# Hemphill

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · November 14, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11203579

## Case

- **Full name:** Demetrius Hemphill v. Robert Snyder
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** November 14, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION

DEMETRIUS HEMPHILL, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 22-1452
)
ROBERT SNYDER, )
Defendant. )

ORDER
COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 37) filed by Defendant Robert E. Snyder. Plaintiff Demetrius Hemphill, a
prisoner at Lawrence Correctional Center, has filed duplicative Motions for Leave to File
an Amended Complaint (Docs. 38, 39). Neither party has filed opposing responses.
I. Background
In December 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) alleging constitutional
violations at Pontiac Correctional Center against Defendants Corrections Lieutenants
Dooling and Evans, Corrections Officer Snyder, and Nurse Mary.
On May 29, 2020, Defendant Evans assigned Plaintiff to a cell in the highest gallery
of Pontiac’s North cell house. Plaintiff complained to Evans that he had been issued a low
gallery permit because of his diabetes, which required him to take two insulin shots daily.
Plaintiff also told Evans his condition causes pain and swelling when climbing stairs.
Defendant Evans refused to assign Plaintiff to a lower gallery.
On June 1, 2020, Defendant Snyder handcuffed Plaintiff before escorting him out
of his cell. When Plaintiff inquired why he was handcuffed, which was not standard

procedure, Snyder responded that Defendant Evans had ordered Plaintiff restrained
because he had complained too much. As Plaintiff returned from receiving insulin,
Snyder deliberately tripped Plaintiff as he approached a stairwell. As a result, Plaintiff
hit the stairs, causing injuries to his chest, shoulder, and knees. Defendant Mary arrived,
but after Snyder informed Mary that Plaintiff was fine, Mary left without taking Plaintiff
to the healthcare unit or scheduling a sick call. Plaintiff was subsequently diagnosed with

knee abrasions and a sprained shoulder. Subsequent diagnostic testing revealed a bruised
area on Plaintiff’s chest.
About a week later, Plaintiff asked for a transfer to protective custody because he
began having problems with other inmates. As a result, Plaintiff was transferred to a cell
in the highest gallery in Pontiac’s West cell house. Plaintiff complained about his high

gallery placement. As a result, Defendant Dooling moved Plaintiff to a cell in gallery two,
which Plaintiff noted was in the disciplinary segregation unit.
The Court determined that Plaintiff had alleged enough facts to proceed with an
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Snyder, a First Amendment
retaliation claim against Defendants Evans and Snyder, and an Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference to serious medical need claims against Defendants Evans, Mary,
and Snyder. The Court dismissed Defendant Dooling for failure to state a claim. (Mer.
Rev. Doc. 10 at 4-6.)
Thereafter, the Court sent Notices of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Summons
to Defendants. (Doc. 12.) The Court’s waiver did not include a first name for Snyder as

Plaintiff’s pleading did not provide one. In May 2023, Defendants Lance Evans and
Robert E. Snyder returned their individual signed waivers of service. (Doc. 13 at 1.) As to
Defendant Mary, the Court informed Plaintiff that after Pontiac stated it did not employ
a nurse with that name, and Plaintiff’s later attempts to provide descriptive
characteristics to identify Mary proved futile, the Court directed the Clerk of the Court
(“Clerk”) to substitute Jane Doe for Nurse Mary. The Court informed Plaintiff that if he

could not identify Doe before the deadline established by the Court Scheduling Order
(Doc. 18), Doe would be dismissed as a party. See June 19, 2023, Order. The Court
Scheduling Order (Doc. 18) set discovery and dispositive motion deadlines and gave
Plaintiff until September 18, 2023, to substitute the real name of Defendant Doe.
In October 2023, the Court granted the Motion to Withdraw the Affirmative

Defense of Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies (Doc. 19) filed by Defendants
Evans and Snyder. On April 19, 2024, Evans and Snyder filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 20), and Plaintiff filed his response (Doc. 24).
In March 2025, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’
dispositive motion. (Doc. 28) After dismissing Defendant Doe for Plaintiff’s failure to file

a Motion to Substitute as directed, the Court granted summary judgment to Defendants
Evans and Snyder on Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation and Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claims. However, the Court denied Snyder summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. (Doc. 28 at 11-12:2.)
After Snyder and Plaintiff expressed an interest in settlement discussions (Docs.
29, 32), the Court referred Plaintiff’s suit to a magistrate judge. During unsuccessful

settlement discussions, the question arose as to whether Snyder was the proper party to
these proceedings.
II. Motions for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment
Although Plaintiff did not oppose Defendant Robert E. Snyder’s Motion for Leave
to File Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff concedes in his Motion for
Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 38 at 1-2) that Robert E. Snyder was not the

individual who Plaintiff alleges violated his constitutional rights. The Court accepts
Plaintiff’s concession and dismisses Robert E. Snyder as a party in this case. Thus,
Defendant Snyder’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 37) is denied.
III. Motions for Leave to File Amended Complaints

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 38) is granted.
The Court strikes Plaintiff’s subsequent Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint
(Doc. 39) as duplicative.
A. Screening Standard
The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient
claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if

it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. Upon
reviewing the complaint, the court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, construing
them liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).
However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be

provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States,
721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
B. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff identifies the following Pontiac officials: Corrections Lieutenants Dooling
and Evans, Correctional Sergeants Blackard and Boland, Corrections Officer John Snyder,
and Nurse Mary.

On May 29, 2020, Defendant Evans assigned Plaintiff to a cell in the highest gallery
of Pontiac’s North cell house. Plaintiff complained to Evans that he had been issued a low
gallery permit because of his diabetes, which required him to take two insulin shots daily.
Plaintiff also told Evans his condition causes pain and swelling when climbing stairs.
Defendant Evans refused to assign Plaintiff to a lower gallery.

On June 1, 2020, Defendant Snyder handcuffed Plaintiff before escorting him out
of his cell. When Plaintiff asked why Snyder handcuffed him for general movement,
which was not standard procedure, Snyder told Plaintiff that Defendant Evans ordered
Plaintiff restrained because he complained too much. As Plaintiff returned from receiving
insulin, Snyder deliberately tripped Plaintiff as he approached a stairwell. As a result,

Plaintiff hit the stairs, causing injuries to his chest, shoulder, and knees. Defendants
Blackard and Boland arrived shortly thereafter, but Blackard, Boland, and Evans denied
Plaintiff’s request to be sent to the Healthcare Unit. Defendant Mary also appeared, but
after Snyder informed Mary that Plaintiff was fine, Mary left without taking Plaintiff to
the healthcare unit or scheduling a sick call. Plaintiff was subsequently diagnosed with
knee abrasions and a sprained shoulder. Subsequent diagnostic testing revealed a bruised

area on the chest.
About a week later, Plaintiff asked for a transfer to protective custody because he
began having problems with other inmates. As a result, Plaintiff was transferred to a cell
in the highest gallery in Pontiac’s West cell house. Plaintiff again complained about his
high gallery placement. As a result, Defendant Dooling moved Plaintiff to a cell in gallery
two, which Plaintiff noted was in the disciplinary segregation unit.

C. Analysis
As the preceding factual summary shows, Plaintiff reiterates the First Amendment
retaliation and Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims he raised in his initial
complaint against Defendant Evans, which this Court considered and dismissed at
summary judgment. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state plausible claims against Evans.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment excessive force
claim against Defendant John Snyder for the alleged force used while escorting Plaintiff
to his cell on June 1, 2020. See Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 667 (7th
Cir. 2012) (“The use of force qualifies as excessive for the purpose of Eighth Amendment
. . . when it entails the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”) (quoting Whitley v.

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).
To make out a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must
establish that (1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment, (2) he suffered
a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future, and (3) the
First Amendment activity was “at least a motivating factor” in the defendants’ decision
to take the retaliatory action. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff states a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant John Snyder
for handcuffing Plaintiff during movement because of Plaintiff’s complaints. See
Daugherty v. Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he filing of a prison
grievance is a constitutionally protected activity supporting a First Amendment
retaliation claim, as are oral complaints about prison conditions.” (internal citation
omitted)); see also Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e decline to

hold that legitimate complaints lose their protected status simply because they are
spoken.”).
“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates ‘deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners.’” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on a claim of deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must satisfy a test that contains both an
objective and subjective component. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). Under
the objective component, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his medical condition is
sufficiently severe. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the subjective

component, the prison official must have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of
mind.” Id. Thus, a plaintiff can establish deliberate indifference by showing that a
defendant “knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.”
Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff’s narrative regarding Defendants Blackard, Boland, and Snyder denying
Plaintiff’s request to be sent to the Healthcare Unit; Snyder’s statements minimizing

Plaintiff’s injuries on June 1, 2020; and Defendant Mary’s lack of medical treatment or
referral, given Plaintiff’s injuries, states an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.
However, for the reasons already noted regarding Pontiac’s confirmation that it
did not employ a Nurse named Mary at the time of Plaintiff’s alleged violations, the Court
directs the Clerk to substitute Defendant Jane Doe for Defendant Mary. The Court

informs Plaintiff that service of process cannot occur on a Doe Defendant. Thus, after the
identified Defendants have been served and filed their Answer, the Court will enter a
Scheduling Order that guides the Plaintiff’s responsibilities in determining the Doe
Defendants during the discovery period, among other issues, and filing a motion to
substitute the Doe Defendants’ real identities before the imposed deadline expires.

Plaintiff does not state a claim against Defendant Dooling for placing him in a
lower gallery cell within the disciplinary segregation unit. Plaintiff claims that Dooling’s
actions violated a state statute. However, Title “42 U.S.C. §1983 does not authorize federal
courts to order state officials to pay damages for violations of state law; remedies in §1983
suits are for violations of federal law only.” Brown v. Randle, 847 F.3d 861, 865 (7th Cir.

2017).
In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), “the Supreme Court determined that
the Fourteenth Amendment provides to inmates a liberty interest in avoiding placement
in more restrictive conditions, such as segregation, when those conditions pose an
atypical and significant hardship when compared to the ordinary incidents of prison
life.” Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff neither makes such a

showing nor provides any facts that Dooling’s decision directly resulted in an injury to
his person. See Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 864 n.19 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[U]nder tort principles
applicable in § 1983 actions, a plaintiff must show that ‘he has suffered an “actual”
present injury and that there is a causal connection between that injury and the
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right caused by a defendant.’”) (quoting
Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 848 (7th Cir. 1999)).

The court informs Plaintiff that, given the unusual circumstances regarding the
misidentification of Defendant Robert E. Snyder, Defendants may raise affirmative
defenses that could result in the dismissal of one or more Defendants despite the Court’s
Merit Review Order on Plaintiff’s amended pleading. See Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559,
563 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Lawsuits brought under § 1983 are governed by the statute of

limitations for personal injury in the state where the injury occurred, which in Illinois is
two years.”); see also Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 864 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A plaintiff’s
lack of knowledge about a defendant’s identity is not a ‘mistake’ within the meaning of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) such that the plaintiff could amend his complaint
outside the statute of limitations period upon learning the defendant’s identity.”); see also

Ray v. Clements, 700 F.3d 993, 1006 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Generally, the party raising an
affirmative defense bears the burden of proof.”).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate Robert E. Snyder as a Defendant and
STRIKE Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 39).

2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 37) is DENIED.

3) The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint
(Doc. 38).

4) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 38) under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff has alleged enough facts to proceed with an Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant John Snyder, a First
Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants John Snyder, and an Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical need claims against
Defendants Blackard, Boland, John Snyder, and Jane Doe. Plaintiff’s claim
against Defendants proceeds in their individual capacity only. Additional claims
shall not be included in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a
party for good cause shown or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait
until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions to give
Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions
filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will be denied as
premature. Plaintiff need not submit evidence to the Court unless otherwise
directed by the Court.

6) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing each Defendant a
waiver of service. Defendants have sixty days from service to file an Answer. If
Defendants have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within ninety
days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status
of service. After Defendants have been served, the Court will enter an order
setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

7) Concerning a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by
Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall
submit to the Clerk said Defendant’s current work address or, if not known, said
Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used only for
effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained
only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed
by the Clerk.

8) Defendants shall file an Answer within sixty days of the date the Clerk sends
the waiver. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The Answer should include all
defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and subsequent
pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. An answer sets
forth the Defendants’ positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of those
positions unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore, no response to
the Answer is necessary or will be considered.

9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’ counsel
has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive
electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.
Therefore, Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of motions and other documents
that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk to Defendants’ counsel. However, this does
not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses
are not filed with the Clerk. Instead, Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests
and responses directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses
sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the
subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendants’
counsel has filed an appearance, and the Court has entered a scheduling order,
which will provide more detailed information about the discovery process.

10) Defendants’ counsel is granted leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of
confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.

11) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his
mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of
a change in mailing address or phone number will result in the dismissal of this
lawsuit with prejudice.

12) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within
thirty days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect
formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and will
require that Defendant to pay the total costs of formal service under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

13) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order under
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

14) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendants under the standard
procedures.
ENTERED November 14, 2025.

s/ Colleen R. Lawless
____________________________________
COLLEEN R. LAWLESS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11203579. Public record. Not legal advice.