# Opinion

> District Court, M.D. Florida · November 13, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11202921

## Case

- **Full name:** Jesse Lee v. City of Gulfport and James O’Reilly
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** November 13, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11202921

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “[o]nly the most egregious conduct meets this standard” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiffs as (1) the officers were told by a sergeant that plaintiffs were on the west side of the fence on private property and (2
- affirming grant of summary judgment for the defendant city on equal protection claim where there was no evidence of discriminatory intent

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

JESSE LEE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:23-cv-2996-VMC-AEP

CITY OF GULFPORT and
JAMES O’REILLY,

Defendants.
/

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on consideration of
Plaintiff Jesse Lee’s Amended/Corrected Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Doc. # 108), Defendant James O’Reilly’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 88), and Defendant City
of Gulfport’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 89) and
Motion to Strike Exhibits to, and New Arguments in,
Plaintiff’s Reply to City’s Response to His Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Doc. # 109). For the reasons that follow,
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment are granted, and Mr.
Lee’s Motion is denied. Gulfport’s Motion to Strike is granted
to the extent the Court strikes Mr. Lee’s new argument
regarding the substantive due process challenge to Gulfport’s
trespass policy. Counts II, IX, and XII are dismissed for
lack of standing. Summary judgment is granted in favor of
Defendants on Counts I, III, IV, V, VI, and VII. The only
remaining counts are Counts X and XI, which seek declaratory
and injunctive relief.
I. Background:

A. The Parties
Mr. Lee moved to Gulfport in October 2018. (Doc. # 89 at
2 ¶ 2). Shortly thereafter, he decided he wanted to operate
an ice cream cart. (Doc. # 89-2 at 26:5-20). Accordingly, Mr.
Lee purchased “a cooler that attaches to a two-wheeled stand,
as well as an umbrella, for his ice-cream business.” (Doc. #
89 at 2 ¶ 4; Doc. # 89-2 at 32:11-33:16, 198-99). Mr. Lee
intended to sell pre-packaged ice cream from his cart. (Doc.
# 89-2 at 189:12-15).
In early 2019, Mr. Lee had two meetings with Mr.

O’Reilly, the City Manager of Gulfport, regarding Gulfport’s
mobile vending laws and was told of Gulfport’s then-policy
prohibiting mobile vending. (Doc. # 88-6 at 1 ¶ 2; Doc. # 89-
2 at 49:4-51:24; Doc. # 89-6). Although Mr. Lee did not obtain
a permit from the Gulfport Merchants Association to sell ice
cream in Gulfport, he nevertheless operated his cart
throughout 2020 based upon his belief that regulation of the
cart was preempted by state law. (Doc. # 89-2 at 72:21-73:14;
Doc. # 89-8 at 6 ¶ 16). Ultimately, Code Enforcement gave Mr.
Lee two tickets for selling products in the Waterfront
Redevelopment District without a permit in violation of
Gulfport Code § 22-6.12(b). (Doc. # 89-8 at 6 ¶ 16; Doc. #
66-1 at 9:19-10:2, 16:19-17:4). After a bench trial in the
County Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, the court

rejected Mr. Lee’s assertion that Gulfport’s regulation of
his ice cream cart was preempted by state law as the cart was
not a “mobile food dispensing vehicle” within the meaning of
Florida Statute § 509.102. (Doc. # 66-1 at 99:10-21, 103:5-
13). Accordingly, the court found Mr. Lee guilty of the
charges. (Id. at 103:5-6).
B. The Trespass Warnings
On September 4, 2020, Mr. Lee went to the Building
Department,1 which is part of the Gulfport City Hall “campus,”
to request a permit for a yard sale. (Doc. # 89-2 at 91:23-
92:10; Doc. # 89-16 at 18:25-19:5). Although there was a sign
on the door stating that the building was closed due to COVID-

19 precautions, Mr. Lee knocked on the door to try to speak
with someone about the permit. (Doc. # 89-2 at 91:23-93:16).
An employee opened the door to speak with Mr. Lee, who became
upset when the employee refused to accept his paperwork
immediately. (Doc. # 89-2 at 94:1-95:15; Doc. # 92-2 at 5-
6). As the employee attempted to shut the door, Mr. Lee

1 The Building Department is also known as the Community
Development Building. (Doc. # 88-6 at 1-2 ¶ 3; Doc. # 89-16
at 16:6-21).
repeatedly pressed “the handicap button on the outside of the
door so that the door couldn’t be shut or be locked.” (Doc.
# 92-2 at 5-6; Doc. # 89-2 at 147:11-148:6). Another employee

then called the police, who arrived at the scene to find Mr.
Lee causing a disturbance and refusing to leave the premises.
(Doc. # 92-2 at 3, 5-6). At the direction of Mr. O’Reilly,
the police gave Mr. Lee a written trespass warning and
informed him that if he returned to City Hall, other than to
attend City Council meetings, he would be placed under arrest.
(Doc. 87-1 at 3; Doc. # 88-6 at 5 ¶ 11; Doc. # 92-2 at 3).
Mr. Lee was still allowed to conduct business in-person at
City Hall if he was accompanied by a police escort. (Doc. #
88-6 at 4-5 ¶ 14).
On July 22, 2021, Mr. Lee was arrested for battery on a
law enforcement officer after he threw a CD that hit Gulfport

Police Commander Stone in the back of his leg in the City
Hall lobby. (Doc. # 89-2 at 131:2-20, 135:6-15; Doc. # 89-16
at 71:3-7). Mr. Lee claims that did not intend to hit
Commander Stone and that he was merely “throwing the disc
past the door line because [he] could not go through the City
Hall doors to resolve [his] own problem.” (Doc. # 89-2 at
131:2-17). Nevertheless, Mr. Lee pleaded guilty to the
charge. (Doc. # 89-2 at 131:23-8).
On September 14, 2021, Mr. Lee returned to the Building
Department to ask why he had received a call from someone
from the Department earlier that morning. (Doc. # 89-2 at

138:2-12, 144:16-22, 151:15-23). Mr. Lee refused to leave the
premises until he received an answer. (Doc. # 88-6 at 9 ¶
27). While waiting, Mr. Lee recorded Gulfport employees and
posted the video to his Facebook page. (Doc. # 88-6 at 9 ¶
27; Doc. # 89-2 at 144:20-25, 148:13-151:6). Although it was
the position of Mr. O’Reilly and the Gulfport Police
Department that Mr. Lee’s prior written trespass warning
applied to the entire City Hall complex, Mr. O’Reilly directed
police officers to give Mr. Lee a second written trespass
warning that specifically stated that Mr. Lee was not to enter
the Building Department. (Doc. # 87-1 at 4; Doc. # 88-6 at 9
¶ 27; Doc. # 89-16 at 17:18-20:17).

The written trespass warnings issued to Mr. Lee did not
have an expiration date or state that they could be appealed
to the City Manager’s office. (Doc. # 87-1 at 3-4; Doc. # 92
at 18 ¶ 18; Doc. # 93 at 17 ¶ 18; Doc. # 108 at 6 ¶ 18).
C. The Arrest at the Gulfport Casino
On April 27, 2023, Gulfport held a private event for the
city’s volunteers at the Gulfport Casino. (Doc. # 89-2 at
168:21-169:3; Doc. # 89-16 at 27:8-13). Prior to the event,
Police Chief Robert Vincent sent an email to Mr. Lee stating
that he had heard that Mr. Lee was planning on showing up at
the event to cause a disturbance. (Doc. # 89-16 at 27:11-
28:8). Accordingly, Chief Vincent stated that this was a

private event, that Mr. Lee was not welcome on the property,
and that if he came onto the property and refused to leave,
he would be arrested for trespassing. (Doc. # 28-4; Doc. #
89-16 at 28:15-21). Mr. Lee admits that he received this email
but claims that he did not read it until the next day. (Doc.
# 89-2 at 171:23-172:16).
According to Mr. Lee, he was unaware that there was a
private event at the Casino at the time he arrived. (Doc. #
89-2 at 174:23-175:3). Rather, Mr. Lee states that he came to
the Casino because he saw City Councilmember Ian O’Hara drive
by and that he approached the Casino to try to make an
appointment with Mr. O’Hara. (Doc. # 89-2 at 174:19-175:5).

The entrance to the Casino is slightly elevated and is
accessible by a ramp and by a set of stairs. (Video referred
to as Video 5 in Doc. # 97 (hereinafter “Video”); Doc. # 89-
2 at 200). Mr. Lee attempted to enter the event but was
stopped at the door. (Doc. # 89-16 at 35:11-14). Chief Vincent
told Mr. Lee to leave the property several times. (Doc. # 89-
16 at 31:23-32:5). Mr. Lee left the elevated area and stood
about six feet from the ramp as he filmed Chief Vincent and
repeatedly asked why he was not allowed to remain on the
premises. (Video; Doc. # 89-2 at 173:20-175:8, 180:13-24).
Chief Vincent told Mr. Lee to leave the area in which he was
standing as he was trespassing, but Mr. Lee refused as he did

not think the area in which he was standing was part of the
Casino. (Doc. # 89-2 at 167:7-170:5, 180:13-181:21). As Mr.
Lee refused to leave the property, which Chief Vincent
considered to be part of the Casino premises, Mr. Lee was
arrested for trespass. (Doc. # 89-2 at 171:13-15, 180:13-
181:10; Doc. # 89-16 at 32:11-33:8). The trespassing charge
ultimately was dropped. (Doc. # 89-16 at 35:18-36:9).
D. Procedural History
Mr. Lee initiated this civil rights action against
Defendants on December 29, 2023. (Doc. # 1). The operative
complaint is the amended complaint, in which Mr. Lee, a Latino
man, claims that Mr. O’Reilly directed the police to issue
two trespass warnings against him, which “permanently banned”

him from Gulfport City Hall and the Building Department,
without explaining why or how to challenge the warnings. (Doc.
# 28 at ¶¶ 7, 13, 48, 66-67, 77-78; Doc. # 28-2; Doc. # 28-
3). The amended complaint separately alleges that Gulfport
and Mr. O’Reilly retaliated against Mr. Lee by having him
arrested for trespass while “standing on public property”
outside of a private event at the Gulfport Casino. (Doc. # 28
at ¶¶ 89-90, 150).
The amended complaint asserts the following twelve
claims against Defendants: an equal protection claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); that Gulfport’s mobile food vendor

ordinance is unconstitutionally vague (Count II); substantive
due process claims for each trespass ban under Section 1983
(Counts III and IV); a First Amendment retaliation claim for
the arrest at the Casino under Section 1983 (Count V);
procedural due process claims for each trespass ban under
Section 1983 (Counts VI and VII); that the trespass policy is
void for vagueness (Count VIII); declaratory relief for the
mobile food vendor ordinance (Count IX); declaratory relief
for the trespass policy (Count X); injunctive relief for the
trespass bans (Count XI); and injunctive relief for the mobile
food vending preclusion (Count XII).
The Court granted in part and denied in part Gulfport’s

motion to dismiss the amended complaint and denied Mr.
O’Reilly’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint. (Doc. #
67). The Court dismissed with prejudice Count VIII, which
challenged Gulfport’s trespass policy as void for vagueness,
and Count X to the extent it sought related declaratory
relief. (Id. at 13-15). Thus, only Counts I, II, III, IV, V,
VI, VII, IX, X, XI, and XII remain. Defendants filed their
answers and affirmative defenses on February 18, 2025. (Doc.
## 77, 78).
Mr. Lee moves for summary judgment on his claims arising
from the alleged substantive and procedural due process
violations, Counts III, IV, VI, and VII. (Doc. # 108).

Defendants move for summary judgment on Counts III, IV, V,
VI, and VII. (Doc. ## 88, 89). Gulfport additionally moves
for summary judgment on Counts I, II, IX, and XII. (Doc. #
89). Each party responded and replied. (Doc. ## 92, 93, 94,
95, 98, 99, 100, 101). Additionally, Gulfport moves to strike
parts of Mr. Lee’s response to its Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. # 109). Mr. Lee responded. (Doc. # 110). The Motions
are ripe for review.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to
defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude
a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742
(11th Cir. 1996) (citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is material if
it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.

1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing
the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are
no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at
trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260
(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986)). “When a moving party has discharged its
burden, the non-moving party must then ‘go beyond the
pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’
designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590,
593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

324).
If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations
or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to
be true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344
F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact finder
evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference
from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine
issue of material fact, the court should not grant summary
judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846
F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). But, if the non-movant’s
response consists of nothing “more than a repetition of his

conclusional allegations,” summary judgment is not only
proper, but required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034
(11th Cir. 1981).
Finally, the filing of cross-motions for summary
judgment does not give rise to any presumption that no genuine
issues of material fact exist. Rather, “[c]ross-motions must
be considered separately, as each movant bears the burden of
establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists
and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Shaw
Constructors v. ICF Kaiser Eng’rs, Inc., 395 F.3d 533, 538–
39 (5th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Oakley, 744
F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Cross-motions for summary

judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in
granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not
genuinely disputed . . . .” (quotation omitted)).
III. Analysis
A. Count I
Count I is a race-based equal protection claim arising
from Gulfport’s actions in preventing Mr. Lee from operating
an ice cream cart. (Doc. # 28 at ¶¶ 102-09). “Proof of
racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429

U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
353 (1991).
Gulfport argues that it is entitled to summary judgment
on Count I as there is no evidence that Gulfport intentionally
discriminated against Mr. Lee based upon his race. (Doc. # 89
at 14). In response, Mr. Lee apparently abandons his claim of
racial discrimination, asserting that his counsel has since
“realized that GULFPORT’s primary purpose in regulating
mobile food vendors . . . is economic protectionism designed
to benefit . . . brick and mortar establishments.” (Doc. # 95
at 7). Accordingly, Mr. Lee does not oppose a grant of summary
judgment to Gulfport on Count I. (Id.).

Based on Mr. Lee’s concession and the applicable law,
Gulfport is granted summary judgment on Count I.
See Parks v. City of Warner Robins, Ga., 43 F.3d 609, 616
(11th Cir. 1995) (affirming grant of summary judgment for the
defendant city on equal protection claim where there was no
evidence of discriminatory intent).
B. Counts II, IX, and XII
Count II of the amended complaint alleges that
Gulfport’s ordinance regulating “mobile food-dispensing
vehicles,” City of Gulfport Code of Ordinances § 13-84, is
unconstitutionally vague. (Doc. # 28 at ¶¶ 110-20). Count IX
seeks a declaration that Code § 13-84(2) is facially

unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Lee.
(Id. at ¶¶ 192-95). Count XII seeks an injunction preventing
Gulfport from further enforcement of Code § 13-84(2). (Id. at
¶¶ 220-23).
Gulfport argues that it is entitled to summary judgment
on Counts II, IX, and XII because Mr. Lee lacks standing to
challenge Code § 13-84(2) as “he does not own, and has never
owned, a ‘mobile food-dispensing vehicle,’ i.e. a food
truck.” (Doc. # 89 at 18). In response to Gulfport’s statement
of material facts, Mr. Lee admits that he “does not own a
mobile food dispensing vehicle,” and, therefore, Gulfport’s
regulation of his ice cream cart is not preempted by Florida

Statute § 509.102, which limits the ability of local
governments to regulate such vehicles. (Doc. # 95 at 5 ¶ 20;
Doc. # 89 at 7 ¶ 20). Nevertheless, Mr. Lee argues that he
has standing to challenge Code § 13-84(2) because “the Code
does not adopt or incorporate the state’s definition of
‘mobile food dispensing vehicle.’” (Doc. # 95 at 7). The Court
agrees with Gulfport.
When an “attack on standing occurs via a motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiffs can no longer rest on their
allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence
specific facts which for the purpose of summary judgment will
be taken as true.” Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers

Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 806 (11th Cir. 1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “To demonstrate his
standing to bring a vagueness challenge (or any other
challenge, for that matter), [the plaintiff] must show that:
(1) he has suffered, or imminently will suffer, an injury-
in-fact; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the operation
of the rules; and (3) a favorable judgment is likely to
redress the injury.” Harrell v. The Fla. Bar, 608 F.3d 1241,
1253 (11th Cir. 2010). “An injury in fact requires the
plaintiff to show that he personally has suffered some actual
or threatened injury.” Granite State Outdoor Advert., Inc. v.
City of Clearwater, Fla., 351 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 2003)

(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“While this requirement is hard to define precisely, we know
that the plaintiff must at least claim to personally suffer
some harm.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Where an ordinance does not expressly define a term, a
court interprets the term “using the normal tools of statutory
interpretation.” United States v. Vineyard, 945 F.3d 1164,
1171 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The starting point for statutory interpretation is the
language of the statute.” United States v. Dawson, 64 F.4th
1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2023). “If the language of the statute
is clear and unambiguous, [courts] will go no further and

will employ that plain meaning.” Id. “The plain meaning of a
statutory term, however, does not turn solely on dictionary
definitions of its component words in isolation.” Id. at 1237.
“Rather, [t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language
is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself,
[but as well by] the specific context in which that language
is used, and the broader context of the statute as a
whole.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Dawson, 64 F.4th at 1237.
Here, Mr. Lee is correct that the Code does not expressly
define the term “mobile food-dispensing vehicle” or
incorporate the state’s definition of the term. However, it

is undisputed that Gulfport enacted Code § 13-84 in August
2020 in response to the Florida legislature’s passage of
Florida House Bill 1193 on June 30, 2020. That Bill preempted
local laws that ban or make certain regulations regarding
mobile food-dispensing vehicles and created Florida Statute
§ 509.102. 2020 Florida House Bill No. 1193; Fla. Stat. §
509.102 (2020); (Doc. # 66-1 at 93:19–94:7; Doc. # 89-8 at 7
¶¶ 20-21; Doc. # 89-11).
Florida Statute § 509.102(2)(a) defines a “mobile food
dispensing vehicle” as “any vehicle that is a public food
service establishment and that is self-propelled or otherwise

movable from place to place and includes self-contained
utilities, including, but not limited to, gas, water,
electricity, or liquid waste disposal.” Fla. Stat. §
509.102(1)(a). A “public food service establishment” is “any
building, vehicle, place, or structure, or any room or
division in a building, vehicle, place, or structure where
food is prepared, served, or sold for immediate consumption
on or in the vicinity of the premises; called for or taken
out by customers; or prepared prior to being delivered to
another location for consumption.” Fla. Stat. §
509.013(5)(a). However, any “place of business issued a
permit or inspected by the Department of Agriculture and

Consumer Services under s. 500.12” is not a public food
service establishment. Fla. Stat. § 509.013(5)(b)(6). Nether
is any “place of business where the food available for
consumption is limited to ice, beverages with or without
garnishment, popcorn, or prepackaged items sold without
additions or preparation.” Fla. Stat. § 509.013(5)(b)(7).
Here, although Mr. Lee admits that he does not own a
mobile food-dispensing vehicle within the meaning of Florida
Statute § 509.102 (Doc. # 95 at 4 ¶ 20), he offers no argument
as to why his ice cream cart should nevertheless be deemed a
mobile food-dispensing vehicle within the meaning of Code §
13-84. At most, he emphasizes that the cart “has been designed

specifically for selling frozen confections.” (Id. at 8). The
only support Mr. Lee offers for this point is a citation to
Code § 13-84(1), entitled “Vehicle requirements,” which
states that “[a] mobile food-dispensing vehicle shall not be
used for vending a product unless the vehicle has been
designed and constructed specifically for such purpose.”
Contrary to Mr. Lee’s contention, it does not follow that all
vehicles designed and constructed specifically to dispense
food are “mobile food-dispensing vehicles” subject to
regulation by Code § 13-84. Accordingly, the Court finds Mr.
Lee’s argument unpersuasive.
Considering the broader context of Code § 13-84, which

was enacted shortly after and in direct response to the
Florida legislature’s enactment of Florida Statute § 509.102,
and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Court
finds that the plain meaning of “mobile food-dispensing
vehicle” as used in Code § 13-84 is the same as set forth in
Florida Statute § 509.102. See Dawson, 64 F.4th at 1236-37
(considering and comparing the language of a neighboring
statute in interpreting the meaning of an undefined statutory
term).
As Mr. Lee admittedly does not own a mobile food-
dispensing vehicle, he has not shown an injury in fact
regarding the alleged vagueness of Code § 13-84, and thus

lacks standing to challenge the ordinance. See Harrell, 608
F.3d at 1257 (“As for the remaining four rules, however,
Harrell has not shown an injury-in-fact, and he therefore
lacks standing to challenge them.”); Granite State, 351 F.3d
at 1117 (“Granite State does not have standing to challenge
Article 4 of the Code because it has suffered no injury with
regard to the City’s permitting and appeals process.”).
Accordingly, Counts II, IX, and XII are dismissed for
lack of standing.
C. Counts III and IV
Counts III and IV allege that Gulfport’s trespass
policy, facially and as applied to Mr. Lee, violates the

substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(Doc. # 28 at ¶¶ 121-40).
Mr. Lee argues that he is entitled to summary judgment
on his substantive due process claims because “[p]ermanently
or indefinitely banning a citizen from city properties under
threat of arrest via a trespass warning, without revealing
the basis of the trespass or providing an opportunity for
review by a neutral decision maker, is arbitrary or conscience
shocking in a constitutional sense.” (Doc. # 108 at 16)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In response and in
support of their own Motions, Gulfport and Mr. O’Reilly argue
that they are entitled to summary judgment on Counts III and

IV because Mr. Lee “has no constitutionally protected liberty
interest in using Gulfport’s City Hall in the manner in which
he has continuously, when allowed access, used it over time”
and, in any event, that issuing trespass warnings to someone
disturbing a nonpublic forum does not shock the conscience.
(Doc. # 92 at 10-12; Doc. # 93 at 9-11; Doc. # 88 at 13-18;
Doc. # 89 at 19). Mr. O’Reilly also argues that he is entitled
to qualified immunity on Counts III and IV. (Doc. # 88 at 10-
12; Doc. # 93 at 2-4). Gulfport further argues that it cannot
be held liable because Mr. Lee has not presented any argument
or evidence that he was injured because of a municipal custom
or policy. (Doc. # 89 at 19-20; Doc. # 92 at 11-12). The Court

agrees that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
Counts III and IV.
“The test in this Circuit as to whether there has been
a violation of [substantive] due process in the context of
section 1983 has two prongs.” Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin
Cnty., 922 F.2d 1536, 1541 (11th Cir. 1991). The Court must
determine (1) that “there has been a deprivation of a
constitutionally protected interest,” and (2) that “the
deprivation was the result of an abuse of governmental power
sufficient to raise an ordinary tort to the stature of a
constitutional violation.” Id.
While the right is “neither fundamental . . . nor

limitless,” the Eleventh Circuit has “recognized a
‘constitutionally protected liberty interest,’ for purposes
of due process, ‘to be in parks or on other city lands . . .
that are open to the public generally.’” Peery v. City of
Miami, 977 F.3d 1061, 1071 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Catron
v. City of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir.
2011)). “This right likely extends to City Hall.” Sheets v.
City of Punta Gorda, Fla., 415 F. Supp. 3d 1115, 1127 (M.D.
Fla. 2019). However, “a person may forfeit this liberty right
by trespass or other violation of law.” Catron, 658 F.3d at

1266; see Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1345
(11th Cir. 1994) (“The Constitution does not confer the right
to trespass on public lands.”).
1. Mr. Lee Was Not Deprived of a Constitutionally
Protected Liberty Interest

Here, the Court assumes that Mr. Lee had a liberty
interest in accessing the Gulfport City Hall complex,
including the Building Department, under the conditions in
which these buildings are typically open to members of the
public. Sheets, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 1127; Catron, 658 F.3d at
1267 n.5 (recognizing that “a resident of St. Petersburg has
some federal right to use St. Petersburg parks under the
ordinary conditions in which these parks are made available
to the general public.”).

However, Mr. Lee forfeited any liberty interest he had
in accessing the City Hall complex, other than for attending
City Council meetings, when he refused to leave the premises
as required by the applicable Florida trespass law, Florida
Statute § 810.08, after causing the previously described
disruptions. Catron, 658 F.3d at 1266; In re Watkins, No. 23-
11718, 2024 WL 1174182, at *1, *5 (11th Cir. Mar. 19, 2024)
(affirming district court’s denial of Watkins’s motion for
leave to file a complaint asserting, inter alia, a due process
claim arising from his suspension from a public library, and
noting that because Watkins “arguably violated the law by
disturbing the peaceful environment of the library,” he “may

have forfeited his liberty interest and no procedural-due-
process violation took place”); Patrick v. McGuire, No. 8:24-
cv-999-MSS-NHA, 2024 WL 4803217, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15,
2024) (holding that plaintiff “forfeited her right to access
the [Pasco County Tax Collector’s] Office when she failed to
comply with the Office’s policy and the requests that she
either comply with the policy or leave”); Sheets, 415 F. Supp.
3d at 1128 (“Put simply, neither Sheets nor any other person
has an absolute right to visit City Hall. So when the City
limits the use of City Hall based on a violation of the
Ordinance, it is not violating liberty interests.”).
Accordingly, there was no substantive due process violation,

and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on that basis.
2. Even If Mr. Lee Did Not Forfeit His Liberty
Interest, Defendants’ Actions Did Not Violate
Mr. Lee’s Due Process Rights

The Supreme Court has “distinguished between
substantive-due-process violations that the government
commits in its legislative versus its executive capacities.”
Littlejohn v. Sch. Bd. of Leon Cnty., Fla., 132 F.4th 1232,
1240 (11th Cir. 2025) (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)). “If legislative action implicates
a fundamental right, that action must survive strict
scrutiny.” Id. at 1239. “If it involves a right that is not
fundamental, we subject that action to rational-basis
review.” Id. at 1243.
“When executive action is involved, only the most
egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the
constitutional sense.” Id. at 1240 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “And to satisfy that standard, . . . the cognizable
level of executive abuse of power is that which shocks the
conscience.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[C]onduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by
any government interest is the sort of official action most
likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level.” Sacramento,
523 U.S. at 849. Only “the most egregious conduct meets this
standard.” Littlejohn, 132 F.4th at 1243 (internal quotation

marks omitted).
“Executive acts characteristically apply to a limited
number of persons and typically arise from the ministerial or
administrative activities of members of the executive
branch.” Id. at 1242 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Legislative acts, on the other hand, generally apply to a
larger segment of — if not all of — society; laws and broad-
ranging executive regulations are the most common examples.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Mr. Lee’s Motion, he asserts that “O’REILLY’s
unilateral decision to direct the GULFPORT police to issue
permanent trespass warnings to LEE is indisputably an

executive rather than a legislative decision.” (Doc. # 108 at
15). In response and in support of their own Motions for
Summary Judgment, Gulfport and Mr. O’Reilly agree and argue
that, even if Defendants deprived Mr. Lee of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest, it cannot be
said that “issuing a trespass warning to someone who violates
a law, by way of attempting to enter a restricted area, or is
disruptive of official public business, is either
unreasonable or ‘egregious’ conduct, or conscience-shocking.”
(Doc. # 88 at 16-18; Doc. # 89 at 19; Doc. # 92 at 9-10; Doc.
# 93 at 9-10). However, in reply, Mr. Lee argues that “the
‘shocks the conscience’ standard does not apply in

determining whether generally applicable government policies
like GULFPORT’s trespass policy violate substantive due
process” and that Defendants’ actions are subject to rational
basis review. (Doc. # 98 at 5) (quoting Littlejohn, 132 F.4th
at 1242). As Gulfport argues in its Motion to Strike (Doc. #
109 at 5-6), Mr. Lee improperly raised this argument for the
first time in his reply. WBY, Inc. v. DeKalb Cnty., Georgia,
695 F. App’x 486, 492 (11th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, the Court
grants Gulfport’s Motion to Strike to the extent of striking
this new argument. In any event, Mr. Lee has not demonstrated
a substantive due process violation under either test.
i. Mr. Lee’s As-Applied Challenge to the
Trespass Policy Does Not Shock the
Conscience

“Because the role of the executive is to apply, or to
enforce, statutes, any as-applied challenge necessarily
implicates executive, rather than legislative, action.”
Hillcrest Prop., LLP v. Pasco Cnty., 915 F.3d 1292, 1302 (11th
Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, Mr. Lee’s as-
applied challenge to Gulfport’s trespass policy is a
challenge to executive action. Littlejohn, 132 F.4th at 1242;
Hillcrest, 915 F.3d at 1302. The Court must determine whether
Defendants’ actions in applying the trespass policy to Mr.
Lee shocked the conscience. Littlejohn, 132 F.4th at 1243.
Defendants’ actions did not rise to that level.

Here, Mr. Lee was issued a trespass warning on September
4, 2020, because he refused to leave the premises of the
Building Department, which was not open to the public due to
COVID-19 precautions. Despite this, Mr. Lee hit the handicap
access button to keep the door to the building open multiple
times. As a result, at Mr. O’Reilly’s direction, the police
responded to the scene, gave Mr. Lee a written trespass
warning, and told him he would be placed under arrest if he
returned to City Hall, other than to attend City Council
meetings. (Doc. # 87-1 at 3; Doc. # 88-6 at 5 ¶ 11; Doc. #
92-2 at 3). Mr. Lee was informed when he was issued the
trespass warning “that he was not being limited from attending

meetings of the Gulfport City Council or otherwise doing
business with the City Hall, but that it would have to be
over the phone, over email, or over the website.” (Doc. # 88-
6 at 5 ¶ 13).
Mr. O’Reilly directed that the police issue another
trespass warning to Mr. Lee as a result of the September 14,
2021 incident. During that incident, Mr. Lee was “verbally
abusive to City employees and again disturbing the work
environment of City Hall, and would not leave until an answer
was provided to him for an alleged phone call he had received
from City Hall, while claiming that he was doing a so-called
‘First Amendment audit’ and filming City employees.” (Doc. #

88-6 at 9 ¶ 26).
The written trespass warning from the 2020 incident says
“Expiration: Indefinite.” (Doc. # 87-1 at 3). The written
trespass warning from the 2021 incident says “Expiration:
Never.” (Id. at 4). However, Mr. O’Reilly explained that, at
the time, Gulfport had a policy of “‘indefinitely’
trespassing individuals,” but that the individual could
appeal the issuance, duration, or scope of a trespass warning
to him as City Manager. (Doc. # 88-6 at 5 ¶ 12). If Mr.
O’Reily refused to change his determination, the individual
could appeal that decision to the City Council. (Doc. # 88-7
at 21:22-23:7; Doc. # 89-16 at 55:16-56:12). There is no

evidence that Mr. Lee received written notice of his right to
appeal. (Doc. # 88-7 at 41:19-21, 48:12-15). Mr. Lee testified
that the reason he did not appeal his trespass warnings was
because he believes the “person violating [his] rights should
not be the one who has the authority to make those decisions.”
(Doc. # 89-2 at 166:1-12).
Here, Defendants’ actions in issuing trespass warnings
indefinitely banning Mr. Lee from accessing the City Hall
campus due to his failure to leave the premises when directed
do not amount to conscience-shocking conduct. Although it
would have been better if the written trespass warnings
explicitly stated the reasons for which the warnings were

issued or the method by which Mr. Lee could appeal the
warnings, this omission does not render the trespass warnings
egregious. See Littlejohn, 132 F.4th at 1243-44 (noting that
“[o]nly the most egregious conduct meets this standard”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
ii. Mr. Lee’s Facial Challenge to the
Trespass Policy Is Unsuccessful as the
Policy Survives Rational Basis Review

To the extent Mr. Lee challenges Gulfport’s trespass
policy on its face (Doc. # 28 at ¶¶ 122, 132), he is
challenging a legislative act. See Kentner v. City of Sanibel,
750 F.3d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Because plaintiffs are
challenging the Ordinance on its face rather than contesting
a specific zoning or permit decision made under the auspices
of the Ordinance, we conclude that they are challenging a
legislative act.”). “Substantive due process challenges that
do not implicate fundamental rights are reviewed under the
‘rational basis’ standard.” Id. As the Eleventh Circuit has
recognized, an individual’s liberty interest “to be in parks
or on other city lands . . . that are open to the public
generally” is not a fundamental right. Peery, 977 F.3d at
1071 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Gulfport
must prevail if the trespass policy “is rationally related to
the achievement of some legitimate government purpose.”
Bannum, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 157 F.3d 819,

822 (11th Cir. 1998). “This standard is highly deferential
and [courts] hold legislative acts unconstitutional under a
rational basis standard in only the most exceptional of
circumstances.” Kentner, 750 F.3d at 1281 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Mr. Lee challenges Gulfport’s policy in which
“supervisors of individual city facilities [were] empowered
to issue trespass warnings whenever they have reason to
believe an individual has caused or is likely to cause a
disruption of services or put the safety of staff or the
public at risk.” (Doc. # 88-7 at 42:8-21).
First, the Court must identify “a legitimate government
purpose — a goal — which the enacting government body could

have been pursuing.” Bannum, 157 F.3d at 822 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). As a
government, “no less than a private owner of property, has
power to preserve the property under its control for the use
to which it is lawfully dedicated,” the government has a
legitimate interest “in limiting the use of its property to
its intended purpose.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (citation omitted); U.S.
Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453
U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981) (“[T]he State . . . has power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which

it is lawfully dedicated.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Public safety is also a legitimate governmental
interest. Bannum, 157 F.3d at 823.
Next, the Court must determine whether a rational basis
exists for the municipality to believe that the policy “would
further the hypothesized purpose.” Bannum, 157 F.3d at 822
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the second prong of
the rational basis test is satisfied. The trespass policy,
which permits supervisors of city facilities to issue
trespass warnings if they have reason to believe an individual
has caused or is likely to cause a disruption of services or
put the safety of staff or the public at risk, is sufficiently

related to the legitimate governmental interests of public
safety and limiting the use of its property to its intended
purpose. Therefore, Mr. Lee’s facial challenge to the
trespass policy is meritless because the policy survives
rational basis review. See Kentner, 750 F.3d at 1281; Bannum,
157 F.3d at 824.
3. Qualified Immunity
As there was no constitutional violation, Mr. O’Reilly
is entitled to qualified immunity on Counts III and IV. See
Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996)
(“Without a constitutional violation, there can be no
violation of a clearly established constitutional right.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).
4. Municipal Liability
As the trespass policy itself is not unconstitutional
and as Mr. O’Reilly did not unconstitutionally apply the
policy to Mr. Lee, Gulfport cannot be held liable under
Section 1983. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
387 (1989).
Therefore, Defendants are granted summary judgment on
Counts III and IV.
Further, in Gulfport’s Motion to Strike, it argues that
this Court should strike Exhibit A to Mr. Lee’s reply in
support of summary judgment, which is a compilation of

trespass warnings issued to other individuals on city-owned
properties that Gulfport produced in response to Mr. Lee’s
first request to produce, as well as any argument that these
trespass warnings are evidence of a municipal custom or
policy. (Doc. # 109 at 2, 4-5). As the evidence and argument
is offered solely in rebuttal to Gulfport’s contention that
Mr. Lee failed to provide evidence of a municipal custom or
policy, which the Court need not address, the Court denies
the Motion as moot to the extent it seeks to strike Exhibit
A to Mr. Lee’s reply and argument related to the trespass
warnings in that Exhibit.
D. Counts VI and VII

Counts VI and VII allege that indefinitely banning Mr.
Lee from City Hall and the Building Department pursuant to
Gulfport’s trespass policy violated the procedural due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. # 28 at ¶¶
153-78).
“A Section 1983 procedural due process claim requires a
plaintiff to prove three elements: (1) a deprivation of a
constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2)
state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.”
Catron, 658 F.3d at 1266 (internal quotation marks omitted).
As previously explained, Defendants did not deprive Mr. Lee
of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in issuing

the trespass warnings. Mr. Lee had already forfeited any
liberty interest he had in accessing the City Hall complex,
other than for attending City Council meetings, when he caused
disruptions and refused to leave the premises as required by
the applicable Florida trespass law, Florida Statute §
810.08. Catron, 658 F.3d at 1266; In re Watkins, 2024 WL
1174182, at *5; Patrick, 2024 WL 4803217, at *8; Sheets, 415
F. Supp. 3d at 1128.
As there was no constitutional violation, Mr. O’Reilly
is entitled to qualified immunity on Counts VI and VII,
Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1490, and Gulfport cannot be held liable

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387.
Accordingly, Defendants are granted summary judgment on
Counts VI and VII.
E. Count V
In Count V, the Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation
claim against Mr. O’Reilly and Gulfport, Mr. Lee alleges that
Defendants “had a premeditated plan to arrest” Mr. Lee at the
Casino and that his arrest for violation of Florida Statue §
810.09 “was not based upon any legitimate concern for safety
or property but rather [Mr. Lee’s] lengthy history of
criticizing [Gulfport].” (Doc. # 28 at ¶¶ 93, 143, 147).
Mr. O’Reilly and Gulfport argue that they are entitled

to summary judgment on Count V because there is no genuine
dispute as to whether Chief Vincent had probable cause to
arrest Mr. Lee for trespass after he refused to leave the
premises after receiving a verbal trespass warning. (Doc. #
88 at 18-20; Doc. # 89 at 20). Gulfport argues that it is
entitled to summary judgment for the additional reason that
there is “no evidence of a [Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)] custom or policy as to the
allegations in Count Five.” (Doc. # 89 at 20-21). In response,
Mr. Lee argues that there are genuine issues of fact regarding
the circumstances of his arrest that preclude a finding that
Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

(Doc. # 94 at 8-9; Doc. # 95 at 11-13). Mr. Lee further
asserts that it is not “necessary to prove the existence of
a ‘policy or custom’ to prevail in a retaliatory arrest
claim.” (Doc. # 95 at 13-14).
The Court agrees with Defendants that there is no genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether there was probable
cause for Mr. Lee’s arrest. Therefore, the Court will not
reach Gulfport’s additional argument regarding the lack of
evidence of a municipal policy or custom.
“To bring a First Amendment claim for retaliation, a
plaintiff generally must show: (1) he ‘engaged in
constitutionally protected speech,’ (2) ‘the defendant’s

retaliatory conduct adversely affected that protected
speech,’ and (3) ‘a causal connection exists between the
defendant’s retaliatory conduct and the adverse effect on the
plaintiff’s speech.’” Jennings v. Smith, No. 23-14171, 2024
WL 4315127, at *4 (11th Cir. Sept. 27, 2024) (quoting
DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th
Cir. 2019)). Moreover, “[t]he plaintiff pressing a
retaliatory arrest claim must plead and prove the absence of
probable cause for the arrest.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S.
391, 402 (2019).
“Probable cause to arrest exists if the facts and

circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, of which he has
reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent
person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit
an offense.” Carter v. Butts Cnty., Ga., 821 F.3d 1310, 1319
(11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This
probable cause standard is practical and non-technical,
applied in a specific factual context and evaluated using the
totality of the circumstances.” Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485
F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007).
“Florida state law criminalizes trespass on property
other than a structure or conveyance — such as a public park

— where a person, ‘without being authorized, licensed, or
invited,’ ‘willfully enters upon or remains’ on the property
‘[a]s to which notice against entering or remaining is given
. . . by actual communication to the offender.’” Watkins v.
Shields, 861 F. App’x 812, 816 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Fla.
Stat. § 810.09(1)(a)); Watkins v. Broward Sheriff Off., 824
F. App’x 865, 868 (11th Cir. 2020).
Here, it is undisputed that, prior to the volunteer
luncheon, Chief Vincent heard that Mr. Lee and another
individual were planning to show up at the event to cause a
disturbance. (Doc. # 89-16 at 27:24-28:8). Accordingly, Chief
Vincent sent Mr. Lee an email warning him that he was not

welcome at the private event and explaining that he would be
arrested for trespass if he were to come and refuse to leave.
(Doc. # 28-4; Doc. # 89-16 at 28:15-21). Mr. Lee attempted to
enter the event but was stopped at the door. (Doc. # 89-16 at
35:11-14). Although Chief Vincent told Mr. Lee to leave the
property several times, Mr. Lee remained standing about six
feet from the ramp leading up to the entrance. (Doc. # 89-16
at 31:23-32:5; Video; Doc. # 89-2 at 173:20-174:8, 180:13-
181:10). Mr. Lee was arrested for trespass after he refused
to leave the property, which Chief Vincent considered to be
part of the Casino premises. (Doc. # 89-2 at 171:13-15,
180:13-181:10; Doc. # 89-16 at 32:11-33:8).

As it is undisputed that Mr. Lee was not invited to the
event at the Casino and refused to leave the area next to the
access ramp despite Chief Vincent’s instructions, the only
element of trespass seriously at issue is whether Chief
Vincent had probable cause to believe that Mr. Lee was not
authorized to remain where he was standing at the time of his
arrest. Mr. Lee points out that, when questioned whether the
area in which Mr. Lee was standing at the time of his arrest
was considered part of the Casino, Chief Vincent testified,
“It depends on who you ask.” (Doc. # 89-16 at 32:15-18).
However, Chief Vincent continued his testimony by stating
that he considered it part of the Casino. (Id. at 32:18-19).

Chief Vincent further testified that he asked Mr. O’Reilly,
who worked at the Casino when he was the Parks and Recreation
Director, and a criminal court judge, both of whom believed
the area was part of the Casino premises. (Id. at 32:20-
33:5).
Mr. Lee has not identified any evidence that
demonstrates there is a genuine issue as to whether the facts
and circumstances within Chief Vincent’s “knowledge, of which
he has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a
prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown,”
that Mr. Lee had violated Florida Statute § 810.09(1)(a)(1)
by refusing to leave the area by the ramp after being asked

to leave. Carter, 821 F.3d at 1319. Indeed, Mr. Lee has not
offered any evidence that the area in which he was standing
was not Casino property other than his conclusory testimony
that it was “not part of the casino.” (Doc. # 89-2 at 179:1-
5, 180:21-24).
Mr. Lee also notes that there is a discrepancy between
the testimony of Chief Vincent and Mr. O’Reilly regarding
whether Mr. O’Reilly told Chief Vincent that Mr. Lee was not
welcome at the Casino on April 27, 2023. (Doc. # 94 at 8-9;
Doc. # 88-7 at 24:12-25:21 32:8-14; Doc. # 89-16 at 27:11-
21, 33:9-11). However, this discrepancy is not material as it
remains undisputed that Mr. Lee was not welcome at the Casino

because he was not invited to the private event. Allen, 121
F.3d at 646; (Doc. # 28-4; Doc. # 94 at 4 ¶ 38; Doc. # 88-7
at 26:14-18; Doc. # 89-16 at 34:25-35:8).
Considering the undisputed evidence that Mr. Lee was not
welcome at the private event at the Casino and refused to
obey Chief Vincent’s command that he leave what Chief Vincent
believed to be part of the Casino premises, the Court agrees
with Defendants that there is no genuine issue of material
fact that Chief Vincent had probable cause to arrest Mr. Lee
for violation of Florida Statute § 810.09. See Watkins v.
Broward Sheriff Off., 824 F. App’x at 868 (finding that
defendant police officer had probable cause to believe that

plaintiff “was actively committing the offense of trespass on
property other than a structure or conveyance when she
arrested him, regardless of whether the signs that she viewed
as ‘no trespassing’ signs actually met the statutory notice
requirements,” because the officer “had been informed that
the property manager had complained to the police that
[plaintiff] refused to leave the property after being asked
to do so, and she knew that he remained on the property when
she arrived”); Joyce v. Crowder, 509 F. App’x 969, 970 (11th
Cir. 2013) (holding that the arresting officers had probable
cause to arrest plaintiffs as (1) the officers were told by
a sergeant that plaintiffs were on the west side of the fence

on private property and (2) the officers reasonably assumed
that plaintiffs had to have crossed the fence, thus
constituting probable cause that plaintiffs had the notice
required by Florida law for violation of
its trespassing statute”); Harvey v. City of Stuart, 296 F.
App’x 824, 828 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that defendants had
probable cause to arrest plaintiff who was “standing at a
location where they knew he did not live and where ‘No
Trespassing’ signs were posted”). The Court grants summary
judgment on Count V in favor of Defendants.
F. Counts X and XI
No party moved for summary judgment on Counts X and XI,

which seek declaratory and injunctive relief regarding
Gulfport’s trespass policy. Accordingly, these counts remain
pending.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Plaintiff Jesse Lee’s Amended/Corrected Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 108) is DENIED.
(2) Defendant James O’Reilly’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. # 88) is GRANTED. Summary judgment in favor of Mr.
O'Reilly is granted on Counts III, IV, V, VI, and VII.
(3) Defendant City of Gulfport’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. # 89) is GRANTED. Summary judgment in favor of
Gulfport is granted on Counts I, III, IV, V, VI, and
VII.
(4) Defendant City of Gulfport’s Motion to Strike Exhibits
to, and New Arguments in, Plaintiff’s Reply to City’s
Response to His Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(Doc. # 109) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as
set forth herein.
(5) Counts II, IX, and XII are dismissed for lack of
standing.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
13th day of November, 2025.

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

39

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11202921. Public record. Not legal advice.