# Griffin

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · November 13, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11203553

## Case

- **Full name:** Sheila Griffin as Independent Administrator of the Estate of R.R., a minor, now deceased v. Poynter et. al
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** November 13, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION

SHEILA GRIFFIN as Independent
Administrator of the Estate of R.R., a
minor, now deceased,
Plaintiff, Case No. 1:20-cv-01427-JEH-RLH

v.

POYNTER et. al,
Defendants.

Order
Now before the Court is the Motion of Defendants Ashley Deckert, Mark
Delashmit, Stefanie Moreau, Daniel Norris, Johanna O’Brien, Mark Ohrwall, Mary
Ann Poynter, and Patricia Shannon (collectively “DCFS Defendants”) for
Summary Judgment. (189).1 For the reasons set forth infra, the Motion for
Summary Judgment (D. 189) is granted as to Count One and it is dismissed with
prejudice; the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims which are dismissed without prejudice.
I
On April 5, 2022, the Court granted the Plaintiff leave to file a Second
Amended Complaint.2 See 04/05/2022 Text Order. On April 19, 2022, the
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, Memorandum in Support, and Answer.

1 Citations to the electronic docket are abbreviated as “D. ___ at ECF p. ___.”
2 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a) and CDIL L.R. 5.11, the Court refers to the deceased minor by her initials,
R.R. For the sake of clarity, the Court will refer to both Griffin, as Independent Administrator of the Estate
of R.R., and R.R., as Plaintiff throughout this Order.
(D. 81, 82 & 83). On November 9, 2022, the Court denied the Motion to Dismiss.
(D. 86). On June 26, 2025, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
(D. 189) to which the Plaintiff filed a Response on August 14, 2025. (D. 192). On
September 29, 2025, the Defendants filed a Reply. (D. 198). On October 16, 2025,
the Defendants filed a Motion to Cite Authority (D. 199) to which the Plaintiff filed
a Response on October 30, 2025. (D. 200). The matter is now fully briefed.
II
The facts of this case are heartbreaking; a young girl, R.R., was fatally
abused by her father’s girlfriend, Cynthia Clay (“Clay”). She was later convicted
of R.R.’s murder and R.R.’s father, Richard Rountree (“Richard”), pleaded guilty
to endangering her life. This case also involves a series of disturbing acts and
oversights by DCFS personnel as they investigated various allegations of abuse
relating to R.R. If DCFS personnel had done things differently, R.R. may still be
alive today, but we will never know. The issue before this Court, however, is not
whether DCFS could have saved R.R. Instead, the question is whether the DCFS
Defendants’ conduct, or lack thereof, amounts to a constitutional violation under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As further explained
below, because R.R.’s abusers are the parties that created the danger in this case
and not the DCFS Defendants, the Court holds that the conduct alleged did not
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Anntionetta Rountree (“Anntionetta”) is R.R.’s biological mother and
Defendant Richard Rountree is R.R.’s biological father. (D. 189 at ECF p. 2). The
two divorced during 2016 and Richard Rountree began living with his girlfriend,
Cynthia Clay, in November of 2016. Id. In late September of that year, Anntionetta
Rountree “was arrested and detained in jail for selling crack cocaine to two
undercover police officers.” Id. Thereafter, police contacted the Department of
Child and Family Services (“DCFS”) for assistance in placing R.R. and her sibling,
C.B., who were at the police station Id. Defendant Ashley Deckert (“Deckert”)
received the call and assigned Defendant Mary Ann Poynter (“Poynter”) as the
“on-call Child Protective Investigator” (“CPI”). Id. “In Illinois, all child welfare
workers”, such as the Defendants in this case, are “required to obtain a Child
Welfare Employment License.” (D. 198 at ECF p. 3). “Each of the named
Defendants at issue” held such a license “during each of their respective
involvement[s] in R.R.’s abuse and neglect investigations.” Id.
As part of her initial investigative response, CPI Poynter reported credible
evidence to indicate “allegations of risk of physical injury and injurious
environment against Anntionetta” and met with Richard Rountree, whose
parental rights were intact, and sent R.R. home with him—an arrangement
Anntionetta also requested.3 Id. at ECF p. 2-3. Richard Rountree was granted
custody by the McLean County Circuit Court on November 21, 2016. Id. at ECF p.
3. Subsequently, CPI Poynter conducted a child protection assessment and
recommended that the allegations be indicated against Anntionetta on November
22, 2016. Id. Defendant Mark Ohrwall reviewed CPI Poynter’s investigation and
agreed with her recommendation. Id.
A
“On July 23, 2017, DCFS received a hotline call from a Bloomington [P]olice
officer, reporting that R.R. advised Anntionetta Rountree that Cynthia Clay and
Richard Rountree hit and whipped R.R.” Id. Defendant Johanna O’Brien took the
call, but did not participate in the investigation relating to R.R. Id. at ECF p. 4. An
investigation was opened, and Defendant Mark Delashmit (“Delashmit”) was

3 “Pursuant to DCFS’s administrative rules, an ‘Indicated report’ means ‘any report of child abuse or neglect
made to the Department for which it is determined, after an investigation, that credible evidence of the
alleged abuse or neglect exists.’” (D. 189 at ECF p. 2-3 n.2).
assigned as the CPI. Id. Plaintiff alleges “Delashmit reviewed a recorded
conversation between Anntionetta Rountree and R.R.” indicating R.R. was being
abused by Cynthia and Richard, including being forced “to stand in the hallway
of the family home holding paint cans above her head for extended periods of time
as punishment.” (D. 192 at ECF p. 7). CPI Delashmit interviewed Richard Rountree
the next day and screened him for substance abuse and domestic violence. (D. 189
at ECF p. 4). He also interviewed R.R.’s babysitter “who said she had never seen
marks or bruises on R.R., that R.R. seemed to do well with her father, and that R.R.
‘lied a lot.’” Id. CPI Delashmit then interviewed Anntionetta who informed him
that Richard Rountree and Cynthia Clay “had been hitting R.R.” Id. He also
“interviewed R.R., who reported that Richard Rountree and Cynthia Clay
‘whooped’ her, causing bruises on her arms and neck” but “CPI Delashmit noted
no bruises or marks on R.R.” Id. Plaintiff disputes the Defendants’ characterization
of Delashmit’s findings; “Delashmit’s investigation was expunged and not
produced in this case”, and, for that reason, it is not possible to say whether he
noted marks. (D. 192 at ECF p. 2-3). Lastly, CPI Delashmit interviewed Cynthia
Clay and Richard Rountree at Richard’s home, and Clay denied hitting R.R.,
stating Richard had disciplined her. (D. 189 at ECF p. 4). CPI Delashmit conferred
with his supervisor, Defendant Ohrwall, who agreed with his recommendation
that the allegations be marked as unfounded; the investigation was closed on July
24, 2017.4 Id. Plaintiff alleges that it was marked as unfounded and that Delashmit
recommended the investigation be closed “despite having contrary information
because he did not believe R.R.’s admission that she was a child abuse victim, and
because R.R.’s mother was motivated to make the complaint because of child

4 “An ‘Unfounded report’ means ‘any report of child abuse or neglect for which it is determined, after an
investigation, that no credible evidence of the alleged abuse or neglect exists.’” (D. 189 at ECF p. 3 n.2).
support payments.” (D. 192 at ECF p. 6). Plaintiff further claims that Delashmit
did so despite knowing that closing the investigation may cause victims to be
“reluctant to come forward in the future” and could “have the effect of
emboldening the abuser such that abuse may continue or worsen.” Id. at ECF p. 6-
7.
B
On April 20, 2018, Anntionetta “called the DCFS hotline to report concerns
of abuse involving R.R.”, and R.R.’s “school principal called the hotline with more
information a few hours later.” (D. 189 at ECF p. 4-5). Defendant Stephanie Moreau
(“Moreau”) “was assigned to investigate, and she traveled to the school to meet
with the principal and the school district’s director of safety and security later that
afternoon.” Id. at ECF p. 5. “R.R.’s principal advised CPI Moreau that R.R. had a
scab over her left eyebrow and that R.R. stated that she fell and hit her head on a
medicine cabinet.” Id. CPI Moreau interviewed R.R. and R.R.’s principal. Id. R.R.
“again reported that she had fallen and hit her head in the bathroom.” Id. “CPI
Moreau also observed that R.R. had a dry skin around her left cheek along her jaw,
a canker sore on her lip, and a chipped tooth; R.R. reported that she had fallen on
her brother’s dresser, and denied that anyone was hitting or hurting her.” Id.
Plaintiff states that CPI Moreau did an “initial supervisory consult” with her
supervisor, Ohrwall, and put together a plan that would require a medical
examination and that “other children in the home . . . be interviewed” because it
was a “paramour household” pursuant to DCFS rules.5 (D. 192 at ECF p. 8).

5 Plaintiff alleges “Moreau’s supervisor, had a responsibility pursuant to DCFS 300.70 to provide guidance
and direction for all investigations of alleged child abuse and neglect by planning, supervising, reviewing,
and coordinating the activities of the Child Protection Specialists under their supervision”; “the
responsibility to ensure all investigations are conducted within the existing framework of statutes and
Moreau did not fill out a paramour assessment form. Id. “Shortly after the initial
interview, CPI Moreau interviewed R.R. again, in person, with Todd Miller, R.R.’s
guardian ad litem” (“GAL”). (D. 189 at ECF p. 5). CPI Moreau also met separately
with GAL Miller to discuss Anntionetta’s contact with R.R. being “limited to
telephone calls on two days per week,” among other things. Id. CPI Moreau
additionally interviewed R.R.’s teacher, “who reported that he had never noticed
any marks on R.R.’s face, that he communicated regularly with Richard Rountree
and Cynthia Clay, and that R.R. seemed to be ‘clumsy.’” Id. “Based on the
information provided by R.R., her principal, and her teacher, CPI Moreau
completed a Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Protocol (“CERAP”),
identifying the ‘safety decision’ as ‘safe’—that is, considering the safety factors,
‘There are no children likely to be in immediate danger of moderate to severe harm
at this time.’” Id. CPI Moreau reviewed her findings with her supervisor,
Defendant Ohrwall, and determined R.R. could return home with Richard and
Clay. Id. at ECF p. 5-6.
On April 23, 2018, CPI Moreau interviewed Richard on the phone and three
days later, on April 26, interviewed Richard and Cynthia in person at their home
and spoke briefly with R.R.; Moreau “observed no other signs of neglect or abuse
in the home.” Id. at ECF p. 6. The parties disagree as to whether those interviews
revealed conflicting timelines as to when R.R.’s tooth was injured. (D. 198 at ECF
p. 8-9). “CPI Moreau completed domestic violence and substance abuse screens of
both Richard Rountree and Cynthia Clay; both were negative.” (D. 189 at ECF p.
6). However, Plaintiff alleges CPI Moreau also conducted a criminal background

policies of the department and that all investigative contacts, activities and documentation are completed
within the allotted time frames” and that he was “to provide Moreau ‘regular and ongoing supervision.’”
(D. 198 at ECF p. 8). However, for reasons discussed further below, it does not change the Court’s analysis.
check and DCFS screening and “knew Cynthia had a prior indicated DCFS finding
in 2012.” (D. 192 at ECF p. 9). Despite this, and Cynthia’s status as a paramour,
Plaintiff alleges CPI Moreau “declined to make weekly visits to R.R.”, that Moreau
and Ohrwall “chose to forgo having R.R. sent to a doctor for examination”, and
“waived the DCFS required contact with R.R.’s treating physician” in violation of
DCFS procedure. Id. at ECF p. 9-10. “CPI Moreau attempted, unsuccessfully, to
interview Anntionetta Rountree during the investigation.” (D. 189 at ECF p. 6).
CPI Moreau also “communicated with R.R.’s doctor’s office, which advised that
R.R.’s doctor had not seen her since 2016 but had noted no previous concerns.” Id.
In response, Plaintiff states the office also informed CPI Moreau that it could not
speak to abuse or neglect because of “the length of time since R.R.’s last visit.” (D.
198 at ECF p. 10). On June 19, 2018, CPI Moreau recommended, and Defendant
Ohrwall agreed, “that the investigation be closed and the allegations unfounded.”
(D. 189 at ECF p. 7). Moreau and Ohrwall determined R.R.’s facial injuries were
minor and attributed them to R.R.’s “clumsiness.” (D. 198 at ECF p. 10). Moreover,
Plaintiff alleges the investigation was closed even though there were inconsistent
timelines regarding R.R.’s tooth injury; that Richard Rountree declined the
completion of a CERAP, and that there “was no final risk assessment of the current
safety threat to R.R” or any interview of non-involved siblings in the home, in
violation of DCFS policies. Id. at ECF p. 11.
C
“On December 10, 2018, a nurse at R.R.’s elementary school called the
hotline, reporting that R.R. had come to school with two black eyes in various
stages of healing.” (D. 189 at ECF p. 7). “DCFS assigned Defendant Patricia
Shannon (“Shannon”) to investigate and Defendant Daniel Norris (“Norris”) as
the DCFS Child Protection Supervisor, to supervise.” Id. “On December 11, 2018,
CPI Shannon contacted the school nurse, who described that R.R. had a healing
left black eye and a black right eye and that R.R. reported she had fallen on her
toys.” Id. “The school nurse noted that R.R. had missed school the previous
Thursday and Friday” and “that she noticed no bruises on R.R. the previous
Wednesday” nor did R.R.’s teacher “notice the black eye after R.R. returned to
school.” Id. “Shortly after speaking with the school nurse by phone, CPI Shannon
went to the school, interviewed R.R.’s principal, and confirmed R.R.’s recent
absences.” Id. CPI Shannon interviewed R.R. with the principal present and R.R.
“reported that she had fallen on her toy box when she tripped over a toy at home,
hitting her face on the left side by her eye.” Id. “According to CPI Shannon, R.R.’s
description of the incident was consistent throughout the interview.” Id. It is
undisputed that R.R. did not offer an explanation for the injury to the right side of
her face. (D. 198 at ECF p. 12). CPI Shannon did not interview R.R.’s teacher or her
sibling, who is another student at the school. (D. 189 at ECF p. 7-8).
CPI Shannon contacted and instructed Richard Rountree and Cynthia Clay
to take R.R. to the doctor the same day and visited their home that evening on
December 11, 2018, but Clay did “not want CPI Shannon to speak with any of the
children in the house.” Id. at ECF p. 8. They did tell CPI Shannon that R.R. suffered
an injury to the left side of her face and then, three days later, woke up with a
bruise to the right side of her face. (D. 198 at ECF p. 13). “During a brief
conversation, 16-year-old C.C., one of R.R.’s siblings, advised CPI Shannon that
R.R. said she had fallen on a toy box, and that Cynthia Clay had given R.R. ice for
her eye.” (D. 189 at ECF p. 8). “CPI Shannon observed the closet being used as a
toy room, noted boxes of toys and a plastic toy bin, and observed there was very
limited space to move around.” Id. “CPI Shannon also interviewed Cynthia Clay
and Richard Rountree, who refused to complete substance abuse or domestic
violence screens and reported being tired of DCFS calls.” Id. After Richard and
Cynthia took R.R. to visit Dr. Moy, CPI Shannon visited the home again and
“Cynthia Clay reported that she had taken R.R. to see a doctor, who reported that
R.R. was fine and the bruising on her face all resulted from the single fall.” Id.
Plaintiff disputes this, alleging that “Cynthia reported that the doctor stated that
the blood stream is being pulled [] across and this is how come you see the bruising
on the other side of the face.” (D. 192 at ECF p. 3). However, “[b]oth Richard
Rountree and Cynthia Clay reported that R.R. was ‘clumsy,’ and that she had
fallen when she tripped over her toys.” (D. 189 at ECF p. 8). “CPI Shannon did not
re-interview R.R., and reported that R.R.’s behavior and interactions with Cynthia
Clay and Richard Rountree appeared ordinary.” Id. Plaintiff states CPI Shannon
was denied access to interview other children in the home by Cynthia and Richard,
including C.B., R.R.’s sibling, roommate, and classmate, in contravention of DCFS
policy. (D. 198 at ECF p. 13-14).
On December 12, 2018, CPI Shannon discussed the investigation with her
supervisor Defendant Norris, who, “after reviewing the family’s prior history and
investigation, approved the CERAP as ‘safe’ and waived weekly visits.” Id. at ECF
p. 9. Plaintiff states Defendant Norris, CPI Shannon’s supervisor, directed her not
to interview C.B., R.R.’s sister, in violation of DCFS policy and that Norris waived
requirements that the 2018 investigation be referred to law enforcement after CPI
Shannon was denied access to other non-involved children in the home. (D. 198 at
ECF p. 14).6 “On December 13, 2018, CPI Shannon contacted R.R.’s physician to
confirm that she had been seen on December 11, 2018.”7 (D. 189 at ECF p. 9). “The
physician’s office confirmed the visit and, at CPI Shannon’s request, completed a

6 Plaintiff alleges Norris failed to supervise CPI Shannon in a number of ways, but for reasons discussed
below, those allegations are not determinative of the outcome in this case. (D. 198 at ECF p. 17).
7 Plaintiff contends that “any contact” was “with a nurse by phone” or fax, and that Dr. Moy never had
“any contact with anyone at DCFS regarding his December 11, 2018 evaluation of R.R.” (D. 192 at ECF p.
3).
DCFS form that lacked information about prior incidents or injuries, but noted no
additional risk factors or concerns.” Id. However, Plaintiff disputes that fact; “Dr.
Moy could not address whether any risk factors were present” because the
December 11, 2018 evaluation was “his first time meeting the patient and that he
did not have a past history.” (D. 192 at ECF p. 3). Subsequently, on December 18,
2018, Defendant Norris reviewed CPI Shannon’s investigation and “agreed with
her recommendation to unfound the investigation”, which was closed the next
day, and alleges that Norris falsely stated “everyone has been seen” despite
knowing various individuals had not been interviewed. (D. 198 at ECF p. 18).
Plaintiff alleges CPI Shannon did not do the paramour assessment and falsely
marked R.R. as safe in the CERAP. Id. at ECF p. 15. Defendant Norris also made a
safe determination and Plaintiff alleges he falsely stated R.R.’s doctor attributed
the injury to the right eye as “plausibly caused by blood traveling from one side
to the other” and stated CPI Shannon had received discharge records from Richard
and Cynthia regarding R.R.’s visit to Dr. Moy’s office when they had not, and even
though he allegedly knew DCFS had not independently verified Cynthia’s account
of the visit with Dr. Moy. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges CPI Shannon discussed
R.R.’s assessment with Dr. Moy, but Dr. Moy testified that he never spoke with
Shannon or anyone from DCFS regarding R.R. and that he did not and would not
advance a “blood pooling” theory as the cause of the injury to R.R.’s right eye. (D.
198 at ECF p. 16-17). Richard Rountree “does not know what the outcome of the
December 2018” investigation was (D. 189 at ECF p. 9),8 but testified that DCFS’s
involvement frustrated and angered Cynthia including texting him when she

8 “DCFS sent letters to Richard Rountree and Cynthia Clay on January 21, 2019, which explained that the
investigation was unfounded – but those letters were sent to a home in Bloomington in which they no
longer lived.” (D. 189 at ECF p. 9).
“would whoop R.R.”9 (D. 198 at ECF p. 20). He also testified he was aware she
would spank R.R. with a belt and witnessed her knee R.R., which was also
recorded on videos, along with other beatings. Id.
D
“On January 25, 2019, the DCFS hotline received a call from a doctor at
Children’s Hospital of Illinois in Peoria after R.R. was transported to the hospital
with life-threatening injuries.” (D. 189 at ECF p. 9). The day after, R.R. died; “the
cause of death was determined to be a peritonitis due to a perforated ileum, caused
by blunt force injury of the abdomen.” Id. at ECF p. 10. “An autopsy showed that
R.R. had scars and abrasions on her body indicative of abuse.” Id. Cynthia Clay
was convicted of first-degree murder and Richard Rountree pleaded guilty to
endangering the life of R.R. Id. Following her death, a DCFS investigation was
opened and R.R.’s family and friends were interviewed and which further
revealed and corroborated details regarding the abuse R.R. suffered. (D. 198 at
ECF p. 23-24). Plaintiff’s psychologist testified that “DCFS continued involvement
in the home escalated Cynthia and Richard’s abuse” because “each time DCFS
involvement in the home ended without consequences” she felt “exonerated and
entitled which increased R.R.’s risk of worsening abuse without protection”. Id.
Plaintiff’s “board-certified child abuse pediatrician” testified that “the failures of
the individual DCFS defendants led to escalating child abuse which ultimately
caused R.R.’s death.” Id. The Defendants dispute the testimony from the Plaintiff’s
psychologist and the pediatrician. Id.

9 Because it does not change the analysis in this case, the Court declines to recount the specifics identified
in text exchanges between Cynthia and Richard that detail the awful abuse R.R. suffered at their hands. (D.
198 at ECF p. 20-21).
III
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23 (1986). The moving party has the burden of providing proper documentary
evidence to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477
U.S. at 323-24. Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party must
come forward with specific evidence, not mere allegations or denials of the
pleadings, which demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial. Gracia v. Volvo
Europa Truck, N.V., 112 F.3d 291, 294 (7th Cir. 1997). “[A] party moving for
summary judgment can prevail just by showing that the other party has no
evidence on an issue on which that party has the burden of proof.” Brazinski v.
Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1183 (7th Cir. 1993). “The parties must
support their assertions that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed by citing to
‘particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers, or other materials . . ..’” Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir.
2018). However, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes over facts
that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment . . . [I]t is the substantive law’s
identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that
governs.” Id. at 248. “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the non-movant’s] favor.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 255 (1986). Finally, a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant’s
position is not sufficient to successfully oppose a summary judgment motion;
“there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-
movant].” Id. at 250.
A
Count One of the Complaint alleges that the “Defendants Poynter, O’Brien,
Moreau, and Shannon, while acting as DCFS Child Protection Specialists and
under the color or law, and Defendants Deckert, Delashmit, Ohrwall, and Norris,
while acting as DCFS Child Protection Supervisors and/or Public Service
Administrators, and under the color of law, individually, jointly, and in conspiracy
with each other, emboldened and encouraged R.R.’s abusers to punish, torture,
and abuse her to the point of death, and ultimately deprived R.R. of her
constitutional right to life, liberty, property, and equal protection under the law”10
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D. 75 at ECF
p. 14-15). The Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s “section 1983 due process claim
against the DCFS Defendants fails as a matter of law” because “a State’s failure to
protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a
violation of the Due Process Clause.” (D. 189 at ECF p. 13) (citing DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989)).11
“To prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove that ‘(1) [she] was
deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and

10 “Plaintiff does not respond to the DCFS Defendants’ argument regarding any equal protection claim.”
(D. 198 at ECF p. 38). That claim is forfeited. See Betco Corp., Ltd. V. Peacock, 876 F.3d 306, 309 (7th Cir. 2017).
Moreover, “disparate impact does not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and
cannot be redressed by suits under § 1983.” Bond v. Atkinson, 728 F.3d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal
citations omitted).
11 “The claim is one invoking the substantive rather than the procedural component of the Due Process
Clause; [plaintiff does] not claim that the State denied [R.R.] protection without according [her] appropriate
procedural safeguards.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
(2) the deprivation was visited upon [her] by a person or persons acting under
color of state law.’” First Midwest Bank v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir.
2021) (quoting Buchanan-Moore v. Cnty. Of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 826, 831 (7th Cir.
2009)). In this case, the parties do not dispute whether the Defendants acted under
color of state law; rather, the Defendants claim their actions did not violate any
constitutionally protected right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. (D. 189 at ECF p. 13). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants
the DCFS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count One.12
The Defendants principally rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in
DeShaney to support their contention that the acts alleged against them did not
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (D. 189 at ECF p. 1).
In DeShaney, the petitioner was a boy that “was beaten and permanently injured
by his father, with whom he lived” and then sued “social workers and other local
officials who received complaints that petitioner was being abused by his father
and had reason to believe that this was the case,” but “did not act to remove [the
boy] from his father’s custody.” 489 U.S. at 191. The issue first surfaced when the
second wife of the boy’s father complained to the police that the boy was being
abused, leaving marks, and stated that he was a “prime case for child abuse.” Id.
at 192. Social services interviewed the father who denied the accusations but did
not pursue them further. Id. A year later, the boy was admitted to the hospital; the
examining physician suspected child abuse and notified social services. Id. Social
services immediately obtained an order from a juvenile court placing the boy in

12 “The Plaintiff withdraws allegations of constitutional violations arising out of the 2016 investigation and
placement of R.R. with her father, Richard Rountree, as set forth in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint,
and Plaintiff agrees to dismiss Defendants, Mary Ann Poynter, Ashley Deckert, and Johanna O’Brien.” (D.
192 at ECF p. 4). However, because the Court ultimately grants the Motion for Summary Judgment as to
all the remaining DCFS Defendants, the Plaintiff’s withdrawal does not affect the Court’s analysis.
the temporary custody of the hospital. Id. Three days later, a “Child Protection
Team” was assembled to investigate the situation and they concluded “there was
insufficient evidence of child abuse to retain” the boy “in the custody of the court.”
Id. “Based on the recommendation of the Child Protection Team, the juvenile court
dismissed the child protection case” and the boy was returned to his father’s
custody. Id. A month later, the boy returned to the emergency room for treatment
of suspicious injuries and emergency personnel called social services, but the
caseworker handling the case concluded there was no basis for further action. Id.
For the next six months, the caseworker continued monthly visits and observed a
number of suspicious injuries that she noted in her files, along with her suspicions
that someone in the home was abusing the boy but did nothing more. Id. In
November 1983, the boy was treated again for injuries in the emergency room that
were believed to be caused by child abuse; social services was alerted, but when
the caseworker visited the DeShaney home on two separate occasions following
the incident, “she was told that [he] was too ill to see her.” Id. at 193. Social services
took no further action. Id. “In March 1984, Randy DeShaney beat [the] 4-year-old”
boy “so severely that he fell into a life-threatening coma.” Id. The boy and his
mother brought an action against various government officials, including social
services, alleging he was deprived of “his liberty without due process of law, in
violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, by failing to intervene to
protect him against a risk of violence at his father’s hands of which they knew or
should have known.” Id.
The Supreme Court concluded that the local officials had not “deprived him
of his liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.” Id. at 191. “The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that ‘[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Id. at 194. However,
“nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to
protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private
actors.” Id. at 195. “The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to
act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.” Id. “It
forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without
‘due process of law,’ but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an
affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to
harm through other means.” Id. In other words, the Due Process Clause is meant
to “protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them
from each other.” Id. at 196.
The Defendants argue that DeShaney forecloses the Plaintiff’s claims. (D. 189
at ECF p. 13-15). Indeed, the former judge presiding over this case noted that the
facts of this case are “remarkably—and regrettably—similar to the factual
background in DeShaney.” (D. 30 at ECF p. 11). This Court concurs. In DeShaney,
the authorities were alerted to suspicious injuries involving the victim on multiple
occasions, and the juvenile court even placed the victim in the temporary custody
of the hospital, but social services did not remove him from his father’s custody.
See 489 U.S. at 191-94. That was so even though an examining physician notified
social services of suspected child abuse; emergency room personnel reported the
victim’s treatment for suspicious injuries on two separate occasions; the
caseworker had observed and recorded a number of suspicious injuries on the
victim’s head during home visits; and, on two home visits, the caseworker was
told the victim was too ill to see her. Id. at 192-03. Despite the warning signs, social
services did nothing. Id. Here, similarly, DCFS personnel received a hotline call
from a Bloomington Police officer, R.R.’s mother, and R.R.’s school nurse, among
others, all reporting various suspicious injuries and concerns of abuse. (D. 189 at
ECF p. 3-9). Still, DCFS did not remove R.R. from the home of Richard and
Cynthia. Id. Nonetheless, as the Court in DeShaney concluded “the State had no
constitutional duty to protect [the boy] against his father’s violence, its failure to
do so—though calamitous in hindsight—simply does not constitute a violation of
the Due Process Clause.” 489 U.S. at 202. The same conclusion applies here: DCFS
Defendants had no constitutional duty to protect R.R. even though their actions—
or lack thereof—may be egregious and reprehensible in retrospect. See id. Despite
the factual similarities and the Supreme Court’s holding in DeShaney, the Plaintiff
argues that the state-created danger exception applies to the facts of this case and
that the facts here are “markedly different” because “the evidence here [is] that
Defendants took affirmative actions that increased the risk of danger to R.R.” (D.
192 at ECF p. 20) (emphasis in original).
B
In DeShaney, the “[Supreme] Court recognized two limited exceptions to
th[e] general rule” that the state owes no constitutional duty to protect against acts
of private violence.13 First Midwest Bank Guardian of Est. of LaPorta v. City of Chicago,
988 F.3d 978, 988 (7th Cir. 2021). Most relevant to the facts and arguments of this
case is DeShaney’s second exception, which “arises only by implication from a brief
observation in the Court’s opinion” insofar as the Court explained that “although
the county and its social workers ‘may have been aware’ of the dangers the child
faced in his father’s home, they ‘played no part in the[] creation of those dangers.’”
Id. (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200). That exception, referred to as “state-
created dangers”, is narrow; it applies “when the state ‘affirmatively places a
particular individual in a position of danger the individual would not otherwise

13 The other exception applies when the state has “an affirmative duty to provide for the safety of a person
it has taken into its custody involuntarily.” Id. Because R.R. was never in custody, that exception is not
relevant here.
have faced.’” Id. (quoting Doe v. Vill. of Arl. Heights, 782 F.3d 911, 916 (7th Cir.
2015)). First, “plaintiff must show that the state affirmatively placed him in a
position of danger” and, second, “that the state’s failure to protect him from that
danger was the proximate cause of his injury.” Id. “To satisfy the proximate-cause
requirement, the state-created danger must entail a foreseeable type of risk to a
foreseeable class of persons.” Id. “A generalized risk of indefinite duration and
degree is insufficient” to establish proximate cause. And, thirdly, “because the
right to protection against a state-created danger arises from the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause, the state’s failure to protect the plaintiff
must shock the conscience.” Id. “Only the most egregious official conduct will
satisfy this stringent inquiry.” Id.
The Defendant’s argue that the state-created danger exception does not
apply because “R.R. faced danger from the abuse her stepmother and her father
inflicted upon her, but—as in DeShaney—she faced that danger both before DCFS’s
involvement and afterwards.” (D. 189 at ECF p. 16). In response, the Plaintiff
argues that the Defendant’s acted affirmatively through “deliberate, affirmative
acts that increased the child’s exposure to a specific, known danger.” (D. 192 at
ECF p. 21). Those acts are as follows.
As to the July 2017 investigation, Plaintiff points to the fact that Defendant
Delashmit “recommended closing the July 2017 investigation despite having
contrary knowledge of a disclosure of abuse by R.R., and an audio recording
describing the same disclosure of abuse.” Id. (emphasis in original). But that line
of argument was also considered and rejected by the Supreme Court in DeShaney,
“While the State may have been aware of the dangers . . . it played no part in their
creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them.” 489
U.S. at 198-201. The Supreme Court reached that conclusion even though the state
“took temporary custody of Joshua” and later “returned him to his father’s
custody,” it reasoned the state “placed him in no worse position than that in which
he would have been had it not acted at all”. Id. at 201. In this case, the state never
took custody of R.R. and Delashmit’s recommendation placed R.R. in no worse
position than if Delashmit had done nothing at all. And, although Delashmit’s
conduct may be perturbing, the Court cannot contravene binding Supreme Court
precedent that forbids transforming a state’s failure to act into a constitutional
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even though it
may have had knowledge or suspicions of abuse. See id.
As to the April 2018 investigation, Plaintiff states “Defendant Moreau made
the determination that R.R. was ‘safe’ under the CERAP despite not taking critical
and mandatory steps to explore the ‘indicated’ background of [Cynthia] Clay,
whose status as a paramour combined with her history of child abuse, put R.R. at
greater risk for abuse.” (D. 192 at ECF p. 24) (emphasis in original). Similarly,
Plaintiff states “Defendant Moreau recommended and Ohrwall determined to
close the investigation despite having knowledge that critical information was
missing due to affirmative waivers, had contrary knowledge that there were
inconsistent timelines and details to the descriptions of the injury, parents were
refusing access to the child and a closing assessment, and other children in the
home were not interviewed as required.” Id. (emphasis in original). However,
those mistaken determinations and failures to act—despite conspicuous reasons
to do so—again advance an argument that hinges on a theory of liability that
breaks with the Supreme Court’s precedent under DeShaney and its progeny in the
Seventh Circuit. “When courts speak of the state’s ‘increasing’ the danger of
private violence, they mean the state did something that turned a potential danger
into an actual one, rather than that it just stood by and did nothing to prevent
private violence.” Doe v. Vill. of Arl. Heights, 782 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2015).
Defendant Moreau’s erroneous determination that R.R. was safe, and his
concomitant failure to take the appropriate steps to confirm her safety, effectively
amount to “standing by” and doing “nothing” to protect R.R. from her abusers—
arguments the Seventh Circuit squarely rejected in Doe, 782 F.3d at 917. Next,
Plaintiff argues that “Defendant Ohrwall waived DCFS required medical
examination, which would have afforded the opportunity for a medical physician
to look at the chipped tooth and whether the conflicting stories were plausible.”
Id. (emphasis in original). Again, while alarming, Defendant Ohrwall’s waiver of
the examination falls short of the kinds of acts that constitute a state-created
danger to R.R.; there is no allegation that the chipped tooth was the result of any
state action. “It is well to remember once again that the harm was inflicted not by
the State of [Illinois], but by [R.R.’s] father” and his live-in girlfriend. DeShaney,
489 U.S. at 203.
As to the December 2018 investigation, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant
Norris directed Defendant Shannon to not interview other children in the home,
in violation of DCFS policies”; “waived requirements to enlist law enforcement
when parents deny access to children, the very children who had witnessed
ongoing abuse to R.R” and “improperly supervised Shannon by failing to discuss
details of the physician’s involvement, where he could have learned that the blood
pooling theory had not been provided by an actual medical professional.” (D. 192
at ECF p. 24). For the reasons previously discussed, however, Plaintiff’s allegations
regarding Norris’s directive that Defendant Shannon not interview other children
in the home and his waiver of other requirements does not amount to a violation
of the Due Process Clause. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196. In general, the Due Process
Clause confers “no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid
may be necessary to secure life [or] liberty”. Id. That is also true with respect to
Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Shannon “determined that R.R. was ‘safe’
under the Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Protocol, despite having
knowledge that [Cynthia] had prior indicated history with DCFS and DCFS rules
require the child be then marked ‘unsafe’”; “falsely documented that Dr. Moy
opined that the reason R.R. had two black eyes . . . was because blood travelled
from one injured eye up across the bridge of the nose and pooled under the other
eye” and “misled her supervisor by falsely stating or not correcting the record that
this blood pooling theory came from the physician directly, instead of being
recounted by the alleged abuser.”14 Id. (emphasis in original). Though Plaintiff
“characterizes [DCFS’s] ineffectual response as affirmatively increasing the
danger to [R.R.]”, the Seventh Circuit has held similar attempts cannot “skirt
precedent.” Wilson-Trattner v. Campbell, 863 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 2017); see Doe,
782 F.3d at 918 (“Not even the allegations that Del Boccio called off Officer Spoerry
(or falsely reported to dispatch that the subjects were gone) created or increased
the danger to Doe.”). The Court is mindful of the fact that “[t]o ‘create or increase’
[danger] must not be interpreted so broadly as to erase the essential distinction
between endangering and failing to protect and thus circumvent DeShaney’s
general rule.” Doe, 782 F.3d at 916 (citations omitted). Even if the Court were to
assume, as the Plaintiff portends (D. 192 at EF p. 29), that DCFS’s “failure to
intervene ultimately increased the danger to [Plaintiff] by indirectly emboldening
[the abuser] to continue to mistreat her, that would not distinguish her case from
DeShaney” under Seventh Circuit precedent. Wilson-Trattner, 863 F.3d at 594. That
is because if the state-created danger exception functioned as a “constitutional rule
prohibiting any act, by any public official, that increases private danger”, then

14 For the same reasons, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Shannon recommended and that Defendant
Norris determined to close the case in reliance on information that was either withheld or false does not
change the analysis. (D. 192 at ECF p. 24-25).
“DeShaney itself is wrongly decided.” Weiland v. Loomis, 938 F.3d 917, 919 (7th Cir.
2019).
The Plaintiff argues that Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 1998),
“demonstrates similar liability under Section 1983.” (D. 192 at ECF p. 24).15 In
Monfils, the Plaintiff called the police department with an anonymous tip alleging
another worker, Kutska, was going to steal an electrical cord from the plant.
Monfils, 165 F.3d at 513. Kutska then went about trying to discover who the
informant was from the police department, while the Plaintiff made several calls
to the police department pleading with its officers not to release the tape to Kutska
because he was “known to be violent.” Id. at 513-14. There, the Court found
Deputy Chief of Detectives Taylor (“Taylor”) created a danger that Plaintiff would
not have otherwise faced. Id. In so concluding, the Court reasoned that “liability
exists when the state ‘affirmatively places a particular individual in a position of
danger the individual would not otherwise have faced.’” Id. (quoting Reed v.
Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993)). As to Taylor specifically, Plaintiff
relayed his concerns directly to Taylor who assured him the tape would not be
released. Id. at 514. “Despite Taylor’s assurance that the tape would not be
released,” Plaintiff also called the Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) who
assured Plaintiff that he would also call Taylor and instruct him not to release it.
Id. at 515. The ADA did, and Taylor told the ADA he was familiar with the case.
Id. The ADA also offered to call Lampkin, who worked in the communication
section of the police department and to whom a “request for a copy of the tape
would normally be directed,” but Taylor assured the ADA “he would take care of

15 Plaintiff cites to a number of other cases outside of the Seventh Circuit that are not binding on this Court.
See, e.g., (D. 192 at ECF p. 21-23) (discussing Tenth and Sixth Circuit cases). Therefore, the Court declines
to engage with those Courts’ analysis because this Court is obliged to follow Seventh Circuit and Supreme
Court precedent.
it” and “assured [the ADA] that the tape would not be released.” Id. Taylor did
neither. Id. The next day, Kutska obtained a copy of the tape and Plaintiff “was
dead by 7:30 a.m.” Id.
Admittedly, on first impression, Monfils could be read to intimate that the
state-created danger exception might apply to the facts of this case because there,
like here, the officer did not take “standard steps to prevent the tape’s release
despite knowing that the release would place the informant in heightened danger,
and the informant was killed.” Doe, 782 F.3d at 917. Similarly, here, the DCFS
Defendants failed to act. However, the Seventh Circuit has characterized Monfils
as a case in which “the police encountered a potential danger and turned it into an
actual one” and that “the plaintiff was safe, or at least considerably safer, before
the police acted than he or she was thereafter.”16 Doe, 782 F.3d at 917. In other
words, but for the state’s release of the tape, Plaintiff in that case would have been
considerably safer. Id. Importantly, and distinguishably from the instant case, the
DCFS Defendants did not affirmatively release any information to R.R.’s abusers
that put her at a heightened risk or affirmatively provide assurances regarding her
safety. Put differently, R.R. was not considerably safer before DCFS entered the
picture, and that is unlike the Plaintiff in Monfils who was considerably safer
before the state released the tape. In this case, DCFS did not “encounter[] a
potential danger and turn[] it into an actual one.” Doe, 782 F.3d at 917. It is clear
that R.R. was already in danger. Other cases in which the state-created danger has
applied confirm that principle more clearly.
In one case, “[f]or example, the police arrested a driver for drag racing and
left the children passengers stranded alone in the car on a busy highway on a cold

16 Proximate cause issue
night.” Id. (internal citations omitted). In another, the police “arrested a sober
driver and left behind an obviously drunk passenger with the keys to the vehicle
who later caused a collision.” Id. (internal citations omitted). In these cases, “the
police encountered a potential danger and turned it into an actual one.” Id. By
contrast, the court has held that a “police officer’s failure to intervene to protect a
student despite knowledge that she was being sexually molested by a middle
school teacher did not increase the danger.” Id. (internal citations omitted). That is
because, in order to succeed under the narrow state-created danger exception, a
“plaintiff must show that the state affirmatively placed him in a position of danger
the individual would not otherwise have faced.” Id. (citations omitted). In this
case, the DCFS Defendants’ acts—while harrowing—did not place R.R. in or create
the danger she faced, her abusers did. The Plaintiff contends that they did increase
the danger because “testimony from R.R.’s father [revealed] that Cynthia Clay—
the abuser—was growing more frustrated and angrier due to DCFS Involvement”
and that there are text messages showing “an increasingly angry Cynthia.” (D. 192
at ECF p. 26). Indeed, Plaintiff’s “psychologist opined that the DCFS Defendants’
continued involvement and failed investigations escalated the abuse to R.R.
because each time DCFS Defendants’ involvement in the home ended without
consequences, Cynthia felt exonerated and entitled”. Id. at ECF p. 28. In essence,
the “DCFS Defendants continued, failed investigations emboldened the abuser
and caused her to increase the abuse.” Id. at ECF p. 28. But a nearly identical
argument fell short in Wilson-Trattner, 863 F.3d at 594. There, in a case of
progressive abuse, the Seventh Circuit observed, “Wilson-Trattner also makes a
more general argument that the appellees’ dismissive and indifferent attitudes to
each of the incidents above endangered her by progressively emboldening [the
abuser].” Id. “That contention is, however, squarely foreclosed by DeShaney.” Id.
The Court is naturally sympathetic to the Plaintiff’s attempts to characterize
the DCFS Defendants’ conduct as affirmative acts, including the closure of cases
prematurely despite having contrary knowledge of abuse disclosures, DCFS
personnel “affirmatively” seeking and giving “waivers of mandatory
procedures”, and their alleged withholding or placing of false information in
reports. See (D. 192 at ECF p. 29). Unfortunately, such characterizations do not
change the fact that they culminate in the state’s failure to act on R.R.’s behalf;
under the Fourteenth Amendment, “a State’s failure to protect an individual
against private violence” does not “constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff, and in faithfully applying the Supreme Court’s precedent in
DeShaney, the Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to have the case closed properly, mandatory
state procedures applied, nor a right to have information—whether true or false—
correctly included in DCFS files, or shared with physicians, supervisors, law
enforcement, or otherwise. See id. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment
as to Count One with prejudice and because the Court concludes the state-created
danger exception does not apply, the Court need not decide the proximate cause
question or whether the Defendants’ conduct shocks the conscience.17
IV
To comport with the Supreme Court’s directive that immunity questions be
resolved “at the earliest possible stage in litigation,” the Court also addresses the

17 Plaintiff also asserts a failure to train theory of § 1983 liability insofar as “Defendants Norris and Ohrwall
improperly supervised their subordinates, causing constitutional violations.” (D. 192 at ECF p. 26).
However, as the Defendants correctly note, that theory “cannot proceed without evidence of an underlying
constitutional violation, which, for reasons set forth above,” the Court finds do not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wilson-Trattner, 863 F.3d at 596.
Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity. Sabo v. Erickson, 128 F.4th 836, 842-43
(7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). “The doctrine
of qualified immunity ‘protects government officials from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson,
555 U.S. at 231 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Determining
whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity involves a two-step inquiry,
“(1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, make out
a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional right was
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Williams v. City of Chicago,
733 F.3d 749, 758 (7th Cir. 2013).18 “If either inquiry is answered in the negative, the
defendant official is protected by qualified immunity.” Koh v. Ustich, 933 F.3d 836,
844 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2018)). “To
be ‘clearly established,’ a constitutional right ‘must have a sufficiently clear
foundation in then-existing precedent.’” Campbell v Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 545 (7th
Cir. 2019) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 534 U.S. 48, 63 (2018)). “The
principle of fair notice pervades the doctrine.” Id. “Qualified immunity applies
unless the specific contours of the right ‘were sufficiently definite that any
reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was
violating it.’” Id. (citations omitted). “Clearly established law cannot be framed at
a ‘high level of generality.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742
(2011)). And while a “’case directly on point’ isn’t required, ‘precedent must have
placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate’”. Id. (internal citations

18 The Court has previously found that Count One as alleged does not constitute a constitutional violation
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court nonetheless addresses the
second prong of the qualified immunity analysis pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directive.
omitted). To answer whether the question is “beyond debate,” the “Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized that the clearly established law must share
specific details with the facts of the case at hand.” Doxtator v. O’Brien, 39 F.4th 852,
863 (7th Cir. 2022).
The Defendants argue that “[e]xisting precedent has placed the
constitutional question beyond debate—but in Defendants’ favor.” (D. 189 at ECF
p. 27) (emphasis in original). In response, the Plaintiff claims that “the Seventh
Circuit has found that ‘[i]t is clearly established that state actors who, without
justification, increase a person’s risk of harm violate the Constitution.’” (D. 192 at
ECF p. 32) (quoting Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2012)).19 In Paine, the
plaintiff was a mentally-ill woman who was arrested and later transported to
another police station miles away and subsequently released in a high-crime area,
without her phone, despite displaying clear mental health issues and was later
raped at knifepoint, which led to her jumping from a window seven stories above
ground in order to escape. Id. at 503-06. The Seventh Circuit limited the principle
Plaintiff relies on from Paine to the facts of that case: “it is clearly established that
the police may not create a danger, without justification, by arresting someone in
a safe place and releasing her in a hazardous one while unable to protect herself,
and it is also clearly established that police must arrange for medical treatment of
serious conditions while custody continues.” 678 F.3d at 511. In a subsequent case,
the Seventh Circuit also plainly rejected arguments like Plaintiff’s that characterize
“DeShaney as equivalent to a constitutional rule prohibiting any act, by any public

19 The other cases Plaintiff relies on as to this issue are from the Tenth and Sixth Circuit. (D. 192 at ECF p.
33). This Court is bound to follow precedent from the Seventh Court and the Supreme Court and the
Plaintiff has not cited a case within either the Seventh Circuit or the Supreme Court that places the
constitutional question according to “then-existing precedent” “beyond debate.” Campbell v Kallas, 936 F.3d
536, 545 (7th Cir. 2019).
official, that increases private danger”; the Court observed, “if that were so . . .
then DeShaney itself is wrongly decided.” Weiland, 938 F.3d at 919. Furthermore,
as the facts of Paine make clear, this case does not share similar allegations of
wrongdoing against the police, nor was Plaintiff ever taken into custody. Paine,
therefore, does not help the Plaintiff because it does not “share specific details with
the facts of the case at hand.” Doxtator, 39 F.4th at 863. Consequently, Paine does
not amount to applicable, clearly established law. See id. To the contrary, the most
analogous case to the instant one is DeShaney, which would suggest the opposite
conclusion: that the Defendants were not violating a clearly established
constitutional right. There, the underlying facts in DeShaney were summarized
aptly by the Chief Justice:
Petitioner is a boy who was beaten and permanently
injured by his father, with whom he lived. Respondents
are social workers and other local officials who received
complaints that petitioner was being abused by his father
and had reason to believe that this was the case, but
nonetheless did not act to remove petitioner from his
father’s custody. Petitioner sued respondents claiming
that their failure to act deprived him of his liberty in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. We hold
that it did not.

489 U.S. at 191. Like here, the facts of that case were “undeniably tragic.” Id. But,
they also bear an undeniable similarity to the fact pattern here. As to the issue of
qualified immunity, DeShaney and its progeny place the constitutional question as
to the clearly established law “beyond debate”, but in the Defendants’ favor.
Doxtator, 39 F.4th at 863. Accordingly, even if Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim was not
already subject to dismissal under DeShaney, it would also be barred by the
doctrine of qualified immunity because the constitutional right was not clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation. Because of that, the Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment as to Count One and it is dismissed with prejudice.
See Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529, 637 (7th Cir. 2014).
V
In this case, the Court is dismissing the sole federal cause of action—
Count One—with prejudice. As a result, no claim over which the Court has
original jurisdiction remains. And, as a “general rule, when the federal claims fall
out before trial,” the district court “should relinquish jurisdiction over any
supplemental . . . state law claims in order to minimize federal intrusion into
matters of purely state law.” Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 252 (7th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Carr v. Cigna Secs., Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 1996)). Therefore, the
Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state
law claims and the remaining Counts are dismissed without prejudice. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
VI
For the reasons set forth supra, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (D. 189) is granted as to Count One and it is dismissed with prejudice;
the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state law claims which are dismissed without prejudice. Therefore, the Clerk is
directed to enter judgment in favor of the DCFS Defendants and close the case.

It is so ordered.
Entered on November 13, 2025
s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11203553. Public record. Not legal advice.