# Kirkpatrick

> District Court, D. Oregon · November 19, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11205811

## Case

- **Full name:** Kaeleen Kirkpatrick v. Tigard-Tualatin School District, Lenichtka Reed, and Carol Kinch
- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** November 19, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11205811

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that the district court could have ordered disclosure of juvenile court records notwithstanding California law limiting their disclosure
- acknowledging the court’s ability to develop common law privileges but declining “to exercise that authority expansively”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

KAELEEN KIRKPATRICK, an individual, C ase No. 3:24-cv-2007-AR

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

TIGARD-TUALATIN SCHOOL DISTRICT,
an Oregon Public School District local
government, LENICHTKA REED, an
individual, and CAROL KINCH, an
individual,

Defendants.
_____________________________________

ARMISTEAD, United States Magistrate Judge

Nonparty City of Tualatin (the City) moves to quash plaintiff Kaeleen Kirkpatrick’s
subpoena to produce relevant Tualatin Police Department records under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 45(d)(3). (ECF 24.) The court has described the facts and claims in this case in a
previous ruling (ECF 23) and incorporates them by reference.
At issue are ten police reports identified by the City as responsive to Kirkpatrick’s
subpoena. It is the City’s position, however, that it is prohibited from releasing those reports
under Oregon’s public records laws. Because those reports were referred to either the
Washington County Juvenile Court or State of Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS),
the City asserts that Kirkpatrick must subpoena those departments to access the records. (Mot.
Quash at 3, ECF 24.) In response, Kirkpatrick argues that the City’s motion is untimely and
Oregon public records laws cited by the City do not limit the reports’ disclosure in discovery.
(Resp. at 4-7, ECF 27.)
The City cites no basis or authority for its position, and the court has found none. As the
moving party, the City has the burden of persuasion, although Kirkpatrick must demonstrate that
the discovery sought is relevant. Horstman v. City of Hillsboro, 3:15-cv-00203-PK, 2016 WL

11775606, at *2 (D. Or. Jan. 14, 2016). The public records laws relied on by the City
(ORS § 419A.255; ORS § 419A.257; and ORS § 419B.035) do not, on their face, prohibit the
City from producing police or incident reports because those reports were ultimately referred to
the juvenile court or ODHS. The City does not challenge the relevance of the reports—thus their
relevance is not at issue. Given those facts, and the apparent lack of other authority for the City’s
position, the court finds that the City has not carried their burden.
That said, the court has an independent duty to limit discovery that falls outside the scope
permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii); V5 Techs.
v. Switch, Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 306, 314 (D. Nev. 2019), aff'd sub nom. V5 Techs., LLC v. Switch,

LTD., 2020 WL 1042515 (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2020). Rule 26 permits the discovery of any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant and proportional to the needs of the case. And Rule 45(d)(3)
directs the court to quash or modify a subpoena that requires disclosure of privileged or other
protected matter if no exception or waiver applies.

Page 2 – OPINION AND ORDER
Kirkpatrick v. Tigard-Tualatin School District, et al., 3:24-cv-02007-AR
Although the City does not raise a privilege argument, the court finds that some of the
responsive documents are privileged under Oregon’s juvenile records privilege law and would
therefore be protected from disclosure in state court. Accordingly, Kirkpatrick must modify her
subpoena in accordance with this order to protect the identifying information of nonparties
(minor children and their adult family members) referenced in the responsive documents.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 governs privileges asserted in cases involving claims
brought under federal law. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 511 F.2d 192, 197 (9th Cir. 1975),
aff’d, 426 U.S. 394 (1976); Breed v. United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 542 F.2d

1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 1976). Here, Kirkpatrick brings claims under federal and state law. The
federal common law of privileges thus governs the state claim as well as the federal claim.
Marbet v. City of Portland, No. CV 02-1448-HA, 2003 WL 23540258, at *6 (D. Or. Sept. 8,
2003).
When applying the federal common law rules of privilege, federal courts should consider
the policies underlying the state privileges. Breed, 542 F.2d at 1115; see also Kelly v. City of San
Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 656 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (“As a matter of comity, federal courts should
attempt to ascertain what interests inspire relevant state doctrine and should take into account the
views of state authorities about the importance of those interests.”).

DISCUSSION
Kirkpatrick is correct that Oregon’s public records laws are not a restriction on a
discovery but “an exception to the rule that every person has a right to inspect the records of any
public body.” Brown v. State of Or., Dep’t of Corr., 173 F.R.D. 262, 264 (D. Or. 1997). Generally,

Page 3 – OPINION AND ORDER
Kirkpatrick v. Tigard-Tualatin School District, et al., 3:24-cv-02007-AR
records that are “confidential and not subject to public inspection” under Oregon law are
confidential and exempt from public disclosure, but not necessarily privileged against discovery.
See Kahn v. Pony Express Courier Corp., 173 Or. App. 127, 142 (2001). That is because Oregon
courts “follow[] the federal view that evidentiary privileges should be strictly construed.” Dodele
v. Conmed, Inc., 2014 WL 60361, at *2 (D. Or. Jan. 7, 2014); Kahn, 173 Or. App. at 142 (“We
are mindful of the principle that [e]videntiary privileges in litigation are not favored.”) (citing
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) and Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990)).
Even so, the Oregon Court of Appeals held in Kahn that ORS § 419A.255(2) establishes
a limited statutory privilege for juvenile court records related to a child’s history and prognosis

that applies generally, including to discovery disputes between two parties in litigation. 173 Or.
App. at 141-42; see also Doe v. Kirk, No. CV 02-104-KI, 2003 WL 23531403, at *2 (D. Or. Jan.
29, 2003) (holding that any records of plaintiff’s “history and prognosis” were privileged under
ORS § 419A.255). That privilege applies “regardless of [the] location” of the records. Matter of
S. J., 316 Or. App. 537, 545 (2021). Kahn defines so-called “history and prognosis records” as
any records “containing information about a child’s medical, psychological, and personal and
family background and predicted future condition or status.” 173 Or. App. at 141-42. Records
that fall outside of that ambit but within the scope of another public records law remain
confidential but are not privileged or protected from discovery. Kahn, 173 Or. App. at 142

(holding that child abuse reporting records are confidential but not privileged under
ORS § 419B.035 unless they relate to a child’s history and prognosis within ORS § 419A.255).
The responsive documents are incident reports created by the City of Tualatin’s police
department and do not originate with the juvenile court or department, the Oregon Youth

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Kirkpatrick v. Tigard-Tualatin School District, et al., 3:24-cv-02007-AR
Authority, or ODHS. But as the City asserts, all of those reports were referred to the Washington
County Juvenile Court and ODHS. It is this court’s view that the privilege described in
ORS § 419A.255 would therefore attach in state court for those records. See Matter of S. J., 316
Or. App. at 550 (“[I]f any ‘history and prognosis’ material is located in either the supplemental
confidential file or the record of the case, the privilege attaches to this material, and it applies
regardless if these same materials exist in duplicate elsewhere.”).
Still, the federal common law applies, and the court is not bound by state privilege law.
See Gonzalez v. Spencer, 336 F.3d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by
Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377,132 (2012) (observing that the district court could have ordered

disclosure of juvenile court records notwithstanding California law limiting their disclosure). The
court has identified only one case in which the district court applied Oregon’s juvenile record
privilege law despite the federal common law of privilege controlling, and it did so without any
discussion. See Doe, 2003 WL 23531403, at *2. Accordingly, the court declines to create a new
evidentiary privilege here. University of Pa., 493 U.S. at 189 (acknowledging the court’s ability
to develop common law privileges but declining “to exercise that authority expansively”).
Despite declining to apply Oregon’s privilege law, “constitutional and prudential
considerations suggest that courts should carefully assess any attempt to compel disclosure of
confidential juvenile court files.” Doe No. 59 v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 3:16-CV-01256-WHO,

2017 WL 11837754, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2017) (citing 23 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth
W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5428, at 817 (1980); see also Fox v. City of
Tulare, 2013 WL 12086297, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2013) (“comity requires that this law be
respected if at all possible”). It is reasonable to extend those considerations to police reports

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Kirkpatrick v. Tigard-Tualatin School District, et al., 3:24-cv-02007-AR
containing sensitive information about minor children, especially in light of those minor
children’s privacy interests.
ORS § 419A.255(2) reflects the state’s important interest in protecting the privacy of
minors and their families. Although the City did not carry its burden in its motion to quash, the
court exercises its authority to modify the subpoena in keeping with the spirit of Oregon’s
privilege law. Doing so will not infringe on Kirkpatrick’s interests or ability to prove her claims.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the City’s motion 1s therefore GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part. The City must produce the documents in accordance with the parties’ stipulated protective
order. In addition, Kirkpatrick must modify the subpoena as follows:
e The names of all minor children and minor children’s nonparty family members must be
redacted and replaced with initials. Any identifying information—including Social
Security numbers, dates of birth, addresses, phone numbers, etc.— must be redacted.
e Although Kirkpatrick concedes that she is not seeking any body-worn camera footage,
the modified subpoena should state that body-worn camera footage need not be produced.
Given that the City will need time to review and redact the responsive documents in
accordance with this order, as well as identify any additional documents compelled by the
subpoena, the City is required to produce the documents by November 28, 2025.
DATED: November 19, 2025

\WEFF ARMISTEAD
United States Magistrate Judge

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Kirkpatrick v. Tigard-Tualatin School District, et al., 3:24-cv-02007-AR

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11205811. Public record. Not legal advice.