# Dillard

> District Court, E.D. New York · November 13, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11203848

## Case

- **Full name:** Jarule Dillard v. John Doe Sgt. Badge #2099; John Doe Sgt. Badge #5342
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** November 13, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11203848

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming dismissal of prisoner’s IFP action alleging claims of exposure to mold and unjust discipline based on the three-strikes rule

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CLERK
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 11/13/202   5 1:31 pm
---------------------------------------------------------------------X
JARULE DILLARD, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EA STERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Plaintiff, LONG ISLAND OFFICE
ORDER
-against- 25-CV-4014(GRB)(ARL)

JOHN DOE SGT. BADGE #2099,
JOHN DOE SGT. BADGE #5342,

Defendants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------X
GARY R. BROWN, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is the application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) filed by Jarule
Dillard (“Plaintiff”), acting pro se, and while incarcerated at the Riverhead location of the
Suffolk County Correctional Facility (the “Jail”). See Docket Entry (“DE”) 7. Upon review, the
Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified by his financial position as reported on the IFP application
to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
application to proceed IFP is granted. However, for the reasons that follow, the Complaint (DE
1) is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).
BACKGROUND
I. Summary of the Complaint
Plaintiff’s complaint is submitted on the Court’s form for civil rights actions brought
pursuant to Section 1983 and seeks to challenge a single missed meal during the dinner service
on March 16, 2025. (See DE 1, in toto.) Named as defendants are two corrections sergeants
identified by badge numbers 2099 and 5342 (together, “Defendants”). (Id.) The brief statement
of claim alleges, in its entirety:1

1 Excerpts from the complaint have been reproduced here exactly as they appear in the original.
Errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected or noted.
On 3/16/25 at 4:00 pm dinner time at SCCF I didn’t receive my halal tray. I asked
two C.O. Badge #2099 about my tray and it’s where abouts, he then went and got
two Sgt. Badge #5342. I told him that I didn’t receive my halal tray, he told me
that he’ll make sure it will come with the Ramadan meals even though I wasn’t
participating in Ramadan. The Ramadan comes again and once again no meal for
me. The Sgt. Badge #5342 said its his fault but there is nothing he can do. I
wasn’t fed at all until the next day, when I’m entitled to 3 meals a day and wasn’t
provided 3 meals. I was deprived my 3rd meal.

(Id. at 4 ¶ IV.) Annexed to the Complaint is a copy of Plaintiff’s Inmate Grievance Form, dated
March 19, 2025, wherein he complained about the missed meal. (Id. at 6.) Accepting the
grievance, on March 26, 2025, the Grievance Coordinator indicated: “Inmate Dillard did not
receive his Halal dinner meal on the date and time in question due to kitchen error. Inmate
Dillard will continue to receive (3) Halal meals per day.” (Id.)
In the space that calls for a description of any injuries suffered, Plaintiff wrote: “There
was no physical injuries besides hunger and food deprivation without due process my 8th and 14th
Amendments were injur[ed].” (Id. at 4 ¶ IV.A.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks “$50,000 for
violation of my constitutional rights . . . .” (Id. at 5 ¶ V.)
LEGAL STANDARDS
The Second Circuit has established a two-step procedure wherein the district court first
considers whether a plaintiff qualifies for IFP status, and then considers the merits of the
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Potnick v. E. State Hosp., 701 F.2d 243, 244 (2d Cir.
1983).
I. In Forma Pauperis
Upon review of the renewed IFP application, the Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified by
his financial status to commence this action without the prepayment of the filing fee. Therefore,
the application to proceed IFP (DE 7) is granted.

2
II. Sufficiency of the Pleadings
As Judge Bianco summarized,
A district court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action
is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). The Court is required to dismiss the action
as soon as it makes such a determination. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
It is axiomatic that district courts are required to read pro se complaints liberally,
see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010), and
to construe them “‘to raise the strongest arguments that [they] suggest [ ].’”
Chavis, 618 F.3d at 170 (quoting Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d
Cir. 2010)). Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must
assume the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in the
complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir.
2010), aff’d, --- U.S. ----, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 185 L. Ed. 2d 671 (2013) (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements . . . are
not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

Notwithstanding a plaintiff’s pro se status, a complaint must plead sufficient facts
to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; accord Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 671
F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011). While “detailed factual allegations” are not
required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff’s factual allegations must also be
sufficient to give the defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).

Patrick v. Bronx Care, No. 14-CV-7392 (JFB)(AKT), 2014 WL 7476972, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 31, 2014).

3
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1983 Claims
Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for
redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d
Cir. 1993). To maintain a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) acted
under color of state law (2) to deprive the plaintiff of a right arising under the Constitution or
federal law. See id.
Here, the Complaint does not allege a plausible Section 1983 claim because the absence
of a single meal does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.2 See, e.g., Jallow v.
Geffner, No. 23-cv-3969, 2024 WL 37073, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2024) (“Courts in this
Circuit have routinely held that an isolated denial of a meal ‘does not give rise to a constitutional
deprivation.’” (quoting Rush v. Fischer, 923 F. Supp. 2d 545, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2013))). The
standard for deliberate indifference under both amendments involves a two-pronged test that

2 Although Plaintiff does not allege whether he is detained pre-trial or is confined in prison, all “[p]risoners and
detainees have constitutionally protected rights to receive humane conditions of confinement, including adequate
food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and security.” Arroyo v. Nassau Cnty. Corr., No. 22-cv-5611, 2022 WL
16636774, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2022) (quoting McKoy v. Suffolk Cnty. Corr. Fac., No. 21-cv-1873, 2022 WL
1092385, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2022)) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). If Plaintiff is
detained pre-trial, he is entitled to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause; whereas, if he
is serving a sentence in prison, he is protected by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017).

4
requires showing an “objective deprivation” with the requisite “mens rea,” Darnell, 849 F.3d at
32, 35. To satisfy the first prong, often framed as the “objective prong,” both amendments
“require[] a showing that the challenged conditions were sufficiently serious such ‘that the
conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his

health.’” Volant v. Nassau Cnty., No. 2:24-cv-7882, 2025 WL 580367, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23,
2025) (quoting the discussion of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement
claims in Darnell, 849 F.3d at 30). “There is no static test to determine whether a deprivation is
sufficiently serious; instead, the conditions themselves must be evaluated in light of
contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The
Second Circuit has held that the Constitution requires that prisoners be fed nutritionally adequate
food and “under certain circumstances a substantial deprivation of food may well be recognized
as being of constitutional dimension.” Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983)
(emphasis added). In order to establish a claim that the denial of food constitutes a constitutional
deprivation, a prisoner must establish that a “sufficiently serious condition” resulted from not

receiving food. Evans v. Albany Cnty. Corr. Fac., No. 9:05-cv-1400, 2009 WL 1401645, at *9
(N.D.N.Y. May 14, 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).3
As for the mens rea prong, the Eighth Amendment requires a showing “that a prison
official had the requisite ‘culpable intent,’ which is present if the official ‘has knowledge that [a
prisoner] faces a substantial risk of serious harm and he disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate the harm.’” Smith v. New York State, No. 23-cv-6601, 2024 WL

3Plaintiff’s allegation that “I wasn’t participating in Ramadan” (DE 1 at 4 ¶ IV) makes clear that his claim is for
deliberate indifference rather than for interference with religious practice.

5
4746554, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2024) (summary order) (quoting Hayes v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996)) (emphasis in original). As such, “mere negligence will
not suffice.” Id. By contrast, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the mens rea prong requires
showing that the defendant-official “acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or

recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition . . . even
though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive
risk to health or safety.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35. “In other words, the . . . ‘mens rea prong’ . . . is
defined objectively” under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations do not demonstrate that either prong is met whether
Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim is brought under either the Eighth Amendment or the
Fourteenth Amendment. Taking as true the allegation that on a single date Plaintiff was not
served the dinner meal causing him to be hungry from lunch until breakfast the following
morning, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that this circumstance posed an “unreasonable risk of
serious damage to his health.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 30; see also Cabassa v. Oshier, No. 9:11-cv-

01237, 2015 WL 5094802, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2015) (denial of a single meal fails to
plausibly state an Eighth Amendment claim); Hankerson v. Nassau Cnty. Corr. Fac., No. 12-cv-
5282, 2012 WL 6055019, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2012) (holding that denial of a single meal
“falls far short of a ‘substantial deprivation of food’ and does not rise to the level of a
constitutional deprivation”) (quoting Robles, 725 F.2d at 15)).
Nor does the Complaint allege any facts from which the Court could reasonably find the
mens rea prong is met under either the Eighth Amendment’s “culpable intent” standard or the
Fourteenth Amendment’s “knew or should have known” standard. To the contrary, as the exhibit

6
annexed to the Complaint demonstrates, Plaintiff’s grievance was accepted, and the Jail
acknowledged the kitchen error on that occasion and represented that immediate corrective
action would be taken in that “[i]nmate Dillard will continue to receive (3) Halal meals per day.”
(ECF No. 1 at 6.) Notably, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dated April 14, 2025, suggesting that Plaintiff

has not had any further issues with his meals after the March 16, 2025 incident described therein.
(Id., in toto.) Thus, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are not plausible and are dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
II. State Law Claims
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over
all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.” However, courts “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim”
if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court explained that “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims
are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine - - judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity - - will point toward declining
to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,
484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).

Here, given the absence of a plausible federal claim, the interests of judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity weigh in favor of not exercising supplemental jurisdiction at
this time over any state law claims that may be reasonably construed from the complaint.
Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state-
law claims contained in Plaintiff’s complaint and Plaintiff may pursue any such claims in statue

7
court.
III. Leave to Amend
A pro se plaintiff should ordinarily be given the opportunity “to amend at least once when
a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Shomo
v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). However, leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).
Here, the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s claims are substantive and could not be cured with
better pleading. Accordingly, leave to amend the Complaint would be futile and is thus is denied.
IV. Section 1915 Privilege
The Second Circuit has long-established that “the benefit of § 1915 is a privilege, not a
right . . . and that the court’s ‘extra measure of authority’ in dealing with § 1915 actions is
necessary because frivolous suits unduly burden the courts, sometimes obscuring meritorious
claims, occasion significant expenditures of public monies, and are a means by which plaintiffs
can use the federal government to harass individual defendants.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d
37, 42 (2d Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). As IFP status is not a constitutional right but rather a
congressionally created benefit, it can be extended or limited by Congress. Polanco v. Hopkins,
510 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Indeed, to help staunch a “flood of
nonmeritorious” prisoner litigation, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA)
established what has become known as the three-strikes rule. Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 590 U.S.
----, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1723 (2020) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007)). That rule

generally prevents a prisoner from bringing suit IFP—that is, without first paying the filing fee—
if he has had three or more prior suits “dismissed on the grounds that [they were] frivolous,

8
malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g)).
In determining when a plaintiff should receive a strike for a dismissed case under section
1915(g), the Second Circuit has made clear that district courts should not impose strikes in its
dismissal orders. See James v. McIntosh, 24-624, 2024 WL 4662980 (2d Cir. Nov. 4, 2024) (“a
district court errs in entering a strike at the dismissal stage”) (citing Deleon v. Doe, 361 F.3d 93,

95 (2d Cir. 2004)). Rather, a district court should only consider whether a plaintiff has three
strikes if it appears that the plaintiff has run afoul of section 1915(g) and is barred from
proceeding IFP in the instant action. See id. As such,
[t]he district court judgments should clearly set forth the reasons for dismissal,
including whether the dismissal is because the claim is “frivolous,” “malicious,”
or “fails to state a claim,” whether it is because the prisoner has failed to exhaust
an available administrative remedy, or for other reasons.

Clarifications of this sort will undoubtedly assist subsequent courts that must
determine whether a plaintiff is barred from maintaining an action in forma
pauperis by the three strikes rule of Section 1915(g).

Deleon, 361 F.3d at 95 (citing Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 1999))
(purgandum).4
Incarcerated litigants face a greater risk of various harms while in prison, including
physical injuries, poor prison conditions, inadequate medical care, and other constitutional
deprivations, making their access to relief from the judicial system of the utmost importance. See
Rosa v. Doe, No. 21-2628, 2023 WL 8009400 (2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2023) (discussing history and
importance of IFP status). This access, however, when done through IFP status, is not

4 See Farmers Property and Casualty Insur. Co. v. Fallon, No. 21-CV-6022 (GRB)(ARL), 2023 WL 4975977, at *3
n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2023) (discussing use of “purgandum” to indicate the removal of superfluous marks for the
ease of reading).

9
unrestricted and the indigent prisoner should be made aware of the limitations. Once a prisoner
accrues three dismissals based on either frivolousness, maliciousness, or for failure to state a
claim, that prisoner will be prohibited from commencing another action or appeal IFP unless he
is in imminent physical danger—regardless of the meritoriousness of the case. See, e.g., Polanco
v. Hopkins, 510 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s IFP action
alleging claims of exposure to mold and unjust discipline based on the three-strikes rule); Fate v.

New York, No. 19-CV-4107 (CS), 2021 WL 1177966, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2021)
(dismissing prisoner’s IFP case alleging campaign of police harassment and retaliation and a
physical assault under the three-strikes rule). Indeed, “[r]equiring prisoners to make economic
decisions about filing lawsuits does not deny access to the courts; it merely places the indigent
prisoner in a position similar to that faced by those whose basic costs of living are not paid by
the state.” Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
Here, the Court does not impose any strikes against the Plaintiff but will note, however -
- for the pro se Plaintiff’s benefit - - that the statute under which he is proceeding is a privilege
subject to revocation. And the plain language of § 1915(g) suggests that such revocation is
compulsory in the face of abuse. See 42 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (“In no event shall a prisoner bring a
civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has [violated the three-strike rule]
unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”) (emphasis added); see
also Lomax, 140 S. Ct. at 1723-24 (“That provision bars further IFP litigation once a prisoner has
had at least three prior suits dismissed on specified grounds.”). Accordingly, the Plaintiff
proceeding IFP here is cautioned that the dismissal of the present complaint for failure to state a
claim may be considered a strike by a future court and contribute to the determination that he has

violated the three-strikes rule of § 1915(g), barring him from commencing further actions or

10
appeals IFP.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP (DE 7) is granted.
However, the Complaint (DE 1) is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A(b). Leave to amend the Complaint is denied. The Clerk of the Court shall enter
judgment accordingly and mail a copy of this order and judgment to the Plaintiff at his address of

record and note such mailing on the docket.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose
of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Gary R. Brown
_______________________
Dated: November 13, 2025 Hon. Gary R. Brown
Central Islip, New York United States District Judge

11

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11203848. Public record. Not legal advice.