# Griffith

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · November 17, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11204432

## Case

- **Full name:** Fernando C. Griffith v. Warden
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** November 17, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

FERNANDO C. GRIFFITH,

Petitioner,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:23-CV-224-SJF

WARDEN,

Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER
Fernando C. Griffith, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a habeas corpus petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge his conviction for murder, arson, and burglary
under Case No. 41C01-5-CF-114. Following a jury trial, on September 20, 2001, the
Johnson Circuit Court sentenced him to 36 years imprisonment in addition to a term of
life imprisonment without parole.
In deciding this habeas petition, the court must presume the facts set forth by the
state courts are correct unless they are rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The Indiana Supreme Court summarized the evidence presented at
trial:
The Greenwood Fire Department responded to a fire at the home of Lloyd
and Judy Georges early on May 19, 2000. Investigators discovered the
bodies of Lloyd and Judy, and autopsies confirmed that stab wounds were
the cause of death. Investigators further determined the fire was
intentionally set with an accelerant. Jewelry was missing from the house
along with Lloyd's wallet. The Georges’ car was also missing from the
garage.
The Greenwood police learned that a witness saw a black male carrying a
gas can in the front yard of the Georges’ house and walking into the front
door of their home. A neighbor informed police that he saw the Georges'
car pulling out of their garage the same morning around 5:05 a.m. The
police found the car ablaze a few days later and ruled it arson because
accelerant was used to fuel the fire.

Assisting the Greenwood Police, Indianapolis Officer Jack Tindall and
Detective Thomas Richard Tudor went to Griffith’s apartment building
around 10:15 p.m. on May 21st, where they noticed that Griffith smelled of
burnt smoke and had band-aids on his hands and fingers. At Detective
Tudor’s direction, Officer Tindall transported Griffith to the Greenwood
Police Department where Officer John Laut noticed the strong smoke odor
and the band-aids while booking Griffith. Upon further inspection, Laut
found one of Lloyd’s rings in Griffith's pocket. Griffith was arrested
between 10:20 p.m. and 11:10 p.m.

Greenwood Detective Patti Cummings directed Officer Tindall to bring
Griffith to the interrogation room for questioning. When Griffith arrived,
Detective Cummings advised him of his Miranda rights during the early
morning hours of May 22. Griffith was held at the Greenwood Police
Department before transport to the Johnson County Jail, which caused his
name to be excluded from the jail population list of suspects who were to
appear before the Magistrate within forty-eight hours. Later that day,
police transported Griffith to the Johnson County Jail.

Hollis Kehrt was also arrested in connection with the present case. On
May 23rd, the Greenwood Police, a captain from the Johnson County Jail,
and the Johnson County Prosecutor wired Kehrt and placed him in the
cell with Griffith to obtain “incriminating information” about the Georges'
murder. Police placed Kehrt in the cell with Griffith before he appeared
before a magistrate. The police were unable to collect any information,
however, because they could not decipher any data from the wire.
The following day, police asked Griffith’s girlfriend Jamie Young to make
a controlled call in an effort to obtain incriminating information from
Griffith. Though police instructed Young not to reveal that the call was
controlled, she immediately did so, and Griffith revealed nothing.
The Greenwood Police prepared a probable cause affidavit on May 22nd,
and revised it on May 23rd. On May 24th, Magistrate Craig Lawson
conducted an initial hearing and determined that probable cause existed
for Griffith’s arrest.
The following day, Griffith’s wife Elizabeth phoned Greenwood police
and told them that Griffith wanted to speak with them. One day later, a
judge granted an order to draw a sample of Griffith’s blood. While en
route to the hospital for the blood draw, Griffith confirmed that he wanted
to speak with the Greenwood police.

At the later meeting with the Greenwood police, officers informed Griffith
of his rights, including his right to counsel and right to remain silent, and
Griffith signed a waiver. Griffith then confessed to the murder of Lloyd
and Judy Georges and the burglary and arson of their home.
Thereafter, the State charged Griffith with two counts of murder, one
count of burglary as a class B felony, and one count of arson, a class B
felony. A jury found him guilty of all counts. The court sentenced Griffith
to life without parole for the murders, and two consecutive eighteen-year
sentences for the counts of burglary and arson.

Griffith v. State, 788 N.E.2d 835, 838–39 (Ind. 2003); ECF 8-5 at 4-5.

In the petition, Griffith asserts claims of trial court error, trial counsel error, and
appellate counsel error. The court will first consider whether Griffith has waived his
claims by declining to brief them and also address the pending motion to appoint
counsel (ECF 37). The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B), permits the
appointment of counsel in a habeas corpus case, if “given the difficulty of the case and
the litigant’s ability, [he] could not obtain justice without an attorney, he could not
obtain a lawyer on his own, and he would have . . . a reasonable chance of winning with
a lawyer at his side.” Winsett v. Washington, 130 F.3d 269, 281 (7th Cir. 1997).
On May 31, 2023, the Warden filed a motion seeking leave to file a response
addressing only the issues of timeliness, procedural default, and cognizability as well as
a proposed response. ECF 8, ECF 9. The court granted the motion but advised that it
might order a round of briefing on the merits after reviewing the parties’ briefing on the
procedural issues and set a deadline for Griffith to reply to the procedural arguments.
ECF 10. On June 13, 2023, Griffith filed a motion to appoint counsel. ECF 11. The court
denied this motion, finding that his filings demonstrated that he remained reasonably

competent at preparing legal documents on his own. ECF 12. The court further noted
that it would be in a better position to assess Griffith’s ability to litigate and whether he
would have a reasonable chance at success with counsel after reviewing the parties’
briefs and the State court record. Id. On November 28, 2023, Griffith filed a motion to
extend the deadline to file a traverse and requested appointment of counsel due to
limited access to the law library. ECF 21. The court denied the request for counsel for

the same reasons and also noted that limited access to the law library may have delayed
his efforts but did not appear to prevent Griffith from preparing a traverse. ECF 22. In
total, Griffith filed six motions to extend, and the court granted a series of extensions
that allowed Griffith about seven months in total to prepare a traverse. ECF 13, ECF 15,
ECF 17, ECF 19, ECF 21, ECF 23, ECF 24.

On December 29, 2023, Griffith filed a traverse that responded to each of the
procedural arguments. ECF 25. Though he was not required to address the merits of
claims, the traverse includes headings for Grounds I-IV as designated in the petition. In
that section of the traverse, Griffith addressed the merits of Ground I, but, with respect
to the other grounds, he vaguely represented that “[d]ue to time constraints and State-

created impediments, Griffith is unable to complete the remainder of his arguments in
reply.” ECF 25-1 at 11-15. On May 3, 2024, the court found Griffith’s procedural
arguments sufficiently persuasive as to order another round of briefing on the
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and the filing of the complete State court record.
On August 1, 2024, the Warden filed a brief addressing the ineffective assistance
of counsel claims and the complete State court record. ECF 31, ECF 33, ECF 34. Pursuant

to the local rules, Griffith’s supplemental traverse was due 28 days later on August 29,
2024. N.D. Ind. L. Cr. R. 47-2. Nevertheless, on December 4, 2024, the court ordered
Griffith to file a supplemental traverse by January 17, 2025, and cautioned him that, if
he did not respond by that deadline, the court might resolve the habeas petition without
the benefit of further briefing. ECF 36. That deadline came and went without any filings
in this case until September 16, 2025, when Griffith filed another motion to appoint

counsel, which remains pending. ECF 37.
Significantly, the deadline to file a supplemental traverse has long passed, and
Griffith has neither requested nor demonstrated good cause to extend or to reset this
deadline. Further, while the trial court error claims are sufficiently developed for
meaningful review in the petition and in the initial traverse, the same cannot be said for

the claims of trial counsel error and appellate counsel error. For example, in the
petition, Griffith faults trial counsel for “failing to argue that the trial court exceeded its
statutory [authority] and abused its discretion when it permitted the State to make
substantive amendments to the charging information several months beyond the
omnibus date.” ECF 1 at 8. However, he does not identify any statute, describe the

purported amendments, or explain how he was harmed by trial counsel’s purported
failure to assert an objection to the amendments. Additionally, the court expressly
asked the parties to address the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, expressly
warned Griffith about the potential consequences for declining to do so, and expressly
informed Griffith that it was not inclined to appoint counsel for him until after this case
was fully briefed. Given this lack of development, it appears that Griffith has waived

his claims of trial counsel error and appellate counsel error. See APS Sports Collectibles,
Inc. v. Sports Time, Inc., 299 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is not this court’s
responsibility to research and construct the parties’ arguments, and conclusory analysis
will be construed as waiver.’); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A
brief must make all arguments accessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play
archaeologist with the record.”); United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991)

(“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”).
Out of an abundance of caution, the court will also consider whether Griffith
required assistance of counsel to prepare a supplemental traverse. In the prior order
denying counsel, the court found him reasonably competent to prepare filings on his
own by relying on his seven motions to extend filed with the Indiana Court of Appeals

on post-conviction review and on the motion to appoint counsel. The court has now had
the benefit of reviewing his initial traverse and the State court record. The State court
record indicates that Griffith prepared motions on his own in State criminal
proceedings even though he also had appointed counsel. For example, he prepared a
39-page handwritten motion to reconsider the order denying his motion to suppress his

confession that contains detailed facts, legal citations, and cogent arguments. ECF 34-8
at 121-60. On post-conviction review, he prepared a 36-page motion to amend his
petition in response to the State’s motion for a more definite statement, and a 6-page
motion for summary judgment with a 19-page affidavit attached. ECF 31-1, ECF 31-4,
ECF 31-5. He also conducted multi-day depositions and examined witnesses on his own
at a multi-day evidentiary hearing. ECF 33-2 through ECF 33-8. And, as detailed above,

his initial traverse in this case adequately and persuasively addressed the procedural
arguments posed by the Warden. Taken together, these documents demonstrate
Griffith’s grasp of the relevant facts and law and his ability to develop them into
rational arguments, so it is unclear why Griffith could not have prepared a
supplemental traverse on his own. Perhaps even more importantly, the record leaves
very little doubt that Griffith could have timely notified the court if he was unable to

prepare a supplemental traverse on his own and needed more time or assistance to do
so.
Consequently, the court finds that Griffith did not need counsel to prepare a
supplemental traverse and that Griffith has waived his ineffective assistance of counsel
claims by declining to develop them either in the petition or in the traverse.1 Further,

even if he did need assistance to prepare a supplemental traverse, Griffith declined to
notify the court in a timely manner and offers no explanation for this substantial delay.
Nevertheless, the court would likely appoint counsel for Griffith if this case were to
proceed beyond the briefing stage. See Rule 8(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases (“If an evidentiary hearing is warranted, the judge must appoint an attorney to

represent a petitioner who qualifies to have counsel appointed under 18 U.S.C. §

1 Given this finding, the court need not further address the parties’ arguments relating to
procedural default, which pertain primarily to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. ECF 8 at 15-20.
3006A.”). However, as detailed below, the court finds that the claims of trial court error
are without merit. Therefore, the court denies the motion to appoint counsel.

TIMELINESS
The court considers the Warden’s argument that Griffith’s petition is untimely.
The statute of limitations for habeas petitions states as follows:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an
application created by State action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of
limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
Based on review of the petition, the date on which the judgment became final is
the applicable starting point for calculating timeliness. His direct appeal culminated
with the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision on May 16, 2003. ECF 8-5. Therefore, his
conviction became final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for

petitioning the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari expired on
August 14, 2003. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (petition for writs of certiorari must filed
within 90 days after entry of judgment); Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009)
(when a State prisoner does not petition the Supreme Court of the United States on
direct appeal, his conviction becomes final when the time for filing a petition expires).
Tolling of the limitations period began on the date on which Griffith’s petition

for post-conviction relief was properly filed in the Johnson Circuit Court. See 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d). According to the State court docket sheet, he filed this petition on April 26,
2004. ECF 8-6 at 2. However, Griffith argues that the prison mailbox rule should apply
to this State court filing. He has submitted evidence indicating that he handed this
petition to a counselor for mailing on March 5, 2004, and the Warden does not dispute

this evidence. ECF 25-2. “[T]he mailbox rule applies to a state pro se prisoner's post-
conviction filings unless the state where the prisoner was convicted has clearly rejected
the rule.” Ray v. Clements, 700 F.3d 993, 1004 (7th Cir. 2012). The State of Indiana has not
rejected but has instead adopted the prison mailbox rule. Dowell v. State, 922 N.E.2d 605,
607 (Ind. 2010) (“[T]his Court has regularly applied the prison mailbox rule in various

orders . . . . We now make explicit the rule as applied in our previous orders.”).
Consequently, the court finds that Griffith’s petition for post-conviction relief was
properly filed on March 5, 2004 – 204 days after his conviction became final.
The State post-conviction proceedings culminated in the dismissal of his appeal
on November 1, 2022. ECF 8-16. Griffith filed the habeas petition 137 days later on

March 18, 2023. ECF 1 at 13. Consequently, only 341 days of the one-year limitations
had elapsed when Griffith filed the habeas petition. Therefore, the court finds that the
habeas petition is timely.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Federal habeas review . . . exists as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the
state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through

appeal.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015).
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
[This] standard is intentionally difficult to meet. We have explained that
clearly established Federal law for purposes of §2254(d)(1) includes only
the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions. And an
unreasonable application of those holdings must be objectively
unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice. To
satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to show that the state
court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking
in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.
Woods, 575 U.S. at 316. Criminal defendants are entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect
one. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986). To warrant relief, a state court’s decision
must be more than incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. Wiggins
v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit
precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the

correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011).
DISCUSSION
Ground I -- Warrantless Arrest
Griffith argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because Officer Tindall lacked
probable cause to arrest him and that evidence obtained as a result of his arrest should

have been excluded at trial. He asserts that the Indiana Supreme Court improperly
relied on evidence obtained by the police after his arrest when it found probable cause.
The Warden argues that this argument is not a valid basis for habeas relief because the
State court provided a mechanism for review. “As long as a habeas petitioner enjoyed
an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim” in state court,

federal habeas review of the claim is barred.” Ben-Yisrayl v. Buss, 540 F.3d 542, 552 (7th
Cir. 2008). “As a general principle, absent a subversion of the hearing process, we will
not examine whether the state courts made the right decision.” Id.
Griffith specifically argues that he did not receive a full and fair hearing because
the Indiana Supreme Court did not decide “by whom, when, and where exactly was his

warrantless arrest made.” ECF 1 at 3. To Griffith’s point, the Indiana Supreme Court
merely noted that the arrest occurred “between 10:20 p.m. and 11:10 p.m.” on May 21,
2000, during which Griffith was at his apartment building and taken to the Greenwood

Police Department office. ECF 8-5 at 4-5. However, the Indiana Supreme Court relied on
the collective knowledge doctrine, rendering more specific determinations unnecessary,
which the court will discuss in greater detail below. Id. at 6. Consequently, the court
cannot find that the State courts deprived Griffith of a full and fair hearing by declining
to make more specific determinations. Nevertheless, the court will review the decision
of the Indiana Supreme Court for the sake of completeness.

“[I]n order to make an arrest without a warrant, the police must have probable
cause to reasonably believe that a particular individual has committed a crime.” United
States v. Rucker, 138 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1998) “A determination of whether there was
probable cause requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
The collective knowledge doctrine permits an officer to stop, search, or
arrest a suspect at the direction of another officer or police agency, even if
the officer himself does not have firsthand knowledge of facts that amount
to the necessary level of suspicion to permit the given action. There is no
Fourth Amendment violation if the knowledge of the officer directing the
stop, search, or arrest—or the collective knowledge of the agency for
which he works—is sufficient to constitute probable cause. In order for the
collective knowledge doctrine to apply, (1) the officer taking the action
must act in objective reliance on the information received, (2) the officer
providing the information—or the agency for which he works—must have
facts supporting the level of suspicion required, and (3) the stop must be
no more intrusive than would have been permissible for the officer
requesting it.

United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 247, 252–53 (7th Cir. 2010).
On May 30, 2000, Detective Patti Cummings of the Greenwood Police
Department submitted a probable cause affidavit. ECF 34-6 at 252-56. In that affidavit,
she attested to obtaining the following information prior to May 21, 2000, the date on
which Griffith was arrested. On May 19, 2000, she went to the victims’ residence where

a fire had occurred. Id. at 252. A fireman informed her that the burn patterns indicated
the use of an accelerant, which, in turn, indicated that the fire had been set intentionally.
Id. She saw the deceased victims inside the residence. Id. On the same day, Detective
Cummings spoke with the victim’s next-door neighbor, who informed her that Mr.
Georges ran a landscaping business and that one of his employees was a black male
named Val whom she had seen at the victim’s residence on several occasions. Id. at 252.

Mr. Georges told her that Val was a stripper and had asked her to make a stripping
costume for Val. Id.
On May 20, 2000, Detective Cummings observed an autopsy in which a
physician informed her that both victims had multiple stab wounds. Id. at 252. She
spoke with Detective Smith who had spoken with Mr. Georges’ friend, David Meek. Id.

at 253. He said that Mr. Georges had brought a black man named Val to his residence
and told him that he met Val at the Unicorn Club, where Val worked as a dancer. Id.
According to Meek, on May 18, 2000, Mr. Georges told Meek that his relationship with
Val had “gone sour”, that he owed Val twenty-five dollars and that he intended to “take
his sweet time” paying him. Id. He also said that Val wanted him to buy a car but that

he did not intend to do so. Id.
Also on May 20, 2000, Detective Cummings spoke with the victims’ son who had
also seen Val at the victims’ residence and identified a photograph of Griffith as
depicting Val. Id. She also spoke with a newspaper deliverer who told her that, at about
5:15 a.m., she saw a black male walking to the victims’ residence with a red gas can
under his arm. Id. The Greenwood Police Department notified her that the Georges’

vehicle had been found on fire. Id. at 255. On the same day, the Greenwood Police
Department contacted other agencies to assist it in locating Griffith. Id. at 254. On May
22, 2000, Detective Cummings spoke with Officer Roller, who told her that, on the
afternoon of May 18, a neighbor saw a black man and a white man arguing on the front
porch of the victim’s residence. Id. at 253.
On April 9, 2001, Griffith, by counsel, filed a motion challenging his arrest and

subsequent detention and seeking to suppress the evidence discovered as a result. ECF
34-8 at 23-27. At an evidentiary hearing on May 31, 2001, Detective Tudor testified that
he worked for the Indianapolis Police Department but that, on May 20, 2000, the chief of
the Greenwood Police Department had asked his department to assist in locating
Griffith. ECF 34-13 at 13-37. On May 21, 2000, he went to the Unicorn Club, where a

supervisor told him that he last saw Griffith on May 18, 2000. Id. Griffith told the
supervisor that “his Sugar Daddy2 [was] going to leave him or give him money and a
car.” Id. The supervisor had seen Griffith with the “Sugar Daddy” at the club several
times and described him as a “white male from Greenwood in his late fifties to early
sixties.” Id. Griffith left the club after midnight on May 19, 2000. Id.

2 This term is defined as “a well-to-do usually older man who supports or spends lavishly on a
mistress, girlfriend, or boyfriend.” Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/sugar%20daddy (last visited on November 14, 2025).
At 10:00 p.m. on May 21, 2000, he met with other police officers, including
Officer Tindall, in a bank parking lot. Id. Officer Tindall told him he was familiar with

Griffith’s appearance. Id. At 10:15 p.m., the police officers went to Griffith’s apartment
building with Officer Tindall walking over to the west side of the building. Id. Less than
a minute later, Officer Tindall informed him over the radio that he had detained
Griffith. Id. He observed several bandages on Griffith’s hands, and he told Officer
Tindall to put Griffith in his police vehicle. Id. He notified the chief of the Greenwood
Police Department of Griffith’s detention, and, at 11:10 p.m., the officers from the

Greenwood Police Department arrived. Id.
Officer Tindall testified that he worked for the Indianapolis Police Department
and that Detective Tudor had asked him to assist with looking for Griffith. Id. at 38-72.
He went to the rear entrance of the apartment building because he knew it was more
likely to be unsecured. Id. As he approached the rear entrance, Griffith stepped out of it.

Id. Officer Tindall recognized Griffith, drew his weapon, and ordered him to the
ground. Id. Griffith complied, and Officer Tindall handcuffed him and placed him in his
police vehicle at Detective Tudor’s direction. Id. Officer Tindall smelled a strong smoky
odor on Griffith and found Mr. Georges’ ring in Griffith’s pocket. Id.
Officer Payne testified that he worked for the Greenwood Police Department. Id.

at 74-91. He arrived at the apartment building at about 11:20 p.m. Id. Detective
Cummings directed him to ask Officer Tindall to take Griffith to the police station,
which he did at about midnight. Id. While Griffith was not free to leave, Officer Payne
did not consider him to be under arrest. Id. He believed that Detective Cummings
arrested him at the police station. Id. Before arriving at the apartment building, Officer
Payne had spoken with Mr. Georges’ friend, Darrell Jenkins. Id. Jenkins said that he had

spoken with Mr. Georges on May 18, 2000, and that Mr. Georges said that he and
Griffith had a “falling out” and that he intended to fire Griffith. Id. At trial, Officer Laut
testified that he found Mr. Georges’ ring in Griffith’s clothing at booking. Id.
On June 19, 2001, the parties stipulated that Griffith’s arrest occurred “at the
point in time when he was placed in an Indianapolis Police Department squad car by
Officer Jack Tindall.” ECF 34-8 at 48. On July 19, 2001, the trial court denied the motion

to suppress, finding probable cause to arrest Griffith. Id. at 87-92.
On direct appeal, Griffith argued that the trial court should have suppressed his
confession because it was the product of a wrongful arrest. ECF 8-3 at 25-29. The
Indiana Supreme Court defined probable cause and reasoned that probable cause could
“rest on collective information known to the law enforcement organization as a whole,

and not solely on the personal knowledge of the arresting officer.” ECF 8-5 at 6. As
evidence supporting probable cause, the appellate court cited Mr. Georges’
conversation with his friend, the victims’ son identification of Griffith as Val, a
neighbor’s report that she saw Mr. Georges arguing with a black man, a witness seeing
a black male carrying a gas can. It also noted the smoky odor, the bandaged hands, and

Griffith’s possession of Mr. Georges’ ring. Id. The appellate court concluded that the
arresting officer had probable cause to believe that Griffith murdered the Georges and
also committed burglary and arson. Id.
After thoroughly reviewing the record, the court cannot find that the State court
made an unreasonable determination on the wrongful arrest claim. To start, the court

relies on the parties’ stipulation regarding the moment of arrest. Though Griffith
attempts to limit the probable cause inquiry to facts personally known by Officer
Tindall, he offers no explanation as to why the collective knowledge doctrine would not
have applied to Officer Tindall, who arrested Griffith at the direction of Detective Tudor
and the Greenwood Police Department. Further, it is readily apparent that Detective
Tudor, Officer Tindall, and the Greenwood Police Department collectively had

sufficient evidence to establish probable cause at the moment of arrest; specifically,
investigation of the crime scene, which established the likelihood of arson; an autopsy
of the victims, which established the likelihood of intentional murders; the discovery of
the Georges’ burned vehicle, which established a likelihood of burglary and second
incident of arson. As to Griffith’s involvement, law enforcement had collectively spoken

to one witness who identified a black man carrying a gas can on the morning of the
residential fire, several witnesses who identified Mr. George as having a particularly
special relationship with a black man named Val as both an employer and as a “Sugar
Daddy,” one witness who identified a photograph of Griffith as Val, two witnesses who
said they heard from Mr. Georges that he had had a falling out with Griffith the day

before his murder, and another witness who said he heard from Griffith that he
believed that his “Sugar Daddy” might leave him instead of giving him a car and
money. After Officer Tindall detained him but before he placed Griffith in the police
vehicle, Officer Tindall also observed Griffith’s bandaged hands. It was not
unreasonable for the State court to have concluded that a reasonable person could have
believed that Griffith had committed a crime based on this evidence.

To Griffith’s point, the Indiana Supreme Court erred by relying on some
evidence that the Greenwood Police Department did not obtain until after his arrest,
including the witness who observed a white man and a black man arguing on the front
porch and the discovery of Mr. Georges’ ring in Griffith’s clothing. Further, the
probative value of the smoky odor is questionable given that Griffith had cooked with a
charcoal grill immediately before his arrest and that some passage of time had occurred

since the incidents of arson. However, even excluding this evidence, the Indiana
Supreme Court had an ample evidentiary basis to find probable cause for Griffith’s
arrest. Therefore, the unlawful arrest claim is not a basis for habeas relief.
Grounds II & III
Griffith argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because he did not receive a

timely probable cause determination and because the police continued to investigate his
crimes during this period of unlawful detention. He contends that the police used the
results of this investigation to obtain search warrants and to obtain evidence used
against him at trial. This argument appears to invoke the doctrine that arrestees are
presumptively entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of

their arrest. See Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523, 539 (7th Cir. 2011).
This claim is somewhat perplexing given that the trial court and the Indiana
Supreme Court both found that Griffith had been improperly held for 63 hours before
receiving a probable cause determination before a magistrate. ECF 8-5 at 6-7; ECF 34-8
at 87-92. Griffith’s true concern thus appears to be that the State courts should have
suppressed evidence as a result of the unreasonably delay. Notably, the trial court

suppressed any evidence obtained after 48 hours of detention but before the probable
cause determination, and the Indiana Supreme Court declined to also suppress
Griffith’s confession because it occurred two days after the probable cause
determination and because Griffith initiated the meeting with the interviewing officers.
Id.
Griffith cannot prevail on this suppression claim because he cannot show that the

State courts’ decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States.” Significantly, the Supreme Court of the United States has never held that
suppression is an appropriate remedy for a delayed judicial determination of probable
cause. See United States v. Pabon, 871 F.3d 164, 179 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Neither the Supreme

Court nor this Court has yet determined whether a violation of McLaughlin’s 48–hour
rule is an appropriate basis for suppression.”); Lawhorn v. Allen, 519 F.3d 1272, 1290
(11th Cir. 2008) (“The issue of whether suppression is an appropriate remedy for a
Riverside/Gerstein violation is unresolved by the Supreme Court although the Supreme
Court has held that exclusion is appropriate for other constitutional violations.”); United

States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 821 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he Supreme Court specifically
declined to reach this issue”); Edmonson v. Harrington, 2013 WL 2178320, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
May 20, 2013) (“The United States Supreme Court has never held that a defendant is
entitled to the suppression of statements made after an alleged Riverside / Gerstein
violation.”). To the contrary, the Supreme Court has stated, “Whether a suppression
remedy applies [to failures to obtain authorization from a magistrate for a significant

period of pretrial detention] remains an unresolved question.” Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S.
79, 85 (1994).3 Therefore, the claim relating to delayed judicial determination of
probable cause is not a basis for habeas relief.
Griffith also argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because he did not receive
an initial hearing as set forth in Ind. Code §§ 35-33-7-1 to 35-33-7-5. He asserts that at the
first initial hearing, the magistrate did not adequately notify him of the charges or

inquire about his legal representation. Notably, the magistrate hearing took place on
May 24, 2000, and the prosecution did not file charges until May 30, 2000. ECF 8-1 at 2;
ECF 34-11 at 4-6. On May 31, the trial court held an initial hearing in which the trial
court explained the charges to Griffith and appointed counsel on his behalf. ECF 34-11
at 7-19. The implication of this argument appears to be that the State courts should have

suppressed the evidence obtained between the first and second initial hearing.
On direct appeal, Griffith raised a somewhat similar argument, contending that
the failure to appoint counsel for him during the magistrate hearing violated his rights
under the Equal Protection Clause and that his confession should have been
suppressed. ECF 8-3 at 29-33. The Indiana Supreme Court rejected this argument,

noting “the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or
another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons,” and that the Sixth

3 According to Westlaw, this language appears in an unnumbered footnote.
Amendment right to appointed counsel attaches only when formal charges have been
filed. ECF 8-5 at 8.

Notably, Griffith cannot obtain habeas relief based solely on violations of State
law. See Dellinger v. Bowen, 301 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Federal habeas relief is
only available to a person in custody in violation of the United States Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States and is unavailable to remedy errors of state law.”).
Nor is it apparent that the State courts violated State law given that Griffith received a
second initial hearing on May 31, 2000.4 Further, the Indiana Supreme Court correctly

found that the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel attaches only at the
moment when charges are filed. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 198,
(2008) (“The Sixth Amendment right of the accused to assistance of counsel in all
criminal prosecutions is limited by its terms: it does not attach until a prosecution is
commenced. We have, for purposes of the right to counsel, pegged commencement to

the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”). It also seems
self-evident that courts are not required to inform individuals of criminal charges before
the prosecution has filed such charges given the practical impossibility of doing so, and
Griffith has cited no Supreme Court case to the contrary.

4 Indeed, it strikes the court that the initial hearing held by the magistrate served only as a
prompt determination of probable cause as required by the Fourth Amendment and that the purpose of
the second initial hearing was to comply with State statutory and other constitutional requirements,
including the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants.
Griffith may also be arguing that the prosecution unreasonably delayed the filing
of charges against him, but such an argument invokes the Sixth Amendment right to a

speedy trial. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (“In addition to the
period after indictment, the period between arrest and indictment must be considered
in evaluating a Speedy Trial Clause claim.”). Griffith did not fairly present a speedy
trial claim to the State courts, and so he cannot obtain habeas relief based on such a
claim. See Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 513–14 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Presenting the same
claim in state court that he later seeks to make in federal court means that the petitioner

must alert the state courts that he is relying on a provision of the federal constitution for
relief.”). Moreover, it seems unlikely that Griffith would have prevailed on such a claim
given that he received a jury trial within fifteen months of his arrest, the complexity of
the investigation and evidence, Griffith’s pursuit of two separate motions to suppress
and a motion to reconsider, and the absence of any prior assertion of this right by

Griffith. See United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (“A Sixth Amendment
claim of a speedy trial violation is analyzed by considering whether delay before trial
was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to
blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a
speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result . . . . When

analyzing which party is more to blame for the delay, the reason for the delay is
generally the focal inquiry.”). Therefore, the claim that Griffith did not receive a proper
initial hearing is not a basis for habeas relief.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11, the court must grant or deny a
certificate of appealability. To obtain a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c), the petitioner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right by establishing “that a reasonable jurist could debate whether (or, for that matter,
agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the
issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For the reasons explained in this order, there is no
basis for encouraging Griffith to proceed further.

For these reasons, the court DENIES the habeas corpus petition (ECF 1); DENIES
the motion to appoint counsel (ECF 37); DENIES a certificate of appealability pursuant
to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11; and DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment in
favor of the Respondent and against the Petitioner.
SO ORDERED on November 17, 2025.

s/Scott J. Frankel
Scott J. Frankel
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11204432. Public record. Not legal advice.