# MANNING

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · November 20, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11206676

## Case

- **Full name:** Kieona Manning v. Maple Grove Health & Rehab Center
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** November 20, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11206676

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- describing interrogatory number five as “ask[ing] Defendant to define the term ‘post-offer, pre-hire drug test’”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
KIEONA MANNING, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:24CV894
)
MAPLE GROVE HEALTH & REHAB CENTER, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to
Compel (Docket Entry 28). For the reasons that follow, the Court
will grant in part and will deny in part the instant Motion.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff “su[ed Defendant] for denying [her a] position as a
CNA.” (Docket Entry 4 (“Amended Complaint”) at 1.)1 According to
the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff met “all the requirements listed
on the job summary” (id.); yet – after she “showed [Defendant her
disability-related, lifting] restrictions” (id. at 2; see also id.
(“I was diagnosed with [l]umbar spine radiculopathy, [d]egenerative
[d]isc [d]isease, [and s]pinal [s]tenosis L4 & L5. This . . .
breaks down to [s]ciatica . . . .”)) – Defendant “told [her that,]
‘due to [her] restrictions[, she] could not be hired’” (id.),
despite the fact that “[t]he only accommodation [she] would have
needed would have been physical assistance when getting someone up,
1 Pin cites refer to the page numbers appearing in the footer
appended to the document upon docketing in the CM/ECF system.
having a lift to help with getting a person up, or modified
schedules when [her s]ciatica is inflamed” (id.). The Amended
Complaint “seek[s] $13,275.20 due to [Defendant] not hiring
[Plaintiff] for having [disability-related] restrictions and not
trying to accommodate [her] in any way.” (Id. at 4; see also id.
at 3 (invoking “Title I of the ADA”).)
Defendant answered (see Docket Entry 13) and discovery
commenced (see Text Order dated July 29, 2025 (“adopting” Docket
Entry 24); see also Docket Entry 24 at 1 £(proposing that
“commencement date’ of discovery will be July 28, 2025” (bold font
omitted))). On September 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant
Motion, seeking relief because Defendant objected to her discovery
demands as ™“‘vague and ambiguous’, ‘unduly burdensome’, and
‘seeking information not relevant to a claim or defense raised in
this action’ several of [sic] times with given [sic] slack answers
or not answering the questions at all.” (Docket Entry 28 at □□□□□

* Plaintiff did not file a brief in support of the instant
Motion (see Docket Entries dated Sept. 25, 2025, to present
(showing no such brief)), contrary to the requirements of the Local
Rules, see M.D.N.C. LR 7.3(a) (“All motions, unless made during a
hearing or at trial, . . . shall be accompanied by a brief except
as provided in section (j) of this rule.”) & (3) (exempting certain
motions from briefing requirement, but not discovery motions made
without agreement between the parties to resolution via expedited
procedures or consent by the opposing party to the requested
relief). Because (A) Plaintiff did include within the instant
Motion some argument and authority of the sort a brief would
contain (see Docket Entry 28 at 1-2 (discussing Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(1)’s definition of scope of discovery and
presenting arguments as to impropriety of Defendant’s objections to
(continued...)

Defendant has responded (see Docket Entry 31) and Plaintiff has
replied (see Docket Entry 34).
DISCUSSION
The instant Motion broadly “request[s that Defendant] provide
proper, complete, and sworn responses in how and where did they get
their answers to [Plaintiff’s] interrogatories and production.”
(Docket Entry 28 at 2; see also id. (demanding that Defendant “stop
using the lawyer tactics by saying ‘[Defendant] objects’, ‘vague
and ambiguous’, ‘unduly burdensome’, and ‘seeking information not
relevant to a claim or defense’”).) “A party seeking discovery may
move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or
inspection,” Fed. R. Civ. P. (3) (B), including when “a party
fails to answer an interrogatory,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
37 (a) (3) (B) (111), or “fails to produce documents,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
(a) (3) (B) (iv). However, “[t]he [C]ourt . . . will only address
specific interrogatories or requests for production of documents
which are brought before the [Clourt on a motion to compel... .”
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Knowles, No. 7:03CV163, 2005 WL 8159565, at *4

“(...continued)
three interrogatories)) and (B) Defendant did not raise Plaintiff’s
failure to file a brief in Defendant’s response opposing the
instant Motion (see Docket Entry 31 at 1-5 (making no mention of
missing brief)), the Court will not exercise its discretion to
summarily deny the instant Motion based on Plaintiff’s violation of
the briefing rule, see M.D.N.C. LR 7.3(k) (“A motion unaccompanied
by a required brief may, in the discretion of the Court, be
summarily denied.”). Plaintiff should understand that any future
non-compliance with the briefing requirement likely will result in
the summary denial of any motion lacking a required brief.

(E.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 2005) (unpublished) (emphasis added); see also,
e.g., McKelvey v. Western Reg’l Jail, No. 3:13CV22206, 2015 WL
2144668, at *6 (S.D. W. Va. May 7, 2015) (unpublished) (denying
motion to compel because moving party “failed to identify the
specific answers to interrogatories that he believe[d wel]lre
incomplete or objectionable”); Hart v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 270 F.R.D. 166, 169 (D. Del. 2010) (“In [his mJotion [t]o
[c]lompel, [the p]laintiff makes only generalized arguments about
[the d]efendant’s [discovery] responses, and the [c]ourt will not
undertake a review of each of the [plaintiff’s discovery] requests
without more specific guidance from [the pJlaintiff on what
responses [the plaintiff] is challenging and why.”).°
In terms of particular discovery items for which Plaintiff
would have the Court compel some further response from Defendant,
the instant Motion identifies two interrogatories by number, i.e.,
“interrogatory number five” (Docket Entry 28 at 1; see also id.
(describing interrogatory number five as “ask[ing] Defendant to
define the term ‘post-offer, pre-hire drug test’”)) and

> To the extent the instant Motion seeks to compel Defendant
to respond to Plaintiff’s “revised request for production” (Docket
Entry 28 at 1), served “[o]n September 5, 2025” (id.), and/or her
“revised [i]nterrogatories” (id.), served “[o]n September 11, 2025”
(id.), the Court agrees with Defendant that “[Plaintiff]
prematurely filed th[at aspect of the instant MJotion . . . on
September 25, 2025” (Docket Entry 31 at 2). See Fed. R. Civ. P.
33(b) (2) (generally allowing 30 days for service of interrogatory
answers and objections); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b) (2) (A) (generally
allowing 30 days for document request responses).

“interrogatory number eight” (id. at 2; see also id. (describing
interrogatory number eight as “ask[ing] Defendant Have Jean
Williams, Kimberly Price, Tammy Johnson, Tawanna Craft, or Scott
(no first name) ever worked on the floor to help a CNA? If so what
did you do to help a CNA?”)). The instant Motion also appends a
document labeled “15 Interrogatories” (id. at 4),* which contains
a corresponding interrogatory number five of “Define post offer -
pre hire drug test” (id.) and a corresponding interrogatory number
eight of “Have Jean Williams, Kimberly Price, Tammy Johnson,
Tawanna Craft, or Scott (no first name) ever worked on the floor to
help a CNA? If so what did you do to help a CNA?” (id.).
Additionally, the instant Motion quotes a third interrogatory
without giving a number: “I asked a simple question ‘who pulled
the resume and where did they pull it from?[] A. Who wrote on the
resume? B. What is it saying?[’]” (Id. at 2.) That language
corresponds to interrogatory number four from the instant Motion’s
appended document labeled “15 Interrogatories” (id. at 4). (See
id. (“4. Who pulled the resume and where did they pull it from[?]
A. Who wrote on the resume? B. What is it saying?”).)

“ After the list of “15 Interrogatories” (Docket Entry 28 at
4) - most of which consist of multiple inguiries and/or contain
multiple sub-parts (see id. at 4-5) - that appended document
continues, under the heading “Plaintiff [sic] Request for
Production of Documents” (id. at 5), with another 15-numbered list
(see id.), followed by an address block for Plaintiff and a
notation of delivery on “July 29, 2025 @ 4:42pm [by e-mail] to
[Defendant’s counsel]” (id. at 6).

As further support, Plaintiff included with the instant Motion
“Defendant[’s ] Answers to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories” (id. at 14
(all-caps and bold font omitted)), showing that, for interrogatory
numbers four, five, and eight, Defendant gave these answers:
4. Who pulled the resume and where did they pull
it from
A. Who wrote on the resume?
B. What is it saying?
ANSWER: [Defendant] objects to this Interrogatory as
vague and ambiguous and as seeking information not
relevant to any claim or defense raised in this action.
Subject to and without waiving any objection, and
pursuant to [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 33(d),
please see document Bates-labeled [Defendant] 000013-16.
5. Define post offer - pre hire drug test?
ANSWER: [Defendant] objects to this Interrogatory as
vague and ambiguous and as seeking information not
relevant to any claim or defense raised in this action.
Plaintiff was drug tested, but the results of her drug
test are not material in this action as she was otherwise
not qualified for the position at issue.
. . . .
8. Have Jean Williams, Kimberly Price, Tammy
Johnson, Tawanna Craft, or Scott (no first
name) ever worked on the floor to help a CNA?
If so what did you do to help a CNA?
ANSWER: [Defendant] objects to this Interrogatory as
seeking information not relevant to a claim or defense
raised in this action. Whether a given staff member of
[Defendant] has performed a task has no bearing on
Plaintiff’s qualifications for the job at issue in her
failure to hire claim.
(Id. at 17 (bold font and underscoring omitted).)
Regarding interrogatory number four, the instant Motion
(A) asserts that Defendant’s above-quoted “answer showed how
6
[Defendant] went around in answering a simple question” (id. at 2),
(B) speculates that, in responding, Defendant just “asked the chief
human resources office or avp of employee relations who did not
know anything about [the events in question]” (id.), (C) expresses
Plaintiff’s lack of “belie[f that Defendant’s] information that was
given was given in good faith effort” (id.), and (D) accuses
Defendant of “playing dodge ball with answering [Plaintiff’s]
question” (id.), all of which supposedly “shows how [Defendants’ ]
attorney[s are] using their power with lies and avoiding to answer
[Plaintiff’s] interrogatories” (id.). In so arguing, the instant
Motion does not mention the “document Bates-labeled [Defendant]
000013-16” (id. at 17), much less explain why Defendant’s direction
of Plaintiff to that document failed to suffice under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 33(d). (See id. at 2.)
Defendant, for its part, did not directly address
interrogatory number four in responding to the instant Motion.
(See Docket Entry 31 at 1-5.)° Plaintiff’s reply likewise neglects

° Defendant’s “Legal Argument” (Docket Entry 31 at 2 (all-caps
and bold font omitted)) opposing the instant Motion contests:
1) Plaintiff’s criticism of Defendant’s objections (without
defending its objection to interrogatory number four) (see id.);
2) the overbreadth and/or irrelevance of some of Plaintiff’s
discovery requests (without specific reference to interrogatory
number four) (see id. at 2-4);
3) Plaintiff’s service of more than the limit of 15
interrogatories, considering all the discrete interrogatory sub-
(continued...)

to discuss interrogatory number four (or even to note the failure
of Defendant’s response to do so). (See Docket Entry 34 at 1-3.)
Under these circumstances, the Court exercises its discretion to
deny without prejudice Plaintiff’s request for relief as to
interrogatory number four. See generally Lone Star Steakhouse &
Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 929 (4th Cir.
1995) (“afford[ing ] district court[s] substantial discretion in
managing discovery”); see also Hughes v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No.
1:12CV717, 2014 WL 906220, at *1 n.1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2014)
(unpublished) (Schroeder, J.) (“A party should not expect a court
to do the work that [the party] elected not to do.”).
Turning to interrogatory number 5, the instant Motion makes
this argument:

°(...continued)
parts and additional interrogatories masquerading as document
requests or as revisions to prior interrogatories (see id. at 3-4;
see also Docket Entry 24 at 1 (proposing limit of “15
interrogatories, including subparts” (bold font omitted)); Text
Order dated July 29, 2025 (“adopting” Docket Entry 24)), which
would not invalidate interrogatory number four (or five or eight)
as the total number of inguiries within interrogatory numbers one
through eight warranting treatment as separate interrogatories does
not appear to exceed 15 (see Docket Entry 28 at 4); and
4) Plaintiff’s resort to “ad hominem attacks on [Defendant]
and its counsel” (Docket Entry 31 at 5 (italics omitted)), which
would not require the Court to reject an otherwise valid request
for relief, even though such attacks “do nothing to advance the
litigation,” United States for the Use and Benefit of Arrow
Concrete Co. v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 981 F. Supp. 443, 445 n.2
(S.D. W. Va. 1997); see also id. at 445 & n.2 (cautioning litigants
against use of over-heated rhetoric while still resolving related
motion on merits).

[I]nterrogatory number five (5) ask[s] Defendant to
define the term “post-offer, pre-hire drug test.”
Defendant objected as vague, ambiguous, and irrelevant,
and further asserted that . . . Plaintiff[’s] drug test
results are “not material.” This objection is improper.
[Interrogatory number five] did not ask about the
results, but rather for Defendant to explain its own
definition and policy concerning post offer, pre hire
drug testing. Such information is directly relevant
under Fed[eral] R[ule of] Civ[il] P[rocedure] 26(b)(1) to
whether Defendant followed its own hiring procedures,
whether . . . Plaintiff was treated consistently with
other applicants, and whether Defendant’s stated reasons
for not hiring . . . [P]laintiff are pretextual.
Defendant should be compelled to provide a substantive
answer and produce responsive documents.
Defendant[’s] objection is improper because
[interrogatory number five] did not ask about the results
at 1st but now [Plaintiff] would like to know the
results. Defendant is arguing the merits by saying
[Plaintiff] was not qualified anyway so it does not
matter. In discovery a defendant cannot withhold
information because the[ defendant] think[s that
information] will not help [the plaintiff].
[Interrogatory number five] is relevant due to the [fact
that the] definition and timing of a post offer and pre
hire drug test goes to whether [Defendant] followed [its]
own hiring process, whether [Plaintiff] was treated
differently than others, whether [Defendant] improperly
tested [Plaintiff] before a bona fide offer, or whether
[Defendant’s] stated reason for not hiring [Plaintiff is]
shifting [and] pretextual.
(Docket Entry 28 at 1.)
This argument suffers from multiple, facially obvious flaws.
“To begin, [i]nterrogatory [number five] does not require the
production of documents,” Morley v. Energy Serv. of Am. Corp., No.
3:22CV375, 2023 WL 3167438, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 28, 2023)
(unpublished); see also Speed RMG Partners, LLC v. Arctic Cat Sales
Inc., No. 20CV609, 2021 WL 5087362, at *12 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2021)
9
(unpublished) (emphasizing that party “is not required to produce
documents in response to an interrogatory”). The Court therefore
rejects Plaintiff’s assertion that, for interrogatory number five,
“Defendant should be compelled to . . . produce responsive
documents” (Docket Entry 28 at 1). Similarly, the plain language
of interrogatory number five’s demand for Defendant to “[d]efine
post offer – pre hire drug test” (id. at 4) did not require
“Defendant to explain its . . . policy concerning post offer, pre
hire drug testing” (id. at 1). Simply put, giving one’s definition
of a term does not necessitate “explain[ing one’s] . . . policy
concerning [the term]” (id.). See https://dictionary.cambridge.org
/dictionary/english/define (defining “define” as “to say what the
meaning of something, especially a word, is” (bold font omitted))
(last visited Nov. 20, 2025).
Next, Plaintiff has contended that Defendant wrongly relied on
the immateriality of the results of her drug test in objecting to
interrogatory number five, because she “did not ask about the
results” (Docket Entry 28 at 1),6 but that contention misses the
point. Defendant noted the immateriality of the drug test results

6 Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s above-quoted admission, the
instant Motion states that “now [she] would like to know the
results” (Docket Entry 28 at 1); however, “[t]he [C]ourt cannot
compel [D]efendant[] to provide such information if [P]laintiff
never made any appropriate request for it,” Grabek v. Dickinson,
No. CIV S-10-2892, 2012 WL 113799, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2012)
(unpublished); accord, e.g., White v. City of Grand Rapids, No.
1:19CV877, 2020 WL 13750043, at *1 (W.D. Mich. July 20, 2020)
(unpublished).
10
to explain the irrelevance of Plaintiff’s inquiry into Defendant’s
definition of “post offer - pre hire drug test” (id. at 4). In
sum, Defendant’s response to interrogatory number five effectively
binds Defendant to the position that Defendant did not rely on any
such drug test to deny Plaintiff employment and, as a result,
Defendant’s definition of that drug test holds no apparent
relevance in this case, as that definition could not affect the
resolution of Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant unlawfully refused
to employ her due to her disability. See Republican Party of N.C.
v. Martin, 136 F.R.D. 421, 425 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (“[W]hile ‘the
requirement of relevancy should be construed liberally and with
common sense, rather than in terms of narrow legalisms, no one
would suggest that discovery should be allowed of information that
has no conceivable bearing on the case.’” (internal brackets
omitted) (quoting C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Prac. & Proc.:
Civil § 2008, at 45-46 (1970))); see also, e.g., U.S. Home Corp v.
Settlers Crossing, LLC, Civ. Action No. 08-1863, 2013 WL 5530282,
at *7 (D. Md. Oct. 3, 2013) (unpublished) (“[I]f the discovery
sought has no bearing on an issue of material fact... it is not
relevant ... .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).’

’ Stated another way, Plaintiff and Defendant have agreed that
the drug test did not cause Defendant to deny Plaintiff employment,
albeit for different reasons, i.e., Plaintiff has asserted that
Defendant did not employ her due to her non-drug-test-related
disability (see Docket Entry 4 at 1-4) and Defendant has countered
that it did not employ Plaintiff due to her non-drug-test-related
(continued...)
11

The instant Motion nonetheless insists that interrogatory
number five:
is relevant due to the [fact that the] definition and
timing of a post offer and pre hire drug test goes to
whether [Defendant] followed [its] own hiring process,
whether [Plaintiff] was treated differently than others,
whether [Defendant] improperly tested [Plaintiff] before
a bona fide offer, or whether [Defendant’s] stated reason
for not hiring [Plaintiff is] shifting [and] pretextual.
(Docket Entry 28 at 1; see also id. (arguing that interrogatory
number five “is directly relevant . . . to whether Defendant
followed its own hiring procedures, whether . . . Plaintiff was
treated consistently with other applicants, and whether Defendant’s
stated reasons for not hiring... [P]laintiff are pretextual”) □□
But Plaintiff has not explained how Defendant’s definition of
that drug test - as opposed to information (not solicited by
interrogatory number five) about (A) the timing of the drug test’s
administration to Plaintiff and others, (B) Defendant’s policy
concerning that drug test, and (C) Defendant’s stated reasons for
not hiring Plaintiff - would reveal “whether [Defendant] followed
[its] own hiring process” (id.), “treated [her] differently than
others” (id.), “improperly tested [her] before a bona fide offer”
(id.), and/or “stated [a] reason for not hiring [her that]

‘(...continued)
failure to “qualif[y] for the position” (Docket Entry 28 at 17
(bold font omitted)). In view of the parties’ agreement that the
drug test did not play a part in the employment decision, the
definition of that drug test does not carry any clear significance
to the resolution of this case.
12

shift[ed, showing] pretext[]” (id.). (See id.; see also Docket
Entry 34 at 1-3 (making no mention of interrogatory number five)
On the other hand, Defendant’s response to the instant Motion does
not engage with Plaintiff’s theory of relevance. (See Docket Entry
31 at 1 (asserting that “Plaintiff served extraordinarily broad
initial discovery requests, most of which sought information and
documents completely irrelevant to any claim or defense in this
case” without analyzing any specific request), 2 (discussing
authority barring discovery “[flishing expeditions” and giving
example of “inquiries .. . seeking all communications relating to
[the p]laintiff” (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted)),
3 (describing “many of Plaintiff’s requests and interrogatories
[as] so overly broad as to constitute fishing expeditions” but not
focusing on any particular request or interrogatory), 4 (arguing
that “majority of Plaintiff’s interrogatories and document requests
are wholly irrelevant to the claims and defenses in this case” and
highlighting two document requests as examples) .)
“Traditionally, the party opposing discovery bears the burden
in a discovery dispute.” Seamon v. Duke Univ., No. 1:15CV462, 2018
WL 1441267, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 21, 2018) (unpublished) (Webster,
M.J.); accord, e.g., Furr v. Jerinkin, No. 5:22C7T3454, 2025 WL
2985897, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2025) (unpublished); South
Carolina State Conf. of the NAACP v. McMaster, 584 F. Supp. 3d 152,
159 (D.S.C. 2022) (Childs, J.); Syngenta Crop Prot., LLC v.

13

Willowood, LLC, No. 1:15CV274, 2016 WL 6783691, at *1 (M.D.N.C.
Oct. 6, 2016) (unpublished) (Peake, M.J.). “That includes ‘where
the resisting party asserts that the discovery is irrelevant.’”
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of N.C., No.
1:14CV954, 2017 WL 11684866, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 9, 2017)
(unpublished) (Webster, M.J.) (quoting United Oil Co. v. Parts
Assocs., Inc., 227 F.R.D. 404, 411 (D. Md. 2005)); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 1:00CV1262, 2012 WL
1565228, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 30, 2012) (unpublished) (Osteen,
C.J.) (“*[T]he burden of showing that the requested discovery is
not relevant to the issues in the case is on the party resisting
discovery.’” (quoting Flora _v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576, 578
(M.D.N.C. 1978) (Gordon, C.J.))); Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F. Supp.
1090, 1114 (EBE.D.N.cC. 1984) (“[T]he burden of showing that the
requested discovery is not relevant to the issues in this
litigation is clearly on the party resisting discovery.”). The
lack of argument by Defendant about interrogatory number five might
loom large if “the [instant M]otion must be decided based upon
th[at traditional allocation of the] burden of persuasion,” United
States v. Sanchez-Martinez, No. 13CR236, 2013 WL 3662871, at *4 (D.
Colo. July 12, 2013) (unpublished). See generally United States v.
Shamsid-Deen, 61 F.4th 935, 946 (llth Cir. 2023) (“In a close case,
the burdens of production and persuasion can decide the case.”).

14

The Court, however, must consider the fact that “[Federal]
Rule [of Civil Procedure] 26(b) (1) was amended in 2015, regarding
the scope of discovery in civil cases, in an effort to curb
widespread abuse in discovery.” Shackleford v. Vivint Solar Dev.
LLC, Civ. Action No. 19-954, 2020 WL 3488913, at *5 (D. Md. June
25, 2020) (unpublished). Notably, that amendment “restore[d]
proportionality to the forefront of the discovery process ... .”
Black v. West Va. State Police, Nos. 3:22CV96, 3:22CV203, 2023 WL
4834948, at *9 (S.D. W. Va. July 27, 2023) (unpublished); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1) (“Unless otherwise limited by court order,
the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case

.. .”). Accordingly, “[u]nder the 2015 amendments to [Federal]
Rule [of Civil Procedure] 26(b) (1), . . . the inquiry is whether
the discovery [sought] is relevant to any party’s claim or defense
and proportional to the needs of the case.” Doe v. Cabell Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., No. 3:21CV31, 2022 WL 288193, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Jan.
31, 2022) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, “on its own, the [C]ourt must limit the... extent
of discovery . . . if it determines that . . . the proposed
discovery is outside the scope permitted by [Federal] Rule [of
Civil Procedure] 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (2) (C) (iii)
(emphasis added); see also Miller v. McWilliams, No. 1:20CV671,

15

2021 WL 11723046, at *1-2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 8, 2021) (unpublished)
(acknowledging that, in opposition to motion seeking to compel
discovery, resisting party “fail[ed] to substantiate [its
discovery] objection with great specificity” but nevertheless
denying motion and emphasizing independent “obligation of the
[c]ourt to enforce [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 26’s
proportionality principle”); Cybernet, LLC v. David, No. 7:16CV16,
2018 WL 810142, at *5-7 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 9, 2018) (unpublished)
(denying motion to compel in part based on judicial responsibility
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to police
proportionality limits), aff’d, 954 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2020); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes, 2015 Amendment (“The
parties and the court have a collective responsibility to consider
the proportionality of all discovery and consider it in resolving
discovery disputes.”). And the applicable rule commentary
expressly contemplates that the party requesting discovery must
satisfy the Court that a disputed discovery demand falls within the
proper scope of discovery (i.e., qualifies as both relevant and
proportional): “A party claiming that a [discovery] request is

important to resolve the issues [in a case] should be able to
explain the ways in which the [requested] information bears on the
issues as that party understands them.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26
advisory committee notes, 2015 Amendment (emphasis added).

16
Consistent with the foregoing authority, some judges in this
circuit (including the now-Chief Judge of this Court) have begun to
apply a burden-shifting approach to discovery disputes: “‘The
party seeking discovery has the [initial] burden to establish its
relevancy and proportionality, at which point the burden shifts to
the party resisting discovery to demonstrate why the discovery
should not be permitted.’” Cook v. Wake Forest Univ. Baptist Med.
Ctr., No. 1:20CV193, 2021 WL 620707, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 17, 2021)
(unpublished) (Eagles, J.) (quoting Shackleford, 2020 WL 3488913,
at *5); see also, e.g., Harris v. Vanderburg, No. 4:19CV111, 2020
WL 7319607, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2020) (unpublished) (focusing,
in order denying compelled response, on requesting parties’ failure
“to explain why they need[ed requested] . . . information” rather
than resisting party’s showing); Machinery Sols., Inc. v. Doosan
Infracore Am. Corp., 323 F.R.D. 522, 526 (D.S.C. 2018) (Childs, J.)
(“While the party seeking discovery has the burden to establish its
relevancy and proportionality, the party objecting has the burden
of showing the discovery should not be allowed and doing so through
clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent

evidence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Eramo v. Rolling
Stone LLC, 314 F.R.D. 205, 209 (W.D. Va. 2016) (“Where a prima
facie showing of discoverability has been made by the party seeking
discovery, the burden shifts to the resisting party to show . . .
that the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad
17
scope of relevance . . ., or (2) is of such marginal relevance that
the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the
ordinary presumption of broad discovery.” (internal ellipsis and
quotation marks omitted)).
Here, the Court concludes that Plaintiff (A) has not
adequately “explain[ed] the ways in which [interrogatory number
five] bears on the issues [in this case],” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26
advisory committee notes, 2015 Amendment, and otherwise (B) has not
satisfied (what some courts have called) her threshold “burden to
establish [interrogatory number five’s] relevancy and
proportionality,” Cook, 2021 WL 620707, at *2 (internal quotation
marks omitted). For either or both of those reasons, the Court
will not compel Defendant to make any further response to
interrogatory number five; instead, “on its own, the [C]ourt must
limit the . . . extent of discovery . . . [because] it [has]
determine[d] that . . . [interrogatory number five] is outside the
scope permitted by [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 26(b)(1),”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), i.e., not “relevant to any
party’s claim or defense,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or (at a

minimum) of insufficient relevance to qualify as “proportional to
the needs of the case,” id.
The preceding analysis leaves for decision Plaintiff’s request
for the Court to compel Defendant to answer interrogatory number
eight: “Have Jean Williams, Kimberly Price, Tammy Johnson, Tawanna
18
Craft, or Scott (no first name) ever worked on the floor to help a
CNA? If so what did you do to help a CNA?” (Docket Entry 28 at
4.) Rather than answer, Defendant “object[ed] to th[at
i]nterrogatory as seeking information not relevant to a claim or
defense raised in this action.” (Id. at 17 (emphasis added).)
Specifically, that objection reasons that information about
“[w]hether a given staff member of [Defendant] has performed a task
has no bearing on Plaintiff’s qualifications for the job at issue
in her failure to hire claim.” (Id.) The instant Motion, in turn,
rejoins that such “information is relevant because[, if]
individuals outside of the CNA role performed CNA duties[, that
(A) would] mean[ Defendant allowed] flexibility in roles” (id. at
2), and (B) would “[s]how a possible pattern of inconsistent job
requirements” (id.), which could allow Plaintiff to “show
[Defendant’s reliance on a] pretextual reason for denying [her]
employment” (id.), e.g., that “qualifications used to reject [her]
were not consistently applied” (id.).
As detailed previously (in connection with interrogatory
number five), the relevance-related arguments made in Defendant’s

response opposing the instant Motion deal with matters unrelated to
Plaintiff’s above-quoted rejoinder to Defendant’s relevance
objection to interrogatory number eight. (See Docket Entry 31 at
1-5.) Furthermore, the unrebutted theories advanced in the instant
Motion about the potential significance of the information sought
19
by interrogatory number eight appear plausible (unlike Plaintiff’s
deficient explanation about the purported importance of the
information solicited by interrogatory number five). As such, for
interrogatory number eight, the Court will enter “an order
compelling an answer,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) (3) (B), and will not
rule sua sponte that interrogatory number eight falls “outside the
scope permitted by [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 26(b) (1),”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (2) (C) (iii). See generally Black, 2023 WL
4834948, at *6 (“The determination as to whether discovery violates
[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 26(b) (2) (C) rests with the
district court, and district courts ‘have broad discretion in their
resolution of discovery problems that arise in cases pending before
them.’” (quoting Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy
Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003))).°

® In addition to seeking compelled answers to interrogatories
four, five, and eight, Plaintiff voiced within the instant Motion
a desire to “speak on [three] lie[s]” (Docket Entry 28 at 2):
1) “lie number one (1) ‘[Defendant] states that Jean Williams
is unknown to [Defendant]’ & ‘All but Jean Williams, who is unknown
to [Defendant]’” (id.);
2) “[l]ie number two (2) WOTC are completed at the point of a
contingent offer” (id.); and
3) “number three (3) lie ‘there is no Jean working for
[Defendant]’ during August 19, 2022” (id.).
The two internal quotations in item one above come from
Defendant’s answers to interrogatory number one (specifically its
principal inquiry and subpart A). (See id. at 16.) In item two
above, Plaintiff appeared to refer to Defendant’s answer to
(continued...)
20

CONCLUSION
The instant Motion presents cognizable requests for relief
regarding three interrogatories (interrogatory numbers four, five,
and eight) served by Plaintiff. The present record does not permit
a definitive determination about the sufficiency of Defendant’s
answer to interrogatory number four. Interrogatory number five
falls outside the relevance and/or proportionality limits on the
scope of discovery. Defendant failed to adequately respond to
interrogatory number eight’s relevant and proportional inquiry.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the instant Motion (Docket Entry
28) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, in that Defendant shall

®(...continued)
interrogatory number two (specifically subpart C). (See id.) The
internal quotation in item three above comes from Defendant’s
answer to interrogatory number 13. (See id. at 18.) Plaintiff
based her allegation that Defendant lied about its knowledge of
Jean Williams and its employment of someone named Jean on “an email
that states [f]acility address and Jean Williams - Interim Director
of Nursing dated August 18, 2022.” (Id. at 2 (apparently
referencing id. at 30).) Plaintiff’s charge that Defendant lied
about the WOTC (work opportunity tax credit) evidently rests on her
assertions that “[n]o contingent offer was made and the WOTC number
was not written down.” (Id. at 2; see also id. (discussing
definitions of “contingent offer” and “contingent job offer”).)
The Court deems these “alleg[ations] that [D]efendant ... liedin
[its] interrogatory responses,” Evans v. Bamke, No. 22CV1255, 2023
WL 7111245, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 27, 2023) (unpublished), “factual
disagreement[s] for another day,” id., not matters suitable for
resolution via a motion to compel, see Cooper _v. McGowan, No.
17CV383, 2018 WL 2223671, at *5 (W.D. Wis. May 15, 2018)
(unpublished) (“[The plaintiff] contends that ... [the defendant]
lied in response to [two] interrogatories ... . [The plaintiff]
can argue in his summary judgment briefing or at trial that [the
defendant] is lying, but [the court] will not compel [the
defendant] to respond to [the plaintiff’s] interrogatories ina
certain way.”).
21

serve Plaintiff with a proper and complete answer to interrogatory
number eight by November 26, 2025, but Plaintiff shall obtain no
further relief (although the Court denies relief as to
interrogatory number four without prejudice).9

/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
November 20, 2025

9 Because “the [instant M]otion is granted in part and denied
in part, the [C]ourt . . . may, after giving an opportunity to be
heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the [instant M]otion.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C). Given that neither party requested
expense-shifting (see Docket Entry 28 at 1-3; Docket Entry 31 at 1-
5; Docket Entry 34 at 1-3), the Court exercises its discretion to
decline to apportion reasonable expenses for the instant Motion,
see generally Bryson v. CompuCom Sys., Inc., No. 1:19CV1121, 2021
WL 7184369, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 10, 2021) (unpublished) (Peake,
M.J.) (“The Court has no indication here that either [p]arty was
significantly more burdened by this motion than the other, so each
will bear its own costs.”); Harrison v. Carrington Mortg. Servs.,
LLC, No. 3:16CV14, 2017 WL 1612135, at *1 (W.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2017)
(unpublished) (recognizing that, when “[Federal] Rule [of Civil
Procedure] 37(a)(5)(C) applies, [] it is within the court’s
discretion whether to apportion expenses”).
22

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11206676. Public record. Not legal advice.