# Kantsepolsky

> District Court, S.D. Florida · November 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11201006

## Case

- **Full name:** Valery Kantsepolsky v. River Shores Association, Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** November 10, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11201006

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a section 1983 claim seeking an injunction of a state court public nuisance action must fall under one of the three AIA exceptions for an injunction to be permitted

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-61725-CIV-DAMIAN/Strauss

VALERY KANTSEPOLSKY,

Plaintiff,
v.

RIVER SHORES ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Defendant.
______________________________________/

ORDER AFFIRMING AND ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [ECF NO. 19]

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Jared M. Strauss’s Report
and Recommendation (“Report”) [ECF No. 19], entered on September 25, 2025,
recommending that Plaintiff, Valery Kantsepolsky’s (“Plaintiff”), Emergency Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order, Reasonable Accommodation, and Preliminary Injunction
(“Motion for TRO”) [ECF No. 3] be denied.
THE COURT has considered the Motion for TRO, Defendant River Shores
Association’s (“Defendant”) Verified Response to the Motion for TRO (“Response to
Motion”) [ECF No. 16], Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Response in Opposition to the
Motion for TRO (“Reply”) [ECF No. 17], the Report, Plaintiff’s Response and Request for
Reconsideration of Report and Recommendation Under the Fair Housing Act
(“Objections”), Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Response and Request for
Reconsideration of Report and Recommendation Under the Fair Housing Act (“Response
to Objections”), the pertinent portions of the record, and relevant authorities and is
otherwise fully advised.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 27, 2025, Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed a Complaint against the

Defendant alleging claims under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. and
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq. See generally ECF No.
1 (“Complaint”). Plaintiff alleges that she owns and resides in a condominium unit that is
governed by the Defendant condominium association. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. Plaintiff also suffers from
medical conditions that limit her ability to tolerate the environment created by demolition,
which may spread chemicals, dust, mold, and other breathing hazards. Id. ¶ 9. She alleges
that Defendant refused to provide reasonable accommodations for Plaintiff’s health
conditions when it tried to conduct exploratory demolition to resolve maintenance issues
affecting other units. See id. ¶¶ 6-8. The Defendant filed suit against her in state court to

enforce its right of entry into her unit and otherwise resolve the parties’ dispute related to
the exploratory demolition. See id. ¶ 11.
In that underlying state court action (River Shores Association, Inc. v. Kantsepolsky, No.
CACE23-013970 (Fla. 17th Jud. Cir. Ct.) (“State Court Action”)), Plaintiff raised as a
counterclaim an FHA violation similar to that which is presented in this action, and
Plaintiff moved for a ninety-day continuance of all pretrial and trial deadlines as a result of
her disability, which Defendant opposed. Id. ¶ 11. The trial court denied her motion on
August 5, 2025. Id. ¶ 12. On August 15, 2025, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which is

currently pending. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Here, Plaintiff appears to seek declaratory relief, injunctive
relief, and monetary damages from the Defendant. See generally id. The case was assigned to
Magistrate Judge Jared M. Strauss pursuant to Administrative Order 2025-11. See ECF No.
2.
The same day Plaintiff filed her case, she filed the Motion for TRO on an emergency

basis, which seeks an order from this Court enjoining the Defendant from “opposing or
interfering with Plaintiff’s request for a reasonable accommodation in the form of a 90-day
extension of pretrial and trial deadlines in the pending state-court action,” directing the
Defendant to only engage in exploratory demolition and repairs in Plaintiff’s unit subject to
her medical conditions, and requiring the Defendant to engage in an interactive process
regarding Plaintiff’s accommodation requests. See Mot. for TRO at 4.
Because Judge Strauss could not directly enter an order on the Motion for TRO, see
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), the case was randomly reassigned to the undersigned. [ECF No.
9]. This Court promptly entered an order concluding that the Motion for TRO was not a

true emergency, directing Plaintiff to serve the motion on the Defendant, re-styling the
Motion for TRO as one for a preliminary injunction, and referring the matter to Judge
Strauss for him to, inter alia, issue a report and recommendation on the Motion for TRO. See
ECF No. 11 at 6.
The Defendant filed its Response on September 5, 2025, arguing that Plaintiff’s
Motion for TRO is an effort to use a federal court to interfere in a pending state court
proceeding in a manner prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. See Resp.
to Mot. at 5-6. On September 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a 27-page Reply (excluding exhibits),
in which she concedes that she was “uncertain what information the Court may consider
most relevant and, out of concern for omitting critical facts, has submitted a longer
response.” See Reply at 1. With respect to the Anti-Injunction Act, Plaintiff argues that
because she “does not seek an injunction directed at the state court itself,” but rather “an
injunction directed at the Defendant, to prevent [it] from proceeding in a manner that denies

Plaintiff’s federally guaranteed rights under the Fair Housing Act and to prevent the
irreparable harm the Plaintiff now faces, [i.e., holding a trial to bring finality to the State
Court Action when Plaintiff cannot, due to her disability, adequately prepare to proceed pro
se].” See id. at 10.
In the Report, Judge Strauss recommends that the Court deny the Motion for TRO
on two bases: first, Plaintiff’s requested injunction is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act
because it would interfere with the State Court Action by imposing the very
stay/continuance of the trial date that the state court judge had declined to enter; second,
with reference to the injunction based on the ADA claim (which was not presented in

Plaintiff’s State Court Action counterclaim and appears for the first time in this action), the
ADA does not provide a basis for Plaintiff to receive injunctive relief for the Defendant’s
failure to accommodate her because the ADA applies only to “places of public
accommodation,” not residential condominiums. See Report at 6, 7, 10, 11.
In Plaintiff’s Objections, she spends the majority setting forth the background of how
Defendant has caused a deterioration of her health condition and has refused to
accommodate her disability despite several physician notes she provided in substantiation.
See generally Objections. Plaintiff repeats most of the factual background that appears in the
Complaint and the Motion for TRO. She explains what motivated her to file this lawsuit in

federal court as follows:
I believed the FHA protected individuals like me, ensuring a process where
disabilities are acknowledged and accommodations discussed. My doctors
made themselves available to clarify or provide depositions. But no such
process has occurred not with the association, nor in the state court. I turned
to the federal court because it has the authority to enforce the Fair Housing
Act and to intervene when a person’s federally protected housing 1ights or
disability civil rights are being disregarded or denied.
See id. at 4-5; see also Report at 7 (“Plaintiff essentially seeks in this Court what she fears she
will not get in state court.”). The only specific objection raised by Plaintiff is that the Report,
“while addressing the [Defendant’s] asserted access rights, did not consider the serious
health implications of my disability or the consequences of denying the reasonable
accommodations requested by my doctors.” Objections at 5.
In the Defendant’s Response to Objections, it points out that Plaintiff never
specifically identified any perceived error in the Report and did not identify any statutory,
rule, or case authority supporting her position. See generally Resp. to Obj. The Report is now
ripe for adjudication by this Court.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When a magistrate judge’s “disposition” has properly been objected to, district courts
must review the disposition de novo. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). When no party has timely
objected, however, “the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face
of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory
committee’s notes (citation omitted).
“Parties filing objections to a magistrate’s report and recommendation must
specifically identify those findings objected to. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections
need not be considered by the district court.” United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1361
(11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). A party’s “objections are improper [if] they expand upon and
reframe arguments already made and considered by [the magistrate judge], or simply
disagree with [the magistrate judge’s] conclusions.” Melillo v. United States, No. 17-CV-
80489, 2018 WL 4258355, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2018) (Bloom, J.); see Marlite, Inc. v.

Eckenrod, No. 10-23641-CIV, 2012 WL 3614212, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012) (Moreno,
J.) (“It is improper for an objecting party to . . . submit [ ] papers to a district court which are
nothing more than a rehashing of the same arguments and positions taken in the original
papers submitted to the Magistrate Judge. Clearly, parties are not to be afforded a ‘second
bite at the apple’ when they file objections to a R & R.” (quoting Camardo v. Gen. Motors
Hourly-Rate Emps. Pension Plan, 806 F. Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992))).
While a pro se litigant’s filings are liberally construed, a pro se litigant must still
properly object to magistrate judge reports and recommendations and conform to
procedural rules, and pro se status does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for

a party to rewrite inadequate objections. See Lewis v. Mavis Tire & Auto Corp., No. 25-cv-
60659, 2025 WL 1854699, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 3, 2025) (Leibowitz, J.) (citing United States
v. Ogiekpolor, 122 F.4th 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2024) and Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760
F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014)).
When the objecting party has not properly objected to the magistrate judge’s
findings, “the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the
record in order to accept the recommendation.” Keaton v. United States, No. 14-21230-CIV,
2015 WL 12780912, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 4, 2015) (Altonaga, J.); see Lopez v. Berryhill, No.
17-CV-24263, 2019 WL 2254704, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2019) (Ungaro, J.) (stating that a
district judge “evaluate[s] portions of the R & R not objected to under a clearly erroneous
standard of review” (citing Davis v. Apfel, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1317 (M.D. Fla. 2000))).
III. DISCUSSION
While Plaintiff only raised a specific objection with the manner in which Judge

Strauss considered her evidence of medical necessity/disability, in an abundance of
deference to the pro se litigant, this Court has undertaken a de novo review of the Report.
A. Standard For Preliminary Injunction.
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must demonstrate “(1) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is
not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the
nonmovant; and (4) that the entry of the relief would serve the public interest.” Schiavo ex. rel
Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Levi Strauss & Co. v.
Sunrise Int’l. Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995) (applying the test to a

preliminary injunction).
While the first step to determine if a plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction is
typically to determine if she has established a “substantial likelihood of success on the
merits,” when a litigant seeks injunctive relief to stay proceedings in state court, courts must
also ensure that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, does not prohibit such an
injunction.
B. The Anti-Injunction Act.
The Anti-Injunction Act states that a federal court “may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28
U.S.C. § 2283. “[I]n assessing the propriety of an injunction entered to stop a state court
proceeding, the sole relevant inquiry is whether the injunction qualifies for one of the
exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act.” Burr & Forman v. Blair, 470 F.3d 1019, 1028 (11th

Cir. 2006). Accordingly, this Court cannot issue Plaintiff’s sought injunction unless it is: (1)
“expressly authorized by Act of Congress”; (2) “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction”; or (3)
“to protect or effectuate its judgments.” In re Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233,
1249 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2283).
“Proceedings in state courts should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by
intervention of the lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state
appellate courts and ultimately [the Supreme Court].” Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Bhd. of
Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McCoy Restaurants, Inc.,
708 F.2d 582, 585 (11th Cir. 1983) (“The import of the Anti-Injunction Act, as its name

suggests, is that a federal court injunction of state litigation is to be the exception, not the
rule.”). Indeed, “[a]ny doubts . . . should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts
to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy.” Atl. Coast Line, 398
U.S. at 297.
The Anti-Injunction Act cannot be avoided by framing the injunction as directed
against a state court litigant instead of against the state court. Id. at 287 (“It is settled that the
prohibition of s[ection] 2283 cannot be evaded by addressing the order to the parties or
prohibiting utilization of the results of a completed state proceeding.”). Unless an exception
applies, the Anti-Injunction Act thus prohibits a federal court from entering an order that

functionally stays the state court’s proceedings. See id.
A litigant also cannot avoid the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibition by casting the
redress sought in the state court as a new, federal claim in the district court that was not
pursued in the state court. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 229 (1972) (holding that a
section 1983 claim seeking an injunction of a state court public nuisance action must fall

under one of the three AIA exceptions for an injunction to be permitted).
Plaintiff argues that the injunction she seeks falls under the “expressly authorized by
Act of Congress” exception to the AIA. See Reply at 3. This Court independently finds that
neither the “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction”1 nor “to protect or effectuate its judgments”2
exceptions apply here even if Plaintiff had raised those arguments.
The Supreme Court provides a two-part analysis for determining whether a federal
statute comes within the Anti-Injunction Act’s “expressly authorized” exception: (1) the
statute “must have created a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a
federal court of equity,” and (2) the federal right or remedy must be such that it can be
“given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding.” Mercer v. Sechan

Realty, Inc., 569 F. App’x 652, 655 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Mitchum, 407 U.S. 237-38).
Plaintiff is mistaken that either the FHA or ADA, which govern her claims in the
Complaint, are “expressly authorized” by Congress as exceptions to the AIA’s general
1 Federal courts may enjoin state court proceedings based on the “necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction” exception in on ly two situations, where: “(1) the district court has exclusive
jurisdiction over the action because it had been removed from state court; or, (2) the state
court entertains an in rem action involving a res over which the district court has been
exercising jurisdiction in an in rem action.” In re Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d
1233, 1251 (11th Cir. 2006). This matter is neither a removal case nor an in rem action, so
this exception does not apply.

2 Neither the Complaint nor Motion for TRO raise any related federal court proceedings
through which Plaintiff could argue that an injunction is necessary to effectuate or protect
any federal court order or judgment.
prohibition against imposing stays in state court actions. The Eleventh Circuit held that the
“expressly authorized” exception did not apply when a litigant raised an FHA claim to
enjoin eviction proceedings in state court because the litigant could always request a stay
from the state court of the unfavorable judgment pending appeal on the basis of the

judgment violating the FHA, so a stay was not necessary for the federal right to be given its
intended scope. See Mercer, 569 F. App’x at 655-56. While the Eleventh Circuit has not
directly weighed in on whether or not the ADA is an “expressly authorized” exception to
the AIA, several courts in this District have concluded that it is not. See Rudnikas v. Fidelity
Brokerage Servs., LLC, No. 24-24547-CIV, 2025 WL 434051, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2025)
(Martinez, J.) (holding that the plaintiff’s claims under Title II and Title V of the ADA are
not “expressly authorized” exceptions to the AIA and the AIA barred the injunctive relief
sought in a state court probate proceeding); Cano v. 245 C&C, LLC, No. 19-21826-CIV, 2019
WL 11769097, at *3-5 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2019) (Lenard, J.) (holding that no exception to

the AIA applied to the plaintiff’s ADA claims permitting her to seek an injunction of a state
court eviction proceeding); see also Grissom v. Baldwin Cnty., No. 25-cv-392-TFM-MU, 2025
WL 3713757, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 2025) (“While the ADA is a federal statute, it does
not specifically authorize the Court to enjoin state court proceedings in favor of a separately
filed ADA case.”). This Court agrees with these district courts’ analyses and conclusions.
Because Congress did not “expressly authorize” either the FHA or ADA to enjoin ongoing
state court proceedings, the AIA prohibits the stay Plaintiff seeks.
Plaintiff’s objection that Judge Strauss did not adequately consider the medical
evidence she attached is without merit here. The specific legal issue central to the
adjudication of the TRO, whether or not the AIA prohibits the injunction she seeks in the
first place, is not impacted by any quantum of evidence of disability that Plaintiff presents.
The fact that Plaintiff suffers from disabilities and has multiple doctors supporting her
request for a continuance of the state court trial has no bearing on whether or not the AIA
prohibits this Court from granting the relief she seeks.

Because Plaintiff cannot show that any of her claims fall within an exception to the
AIA’s general prohibition against staying state court proceedings, her Motion for TRO
predicated on those same claims must be denied. The Motion for TRO must be denied on
this basis alone. This Court has also reviewed the remaining analyses in the Report in which
Judge Strauss recommends denial of the Motion for TRO because Plaintiff does not show a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her ADA claims and agrees with the
analysis and conclusions therein, including his conclusion that Plaintiff has not shown a
likelihood of success on the merits of her ADA claim.
IV. CONCLUSION

The undersigned has undertaken a de novo review of the Report and the record and
agrees with Judge Strauss’s well-reasoned findings, thorough analysis, and conclusion that
the Anti-Injunction Act bars the injunction Plaintiff seeks here and, therefore, the Motion
for TRO should be denied.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Judge Strauss’s Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 19] is AFFIRMED
AND ADOPTED and incorporated by reference herein for the purpose of
appellate review. Plaintiff’s Objections [ECF No. 22] are OVERRULED.
2. The Motion for TRO [ECF No. 3] is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in the Southern District of Florida, this 10th
day of November, 2025.

MELISSA “da os
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: U.S. Magistrate Judge Jared M. Strauss
Counsel of record
Valery Kantsepolsky, Pro Se
2970 NE 16th Ave, Unit 416
Oakland Park, FL 33334
Email: kodiakisland7@gmail.com

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11201006. Public record. Not legal advice.