzi gave her a letter terminating her employment. The letter reads as follows:

This letter constitutes official notification that your part-time
employment in the Department of Transportation at Alabama A&M
University (“University”) end[s] effective October 19, 2022. Your final
AAMU paycheck will be issued in October payroll and it will include
payment of your salary through the end of the [sic] October, 2022. You
are required to turn in all keys, badges, and University equipment to me
prior to your departure.
I wish you well in your future endeavors.
Doc. no. 22-14 (alterations supplied). The letter bore only Chimwedzi’s signature.
Even so, Chimwedzi and Batiste testified in deposition that Batiste approved the
termination.37
B. Issues of Material Fact
In view of the foregoing, the court finds that there are far too many genuine
issues of material fact for this matter to be resolved on summary judgment. For
example:

36 Doc. no. 22-3 (Batiste dep.), at 42 (alterations supplied).
37 Doc. no. 22-1 (Chimwedzi dep.), at 129; doc. no. 22-3 (Batiste dep.), at 50.
9
• Whether plaintiff engaged in protected activity.
Plaintiff testified in deposition that she complained to Dr. Batiste in a private

meeting that Chimwedzi treated men and women differently with respect to their
schedules. However, Dr. Batiste testified that plaintiff complained about scheduling
issues, but not about discriminatory treatment with respect to scheduling.

Accordingly, there is an issue of credibility as to whether plaintiff engaged in
protected activity.
• Whether the decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment pre-dated
any protected activity.
AAMU contends that Chimwedzi decided to terminate plaintiff’s employment
on September 13, 2022 — the date she stated that she was not available to work

extended shifts ending at 9:30 p.m., and three days before she allegedly complained
to Batiste about Chimwedzi’s discriminatory conduct. Chimwedzi’s deposition
testimony is the only evidence of the date of his alleged decision to terminate plaintiff.
However, plaintiff was not actually terminated until more than a month later, on

October 19, 2022 — the day after plaintiff notified Dr. Batiste that she had attempted
to speak with Dr. Wims about her concerns — all of which tends to indicate that
Chimwedzi’s pants may have been on fire during his deposition testimony.

Even so, AAMU attempts to extinguish any flames and explains the delay by
stating that, after Chimwedzi made his alleged decision to terminate plaintiff, he was
10
required to consult with the Human Resources Department and, ultimately, to obtain
the approval of Dr. Batiste, which occurred on some unknown date prior to October

19. There is no evidence in the record of the date upon which he consulted with the
Human Resources Department. Bottom line: regardless of this court’s obvious
incredulity, these are issues of material fact.

• Who was the decisionmaker?
In its initial brief, AAMU argues that Chimwedzi was the decisionmaker, and
that he made the decision to fire plaintiff on September 13, 2022.38 In AAMU’s
response to plaintiff’s request for admissions, however, the University denied that

Chimwedzi was the decisionmaker.39 Chimwedzi testified in deposition that he did
not know that plaintiff had complained to Dr. Batiste about sex discrimination, and
that plaintiff did not complain to him that she believed that women were treated less
favorably than men in the Transportation Department.40

Dr. Batiste initially testified during deposition that she discussed plaintiff’s
scheduling conflict with Chimwedzi, but later testified as follows:
Q. When you would receive a communication from somebody like
Ms. West and then you would go to talk to Mr. Chimwedzi, would
you reveal the identity of the person who sent the complaint about
38 See doc. no. 23 (Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment), at 19;
doc. no. 27 (Defendant’s Reply Brief), at 7.
39 Doc. no. 26-2 (Defendant’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Discovery Requests), at ECF 3.
40 Doc. no. 22-1 (Chimwedzi dep.), at 98.
11
the department to you?
A. No, no.

Doc. no. 22-3 (Batiste dep.), at 60.
It is undisputed that Dr. Batiste approved Chimwedzi’s decision to terminate
plaintiff’s employment. Dr. Batiste stated that Chimwedzi told her that he was

seeking approval to terminate plaintiff’s employment because of “a lot of scheduling
conflict and her refusal to be amenable to the schedules that he provided to her.”41
She did not recall whether Chimwedzi provided her with any documentation to
support plaintiff’s termination.

If a jury finds plaintiff credible with respect to her allegation that she
complained to Dr. Batiste about Chimwedzi’s discriminatory conduct, it also could
find that Dr. Batiste at least approved Chimwedzi’s decision to terminate plaintiff’s

employment with knowledge that plaintiff engaged in protected activity.
• Pretext
Chimwedzi’s letter terminating plaintiff’s employment did not provide a reason
for her termination. Chimwedzi testified in deposition that plaintiff’s employment

was terminated due to her “[j]ust not being available to work and having problems

41 Doc. no. 22-3 (Batiste dep.), at 45.
12
with the scheduling. She’s not available.”** Dr. Batiste confirmed in deposition that
Chimwedzi told her that was the reason.” However, plaintiff points out that AAMU
produced only two schedules from her 2022 employment. Comparison of one of those
schedules with plaintiffs timecards showing the hours that she actually worked does
not support Chimwedzi’s justification for plaintiff's termination.”
Ill. CONCLUSION
In sum, genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on
plaintiff's claim of retaliation under Title VII, and the motion is due to be denied as
to that claim. A separate order consistent with this memorandum opinion will be
entered contemporaneously herewith.
DONE this 21st day of November, 2025.
yaad ni

” Doc. no. 22-1 (Chimwedzi dep.), at 123 (alteration supplied). Notably, the availability
forms completed by the bus drivers during the September 15, 2022 meeting with Chimwedzi were
not produced by AAMU.
Doc. no. 22-3 (Batiste dep.), at 45.
“ See doc. no. 25 (Plaintiff's Response), at 25.
13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11207261. Public record. Not legal advice.