# Opinion

> District Court, S.D. Florida · November 20, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11206783

## Case

- **Full name:** Eduardo Duvallon Boffill v. Field Office Director, Miami Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** November 20, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11206783

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- acknowledging the abrogation of prior Eleventh Circuit precedent interpreting § 1252(d)(1) as a jurisdictional bar by Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 413 (2023)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No.: 25-cv-25179-JB

EDUARDO DUVALLON BOFFILL,

Petitioner,

v.

FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR,
Miami Field Office,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
et al.,

Respondents.
__________________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Petitioner Eduardo Duvallon
Boffill’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”). ECF No. [1].
Respondents filed a Return Opposing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Petitioner filed a Traverse. ECF Nos. [7], [8]. Upon due consideration of the parties’
submissions, the pertinent portions of the record, and the applicable law, for the
reasons explained below, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a Cuban citizen who has resided in the United States since April
2022. ECF No. [1] at ¶ 10. Petitioner has no criminal history. ECF No. [7-4] at 3.
At the time of his initial encounter with Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), CBP
released Petitioner on his own recognizance “[i]n accordance with section 236 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act [codified at 8 U.S.C. ¶ 1226].” ECF No. [1-3] at 6.
On September 16, 2024, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a
Notice to Appear (“NTA”), charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under section

212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) as “an alien present in
the United States who has not been admitted or paroled,” and thereby initiated
removal proceedings against Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). Id. at 3. On July
17, 2025, DHS lodged an additional charge of inadmissibility against Petitioner under
section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA. Id. at 7.
After a traffic stop, Petitioner was taken into custody by the United States

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on October 2, 2025. ECF Nos. [1] at
¶ 28, [1-3] at 2, [7-4]. Petitioner is currently being held at the Federal Detention
Center (“FDC”) in Miami, Florida. ECF Nos. [1] at ¶ 30, [7-5].
On November 4, 2025, Petitioner appeared before an Executive Office for
Immigration Review (“EOIR”) immigration judge (“IJ”) for a bond hearing. ECF No.
[7-8]. The IJ denied bond without conducting a dangerousness or risk of flight
determination, concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner’s

detention status pursuant to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) published
decision in In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), which found that
IJs lack authority to consider bond requests of noncitizens who have resided in the
United States but have not been admitted or paroled because those individuals are
subject to mandatory detention without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). See id.; 29
I. & N. Dec. at 221. Petitioner has a master calendar hearing in his immigration case
currently scheduled for December 2, 2025. ECF Nos. [7-1] at ¶ 17, [7-9].
On November 7, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. ECF No. [1].

Petitioner raises four claims, one of which is asserted in the alternative. Count I
alleges that Petitioner’s continued detention without a bond hearing contravenes the
INA because the mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) was
improperly applied to him, as a person who previously entered the United States and
was residing in the country before being placed in removal proceedings. Id. at ¶¶ 66–
68. Counts II and III allege that Petitioner’s continued detention without an

individualized bond hearing violates substantive and procedural due process. Id. at
¶¶ 69–77. Count IV is an alternative claim, brought in the event the Court finds that
Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention, for injunctive relief requiring
Respondents to provide Petitioner with evidence of his parole out of custody pursuant
to 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(h)(2). Id. at ¶¶ 58–65, 78–83. Petitioner requests that the Court
declare that Respondents’ “actions or omissions violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and/or the INA” and order Respondents to

“provide Petitioner with a prompt and constitutionally adequate bond hearing before
an immigration judge with jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. ¶ 1226(a), at which the
government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
continued detention is justified.” Id. at 19(c), (d).
Petitioner also requests two other forms of alternative relief. First, Petitioner
requests, “[i]n the alternative,” that the Court declare that Petitioner’s release from
physical DHS custody in April 2022 was a parole under 8 U. S. C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), and
that Respondents unlawfully failed to provide the Petitioner with evidence of his
parole at the time of his release from custody as required by 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(h)(2).

Second, and again “[i]n the alternative,” Petitioner asks that the Court order the
Respondents to provide petitioner with evidence of his parole out of custody “via Form
I-94 relating to the time of his original release from DHS custody on April 25, 2022.”
Id. at 19(e), (f).
II. ANALYSIS

District courts have the authority to grant writs of habeas corpus. See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(a). Habeas corpus is fundamentally “a remedy for unlawful executive
detention.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (citation omitted). A writ may
be issued to a petitioner who shows that he is being held in custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Court’s jurisdiction
extends to challenges involving immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
A. Jurisdiction

Respondents argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the Petition
based upon (i) 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3), (ii) 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), and (iii) 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(9). ECF No. [7] at 4–8. The Court rejects these arguments and addresses
each provision in turn.
i. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)
Respondents argue that section 1252(e)(3) deprives this Court of jurisdiction
because it provides the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia with exclusive

authority to review “determinations under section 1225(b) of this title and its
implementation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A). The Court is not persuaded.
First, section 1252(e)(3) is titled “Challenges on validity of the system.” 8
U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3). Petitioner does not raise any systemic challenges, nor does he
challenge the implementation of section 1225(b)(2). Petitioner challenges the
lawfulness of his detention without a bond hearing, not the validity of the statutory

scheme itself.
Second, section 1252(e)(3) only applies to determinations of “(i) whether such
section, or any regulation issued to implement such section, is constitutional; or (ii)
whether such a regulation, or a written policy directive, written policy guideline, or
written procedure issued by or under the authority of the Attorney General to
implement such section, is not consistent with applicable provisions of this
subchapter or is otherwise in violation of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A)(i), (ii).

Petitioner does not challenge the lawfulness of any particular statute, regulation, or
written policy or procedure. Rather, Petitioner asserts that Respondents lack
authority to detain him under section 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme
because his detention is governed by section 1226(a), which entitles noncitizens such
as Petitioner to a bond hearing.
Finally, section 1252(e)(3) is inapplicable as it is limited, by its express terms,
to determinations under section 1225(b) and, as explained below, section 1225(b) does
not apply here. For these reasons, the Court concludes, as have numerous courts in

this Circuit and around the country, that section 1252(e)(3) does not deprive this
Court of jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims. See Rojano Gonzalez v. Sterling, No.
25-cv-6080, 2025 WL 3145764, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2025); J.A.M. v. Streeval, No.
4:25-cv-342, 2025 WL 3050094, at * 1 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025); Mata Velasquez v.
Kurzdorfer, No. 25-cv-493, 2025 WL 1953796, at *6-7 (W.D.N.Y. July 16, 2025);
Orozco-Martinez v. Lynch, No. 25-cv-1353, 2025 WL 3223786, at * 2 (W.D. Mich. Nov.

19, 2025); Morales Rodriguez v. Arnott, No. 6:25-cv-00836, 2025 WL 3218553, at * 2
(W.D. Mo. Nov.18, 2025); Cardona-Lozano v. Noem, No. 25-cv-1784, 2025 WL
3218224, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2025); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25-cv-6137,
2025 WL 2630826, at * 10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025).
ii. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)
Next, Respondents argue that section 1252(g) precludes the Court from
exercising jurisdiction. ECF No. [7] at 5–6. Respondents’ position is not supported

by either a plain reading of the statute or the applicable case law.
Section 1252 is “Congress’s comprehensive scheme for judicial review of
removal orders.” Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. USCIS, 964 F.3d 1250, 1256–57
(11th Cir. 2020). To be sure, this provision bars judicial review over “any cause or
claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against any alien[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1252(g). It “is specifically directed at the
deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence prolongation of removal proceedings.”
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 487 (1999).

However, “1252(g) is not to be construed broadly as a ‘zipper’ clause applying to the
full universe of deportation-related claims, but instead as applying narrowly to only
the three ‘discrete’ governmental actions enumerated in that subsection.” Wallace v.
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 616 F. App’x 958, 960 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing
A.A.D.C., 525 U.S. at 472–73). “And although many other decisions or actions may
be part of the deportation process, only claims that arise from one of the covered

actions are excluded from [a court’s] review. . . .” Camarena v. Dir., Immigr. &
Customs Enf’t, 988 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
Here, Petitioner’s claim does not implicate the Attorney General’s decision to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders. Rather,
Petitioner challenges the legality of his detention. Such claim is reviewable. See
Canal A Media Holding, LLC, 964 F.3d at 1257–58 (claim was not barred by § 1252(g)

where action did not fall into one of three categories as “[w]hen asking if a claim is
barred by § 1252(g), courts must focus on the action being challenged.”); see also
Maldonado v. Olson, No. 25-cv-3142, 2025 WL 2374411, at *6 (D. Minn. Aug. 15,
2025) (petitioner’s due process challenge was not barred by § 1252(g) as it did not
“challenge the actions of Respondents in commencing proceedings, adjudicating
cases, or executing removal orders.”); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 25-cv-01542, 2025 WL
2676082, at *8 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (“[B]ecause Petitioner challenges the
lawfulness of his detention during the pendency of his removal proceedings, it is not
a challenge to one of the ‘three discrete events along the road to deportation’ that §

1252(g) applies to.”); Leal-Hernandez v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02428, 2025 WL 2430025,
at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025) (“Petition[er] mounts a challenge solely to his continued
custody. None of the cases the Government relies on pertain to cases in which a
petitioner . . . pursued judicial review of his allegedly unconstitutional custody. In
accordance with Supreme Court precedent and the plain language of the text, §
1252(g) does not bar [jurisdiction].”); Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-2396, 2025 WL

2770629, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (“Petitioner seeks only review of the legality
of her detention, which does not require judicial intervention into the Attorney
General's decisions to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, and execute removal
orders. . . . Adopting [the government’s] interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) . . . would
eliminate judicial review of immigration detainee’s claims of unlawful detention[.]”);
Campos Leon v. Forestal, No. 25-cv-01774, 2025 WL 2694763, at *1–2 (rejecting
respondents’ § 1252(g) argument and concluding that the court had jurisdiction to

hear habeas petition challenging DHS’ refusal to abide by the IJ’s bond order).
Accordingly, section 1252(g) does not prevent this Court from exercising
jurisdiction over the Petition.
iii. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)
Finally, Respondents contend that section 1252(b)(9) bars this Court’s review
of Petitioner’s claims. ECF No. [7] at 6–8. Under Section 1252(b)(9), the Courts of
Appeals are the exclusive forum for judicial review “of all questions of law . . .
including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions,
arising from any action taken . . . to remove an alien from the United States.” 8

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). Respondents argue that Petitioner’s challenge to the basis of his
detention “arise[s] from [an] action taken . . . to remove an alien from the United
States.” ECF No. [7] at 8. The Court does not agree.
This position was squarely addressed in Jennings v. Rodriguez, where the
United States Supreme Court held that “questions of law” regarding whether “certain
statutory provisions require detention without a bond hearing” do not “arise from”

the decision to remove an alien from the country as set forth in section 1252(b)(9).
Jennings, 583 U.S. 281, 292–294 (2018). The Supreme Court rejected an “expansive
interpretation of § 1252(b)(9),” explaining that even if “[t]he ‘questions of law and fact’
. . . could be said to ‘aris[e] from’ actions taken to remove the aliens in the sense that
the aliens’ injuries would never have occurred if they had not been placed in
detention,” this “expansive interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) would lead to staggering
results.” Id.

Moreover, section 1252(b)(9) “does not present a jurisdictional bar where those
bringing suit are not asking for review of an order of removal, the decision to seek
removal, or the process by which removability will be determined.” Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020). Here, Petitioner is not
bringing any such challenge. Petitioner is challenging his mandatory detention
under section 1225(b), and his entitlement to a bond hearing. For these reasons, the
Court concludes that section 1252(b)(9) does not divest the Court of its jurisdiction to
consider the Petition.
Having determined that the Court has jurisdiction over the Petition, the Court

turns to the remaining arguments.
B. Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should dismiss the Petition because
Petitioner has not exhausted his remedies in that he has not sought review of the IJ’s
decision before the BIA. ECF No. [7] at 9. In response, Petitioner suggests that
continuing to pursue administrative relief would be futile given the BIA’s recent

decision in In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025). ECF No. [8] at 8–
9. Respondents’ argument misses the mark.
The exhaustion requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) “is not jurisdictional,”
but prudential. Kemokai v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 83 F.4th 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2023)
(acknowledging the abrogation of prior Eleventh Circuit precedent interpreting §
1252(d)(1) as a jurisdictional bar by Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 413
(2023)). In In re Yajure Hurtado, the BIA rejected the precise argument Petitioner

raises here. 29 I. & N. Dec. at 220 (“Under the plain reading of the INA, we affirm
the [IJ’s] determination that he did not have authority over the bond request because
aliens who are present in the United States without admission are applicants for
admission as defined under . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the
duration of their removal proceedings.”). The BIA issued In re Yajure Hurtado as a
published decision, and such decisions “serve as precedents in all proceedings
involving the same issue or issues.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(2); see also id. § 1003.1(d)(1).
Thus, considering In re Yajure Hurtado, it appears evident that a noncitizen

like Petitioner, who has resided in the United States for years but has not been
admitted or paroled, will be subject to mandatory detention without bond under
section 1225(b)(2) upon review by the BIA. See In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec.
at 221. Administrative “exhaustion is not required where[,]” as here, “an
administrative appeal would be futile[.]” Linfors v. United States, 673 F.2d 332, 334
(11th Cir. 1982) (citing Von Hoffberg v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1980)).

Therefore, since any “bond appeal to the BIA is nearly a foregone conclusion under In
re Yajure Hurtado, any prudential exhaustion requirements are excused for futility.”
Puga v. Assistant Field Off. Dir., Krome North Serv. Processing Ctr., 25-cv-24535,
2025 WL 2938369, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025); see also Jefry Josue Del Cid Del Cid
and Marlon Letona Marroquin v. Pamela Bondi, 2025 WL 2985150, at *13 (W.D. Pa.
Oct. 23, 2025); Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, --F. Supp. 3d--, 2025 WL 2809996, at *4
n.2 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025); Inlago Tocagon v. Moniz, --F. Supp. 3d--, 2025 WL

2778023, at *2 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2025); Roman v. Noem, No. 25-cv-01684, 2025 WL
2710211, at *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 23, 2025).
C. Legality of Petitioner’s Mandatory Detention
Respondents contend that Petitioner’s entry into the United States without
inspection or admission renders him an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C.
section 1225(b)(2)(A), making him subject to mandatory detention and ineligible for
a bond hearing. ECF No. [7] at 9–22. Petitioner asserts that his detention is governed
by 8 U.S.C. section 1226(a), which allows for the release of noncitizens on bond. ECF
Nos. [1] at ¶ 45, [8] at 9–11. The Court examines each of these statutes in turn.

i. 8 U.S.C. § 1225
Section 1225 governs the inspection, detention, and removal of applicants for
admission. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 et seq. Applicants for admission are defined as
noncitizens “present in the United States who ha[ve] not been admitted” or those
“arriv[ing] in the United States.” Id. All applicants for admission “must be inspected
by immigration officers to ensure that they may be admitted into the country

consistent with U.S. immigration law.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287
(2018).1 To that end, “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2).” Id.
at 289 (emphasis added).
“Section 1225(b)(1) applies to all aliens initially determined to be inadmissible
due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation.” Id. Such
noncitizens are generally subject to expedited removal “without further hearing or

review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). However, if the noncitizen expresses “an intention to
apply for asylum” or a fear of persecution,” the statute requires referral to an
interview with an immigration officer. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If the immigration

1 Indeed, Jennings began its analysis by emphasizing the temporal and categorical
distinction between the detention statutes. Section 1225 applies to noncitizens who
are “seeking admission into the country” at the border or a port of entry, whereas
section 1226 governs those “already in the country pending the outcome of removal
proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 285–89.
officer finds a “credible fear,” the noncitizen “shall be detained for further
consideration of the application for asylum.” Id. Respondents concede that Petitioner
is “not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).” ECF No. [7] at 12.

On the other hand, “Section 1225(b)(2) is broader” and “serves as a catchall
provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).”
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Noncitizens covered under § 1225(b)(2) are detained for
removal proceedings “if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien
seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” into the
country. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Importantly, detention under § 1225(b)(2) is

mandatory. See Gomes v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *8 (D. Mass.
July 7, 2025).
ii. 8 U.S.C. § 1226
Federal immigration law “also authorizes the Government to detain certain
aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings,
583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added). Section 1226(a) provides that when a noncitizen
has been “arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be

removed from the United States,” the Attorney General may either continue to detain
the individual or release them on bond or conditional release. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
The statute thus “establishes a discretionary detention framework.” Gomes, 2025 WL
1869299, at *2. Importantly for purposes of the instant action, “[f]ederal regulations
provide that aliens detained under [section] 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the
outset of detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1),
1236.1(d)(1)); see also Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25-Civ-5937, 2025 WL 2371588,
at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025) (“To be sure, a noncitizen detained under [section]
1226(a) is undoubtedly entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge.”).

iii. Petitioner’s Detention Is Governed By 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Not
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)
The question of whether section 1225(b)(2) or section 1226(a) governs
Petitioner’s detention is a question of statutory interpretation squarely within the
Court’s jurisdiction. Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425,
at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (noting that the interplay of these two sections is a
matter “of statutory interpretation belong[ing] historically within the province of the
courts.”) (citing Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024)); Barrios
v. Shepley, No. 25-cv-00406, 2025 WL 2772579, at *5 (D. Me. Sept. 25, 2025) (district
court had jurisdiction to review petitioner’s challenge to the “statutory framework”
regarding his detention); see Gomes, 2025 WL 1869299, at *8 n.9 (“Courts must

exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions”);
Mosqueda, 2025 WL 2591530, at *7 (district court had jurisdiction to decide whether
§ 1225 or § 1226 applied as “[t]hese are purely legal questions of statutory
interpretation.”).
From the outset of Petitioner’s case, both CBP and DHS proceeded under
section 1226. Specifically, CBP’s Order of Release on Recognizance stated that

Petitioner was being released on his own recognizance “[i]n accordance with section
236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act,” codified at section 1226. ECF No. [1-3]
at 6. Additionally, the NTA that DHS issued to Petitioner did not classify him as an
“arriving alien.” ECF No. [1-3] at 3. Instead, the NTA charged him as “present in
the United States without admission or parole.” Id. This classification places him
squarely within section 1226. See e.g., Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *8

(emphasizing ICE’s selection of “present” rather than “arriving” on the NTA as
evidence that § 1226 applied); see also Hyppolite v. Noem, No. 25-4304, 2025 WL
2829511, *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025) (respondent’s initial classification of petitioner
“certainly is relevant to the Court's assessment of the credibility and good faith of
‘Respondents’ new position as to the basis for [Hyppolite’s] detention, which was
adopted post hoc and raised for the first time in this litigation.’”) (citation omitted);

Perez v. Berg, No. 25-cv-494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. July 24, 2025) (“The
Court notes that the government itself charged Petitioner as an alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or paroled rather than an arriving alien.”)
(quotations omitted).
In addition, “[w]hereas [section] 1225 governs removal proceedings for
‘arriving aliens,’ [section] 1226(a) serves as a catchall.” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No.
25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025). As the Supreme

Court stated in Jennings, section 1226 “creates a default rule” that “applies to aliens
already present in the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. The inclusion of a
“catchall” provision in section 1226, particularly following the more specific provision
in section 1225, is “likely no coincidence, but rather a way for Congress to capture
noncitizens who fall outside of the specified categories.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL
2609425, at *5; see also Barrera, 2025 WL 2690565, at *4 (citation omitted). The
circumstances surrounding Petitioner’s detention align with section 1226(a), not
section 1225(b)(2). Indeed, other Courts in this Circuit and District have uniformly
rejected Respondents’ expansive interpretation of section 1225. See, e.g., Gil-Paulino

v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 25-cv-24292, ECF No. [41], (S.D. Fla. Oct.
10, 2025) (respondent’s interpretation of the INA “directly contravenes the statute”
and “disregards decades of settled precedent”); see also Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL
2609425, at *7 (“Finally, the BIA's decision to pivot from three decades of consistent
statutory interpretation and call for Pizarro Reyes’ detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is
at odds with every District Court that has been confronted with the same question of

statutory interpretation.”); Puga, No. 25-24535, 2025 WL 2938369, at *3–6; Merino
v. Ripa, No. 25-23845, 2025 WL 2941609, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025); Lopez v.
Hardin, No. 25-cv-830, 2025 WL 2732717, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2025); Alvarez v.
Morris, 25-cv-24806, ECF No. [6], (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2024) (collecting cases).
Petitioner’s detention is governed by section 1226(a) and, therefore, he is
entitled to an individualized bond hearing before an IJ. As such, Petitioner’s
mandatory detention under section 1225(b) without conducting a dangerousness and

risk of flight determination rests on an incorrect statutory interpretation and
contravenes the INA. Accordingly, Count I of the Petition is meritorious, and
Petitioner is entitled to relief thereon.
The Court declines to reach the merits of Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due
process claims raised in Counts II and III of the Petition, as it is granting the relief
he seeks in Count I. See, e.g., Puga, 2025 WL 2938369, at *6 (declining to reach the
merits of the petitioner’s due process claim because it granted the requested relief in
another count, but allowing the due process claim to be reasserted if the respondents
do not comply with the court’s order to provide a bond hearing or release); Pizarro

Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *8. Should Respondents fail to comply with this Order
by providing Petitioner a bond hearing consistent with section 1226(a), Petitioner
may renew his due process claim. Given that Counts II and III are unripe claims
contingent on Petitioner not receiving a custody determination hearing under section
1226(a), “the Court must dismiss it without prejudice[.]” Babilla v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
No. 20-cv-1434, 2020 WL 6870610, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2020) (citations omitted);

see also Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (“A claim is not ripe for
adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all[.]’” (alteration added; quoting Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580–81 (1985)). Further, given that
the Court is granting relief on Count I, Petitioner’s alternative claim in Count IV is
likewise dismissed without prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as
follows:
1. Petitioner Eduardo Duvallon Boffill’s Verified Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, ECF No. [1], is GRANTED IN PART. Respondents shall afford
Petitioner an individualized bond hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or
otherwise release Petitioner.
2. Counts II, II, and IV of the Petition are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
3. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 20th day of
November, 2025.

JACQU NE BECERRA
UNITE TATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11206783. Public record. Not legal advice.