# Rainey v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago

> Illinois Supreme Court · November 20, 2025 · 2025 IL 131305

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11206002

## Case

- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** November 20, 2025
- **Citations:** 2025 IL 131305
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 5 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11206002

## Opinion text

2025 IL 131305

IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 131305)

TAMICA N. RAINEY, Appellee, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN’S
ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant.

Opinion filed November 20, 2025.

JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Neville and Justices Theis, Overstreet, Holder White,
Cunningham, and Rochford concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 This case requires us to interpret section 5-228(b) of the Illinois Pension Code
(40 ILCS 5/5-228(b) (West 2022)) to determine whether plaintiff Tamica Rainey is
entitled to an award of her attorney fees and costs based on the appellate court’s
ruling that ordered defendant, the Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity
and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago (Board), to restore her duty disability
benefits. We find the statute authorizes the award of attorney fees and costs to
police officers, like Rainey, who successfully challenge on administrative review
the discontinuation of their duty or occupational disease disability benefits.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 Rainey was injured in car accidents in 2013 and 2015 while on duty as a
Chicago police officer. She applied for duty disability benefits in 2016 and was
awarded them in 2017 under section 5-154 of the Pension Code (id. § 5-154) for
injuries she sustained to her neck and shoulder. Rainey was required to submit to
annual examinations under section 5-156 of the Pension Code (id. § 5-156) to
review her disability status. The Board scheduled a March 2022 status hearing to
determine whether Rainey’s duty disability benefits should be continued, modified,
or discontinued. Rainey appeared before the Board on March 24, 2022, and
requested a continuance to obtain counsel and medical records, which the Board
granted. Rainey submitted additional medical records to the Board on June 25,
2022, and at a June 30, 2022, hearing, the Board continued the proceedings on its
own motion so it could review the recent submissions. At an August 25, 2022,
hearing, Rainey requested another continuance. The Board offered to award her an
ordinary disability benefit at 50% salary without a hearing, an offer she declined.
See id. § 5-155. The Board rejected Rainey’s request to continue the hearing, held
the hearing, and voted to discontinue her duty disability benefits. The Board issued
its written decision on October 27, 2022, finding Rainey was no longer disabled as
a result of her duty-related injuries. However, when Rainey reported to the police
department for assignment, the department found her to be physically unable to
perform her duties. Rainey was not cleared for full duty, and the department was
unable to provide her with a position.

¶4 Rainey sought administrative review, and the Cook County circuit court
reversed the Board’s decision to discontinue Rainey’s duty disability benefits. The
trial court relied on this court’s ruling in Kouzoukas v. Retirement Board of the
Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 234 Ill. 2d 446, 471 (2009), where
we found that an officer remains disabled when the police department is unable to
provide her a position with the necessary accommodations. Rainey also sought, and
the trial court granted, her attorney fees and costs in the amount of $33,981.94

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pursuant to section 5-228(b) of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/5-228(b) (West
2022)). The Board appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
conclusion that Rainey’s duty disability benefits should continue. 2024 IL App (1st)
231993, ¶¶ 61, 68. It also affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs.
Id. This court thereafter granted the Board’s petition for leave to appeal, where it
challenges only the award of attorney fees and costs.

¶5 ANALYSIS

¶6 The issue before us is whether Rainey was entitled to an award of statutory
attorney fees and costs for successfully challenging the Board’s discontinuation of
her duty disability benefits. The Board asserts that the attorney fees and costs
provision of the Pension Code does not apply when the Board discontinues duty
disability benefits. It argues that Rainey is not entitled to recover her attorney fees
and costs and that the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s incorrect
determination that the award was proper. The Board construes the attorney fees and
costs provision as applicable in only two circumstances: when an initial duty
disability benefits application is denied (1) under section 5-154 or (2) under section
5-154.1, neither of which, it contends, is at issue here. See 40 ILCS 5/5-154, 5-
154.1 (West 2022). In response, Rainey argues that the plain language of the
attorney fees and costs provision directs that she is entitled to the statutory fee
because she successfully challenged the Board’s denial of her continued duty
disability benefits on administrative review. She maintains the appellate court
correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court and its award of attorney fees and
costs.

¶7 To determine whether Rainey was eligible for a statutory attorney fees and costs
award, we must interpret sections 5-154, 5-156, and 5-228(b) of the Pension Code.

¶8 Section 5-154, titled “Duty disability benefit,” states:

“(a) An active policeman who becomes disabled on or after the effective
date as the result of injury incurred on or after such date in the performance of
an act of duty, has a right to receive duty disability benefit during any period of
such disability for which he does not have a right to receive salary, equal to

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75% of his salary, as salary is defined in this Article, at the time the disability
is allowed ***.” Id. § 5-154(a).

¶9 Section 5-156 is titled “Proof of disability—Physical examinations” and
provides:

“Proof of disability—Physical examinations. Proof of duty, occupational
disease, or ordinary disability shall be furnished to the board by at least one
licensed and practicing physician appointed by the board. In cases where the
board requests an applicant to get a second opinion, the applicant must select a
physician from a list of qualified licensed and practicing physicians who
specialize in the various medical areas related to duty injuries and illnesses, as
established by the board. The board may require other evidence of disability. A
disabled policeman who receives a duty, occupational disease, or ordinary
disability benefit shall be examined at least once a year by one or more
physicians appointed by the board. When the disability ceases, the board shall
discontinue payment of the benefit, and the policeman shall be returned to
active service.” Id. § 5-156.

¶ 10 Section 5-228, titled “Administrative Remedies,” states:

“(b) If any policeman whose application for either a duty disability benefit
under Section 5-154 or for an occupational disease disability benefit under
Section 5-154.1 has been denied by the Retirement Board brings an action for
administrative review challenging the denial of disability benefits and the
policeman prevails in the action in administrative review, then the prevailing
policeman shall be entitled to recover from the Fund court costs and litigation
expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, as part of the costs of the
action.” Id. § 5-228(b).

¶ 11 Also important to our discussion are sections 5-154.1 and 5-155 of the Pension
Code. Section 5-154.1, “Occupational disease disability benefit,” provides, in
pertinent part:

“(b) Any police officer with at least 10 years of service who suffers a heart
attack or any other disabling heart disease but is not entitled to a benefit under
Section 5-154 is entitled to receive an occupational disease disability benefit

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under this Section. The occupational disease disability benefit shall be 65% of
the salary attached to the rank held by the police officer in the police service at
the time of his or her removal from the police department payroll.” Id. § 5-
154.1(b).

Section 5-155, “Ordinary disability benefit,” states:

“Ordinary disability benefit. A policeman less than age 63 who becomes
disabled after the effective date as the result of any cause other than injury
incurred in the performance of an act of duty, shall receive ordinary disability
benefit during any period or periods of disability exceeding 30 days, for which
he does not have a right to receive any part of his salary.” Id. § 5-155.

¶ 12 In interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the legislature. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc., 238 Ill.
2d 455, 461 (2010). A statute’s plain language is the best indicator of legislative
intent, and where the statute’s language is clear, we apply it as written. Id. (citing
DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006)). No term should be rendered
meaningless, and we cannot read into the statute exceptions, limitations, or
conditions the legislature did not intend. Id. We review issues of statutory
construction de novo. State ex rel. Schad, Diamond & Shedden, P.C. v. My Pillow,
Inc., 2018 IL 122487, ¶ 18.

¶ 13 We begin our interpretation of the above statutory provisions, as the appellate
court did, with the statute’s plain language, which we consider as a whole pursuant
to the appropriate interpretive rules. Three sections of the Pension Code describe
the types of disability benefits and explain an officer’s right to those benefits, which
differ according to whether the disability is duty (40 ILCS 5/5-154 (West 2022)),
occupational disease (id. § 5-154.1), or ordinary (id. § 5-155 (“the result of any
cause other than injury incurred in the performance of an act of duty”)). We first
examine section 5-154, which describes a police officer’s right to the disability
benefit. It is applicable to an “active policeman who becomes disabled” as a result
of a job-related injury and authorizes “a right to receive duty disability benefit.” Id.
§ 5-154(a). Section 5-154 does not include any processes or evidentiary
requirements to obtain and maintain a duty disability benefit. It is section 5-156 that
describes the process in which a police officer must engage and the proof she must
present to both obtain and continue her disability benefit. Section 5-156 specifies

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its applicability to all three types of disability benefits, including duty, occupational
disease, and ordinary. It includes the requirements for proof of disability in both
the initial request for disability benefits and for continuation of those benefits. Id.
§ 5-156. It addresses “applicant[s]” and their burden of proof and requires that the
“disabled policeman” receiving a disability benefit be examined annually. Id.
Finally, section 5-156 explains that benefit payments shall be “discontinue[d]”
when the policeman’s disability ceases. Id.

¶ 14 We agree with the appellate court’s interpretation that section 5-154 provides
for an ongoing right to benefits and section 5-156 sets forth the process and required
proof for a disabled police officer to obtain disability benefits and to continue
receiving them. See 2024 IL App (1st) 231993, ¶¶ 58-59. The appellate court
correctly characterized Rainey’s continuation of benefits as an “ongoing section 5-
154 application” for benefits, recognizing there is only one process to obtain and
continue disability benefits. Id. ¶ 61. Rainey applied for and was granted a duty
disability benefit in 2017 based on the injuries she received in the performance of
her police duties. As statutorily required, the Board reviewed the continuation of
Rainey’s duty disability benefits in 2022, initiated additional review, and concluded
they should be discontinued. At that time, Rainey did not submit another
application to the Board for the continuation of her duty disability benefits. Neither
she nor the Board revisited old evidence but concentrated on evidence establishing
that her duty-related injuries continued to disable her. The Board asked her for
proof that she continued to suffer from her disability and that the disability
prevented her from performing her responsibilities as a police officer. What Rainey
submitted were medical records in support of the continuation of her duty disability
benefits. This proof is the same type she submitted in 2017 when originally seeking
benefits, although the 2022 evidence concerned her current medical circumstances,
but it was all based on her duty-related injuries. Section 5-156 requires the same
proof for the initial award of duty disability benefits and for the continuation of
them, that is, evidence establishing disability. Rainey had to show she continued to
be disabled and that the disability resulted from a duty-related injury. Section 5-
156 presents the process and requirements an officer must meet to be awarded a
disability benefit. It does not differentiate between the types of disabilities or
whether the officer is seeking to start disability benefits or to continue them. With
both her initial request and in her response to the status hearing, Rainey was seeking
duty disability benefits.

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¶ 15 The Board misconstrues the statute when it argues that section 5-228(b)
differentiates between an original request for benefits and the continuation of them.
The Board places great stock in the legislature’s use of “deny” and “discontinue”
in section 5-228(b), contending that the use of those different words codifies that
section 5-154 and 5-156 set forth different processes. We find the distinction to be
without a difference. Section 5-228(b) refers to officers whose disability benefit
application had been “denied” and who successfully challenge the “denial” of
benefits. The plain language does not limit the attorney fees and costs award to only
those officers who prevail on their challenge to the original request for disability
benefits. Had the legislature intended that outcome, it would have differentiated
between section 5-154 and section 5-156 as it did between section 5-154 and section
5-154.1, and section 5-155. The Board itself, in its decision and order discontinuing
Rainey’s disability benefits found Rainey was not “entitled to continuation of duty
disability pension benefits pursuant to section [5-]154 of the Illinois Pension
Code.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 16 The Board relies on two unpublished appellate court decisions as support that
Rainey was not entitled to an attorney fees and costs award based on its
interpretation that section 5-228(b) differentiates between an initial request for
disability benefits and an officer’s defense of their continuation. In Warner v.
Retirement Board of the Policeman’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 2022 IL
App (1st) 200833-U, ¶ 2, the Board terminated the plaintiff’s duty disability
benefits granted under section 5-154 and awarded him ordinary duty benefits under
section 5-155 instead. The Board found that the plaintiff’s disability was not
causally related to his act of duty injury. Id. ¶ 8. The trial court reversed the Board’s
denial of the plaintiff’s continued duty disability benefits, and although the
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s determination regarding the plaintiff’s
disability, it denied the plaintiff an award of attorney fees and costs under section
5-228(b) of the Pension Code. Id. ¶¶ 69, 71. The court concluded that the appeal
concerned continuing proof of disability, not an application for disability benefits,
and thus section 5-228(b) did not apply. Id. ¶ 69. In rejecting the plaintiff’s attorney
fees and costs request, the Warner court reasoned the appeal involved “proceedings
initiated by the Board under section 5-156 to establish continuing proof of
disability,” not an application for disability benefits under section 5-154, and
differentiated the two types of proceedings. Id. Similarly, in Koniarski v.
Retirement Board of the Policeman’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 2021 IL

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App (1st) 200501-U, ¶ 47, the appellate court distinguished between section 5-154
and section 5-156 in finding the plaintiff was not entitled to an attorney fees and
costs award under section 5-228(b). Like the Warner court, the Koniarski court
stated that the appeal was not about an application for benefits under section 5-154
but about the continuation of benefits under section 5-156 and an award of attorney
fees and costs for the successful challenge of the discontinuation of benefits is not
authorized by the statutory language. Id. Warner and Koniarski both concluded that
section 5-228(b) concerns only initial applications for disability benefits and not
the discontinuation of them.

¶ 17 The appellate court below rejected Warner and Koniarski, finding them
unpersuasive and noting that they are unpublished, nonprecedential, and
nonbinding Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 (eff. Feb. 1, 2023) orders. 2024 IL App
(1st) 231993, ¶ 64. The appellate court determined both decisions were
“conclusory” regarding the attorney fees and costs issue. Id. We agree with the
appellate court’s description of Warner and Koniarski as “conclusory” in
interpreting the attorney fees and costs provision. Indeed, both courts presented the
same conclusion almost verbatim, merely setting forth the language of section 5-
228(b) and summarily determining that it applied only to the denial of an original
application for benefits and not to the discontinuation of the benefits. Both Rule 23
orders are devoid of any analysis or reasoning regarding the resolution of the issue.
They do not rely on rules of statutory interpretation or present any support for their
conclusory and incorrect construction of the attorney fees and costs provision. In
contrast, the appellate court in the instant case employed a reasoned statutory
analysis in rejecting the conclusions reached by the Warner and Koniarski courts
and holding that section 5-228(b) applies where “an applicant for duty disability
benefits has benefits discontinued by the Board at a status hearing and succeeds in
having that decision by the Board reversed on appeal.” Id. ¶ 57.

¶ 18 Likewise, we reject the Board’s interpretation that section 5-154 and section 5-
156 are two separate processes: one to apply for benefits and one to discontinue
them. Sections 5-154, 5-154.1, and 5-155 each address a disabled officer’s right to
the disability benefit. Section 5-156 explains how to obtain the benefits. The
sections necessarily work together and apply to all disability benefits. As stated
above, the plain language of the statute does not distinguish between an initial
application for benefits and the continuation of them. The Board’s interpretation of

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the attorney fees and costs provision, limiting the award to those officers whose
initial application for disability benefits was denied and reversed on administrative
review, is in contradiction of the legislative intent to assist disabled officers who
successfully challenge the denial of their disability benefits, including their
continuation. The award of attorney fees and costs helps to level the playing field
for officers who are required by the Board to defend their eligibility for continued
disability benefits. The attorney fees and costs provision supports officers who are
confronting the vast resources of the Board. Police officers like Rainey who
respond to the Board’s review of their disability benefits should not be penalized
for defending those benefits when they are improperly discontinued.

¶ 19 The unambiguous language of the statute directs that the trial court may award
attorney fees and costs to an officer who applies for and receives disability benefits
for a duty-related injury or for occupational disease and successfully challenges the
denial of benefits. Both section 5-154 and section 5-154.1 provide disability
benefits for duty-related injuries. See 40 ILCS 5/5-154(a) (West 2022)) (benefits
for officer injured “in the performance of an act of duty”); id. § 5-154.1(a) (benefits
for officer with disability that “arise[s] out of or in the course of employment”). In
enacting these provisions, the legislature determined that these two classes of
officers were entitled to an attorney fees and costs award when their applications
for duty or job-related disability were wrongly denied by the Board. It makes no
sense to deny these officers an award of attorney fees and costs when they challenge
the discontinuation of their disability benefits. Indeed, we construe the legislative
intent in favor of officers who are disabled as a result of their public service. We
find section 5-228(b) allows attorney fees and costs to be awarded to officers who
successfully challenge denial of their initial request for duty or occupational disease
disability benefits and the continuation of those benefits.

¶ 20 Section 5-228(b) does differentiate between duty/occupational disease
disabilities and ordinary disabilities. Its plain language limits attorney fees and
costs awards to police officers whose disabilities are duty related and does not
authorize an award to officers obtaining an ordinary disability benefit,
distinguishing officers who incur injuries related to the job from those officers
whose disabilities are not job related. The appellate court construed these
provisions with the rest of the statute and properly distinguished police officers
seeking duty- or occupational-related disability benefits from those officers seeking

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ordinary disability benefits unrelated to their job as police officers. 2024 IL App
(1st) 231993, ¶ 62. It reasoned the distinction exists to provide greater support to
officers who are disabled as a result of their job-related injuries as opposed to
officers whose disabilities arose outside the context of their employment. Id. ¶ 63.
It concluded that “the legislature clearly and logically prioritized officers who were
wrongly denied job-related disability benefits.” Id. ¶ 62. We agree with the
appellate court’s reasoning that the legislature decided that officers who sought
disability benefits under section 5-155 for a disability “the result of any cause other
than injury incurred in the performance of an act of duty” (40 ILCS 5/5-155 (West
2022)) were not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs. 2024 IL App (1st)
231993, ¶ 62. The statute evinces a policy that officers who are denied job-related
duty disability benefits should not foot the bill for challenging the improper denial
or termination of those benefits. Per the plain language of section 5-228(b), we find
officers who are seeking ordinary disability benefits unconnected to a job-related
disability are not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs.

¶ 21 Finally, we consider the Board’s argument that pending legislation negates the
above policy determination where the proposed legislation permits an award of
attorney fees to officers who also prevail in challenging the denial of ordinary
benefits and to those who challenge the termination of their continued disability
benefits. The legislation would codify the appellate court’s ruling in this case that
attorney fees and costs may be awarded to officers who successfully challenge the
denial of benefits and the continuation of them. The legislation failed to pass, and
according to the Board, the legislature’s failure to adopt the legislation means that
it agrees with the cases interpreting the fee provision such as Warner and Koniarski.
See Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc., 232 Ill. 2d 369, 380 (2008)
(legislature’s failure to pass legislation indicates its acceptance of the judicial
interpretation of the statute). We are not persuaded by the Board’s reliance on
legislative efforts to amend the attorney fees and costs provision.

¶ 22 CONCLUSION

¶ 23 We affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the judgment of
the circuit court, and find that section 5-228(b) of the Pension Code authorizes the
award of the attorney fees and costs to a police officer who prevails on

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administrative review when challenging either the denial of duty or occupational
disease disability benefits or the discontinuation of them.

¶ 24 Appellate court judgment affirmed.

¶ 25 Circuit court judgment affirmed.

¶ 26 Board decision reversed.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11206002. Public record. Not legal advice.