# Rob

> District Court, E.D. New York · October 14, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11203949

## Case

- **Full name:** Mikael Gianfranco Rob v. Lola Hilton Von Horn
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** October 14, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11203949

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that two notices that an action could be dismissed was sufficient notice

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------------X
MIKAEL GIANFRANCO ROB,
REPORT AND
Plaintiff, RECOMMENDATION

v. 19-CV-3822
(Donnelly, J.)
LOLA HILTON VON HORN, (Marutollo, M.J.)

Defendant.
-------------------------------------------------------------------X
JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO, United States Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Mikael Gianfranco Rob filed this breach of contract action (the “Rob Action”)
against Defendant Lola Hilton Von Horn in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County
of Queens, on December 3, 2018, and it was removed to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York on January 28, 2019. See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 4.1 On July 1,
2019, the Rob Action was transferred to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406(a) and 1441(a).
See Dkt. No. 12. Separately, Von Horn brought an action against Mary Connors—related to the
allegations in the Rob Action—in this Court on August 10, 2022. See generally Von Horn v.
Connors, No. 22-CV-4721 (AMD) (JAM) (the “Von Horn Action”), Dkt. No. 1.2
Currently pending before this Court, on a referral from the Honorable Ann M. Donnelly,
United States District Judge, is Rob’s motion for default judgment pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P.
55(b)(2). See generally Dkt. Nos. 96, 98; see also Referral Order dated May 19, 2025. In the Rob

1 Citations are to the Rob Action unless otherwise stated.

2 On September 20, 2025, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation that the Von Horn Action
be dismissed due to Von Horn’s failure to prosecute. See Von Horn Action, Dkt. No. 70. Von Horn has
not made any filings in the Von Horn action to date.
Action, Rob seeks entry of default judgment in the amount of €500,000,3 plus pre-and post-
judgment interest against Von Horn, based on her alleged breach of contract or, alternatively, her
unjust enrichment. See Dkt. Nos. 96-1, 96-7, 98-1. Rob also seeks dismissal of Von Horn’s
counterclaims. Dkt. No. 96-1 at 14-184; see also Dkt. No. 26.
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Rob’s

motion be granted in part and denied in part.5
I. Background

A. The Action
From 1990 to 1999, Rob alleges that he made a number of loans to Von Horn in the sum
of 5 million Swedish Krones and €500,000, which Rob alleges “is the equivalent of One Million
Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,300,000).6 Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 6. Von Horn allegedly used those
loans to purchase several investment properties in the French Riviera and in the United States. Id.
¶ 7. Rob alleges that Von Horn agreed to “be repaid [o]n demand or upon the sale of those
properties purchased with the funds loaned to her.” Id.

3 Rob’s damages request is in a foreign currency, but “American courts rarely enter judgments in a foreign
currency.” Yukos Cap. S.A.R.L. v. Samaraneftegaz, 592 F. App’x 8, 12 (2d Cir. 2014). The issue of
currency conversion will be discussed in the Damages section below.

4 Page citations are to the ECF-stamped pages, unless otherwise stated.

5 Ryan Pinch, a judicial intern who is a third-year law student at the U.C. Berkeley School of Law, is
gratefully acknowledged for his assistance in the research of this Report and Recommendation.

6 The Court notes that based on December 31, 1999 exchange rates, SEK 5,000,000 was approximately
$587,500, while €500,000 was approximately $502,000, making the converted total based closer to
$1,100,000. See, e.g., Investing.com, USD/SEK Historical Data, Investing.com,
https://www.investing.com/currencies/usd-sek-historical-data (last visited Oct. 12, 2025); European
Central Bank, Euro reference exchange rate: US dollar (USD), Euro-reference Exchange Rates,
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/html/eurofxr
ef-graph-usd.en.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2025).
On November 16, 2011, Rob claims that Von Horn executed, under oath, a $650,000
promissory note in Rob’s favor, which allegedly accounted for “half of the money he [had] lent to
her.” Id. ¶ 8. Together with the promissory note, Von Horn allegedly granted Rob security
interests in two properties in Nice, France, that she purchased with the funds Rob had loaned to
her. Id. ¶ 9.

On January 5, 2012, Von Horn allegedly executed a letter of debt agreement (“Letter of
Debt”), memorializing another $650,000 in indebtedness to Rob, representing “the other half of
the money he lent to her.” Id. ¶ 10. The Letter of Debt further granted Rob a security interest in
Von Horn’s present and prospective real estate holdings, including apartments in Nice, France and
Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Id. ¶ 11. Rob alleges that future purchases of real estate by Von Horn
were to be deemed “additional collateral” pursuant to this agreement, and subject to Rob’s security
interest. Id. ¶ 12.
On January 12, 2015, Rob alleges that Von Horn—with Rob’s knowledge and consent—
purchased property in Astoria, Queens, which served as additional collateral for the repayment of

the balance of the loan in the sum of $650,000 made by Rob to Von Horn. Id. ¶ 13-14.
On May 1, 2015, Rob alleges that Von Horn sold one of her properties in Florida and paid
Rob $650,000 in satisfaction of the November 16, 2011 promissory note. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Rob further
alleges that he and Von Horn came to an agreement whereby he would pay her real estate taxes on
one of her Florida properties and that the property would be sold in 2017 to satisfy principal due
to Rob under the Letter of Debt. See Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 18-20; see also Von Horn Action, Dkt. Nos.
68-4, 68-5.
On September 1, 2018, Rob alleges that he demanded repayment of the loan balance
pursuant to the Letter of Debt. Id. ¶ 21; Von Horn Action, Dkt. No. 68-3.
On March 29, 2019, Von Horn sold one of her Florida properties that was allegedly subject
to Rob’s security interest, but did not pay Rob proceeds therefrom or otherwise satisfy the Letter
of Debt. Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 22.
Rob commenced the Rob Action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County
of Queens, on December 3, 2018. See Dkt. No. 4-1 at 3. On January 28, 2019, Von Horn removed

the Rob Action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. See Dkt.
Nos. 1, 4. On July 1, 2019, the Rob Action was transferred to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York. Dkt. No. 12; July 1, 2019 Text Order.
Rob was granted leave to file an amended complaint and did so on September 14, 2020.
See Dkt. No. 22. In the amended complaint, Rob seeks damages in the sum of €500,000, which
Rob asserts is the equivalent of $650,000, plus interest. See id. ¶¶ 6, 26, 32. The parties
unsuccessfully attempted mediation in September 2021. See September 21, 2021 Text Order.
On June 1, 2022, Judge Donnelly held a pre-motion conference on Rob’s and Von Horn’s
respective letters requesting leave to move for summary judgment. See June 1, 2022 Text Order;

Dkt. Nos. 43, 45, 47.
On June 15, 2022, Rob and Von Horn filed a joint status report indicating, inter alia, that
they both intended to withdraw their respective requests to move for summary judgment. See Dkt.
No. 49.
On December 9, 2022, Judge Donnelly consolidated the Rob Action and Von Horn Action,
stating that, “[t]hese two cases present numerous common questions of law and fact, including
Rob’s alleged loans to Von Horn and the disposition of Von Horn’s real property” and that
requiring separate trials for the two cases “would force the same witnesses to testify twice about
these topics.” December 9, 2022 Text Order.
B. The Von Horn Action
On August 10, 2022, Von Horn filed suit against Mary Connors, alleging that Connors
conspired with Rob to defraud Von Horn, and bringing causes of action for fraud, aiding and
abetting a breach of fiduciary duties, conversion, and civil conspiracy against her. See generally
Von Horn Action Dkt. Nos. 1, 26-2. Specifically, Von Horn’s lawsuit alleges that she and Rob

became romantic partners in the 1990s. Von Horn Action, Dkt. No. 26-2 ¶¶ 16-17. Von Horn also
alleges that she served as Rob’s “sponsor” and allowed him to live at her various properties while
he obtained an economics degree. Id. ¶ 18. Von Horn asserts that Rob learned of her alleged
“disabilities—severe dyslexia and alcoholism—which left her vulnerable[,]” and took advantage
of her. Id. ¶ 19. Von Horn further claims that “Rob had inserted himself into Von Horn’s affairs
to such an extent that Rob had fully displaced Von Horn’s past husbands’ and family members’
day to day trusteeships and Rob became the primary trusted friend upon which Von Horn relied.”
Id. ¶ 24.
Von Horn claims that “Rob was successful over the years convincing [her] to send to him

her signatures on blank pieces of paper which he could use in creating letters of authority to
manage Von Horn’s spa business and real estate issues.” Id. ¶ 28. Additionally, Von Horn alleges
that Rob was entrusted with rental management of her “Pilot House” property in Florida (“Pilot
House”) and the payment of proceeds to Von Horn. Id. ¶ 39. Von Hon asserts that “Rob and
Connors convinced [her] that Rob should have a Power of Attorney” over Von Horn. Id. ¶ 45.
Von Horn also alleges that Rob and Connors induced her to grant them access to her Chase bank
account, and that proceeds from the May 2015 sale of one of her properties in Florida were
deposited in such Chase account. Id. ¶¶ 52, 60. Once the funds were deposited, Von Horn alleges
that “Rob converted and transferred from the Von Horn joint account using his online transfer
credentials the sum of $650,000 to his individual Money Market Account at Chase Bank.” Id. ¶
61. Additionally, Von Horn alleges that Rob and Connors, “siphoned off rental income from Von
Horn’s Astoria apartment” via the same Chase account. Id. ¶ 63.
Additionally, Von Horn claims that she did not discover this alleged fraud until Rob
commenced the present lawsuit in New York State Court. Id. ¶ 64, 81. Von Horn further asserts

that, “Rob had previously duped Von Horn into signing other documents over the years since 2010
as part of the long-planned scheme to defraud [her].” Id. ¶ 66.
Von Horn contends that Rob and Connors continued their scheme after they were
confronted about the alleged conversion of funds, by promising to purchase an apartment in
Stockholm, Sweden for Von Horn. Id. ¶¶ 68-70. Von Horn alleges that she engaged counsel in
Sweden and brought an action to quiet title to this apartment in Stockholm, but that such efforts
were unsuccessful. Id. ¶¶ 94-96.
C. Pertinent Consolidated Procedural History
As noted above, the Court consolidated the Rob Action and the Von Horn Action on

December 9, 2022. December 9, 2022 Text Order. The parties participated in an unsuccessful
mediation on June 6, 2023. June 6, 2023 Text Order. On August 21, 2024, Connors filed a letter
seeking leave to move to dismiss Von Horn’s complaint, Von Horn Action Dkt. No. 20, which
Von Horn opposed on September 20, 2023, Von Horn Action Dkt. No. 22. On March 28, 2024,
Judge Donnelly granted in part and denied in part Connors’s motion to dismiss, and directed Von
Horn’s proposed amended complaint be deemed the operant complaint. See Von Horn Action Dkt.
Nos. 40; 26-2.
Discovery closed on April 19, 2024. See April 19, 2024 Text Order. Rob informed the
Court of his intention to move for summary judgment on April 24, 2024. See Dkt. No. 72. The
Court directed both parties to submit Rule 56.1 Statements of Undisputed Fact and extended those
deadlines multiple times before setting a final deadline of October 31, 2024. See Dkt. Nos. 72, 74,
75.
On October 29, 2024, Von Horn’s counsel, Paul Verner, filed an emergency request to be
relieved as her attorney, citing “deterioration of [the] working relationship with [his] client.” Dkt.

No. 76 at 1. The Court deferred ruling on the motion to withdraw until Verner could further
communicate with Von Horn. October 30, 2024 Text Order.
The Court held a telephonic conference regarding the withdrawal motion on December 13,
2024. The Court ordered Von Horn to personally appear at the telephonic conference. Von Horn,
however, failed to appear. The Court ordered Von Horn to show cause by December 20, 2024,
and provide an explanation for her failure to appear in violation of the Court’s Order. December
13, 2024 Text Order. The Court also warned Von Horn that her failure to respond or comply with
its orders could result in sanctions, such as dismissal of the Von Horn Action and entry of a
judgment of default in the Rob Action. Id. The Court directed Verner to serve the Court’s

December 13, 2024 Order on Von Horn and file proof of the same on the docket. See December
22, 2024 Text Order. Verner served Von Horn and her nieces, Andrea Gunnarson and Sara
Norman, at their last-known email addresses on December 24, 2024. Dkt. No. 87; see December
22, 2024 Text Order.
On December 26, 2024, the Court granted Verner’s motion to withdraw and extended the
deadline for Von Horn to show cause until January 8, 2025. December 26, 2024 Text Order. The
Court reiterated its admonition that Von Horn’s failure to respond to Court orders could result in
dismissal of the Von Horn action or entry of a judgment of default in the Rob Action. Id. This
Order was also served on Von Horn and her two nieces by Verner at their last-known email
addresses. See Dkt. No. 89.
After Von Horn again failed to show cause in response to the Court’s Order, the Court sua
sponte extended the deadline her to do so until January 31, 2025. See January 9, 2025 Text Order.
The Court again warned Von Horn that failure to respond could result in dismissal of her action or

a default judgment. Id. The Court directed the Clerk of Court to serve the Order on Von Horn
and her two nieces at their last-known email addresses. Id.
Von Horn did not show cause or otherwise respond to the Court’s orders. See February
11, 2025 Text Order. Accordingly, on February 11, 2025, the Court directed Connors to file a
motion to dismiss for Von Horn’s failure to prosecute the Von Horn Action, and Rob was directed
to seek a Certificate of Default from the Clerk of Court for Von Horn in the Rob Action. See id.
Again, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to serve the Order on Von Horn and her nieces via
email. Id.
On March 18, 2025, Von Horn replied to the undersigned’s chambers in one such email,

attempting to explain her absence from the Court’s December 13, 2024 status conference and her
failure to respond to the Court’s orders. Contrary to the Court’s orders, however, Von Horn, did
not file anything on the docket. There were no further communications or submissions from Von
Horn to the Court.
On April 2, 2025, Connors filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. Von Horn
Action Dkt. No. 64. On May 16, 2025, Rob filed the instant motion for default judgment against
Von Horn. Dkt. No. 96. Both motions were referred to the undersigned by Judge Donnelly. See
April 14, 2025 Text Order; May 19, 2025 Text Order.
II. Legal Standard for Default Judgment
“Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a two-step process for obtaining
a default judgment.” Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 2011). At the first
step, the Clerk of Court enters a party’s default after an affidavit or other evidence shows that the
“party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise

defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a); NYQF Inc. v. Sigue Corp., 781 F. Supp. 3d 104, 114 (E.D.N.Y.
2025) (explaining, “the Clerk of Court enters a party’s default after an affidavit or other evidence
shows that the ‘party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead
or otherwise defend.’” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a))). “If a claim is for ‘a sum certain or a sum
that can be made certain by computation,’ the clerk can enter judgment.” NYQF Inc., 781 F. Supp.
3d at 114 (quoting Esquivel v. Lima Rest. Corp., No. 20-CV-2914 (ENV) (MMH), 2023 WL
6338666, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2023) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1)). At the second step,
and “[i]n all other cases, the party must apply to the court for a default judgment.” Id. (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)). To “enter or effectuate judgment” the Court is empowered to: “(A) conduct

an accounting; (B) determine the amount of damages; (C) establish the truth of any allegation by
evidence; or (D) investigate any other matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
The Second Circuit “generally disfavor[s]” default judgment and has repeatedly expressed
a “preference for resolving disputes on the merits.” Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96
(2d Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, in evaluating a motion for default judgment, a court accepts as true
the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations, except those relating to damages. Greyhound
Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Flaks v.
Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1974). The plaintiff bears the burden of alleging “specific
facts,” rather than “mere labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements,” so
that a court may infer a defendant’s liability. Cardoza v. Mango King Farmers Mkt. Corp., No.
14-CV-3314 (SJ) (RER), 2015 WL 5561033, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2015) (citing Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 5561180
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2015)).
The decision to grant or deny a default motion is “left to the sound discretion of a district

court.” Esquivel, 2023 WL 6338666, at *3 (quoting Shah v. New York State Dep’t of Civ. Serv.,
168 F.3d 610, 615 (2d Cir. 1999)). A court “possesses significant discretion” in granting a motion
for default judgment, “including [determining] whether the grounds for default are clearly
established.” Chen v. Oceanica Chinese Rest., Inc., No. 13-CV-4623 (NGG) (PK), 2023 WL
2583856, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2023) (quotations and citation omitted). The Court may also
“consider numerous factors, including whether plaintiff has been substantially prejudiced by the
delay involved and whether the grounds for default are clearly established or in doubt.” Franco v.
Ideal Mortg. Bankers, Ltd., No. 07-CV-3956 (JS) (AKT), 2010 WL 3780972, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 23, 2010) (cleaned up), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3780984 (E.D.N.Y.

Sept. 17, 2010). As the Second Circuit has observed, the Court is guided by the same factors
which apply to a motion to set aside entry of a default, which include “whether the defendant’s
default was willful; (2) whether defendant has a meritorious defense to plaintiff’s claims; and (3)
the level of prejudice the non-defaulting party would suffer as a result of the denial of the motion
for default judgment. See Enron Oil Corp., 10 F.3d at 96; Franco, 2010 WL 3780972, at *2 (listing
factors).
III. Jurisdiction and Venue
The Court “must satisfy itself that it has subject matter and personal jurisdiction before
rendering judgment against defendants.” Dumolo v. Dumolo, No. 17-CV-7294 (KAM) (CLP),
2019 WL 1367751, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2019); see Covington Indus., Inc. v. Resintex A.G.,
629 F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir. 1980) (“A judgment entered against parties not subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the rendering court is a nullity.”).
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, district courts “shall have original jurisdiction of all civil

actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest
and costs” and is between “citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) requires complete diversity between all plaintiffs and defendants.
Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68, (1996). The Second Circuit “recognizes a rebuttable
presumption that the face of the complaint is a good faith representation of the actual amount in
controversy.” Wolde-Meskel v. Vocational Instruction Project Cmty. Servs., Inc., 166 F.3d 59, 63
(2d Cir. 1999).
Here, Rob is a resident of New York. Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 1. Von Horn is a citizen of Sweden.
Id. at ¶ 2. Further, the Rob Action seeks damages in the amount of $1,300,000 plus legal fees and

costs, which exceeds the minimum threshold of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Dkt. No. 22 at 6.
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends a finding that the Court has subject
matter jurisdiction over Rob’s claims.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
“[B]efore a court grants a motion for default judgment, it may first assure itself that it has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp.,
619 F.3d 207, 213 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); BASF Corp. v. Original Fender Mender, Inc.,
No. 23-CV-2796 (HG) (JAM), 2023 WL 8853704, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2023) (finding “[a]
court may not enter default judgment unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the party against
whom the judgment is sought, which also means that he must have been effectively served with
process.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)), report and recommendation adopted Text
Order dated Jan. 9, 2024, judgment entered 2024 WL 4648142 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2024). “The
three requirements for personal jurisdiction are: (1) the plaintiff’s service of process upon the
defendant must have been procedurally proper; (2) there must be a statutory basis for personal

jurisdiction that renders such service of process effective; and (3) the exercise of personal
jurisdiction must comport with constitutional due process principles.” Perez v. Exquisito Rest.
Inc., No. 23-CV-8707 (OEM) (MMH), 2025 WL 630138, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2025) (quoting
Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59-60 (2d Cir. 2012) (subsequent
history omitted)).
Here, the Court has personal jurisdiction over Von Horn. First, Rob properly served the
Summons and Complaint on Von Horn. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1) permits a party
to effect service in accordance with the rules of the state where the district is located or where
service is made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). New York state law permits service to be made by

“delivering the summons . . . to a person of suitable age and discretion at the actual place of
business . . . of the person to be served and by either mailing the summons . . . to the person to be
served at his or her actual place of business” or to the person’s last known residence. N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 308(2). Here, Rob properly served Von Horn by delivering copies of the summons and
Complaint to her domicile and by mailing a copy of the same. See Dkt. No. 4-3; see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(A).
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court find it has personal
jurisdiction over Von Horn.
C. Venue
The amended complaint alleges that the acts or omissions that give rise to the lawsuit
occurred in this District. See Dkt. No. 22; Dkt. No. 4-1. Because “a civil action may be brought
in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated” under 28

U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), the amended complaint establishes that venue is proper. See Dkt. No. 22 at
¶ 5. Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends a finding that venue is proper in this
District.
IV. Procedural Compliance for Default Judgment
“A motion for default judgment will not be granted unless the party making the motion
adheres to all of the applicable procedural rules.” Annuity, Welfare & Apprenticeship Skill
Improvement & Safety Funds of Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Loc. 15, 15A, 15C & 15D,
AFL-CIO v. Allstate Mapping & Layout, LLC, No. 22-CV-1831 (PKC) (TAM), 2023 WL
1475389, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2023) (quoting Century Surety Company v. Adweek, No. 16-CV-

335 (ENV) (PK), 2018 WL 10466835, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2018)). “[L]ocal rules have the
force of law, as long as they do not conflict with a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, Congress,
or the Constitution.” Fin. Servs. Vehicle Tr. v. Osmanaj, No. 22-CV-7491 (RPK) (CLP), 2023
WL 7000935, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2023) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
A. Entry of Default
The undersigned respectfully recommends a finding that Rob properly obtained the
certificate of default against Von Horn. Von Horn had been participating in litigation for six years
until she abruptly stopped responding to Court orders in late 2024. Prior to the Clerk’s entry of
default, Von Horn was personally served via email and first-class mail at her alleged last-known
address. Dkt. No. 91-2. Rob provided a declaration of service, a declaration in support of default,
and a proposed certificate of default on February 24, 2025. Dkt. No. 91-2. After ordering Von
Horn to show cause as to why she should not be sanctioned for failure to appear at a scheduled
conference on December 13, 2024, the Court provided numerous extensions, but Von Horn failed
to respond to the Court’s orders. February 11, 2025 Dkt. Order. Rob requested a certificate of

default pursuant to Local Civil Rule 55.1. Dkt. No. 91; L. Civ. R. 55.1. The Clerk of Court entered
default against Von Horn on February 25, 2025. Dkt. No. 92.
Moreover, Von Horn’s failure to respond to the Court’s orders here was willful.
Notwithstanding the Court’s efforts, Von Horn abruptly stopped responding, failed to appear, and
has not in any way attempted to defend this action, thus constituting willfulness in the context of
default judgment. See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 129 (2d Cir.
2011) (“the ‘typical Rule 55 case [is one] in which a default has entered because a defendant failed
to file a timely answer.’ Brock v. Unique Racquetball & Health Clubs, Inc., 786 F.2d 61, 64 (2d
Cir. 1986)). Nonetheless, a district court is also empowered to enter a default against a defendant

[that] has failed to . . . otherwise defend.’’ Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)). Indeed, the
undersigned has respectfully recommended that the Von Horn Action be dismissed due to Von
Horn’s failure to prosecute. See Von Horn Action, Dkt. No. 70.
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends a finding that the Clerk’s
Certificate of Default was properly entered against Von Horn.
B. Local Civil Rule 7.1 and Local Civil Rule 55.2
Local Civil Rule 7.1(a) requires that a plaintiff attach to a motion for default (1) a notice
of motion specifying the applicable rules or statutes pursuant to which the motion is brought; (2)
a memorandum of law setting forth the cases and other authorities relied upon in support of the
motion; and (3) supporting affidavits and exhibits containing any factual information and portions
of the record necessary for the decision of the motion. See Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(a).
Under Local Civil Rule 55.2,
any party seeking a default judgment must file: (1) an affidavit or declaration
showing that: (A) the clerk has entered default . . .; (B) the party seeking default
judgment has complied with the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act . . .; (C) The
party against whom judgment is sought is not known to be a minor or an
incompetent person . . .; (2) . . . the papers required by Local Civil Rule 7.1,
including a memorandum of law, a proposed order . . .; and (3) a certificate of
service stating that all documents in support of the request for default
judgment . . . have been personally served on, or mailed to the last known residence
(for an individual defendant) or business address (for other defendants) of, the party
against whom default judgment is sought.
Loc. Civ. R. 55.2(a). In addition to the requirements of Local Rule 55.2(a), a party seeking default
judgment from the court must file a statement of damages that shows the proposed damages and
their bases. Loc. Civ. R. 55.2(c).
Rob complied with the procedural requirements set forth in Local Civil Rule 7.1(a) by
filing a notice of motion (Dkt. No. 96), a memorandum of law (Dkt. No. 96-1), and affidavits and
exhibits (Dkt. Nos. 96-2 – 96-8) in support of the motion. Rob also included a word count
certification statement, as required by Local Civil Rule 7.1(c). Dkt. No. 98-1 at 14. The
undersigned respectfully recommends that Rob is found to have complied with the requirements
of Local Civil Rule 7.1.
Rob initially failed to comply with the requirements of Local Rule 55.2(a), and the Court
ordered Rob to submit a supplemental declaration. See Text Order dated Sept. 9, 2025. Rob’s
revised submission affirms that the Clerk of Court has entered a certificate of default; that Rob has
complied with the SCRA (discussed further infra); and that Von Horn is not a minor or
incompetent person. Dkt. No. 92; Dkt. No. 98-2 ¶¶ 14-16; see Loc. Civ. R. 55.2(a). Rob also
included a certificate of service showing that Von Horn was served at her last known address, in
compliance with Local Civil Rule 55.2(a)(3). Dkt. No. 96-8. Additionally, Rob included a
proposed judgment per Local Rule 55(a)(2). Dkt. No. 96-7. Rob further filed a declaration
showing the proposed damages and the bases for calculating those amounts and supplemented that
declaration at the Court’s request. See Dkt. Nos. 96-2, 98-2; Text Order dated Sept. 20, 2025.
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Rob be found to have met the

jurisdictional requirements to proceed with his motion under Local Civil Rule 55.2.
C. Compliance with the SCRA
The SCRA requires a plaintiff seeking default judgment to “file with the court an affidavit
stating whether or not the defendant is in military service and showing necessary facts to support
the affidavit.” 50 U.S.C. § 3931; see also Windward Bora, LLC v. Ortiz, No. 21-CV-04154 (MKB)
(JMW), 2022 WL 3648622, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 5, 2022), report and recommendation adopted,
2022 WL 3647586 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2022). “The non-military affidavit must be based not only
on an investigation conducted after the commencement of an action or proceeding but also after a
default in appearance by the party against whom the default judgment is to be entered.” Apex Mar.

Co. v. Furniture, Inc., No. 11-CV-5365 (ENV) (RER), 2012 WL 1901266, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May
18, 2012).
Rob’s supplemental declaration includes a printout from the Department of Defense
Manpower Data Center—an entity that hosts the SCRA verification website—showing no results
for Von Horn. Dkt. No. 98-7; see Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, FSB as trustee of Aspen Holdings
Tr. v. Fernandez, 712 F. Supp. 3d 324, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (holding, “[a]dequate proof might
consist of a report from the Department of Defense’s website obtained after the defendant’s default
certifying that the defendant is not in active military service.”); ADI Glob. Distribution v. Green,
No. 20-CV-3869 (AMD) (JMW), 2023 WL 3355049, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3346499 (E.D.N.Y. May 10, 2023) (affirming that plaintiff
seeking default judgment must “file with the court an affidavit stating whether or not the defendant
is in military service and showing necessary facts to support the affidavit . . . Certification . . . of
a defendant’s military status can be obtained from the Department of Defense’s Servicemembers
Civil Relief Act website[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Rob acknowledges

in his declaration that the search was only run by name and not by Social Security number, as Von
Horn is undisputedly a citizen of Sweden who does not possess a Social Security number. Dkt.
No. 98-2 ¶¶ 4-6; Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 23 ¶ 2; see Dkt. No. 96-3 (showing Von Horn’s Swedish
passport).
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Rob be found to have satisfied
the SCRA requirements to proceed with his motion.
V. Liability for Default Judgment
A. Breach of Contract
To state a breach of contract claim under New York law, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the

existence of a contract; (2) performance of the contract by one party; (3) breach by the other party;
and (4) damages. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Palace Car Servs. Corp., No. 06-CV-4881 (FB) (CLP),
2007 WL 2287902, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2007) (citing Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 206 F.3d 240,
245-46 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Diesel Props S.r.l. v. Greystone Bus. Credit II LLC, 631 F.3d 42,
52 (2d Cir. 2011); Orlander v. Staples, Inc., 802 F.3d 289, 294 (2d Cir. 2015); accord AKF, Inc.
v. W. Foot & Ankle Ctr., 632 F. Supp. 3d 66, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 2022).
In a default judgment case, “a party’s default is deemed to constitute a concession of all
well pleaded allegations of liability[.]” Greyhound Exhibitgroup, 973 F.2d at 158; Mickalis Pawn
Shop, 645 F.3d at 137 (“It is an ancient common law axiom that a defendant who defaults thereby
admits all well-pleaded factual allegations contained in the complaint”) (internal quotations marks
omitted). Furthermore, the Court is “required to accept all of [the plaintiff’s] factual allegations
as true and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84
(2d Cir. 2009); see also Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc., 973 F.2d at 158.
Here, Rob adequately alleges each element of liability. First, Rob has demonstrated the

existence of a contract between himself and Von Horn, exhibited by the signed Letter of Debt, and
the Letter of Acknowledgment. Dkt. Nos. 96-3, 96-4. Those signed agreements memorialize the
loan agreements at issue, which Rob further describes in the amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 22
¶ 6. Second, Rob has successfully pleaded his own performance of the contract as he claims he
provided loans to Von Horn totaling approximately $1,300,000 between 1990 and 1999. Id. Third,
Rob sufficiently alleges that Von Horn sold one of her residential properties, entitled Pilot House,
without settling the debt she owed to Rob, as they had allegedly agreed. Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 22. Finally,
Rob alleges damages resulting from Von Horn’s failure to satisfy the debts as acknowledged in
the amount of €500,000, or $650,000, due to Von Horn’s breach of contract. Id. ¶ 32.

In light of Von Horn’s default, Rob’s allegations—accepted as true per Greyhound
Exhibitgroup, Inc., 973 F.2d at 158, and its progeny—are sufficient to establish that Von Horn is
liable for breach of contract for the purposes of entry of default judgment. See Ajna Living, LLC
v. Digital Accessories TCM Ltd., No. 22-CV-3127 (PKC), 2023 WL 3255466, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
May 4, 2023) (finding defendants liable for breach of contract for entry of default judgment under
similar circumstances); BASF Corp. v. Prime Auto Collision Inc., No. 20-CV-4797 (NGG) (RLM),
2022 WL 704127, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2022) (finding defendant liable for breach of contract
for entry of default judgment under similar circumstances); Abularach v. High Wing Aviation LLC,
No. 22-CV-1266 (MKB) (RML), 2022 WL 18558800, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2022) (finding
allegations in complaint sufficient to establish liability for breach of contract on default judgment
motion), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 1766282 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2023);
Constellation Newenergy, Inc. v. Om Vegetable, Inc., No. 22-CV-03766 (LJL), 2022 WL 3334707,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2022) (imposing liability on defaulting defendants for breach of contract).
B. Unjust Enrichment

Rob argues, “[i]n the alternative, the [amended complaint] established Rob’s claim for
unjust enrichment against von Horn.” Dkt. No. 96-1 at 12; see Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 33-36. At the outset,
as Rob raises his claim for unjust enrichment only in the alternative, Rob does not appear to seek
relief for unjust enrichment absent a finding that Von Horn breached the contract at issue. See
Dkt. No. 98-1 (“Even if the Court were to question the enforceability of the Letter of Debt, default
judgment would still be proper on Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim.”). Thus, there may be no
need to address this argument in light of the undersigned’s recommendation above. In an
abundance of caution, however, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Rob’s alternative
argument for unjust enrichment be denied as duplicative of his breach of contract claim.

“[C]laims are duplicative of one another if they ‘arise from the same facts . . . and do not
allege distinct damages.” NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc’ns, LLC, 537 F.3d 168, 175 (2d
Cir. 2008); see also Prime Auto Collision Inc., 2022 WL 704127, at *5. “New York law does not
permit recovery under unjust enrichment . . . where such claims are duplicative of a breach of
contract claim and the court has determined that there is a valid, enforceable contract that governs
the same subject matter.” Skyline Restoration, Inc., 2019 WL 5150207, at *4; see also Greystone
Bus. Credit II, 631 F.3d at 54 (finding “[t]he theory of unjust enrichment lies as a quasi-contract
claim. It is an obligation the law creates in the absence of any agreement.”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Contest Promotions NY, LLC, No. 15-CV-501
(MKB), 2016 WL 1255726, at *3-*4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2016) (denying default judgment as to
unjust enrichment claim upon finding that it was duplicative of breach of contract claim).
In claiming breach of contract in the amended complaint, Rob seeks damages in the sum
of €500,000, which Rob asserts is the equivalent of $650,000, plus interest. Dkt. No. 22 at ¶¶ 23-
32. In claiming unjust enrichment in the amended complaint, Rob effectively makes the same

arguments as he made for breach of contract. Id. ¶¶ 33-36. Indeed, as noted above, Rob’s motion
for default judgment acknowledges the same by noting that unjust enrichment serves as an
alternative theory of liability. Dkt. No. 96-1 at 12-13.
When a valid contract governs the dispute between parties, a plaintiff is not entitled to
recover for claims duplicative of a claim for breach of that contract. See Serrano v. Palacios, No.
21-CV-980 (CBA) (TAM), 2022 WL 2134293, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2022) (dismissing breach
of fiduciary duty claim that was duplicative of breach of contract claim), report and
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2132951 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2022); Skyline Restoration, Inc.
2019 WL 5150207, at *4 (recommending denying default judgment for unjust enrichment claim

that was duplicative of the breach of contract claim); La Saltena S.A.U. v. Ercomar Imports
Internacional Corp., No. 21-CV-4675 (KAM) (LB), 2024 WL 2319622, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 22,
2024) (denying plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim as an invalid cause of action under New York
law, where a valid contract existed between the parties, and the claim was duplicative of the breach
of contract claim).
Therefore, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Rob’s motion for default
judgment be denied with respect to Rob’s in-the-alternative unjust enrichment claim, as such is
duplicative of his breach of contract claim. See Original Fender Mender, Inc., 2024 WL 3740439,
at *8.
VI. Damages for Default Judgment7
A. Legal Standard
“Once liability has been established, a plaintiff must provide admissible evidence
establishing the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.” Paypolitan OU v. Marchesoni,
No. 21-CV-5397 (RA) (RWL), 2022 WL 17541091, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2022), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 21-CV-5397 (RA), 2022 WL 17541749 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2022)
(citing Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., Division Of Ace Young
Inc., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997)). “While a party’s default is deemed to constitute a
concession of all well pleaded allegations of liability, it is not considered an admission of
damages.” Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc., 973 F.2d at 158. “Rather, the Court must be satisfied
that Plaintiff has met the burden of proving damages to the Court with reasonable certainty.”
Balhetchet v. Su Caso Mktg. Inc., No. 19-CV-4475 (PKC) (SJB), 2020 WL 4738242, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2020) (cleaned up).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), “‘[a] default judgment must not differ in kind

from, or exceed the amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.’” Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645
F.3d at 128 n.16 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c)); see also Trustees of Metal Polishers Loc. 8aA-
28A Funds v. Nu Look Inc., No. 18-CV-3816 (PKC) (RLM), 2020 WL 6370146, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 14, 2020) (“[Rule 54(c)] limits a plaintiff’s default judgment recovery to the relief sought in
the complaint, and “ensures that a defendant who is considering default can look at the damages
clause, satisfy himself that he is willing to suffer judgment in that amount, and then default without
the need to hire a lawyer” (citations omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL

7 Rob did not submit a request for attorneys’ fees in either his motion or his proposed judgment (see Dkt.
Nos. 96-1, 96-7), despite requesting “legal fees” in the amended complaint. Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 36. Rob’s
updated declaration confirmed that he is not seeking attorneys’ fees. Dkt. No. 98 at 1 (“Plaintiff does not
seek attorneys’ fees or costs”). Any such claim for attorneys’ fees is therefore deemed abandoned.
5793204 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2020). Unless the number of damages is certain, a court entering
default judgment is required to make an independent determination of the sum it awards. Fed. R
Civ. P. 55.
Once liability is established, “the court must ascertain damages with ‘reasonable
certainty.’” CIT Bank N.A. v. Elliott, No. 15-CV-4395 (JS) (ARL), 2019 WL 4439347, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2019) (citation omitted). “An evidentiary hearing is not required so long as
there is a basis, by detailed affidavits and other documentary evidence, for the damages awarded.”
Id. (citation omitted); Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, FSB ex rel. Aspen Holdings Tr. v. Fernandez,
712 F. Supp. 3d 324, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (“The court may determine damages without an in-
person hearing based on the plaintiff's affidavits so long as it can ensure a basis for the damages
specified in the default judgment”). “The party seeking to recover costs bears the burden of
adequately documenting and itemizing the costs requested.” CIT Bank N.A., 2019 WL 4439347,
at *2 (cleaned up).
B. Claimed Damages

i. Foreign Currency
Under New York law, “[a] party injured by breach of contract is entitled to be placed in
the position it would have occupied had the contract been fulfilled according to its terms.” Merrill
Lynch & Co. Inc. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 500 F.3d 171, 185 (2d Cir. 2007). A plaintiff may
submit documentary evidence or detailed affidavits to support its damages claim. Chen, 2023 WL
2583856, at *14. “[I]n a diversity action, the date on which to convert a foreign currency judgment
into United States dollars is governed by the law of the forum state.” Nature’s Plus Nordic A/S v.
Nat. Organics, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 556, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Cagan v. Gadman, No. 08-
CV-3710 (SJF) (ARL), 2012 WL 5422270, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2012)).
As a federal court sitting in diversity, “[the Court] must apply the currency conversion rule
employed by the courts of New York. New York courts have adopted the ‘judgment day’ rule,
which mandates conversion based on the exchange rates as of the date of judgment.” Weiss v. La
Suisse, Societe D’Assurances Sur La Vie, 293 F. Supp. 2d 397, 408-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing
Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 865 (2d Cir.1981)) (applying New

York Judiciary Law § 27 to breach of contract case with disputed amount in Swiss Francs); see
Rienzi & Sons, Inc. v. Puglisi, 638 F. App’x 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2016) (applying New York Judiciary
Law § 27 to diversity action where disputed amount is in euros); see also Dynamic Cassette Int’l
Ltd. v. Mike Lopez & Assocs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 8, 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding “[s]ection 27(b)
now explicitly provides that a judgment entered in a foreign currency be converted into United
States dollars at the exchange rate prevailing on the date of judgment.”).
Per New York Judiciary Law § 27, Computation of Judgments and Accounts,
In any case in which the cause of action is based upon an obligation denominated
in a currency other than currency of the United States, a court shall render or enter
a judgment or decree in the foreign currency of the underlying obligation. Such
judgment or decree shall be converted into currency of the United States at the rate
of exchange prevailing on the date of entry of the judgment or decree.
N.Y. Judiciary Law § 27(b) (emphasis added); see also Commissions Imp. Exp. S.A. v. Republic
of the Congo, No. 14-MC-187 (AJN), 2020 WL 4040753, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2020)
(distinguishing N.Y. Judiciary Law § 27 from other local laws such as Code of the District of
Columbia § 15-906); cf. Nature’s Plus Nordic A/S, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 557-58 (finding Judiciary
Law § 27(b) inapplicable because the contract at issue required performance of a service and not
payment of a specified amount of foreign currency); Liberty Media Corp. v. Vivendi Universal,
S.A., No. 03-CV-2175 (SAS), 2013 WL 105776, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2013) (finding that
application of N.Y. Judicial Law § 27 was not appropriate as the Court was exercising
supplemental and not diversity jurisdiction).
Further, New York state law has acknowledged that contracts expressed in foreign currency
carry the risk of exchange rate fluctuations and either side may profit (or suffer) from such
fluctuations. In re James’ Will, 248 N.Y. 1, 6 (1928).
ii. Analysis
As Von Horn’s liability has been established with respect to Rob’s breach of contract claim,

the Court turns to evaluate damages resulting from that breach. “While a party’s default is deemed
to constitute a concession of all well pleaded allegations of liability, it is not considered an
admission of damages.” Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc., 973 F.2d at 158. “Rather, the Court must
be satisfied that Plaintiff has met the burden of proving damages to the Court with reasonable
certainty.” Balhetchet,, 2020 WL 4738242, at *3 (cleaned up). “Under New York law, it is well-
settled that ‘[a] party injured by breach of contract is entitled to be placed in the position it would
have occupied had the contract been fulfilled according to its terms.” BASF Corp. v. Gabriel’s
Collision Norman Ave., Inc., No. 21-CV-1908 (ENV) (RER), 2022 WL 1407244, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 12, 2022) (internal citations omitted).

Presently, “Rob seeks judgment for €500,000, which currently is less than $650,000.00.”
Dkt. No. 96-1 at 13; Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 32; see also Dkt. No. 96-7 (proposing an entry of judgment “in
the principal amount of €500,000”). In support of his request, Rob includes copies the Letter of
Debt and Letter of Acknowledgement that Von Horn signed on January 5, 2012, and October 6,
2015, respectively. Dkt. Nos. 96-3, 96-4, 96-5. The Letter of Debt acknowledges an outstanding
debt in the amount of €500,000, so a judgment in that amount, converted as discussed infra would
place Rob in the position he would have been in if Von Horn fulfilled the Letter of Debt. Dkt. No.
96-3; see Gabriel’s Collision Norman Ave., Inc., 2022 WL 1407244, at *3 (finding that plaintiff
is entitled to the benefits they would have received had the contract terms been fulfilled).
As referenced above, courts in this Circuit “rarely enter judgments in a foreign currency,”
although there is no longer any reason why courts cannot enter judgment in a foreign currency.
Yukos Cap. S.A.R..L., 592 F. App’x at 12 (citing Competex, S.A. v. Labow, 783 F.2d 333, 337 (2d
Cir. 1986)); see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 823 (1987) (“The traditional
United States rule has been that courts in the United States are required to render money judgments

payable in United States dollars only, regardless of the currency of obligation or loss.”). Rob has
not established why euros, rather than U.S. dollars, should be the currency awarded here.
In any event, because this contract dispute concerned a loan agreement and an outstanding
debt denominated in euros, it falls squarely within New York Judiciary Law § 27(b), and
calculation of exchange rate on the day of entry of judgment is appropriate. N.Y. Judiciary Law
§ 27(b); see Dye v. Kopiec, No. 16-CV-2952 (LGS) (KNF), 2019 WL 2527218, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
May 10, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-CV-2952 (LGS), 2019 WL 2525410
(S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2019) (finding that, “that part of the amount of damages established with
reasonable certainty that is in euros, namely, €1,020,000, will be converted to United States dollars

at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of the final judgment in this action”); see also
Petersen Energia Inversora, S.A.U. v. Argentine Republic, No. 15-CV-2739 (LAP), 2023 WL
2746022, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2023), upheld, in part, on reconsideration, No. 15-CV-2739
(LAP), 2023 WL 3625784 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2023) (rejecting day of judgment conversion from
pesos to dollars when the obligation was not specified in pesos originally).
Here, Rob clearly asserts a violation of a loan agreement for a fixed amount of foreign
currency, not a contract for goods and services. Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 26. Similarly, Dye concerned a
plaintiff asserting a breach of a promissory note for a given amount of euros. Dye, 2019 WL
2527218, at *1. This case is analogous to Dye, where the district court awarded damages based
on a verified amount of euros and then converted that amount to dollars on the day judgment was
entered. See Dye, 2019 WL 2527218, at *7; Glob. Exp. Mktg. Co. v. Abdelrahman A. Abbar
Trading Co., No. 20-CV-3504 (JPC) (SN), 2023 WL 425042, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2023), report
and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2632230 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2023) (finding defendant in
default and recommending judgment be entered in dollars equivalent to the amount of Saudi

Arabian Riyals specified in the Balance Agreement); Cagan v. Gadman, No. 08-CV-3710 (SJF)
(ARL), 2012 WL 5422270, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2012) (converting U.K. judgment from GBP
to U.S. dollars at exchange rate prevailing on the day of American court order).
Accordingly, for the reasons described above, Rob is entitled to judgment in his favor and
against Von Horn in the principal amount of €500,000—to be converted to American dollars on
the date final judgment is entered. See Dkt. Nos. 96-3, 96-7.8
C. Pre-Judgment Interest
Rob also requests pre-judgment interest on the award of monetary damages for the breach
of contract claim. See Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 32; Dkt. No. 96-1 at 14; Dkt. No. 96-2. “Under New York

law, if a plaintiff prevails on a claim for breach of contract, that plaintiff is also entitled to pre-
judgment interest.” Gabriel’s Collision Norman Ave., Inc., 2022 WL 1407244, at *3 (awarding
pre-judgment interest where the plaintiff prevailed on its breach of contract claim). The statutory
rate for pre-judgment interest is nine percent per annum under New York Law. See N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 5004; see also Arch Specialty Ins. Co. v. B & V Constr. Inc., No. 23-CV-2429 (NGG) (LGD),
2024 WL 1739862, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2024). The Court should calculate pre-judgment
interest “from the earliest ascertainable date the cause of action existed . . . to the date the verdict

8 The undersigned notes that the judgment envisioned by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) is the final judgment in the
case, not the present Report and Recommendation, and thus does not make the currency conversion at this
stage. See Dow Chemical Pacific Ltd. v. Rascator Maritime S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 1986).
was rendered or the report or decision was made.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5001(b)–(c), 5004.
Nevertheless, courts have “wide discretion in determining a reasonable date from which to award
pre-judgment interest[.]” Eco-Fuels LLC v. Sarker, No. 22-CV-250 (KAM) (JAM), 2024 WL
779038, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2024) (quoting Conway v. Icahn & Co., 16 F.3d 504, 512 (2d
Cir. 1994)).

Here, and because Rob seeks monetary damages rather than equitable relief, pre-judgment
interest is appropriate at a rate of nine percent per annum. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5004. Rob initially
requested an award of pre-judgment interest from March 1, 2015, which he alleged was the date
that Von Horn sold Pilot House and failed to pay him the proceeds. See Dkt. No. 96-1 at 13-14.
But by Rob’s own submissions, Von Horn maintained Pilot House, with Rob’s assistance to pay
property taxes, until March 29, 2019. See Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 18-22. Rob’s supplemental damages
submission corrected this discrepancy and requested pre-judgment interest starting on March 29,
2019. Dkt. No. 98-1 at 10-11 (“Von Horn breached her repayment obligation no later than March
29, 2019 when she sold the Pilot House property and failed to apply the proceeds to her debt”).

Based on this record, the appropriate day to start calculating pre-judgment interest is March
29, 2019, which is when, as Rob acknowledges, Von Horn sold Pilot House and failed to repay
Rob in accordance with the Letter of Acknowledgement. See id. at 6-7; 96-4; Delville v. Firmenich
Inc., 23 F. Supp. 3d 414, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding prejudgment interest appropriate from the
date of breach to the date judgment is entered); McNally Wellman Co., a Div. of Boliden Allis v.
New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 63 F.3d 1188, 1200 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding “[t]he ‘earliest
possible date’ in contract actions arises when the alleged breach occurred, regardless of the parties’
states of mind or subsequent discussions.”).
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that pre-judgment interest be
awarded from March 29, 2019 through the date of entry of final judgment for Rob’s claim for
breach of contract.
D. Post-Judgment Interest
Rob is entitled to post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). The Second Circuit

has consistently held that post-judgment interest, as governed by federal statute, is mandatory.
Schipani v. McLeod, 541 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2008); see Duffy v. Oyster Bay Indus., Inc., No.
10-CV-3205 (ADS) (ETB), 2011 WL 2259798, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2011) (“The very
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1961 ensures that an award of post-judgment interest is mandatory in any
civil case where money damages are recovered”), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL
2259749 (E.D.N.Y. June 2, 2011).
Under the statute, interest is calculated “from the date of the entry of judgment, at a rate
equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding[] the date of the

judgment.” Cabrera v. Canela, 412 F. Supp. 3d 167, 186 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1961(a)).
Therefore, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Rob be awarded post-judgment
interest, to be calculated from the date the Clerk of Court enters judgment in this action until the
date of payment, using the federal rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961. See Fermin v. Las Delicias
Peruanas Rest., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 3d 19, 52 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
VII. Counterclaims
In Von Horn’s answer, she asserts five counterclaims, to wit: (1) Rob fraudulently induced
Von Horn by his intentional misrepresentations, to which Von Horn relied to her detriment; (2)
Rob committed active fraud in the performance of his duties to Von Horn under the Short Form
Power of Attorney (“POA”) by his intentional misrepresentations; (3) Rob breached his fiduciary
duties accepted and bargained for under the POA; (4) Rob converted the “monies and property of
Von Horn without legal justification or privilege”; and (5) Rob’s fraud, fraudulent inducement,
breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion all give rise to compensable damages in favor of Von

Horn. Dkt. No. 26 at 8-9. Rob’s motion for Default Judgment includes a request for dismissal of
Von Horn’s counterclaims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute.
Dkt. No. 96-1 at 14-18. As discussed below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the
Court dismiss Von Horn’s counterclaims.
A. Legal Standard
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a case may be
involuntarily dismissed if a plaintiff “fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court
order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Schwartz v. AMF Bowling Centers, Inc., No. 19-CV-7096
(WFK) (JAM), 2025 WL 1682269, at *3-*4 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2025) report and recommendation

adopted, 2025 WL 1826568 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 2, 2025) (directing defendant to file Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(b) motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute); Nielsen v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc., No. 23-CV-5619
(JGLC) (HJR), 2025 WL 868495, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2025), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 23-CV-5619 (JGLC), 2025 WL 1265807 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2025) (applying court’s
inherent authority to dismiss case for failure to prosecute). Although dismissal under Rule 41(b)
is subject to the discretion of the district courts, the Second Circuit has stated that a Rule 41(b)
dismissal is a “harsh remedy to be utilized only in extreme situations.” LeSane v. Hall’s Sec.
Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 209 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
Before exercising its discretionary authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute, a district
court should consider the following five factors:
[1] the duration of the plaintiff’s failures, [2] whether plaintiff had received notice
that further delays would result in dismissal, [3] whether the defendant is likely to
be prejudiced by further delay, [4] whether the district judge has take[n] care to
strik[e] the balance between alleviating court calendar congestion and protecting a
party’s right to due process and a fair chance to be heard . . . and [5] whether the
judge has adequately assessed the efficacy of lesser sanctions.
Baptiste v. Sommers, 768 F.3d 212, 216 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535
(2d Cir. 1996)). No single factor is dispositive, and they apply “regardless of whether plaintiff is
represented by counsel or proceeding pro se.” Doe v. City of New York, 2004 WL 2397191, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2004); see Nita v. Conn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 16 F.3d 482, 485 (2d Cir. 1994).
For a pro se litigant, dismissal is reserved for “circumstances [that] are sufficiently extreme.”
Jacobs v. Cnty. of Westchester, No. 99-CV-4976 (WCC), 2008 WL 199469, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
22, 2008) (quoting Coss v. Sullivan County Jail Adm’r, 171 F.R.D. 68, 70 (S.D.N.Y.1997); Lucas
v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996) (cautioning that, “deference is due to the district court’s
decision to dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint only when the circumstances are sufficiently
extreme.”). “While the Second Circuit has cautioned that pro se plaintiffs should be granted
special leniency regarding procedural matters, courts in this district have recognized that [] even
pro se litigants must prosecute claims diligently, and dismissal with prejudice is warranted where
the Court gives warning.” Zeigler v. Annucci, No. 23-CV-707 (KMK), 2025 WL 1056904, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2025) (cleaned up and internal citations omitted).
“Rule 41 applies with equal force ‘to a dismissal of any counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-
party claim.’” Rsch. Found. for State Univ. of New York v. Telluric Labs, LLC, No. 21-CV-1898
(JS) (SIL), 2023 WL 6307995, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2023) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(c));
see Xiamen ITG Grp. Corp. v. Peace Bird Trading Corp., No. 19-CV-6524 (DLI) (ST), 2024 WL
5399245, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2024) (applying Rule 41(c) to analyze dismissal of
counterclaims under Rule 41(b) framework).
B. Discussion
Here, the five Baptiste factors require dismissal of all counterclaims due to Von Horn’s
failure to prosecute this action. See Baptiste, 768 F.3d at 216; Mendoza v. 901 Columbus Deli

Corp., No. 24-CV-9586 (KPF), 2025 WL 2390728, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2025) (concluding
that “these factors weigh in favor of dismissal of this action” where a plaintiff “has consistently
failed to prosecute this case over a period of months.”).
With respect to the first Baptiste factor, the duration of the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute
has been egregious. See id. Von Horn has engaged in over 10 months of dilatory conduct since
she first failed to appear on December 13, 2024, and she has been unavailable to the Court since
that missed court appearance. December 13, 2024 Text Order. It is well established in this Circuit
that a delay of several months can warrant dismissal. See Yadav v. Brookhaven Nat’l Lab., 487
Fed. Appx 671, 673 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[Plaintiff’s] dilatory conduct extended for only three months,

we have noted that a delay of a matter of months can potentially warrant dismissal.”) (internal
quotations and citation omitted); Caussade v. United States, 293 F.R.D. 625, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(finding that dismissal is appropriate in seven months if defendant is completely inaccessible, as
this conduct strongly suggests plaintiff is not diligently pursuing their claim); Dong v. United
States, No. 02-CV-7751 (SAS), 2004 WL 385117, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2004) (finding that,
“the very fact that Dong has been inaccessible for the last two months—without notifying the
Court, the Government, or the Pro Se Office of a change of address—strongly suggests that he is
not diligently pursuing this claim”); Hibbert v. Apfel, No. 99-CV-4246 (SAS), 2000 WL 977683,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2000) (holding that six months of inaction by plaintiff justifies dismissal
of an action).
With respect to the second Baptiste factor, the Court has adequately put Von Horn on notice
that failure to comply with Court orders could result in dismissal. See Hunter v. New York State
Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 515 F. App’x 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that two notices that an action

could be dismissed was sufficient notice). When Von Horn first failed to appear as directed at the
December 13, 2024 conference, the Court provided an unambiguous warning that, “[f]ailure to
comply with this order may result in sanctions, including . . . the Court issuing a sua sponte report
and recommendation [] that Von Horn’s case be dismissed for failure to comply with court orders
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).” December 13, 2024 Text Order (italics added). As noted above, this
Order was served on Von Horn and her nieces via email by Verner, who said such email addresses
were the “same means of communication [Verner and the recipients had] used since [Verner] first
appeared in these consolidated actions.” Dkt. No. 88.
Similarly, when Von Horn failed to respond, on December 26, 2024, the Court further

ordered her to show cause, again cautioning that her “failure to comply with this and other of the
Court’s orders may result in sanctions, including” dismissal of the Von Horn Action and a default
judgment in the Rob Action. December 26, 2024 Text Order. Verner again served this Order on
Von Horn and her nieces via email. Dkt. No. 89.
When Von Horn’s failure to respond persisted through January 9, 2025, the Court sua
sponte extended her deadline to do so until January 31, 2025, again cautioning Von Horn “that
failure to comply with Court orders may result in sanctions, which include sua sponte dismissal or
default judgment.” January 9, 2025 Text Order (italics added). The Court also directed the Clerk
of Court to serve its January 9, 2025 Order on Von Horn and her nieces via email. Id.
By February 11, 2025, Von Horn still had yet to show cause or otherwise respond to the
Court’s numerous Orders. February 11, 2025 Text Order. The Court then directed Connors to file
a motion to dismiss for Von Horn’s failure to prosecute the Von Horn Action, and Rob was directed
to seek a Certificate of Default from the Clerk of Court for Von Horn in the Rob Action. See id.
The Clerk of Court served the Court’s Order on Von Horn and her nieces via email.9 Id. Further,

to date, Von Horn has failed to respond to the undersigned’s September 20, 2025 Report and
Recommendation recommending dismissal for her failure to prosecute in the Von Horn Action.
See Von Horn Action, Dkt. No. 70.
These orders provided explicit notice to Von Horn that her failure to prosecute and comply
with Court orders would result in dismissal of her case. See Hunter, 515 F. App’x at 43; Velt Corp.
v. United States, No. 19-CV-5463 (MKB) (ST), 2020 WL 8413513, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2020),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 19-CV-5463 (MKB) (ST), 2020 WL 7639962 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 23, 2020) (finding that failure to comply with three orders to file a status report warranted
dismissal); but see Lewis v. Frayne, 595 F. App’x 35, 37 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that a warning

embedded in an order to show cause was overly technical and cannot be sufficient notice on its
own). Additionally, the warnings provided to Von Horn were sufficiently forward-looking as they
warned her that the action would be dismissed in the event of further delay. See United States ex
rel. Drake v. Norden Sys., Inc., 375 F.3d 248, 255 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that a warning that an
action will be dismissed based on past delay provides insufficient notice to defendant to satisfy the
second factor of the Rule 41(b) dismissal test).

9 As noted above, on March 18, 2025, over a month after the Clerk of Court served the Court’s February
12, 2025 Order on Von Horn and her nieces via email, Von Horn replied to such email, but did not file
anything on the docket or otherwise resume prosecuting her case.
With respect to the third Baptiste factor, Von Horn’s failure to appear allows the Court to
presume as a matter of law that defendant will be prejudiced by further delay. Tankersley v. City
of New York, No. 19-CV-3359 (MKB), 2021 WL 5013620, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2021). The
principal allegations in this case concern a series of alleged loans that are decades old, and fading
memories of the events in question could prejudice Rob’s ability to mount a defense against these

counterclaims. See Rubin v. Abbott Lab’ys, 319 F.R.D. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that the
longer the litigation process takes, the less likely it is that critical witnesses will be available)
(citing Yang v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 07-CV-6499, 2008 WL 3126188, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July
14, 2008)). “Prejudice may be presumed as a matter of law in certain cases, but the issue turns on
the degree to which the delay was lengthy and inexcusable. In cases where ‘delay is more moderate
or excusable, the need to show actual prejudice is proportionally greater.’” Norden Sys., Inc., 375
F.3d at 256 (quoting Lyell Theatre Corp. v. Loews Corp., 682 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1982)). Lyell
is instructive, as it upheld a presumption of prejudice against a defendant when plaintiff repeatedly
failed to provide documents that the Court ordered, even after repeated warnings that dismissal

could result. 682 F.2d at 39-40, 43. The present case is similar, where, as in Lyell, Von Horn has
been repeatedly warned that failure to show cause or otherwise respond to Court orders could result
in dismissal. See December 13, 2024, December 26, 2024, and January 9, 2025 Text Orders.
Accordingly, Von Horn’s failure to heed the Court’s orders and drive her counterclaims forward
permits the Court to presume prejudice to Rob.
With respect to the fourth Baptiste factor, the Court must weigh the administrative burden
placed on the Court’s docket by stagnant cases, such as Von Horn’s, with Von Horn’s right to due
process and fair chance to be heard. See Rubin, 319 F.R.D. at 121; Baptiste, 768 F.3d at 216. In
making this determination, courts “look at whether a litigant has been given an opportunity ‘to be
heard on the issue of failure to prosecute’” and compare that to, “plaintiff’s ‘interest in prosecuting
[its] case.’” Velt Corp., 2020 WL 8413513, at *3 (quoting Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159,
182 (2d Cir. 2001); Caussade, 293 F.R.D. at 631). When considering docket congestion, the
Second Circuit has stated that “[t]here must be compelling evidence of an extreme effect on court
congestion before a litigant’s right to be heard is subrogated to the convenience of the court.” Id.

(quoting Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535-36 (2d Cir. 1996)).
Here, despite having repeatedly been notified of this Court’s orders, Von Horn has ignored
them, thus demonstrating a clear lack of interest in pursuing her counterclaims. See Caussade,
293 F.R.D. at 631 (holding that failure to respond to repeated requests from the Court weighs in
favor of granting a Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute); Velt Corp., 2020 WL
8413513, at *3. Moreover, Von Horn has had ample opportunity to be heard, as evidenced by the
Court’s repeated grants of sua sponte extensions of her time to respond and directions to the Clerk
of Court that Von Horn and her nieces be served with the Court’s Orders. See December 26, 2024,
January 9, 2025, and February 11, 2025 Text Orders. Accordingly, in the face of Von Horn’s

waning interest in prosecuting her counterclaim, the balance tips in favor of alleviating the
administrative burden and congestion that stagnant cases, such as this one, place on the Court’s
docket.
The final Baptiste factor compels the court to consider whether lesser sanctions are
available to remedy prejudice resulting from Von Horn’s delay. See Baptiste, 768 F.3d at 216.
Courts in this Circuit have repeatedly held that when plaintiffs fail to respond to the Court or their
own lawyer, no sanction short of dismissal is likely to rectify the issues created by the plaintiffs’
absences. See Lewis v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 23-CV-857 (AMD) (LKE), 2024 WL
4593424, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2024) (explaining that a “lesser sanction is unlikely to remedy
the prejudice resulting from [the plaintiff’s] delay and failure to comply with court orders”); Copiel
v. Pugliese, No. 19-CV-4231 (MKB) (LB), 2021 WL 2792182, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2021),
report and recommendation adopted as modified, No. 19-CV-4231 (MKB) (LB), 2021 WL
2659985 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2021) (noting that “when a plaintiff fails to respond to a Court order
once threatened with dismissal, it is unlikely that a lesser sanction will result in reengagement in a

matter”). Courts have also raised the practical concern that no lesser sanction would be effective
because the non-responsive plaintiff would be unaware that such a sanction had been applied. See
Blake v. Payane, No. 08-CV-0930 (PAC) (PED), 2011 WL 7163172, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11,
2011).
Von Horn’s lack of interest in this case, as evidenced by over 10 months of
unresponsiveness, shows that a lesser sanction, such as a fine, would likely have no effect. See
Rogers v. Villafane, No. 12-CV-3042 (CBA) (MDG), 2013 WL 3863914, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 24,
2013) (“There is no indication that a lesser sanction, such as a fine, would be effective, given the
plaintiff’s failure to take any action for several months to indicate an interest in pursuing this

case.”).
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Von Horn’s counterclaims,
as outlined in Dkt. No. 23, be dismissed under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute.
VIII. Conclusion
In sum, the undersigned finds that Rob sufficiently alleges Von Horn’s liability for breach
of contract under New York law and respectfully recommends that default judgment be entered in
favor of Rob against Von Horn, in the principal amount of €500,000—to be converted to American
dollars on the date of final judgment, plus pre-judgment interest. The undersigned respectfully
recommends that Von Horn’s counterclaims be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b). A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being electronically served on
counsel. This Court directs Rob’s counsel to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation by
overnight mail and first-class mail to Von Horn and to file proof of service on ECF by October 16,
2025.
Copies shall be served at the following mail and email addresses:

Lola Hilton Von Horn
Grev Magningatan 16
S-114 55 Stockholm, Sweden
lolahvonhorn@gmail.com
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within 14 days after
service of this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) & (d) (addressing computation of days). Any requests for an extension
of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Donnelly. Failure to file objections within
this period designating the particular issues to be reviewed waives the right to appeal the district
court’s order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v.
Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010);
Kotlyarsky v. United States Dep’t of Just., No. 22-2750, 2023 WL 7648618 (2d Cir. 2023); see
also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
October 14, 2025 SO ORDERED.

/s/ Joseph A. Marutollo
JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11203949. Public record. Not legal advice.