# Rose Okpalobi v. PHH Mortgage Corporation, et al.

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · November 7, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11200111

## Case

- **Full name:** Rose Okpalobi v. PHH Mortgage Corporation, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** November 7, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ROSE OKPALOBI CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-809
PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION, ET AL. SECTION: “G”(5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Defendants PHH Mortgage Corporation (“PHH”) and REO
Management Solutions, LLC’s (“REO”) (collectively, “Defendants”) “Motion to Dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(1) and for Judgment on the Pleadings Under Rule 12(c).”1 In this litigation, Plaintiff
Rose Okpalobi (“Plaintiff”), both individually and as executrix for the Estate of Ifeanyi Charles
Anthony Okpalobi (“Decedent”), pursues claims against Defendants for damages Hurricane Ida
allegedly caused to property owned by Decedent.2 In the instant motion, Defendants argue that
this case should be dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata.3 Alternatively, Defendants assert
this case should be dismissed on the merits.4 Plaintiff opposes the motion.5 Having considered the
motion, the memoranda in support and opposition, the record, and the applicable law, the Court
grants the motion.

1 Rec. Doc. 40.
2 Rec. Doc. 1-2 at 3–5.
3 Rec. Doc. 40-1 at 8.
4 Id. at 14–24.
5 Rec. Doc. 44.
A. Okpalobi v. American National Property and Casualty Company, et al., No. 23-6691
(“Okpalobi I”)
Plaintiff filed Okpalobi I in state court, naming PHH, American National Property and
Casualty Company (“ANPAC”), Mortgage Assets Management, LLC (“MAM”), and Nationstar
Mortgage LLC d/b/a Champion Mortgage (“Nationstar”) as defendants.6 ANPAC removed the
matter to this Court on November 3, 2023, at which time the case was allotted to this Section and
was assigned case number 23-6691.7 In Okpalobi I, Plaintiff alleged that: she owns 4928 Cartier
Ave., New Orleans, LA (hereinafter referred to as the “Property”);8 PHH services a home equity

conversion note executed by Decedent which is secured by a home equity conversion mortgage
over the Property;9 ANPAC issued a homeowner’s insurance policy for the Property;10 the
Property was damaged by Hurricane Ida;11 Plaintiff filed a claim on the ANPAC policy;12 and
ANPAC underpaid the claim;13 PHH had a contractual and fiduciary duty to pursue additional
insurance proceeds from ANPAC.14 Based on those allegations, Plaintiff claimed PHH owed her
a fiduciary and contractual duty to pursue additional insurance proceeds from ANPAC.15 Plaintiff

6 Rec. Doc. 40-2.
7 Okpalobi I, Case No. 23-6691, Rec. Doc. 1.
8 Id.
9 Rec. Doc. 40-3.
10 Rec. Doc. 40-4.
11 Okpalobi I, Case No. 23-6691, Rec. Doc. 1.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Okpalobi I, Case No. 23-6691, Rec. Doc. 1-9.
policy and was liable under Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1892 and 22:1973 based on its

adjustment of the insurance claim.16
On January 3, 2024, ANPAC filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in which it asserted
that Plaintiff was neither an insured nor a third-party beneficiary under the ANPAC policy.17 On
January 24, 2024, PHH filed a Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on grounds that
Plaintiff lacked standing to sue in her individual capacity because she does not have an interest in
the property and because PHH did not owe her or Decedent a contractual or fiduciary duty to
pursue additional insurance proceeds from ANPAC.18 On May 8, 2024, this Court entered an order
denying PHH’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. In its ruling, this Court found that Plaintiff
lacked standing to pursue any claims in her individual capacity and that PHH did not owe
Decedent’s estate a fiduciary or contractual duty to pursue additional insurance proceeds, but the

Court denied the motion to allow Plaintiff to amend and cure any pleading deficiencies.19 Plaintiff
did not amend by the deadline.
PHH filed a renewed motion to dismiss on September 3, 2025.20 The Court granted PHH’s
renewed motion to dismiss on September 25, 2024.21 This Court entered judgment on September
26, 2024 in favor of PHH, ANPAC, and MAM and against Plaintiff, thereby dismissing Plaintiff’s

16 Id.
17 Okpalobi I, Case No. 23-6691, Rec. Doc. 8.
18 Okpalobi I, Case No. 23-6691, Rec. Doc. 18.
19 Okpalobi I, Case No. 23-6691, Rec. Doc. 35.
20 Okpalobi I, Case No. 23-6691, Rec. Doc. 41.
21 Okpalobi I, Case No. 23-6691, Rec. Doc. 43.
B. Okpalobi v. American National Property and Casualty Company, et al., Case No. 25-809
Plaintiff filed the instant matter in state court on August 26, 2023.23 This case also relates
to damage to 4928 Cartier Ave., New Orleans, LA, as a result of Hurricane Ida.24 In the Original

Petition, Plaintiff alleged that REO was an insurer, Plaintiff filed a claim with REO, and REO
failed to properly adjust the claim.25 Plaintiff claimed that PHH held the mortgage loan.26 She
asserted a bad faith insurance adjusting claim against REO and alleged that her attorney would
have an attorney’s fee lien over any insurance proceeds and damages that might be awarded against
REO.27 Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in state court on the grounds that neither
is an insurer.28 The state court granted Defendants’ motion, but the state court also granted Plaintiff
leave to amend.29
Plaintiff filed a First Amended and Supplemental Petition for Damages on March 27,
2025,30 adding a new claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.31 The factual allegations Plaintiff makes are

as follows: the note and mortgage specify that, if the borrower dies, the Loan would be converted
to a term loan; Plaintiff is a beneficiary of the Loan; Plaintiff is the executrix of Decedent’s estate;

22 Okpalobi I, Case No. 23-6691, Rec. Doc. 44.
23 Rec. Doc. 1-1.
24 Id. at 2.
25 Id. at 1, 4.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Rec. Doc. 1-3.
29 Rec. Doc. 1-5.
30 Rec. Doc. 1-2.
31 Rec. Doc. 1-4.
Hurricane Ida; the Property was insured under a lender-placed insurance policy; insurance

proceeds were issued by an “unknown” insurer; Defendants collected and “pocketed” the
insurance proceeds rather than making them available to repair the Property; Defendants have not
accounted for the insurance proceeds; Defendants had an obligation to repair the Property; and
Defendants initiated foreclosure.32 Based thereon, Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action:
breach of contract, negligence; intentional infliction of emotional distress; fraud; unjust
enrichment; bad faith; and racial discrimination under 42 § U.S.C. 1981.33 Plaintiff seeks recovery
of damages and attorneys’ fees.34
On April 28, 2025, after Defendants removed the case to this Court.35 On October 7, 2025,
Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Judgment on the
Pleadings.36 Plaintiff opposed the motion on October 14, 2025.37 Defendants filed a reply brief on

October 27, 2025.38
II. Parties’ Arguments
A. Defendants’ Arguments in Support of the Motion

In the instant motion, Defendants argue that this case should be dismissed because Plaintiff
lacks standing to sue in her individual capacity and the doctrine of res judicata should apply to the

32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Rec. Doc. 1.
36 Rec. Doc. 40.
37 Rec. Doc. 44.
38 Rec. Doc. 49.
suit concerns the same property and parties as in Okpalobi I, where this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s

claims with prejudice.40
In Okpalobi I, the defendants asserted that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring claims in her
individual capacity.41 Likewise, and for the same reasons Defendants contend that Plaintiff lacks
standing to bring claims in her individual capacity here.42 Defendants submit that on November
16, 2021, the Civil District Court for the Parish of New Orleans entered a Judgment of Possession
distributing Decedent’s estate.43 Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to sue in her
individual capacity because said Judgment did not give ownership of the Property to her.44 Further,
Defendants put forth this Court’s order in Okpalobi I, which found that Plaintiff lacked standing
in her individual capacity, to support their argument for lack of standing here.45
Defendants argue that the doctrine of res judicata bar any claims brought in her capacity as

executrix of the estate. Res judicata has four elements: (1) the parties are identical or in privity; (2)
the judgment in the prior action was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior
action was concluded by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action
was involved in both suits.46 Defendants contend that the parties in the instant matter are identical

39 Rec. Doc. 40-1 at 5.
40 Id. at 1.
41 Okpalobi I, Case No. 23-6691, Rec. Doc. 41.
42 Rec. Doc. 40-1 at 14.
43 Okpalobi I, Case No. 23-6691, Rec. Doc. 18-5.
44 Rec. Doc. 40-1 at 15.
45 Id.
46 Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 312–13 (5th Cir. 2004).
a party to both suits individually and in her capacity as executrix of Decedent’s estate.48 Further,

PHH is named as a Defendant in both suits.49 While REO was not named a defendant in Okpalobi
I, Defendants assert that REO, as the mortgage servicer for the loan, is in privity with PHH, the
loan holder.50 Defendants contend that this relationship meets the privity requirement for applying
res judicata.51
Defendants submit that this Court had competent jurisdiction over Okpalobi I and that
Plaintiff has not challenged this Court’s jurisdiction over that initial case.52 Further, Defendants
argue that the Okpalobi I judgment was a final judgment on the merits.53 Defendants point out that
a “dismissal with prejudice” is generally a final judgment on the merits.54 Additionally, it is well
established that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are made on the merits.55 Moreover, Defendants cite Pie
Dev., L.L.C. v. Pie Carrier Holdings, Inc., to assert that “when a plaintiff declines the opportunity

to amend, even a ‘dismissal without prejudice converts to a dismissal with prejudice and
constitutes a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes.’”56 Under this precedent

47 Rec. Doc. 40-1 at 9.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. (citing Maxwell v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 544 Fed. App’x. 470, 473 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the
relationship between a mortgagee and the mortgage nominee was sufficient to meet the privity requirement to apply
res judicata).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 10.
54 Id. (citing Oreck Direct, LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 560 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted)).
55 Id. (citing Federated Dep’t. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n. 3 (1981) (internal citation omitted)).
56 Id. (citing 128 F.4th 657, 662–63 (5th Cir. 2025)).
subsequent dismissal of that case with prejudice leaves no doubt that it was a judgment on the

merits.57
Defendants assert that when two causes of action are based on the same nucleus of
operative facts the “same claim or cause of action” element of the res judicata test is met.58
Defendants draw parallels between the case at bar and Agrilectric Power Partners, Ltd. v. General
Electric Co., to establish that Okpalobi I and the instant matter arose from the same nucleus of
operative facts.59 Defendants argue that Argilectric should instruct this Court in finding that res
judicata applies here.60
Should the Court find that res judicata does not apply here, Defendants advance alternate
theories supporting dismissal including lack of contractual privity; failure to allege a breach of
contract claim; preclusion of claims under the Louisiana Credit Agreement Statute; and failure of

fiduciary duty, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, unjust enrichment, and fraud claims as a matter of law.61
B. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition to the Motion
In opposition to the motion Plaintiff argues that she has standing in both her individual
capacity and as executrix of Decedent’s estate.62 Further, Plaintiff asserts that res judicata does not
apply to the instant action.63

57 Id.
58 Id. at 11. (citing United States v. Davenport, 484 F.3d 321, 324, 326 (5th Cir. 2007)).
59 Id. (citing 20 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 1994)).
60 Id. at 11–12.
61 Id. at 14–25.
62 Rec. Doc. 44 at 5–6.
63 Id. at 3.
asserts direct, concrete, and particularized injuries. She resides at the
damaged property, maintains the premises, and has invested
substantial time and resources attempting to restore it to habitable
condition. Defendants’ actions, including the refusal to release
insurance funds necessary for the repair of the property have
inflicted tangible harms on Plaintiff, including emotional distress,
disruption of habitation, and the deprivation of use and value of her
home.64
Plaintiff maintains that she has standing as executrix of Decedent’s estate because
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3191 “expressly grants a succession representative—
such as an executrix—the authority to “enforce all rights of the succession,” including those
involving recovery or protection of residual estate assets.65 Hence, Plaintiff states that her “claims
on behalf of the estate to recover misappropriated insurance proceeds—funds indisputably paid
out in response to Hurricane Ida damage to property owned by the decedent—fall squarely within
the scope of her representative authority under Louisiana law.”66
Regarding the application of res judicata, Plaintiff focuses on the identity of parties
requirement, asserting that because “REO was neither a party in Okpalobi I nor in legal privity
with the named parties in Okpalobi I, it cannot benefit from claim preclusion.”67 Further, Plaintiff
contends that she only brought claims in Okpalobi I in her personal capacity.68 Whereas here, she
is bringing claims both individually and as the executrix of Decedent’s estate.69 Plaintiff argues

64 Id. at 6.
65 Id. at 5.
66 Id. at 6.
67 Id. at 4.
68 Id.
69 Id.
those brought in a representative capacity.70

Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that Okpalobi I did not end with a final judgment on the
merits.71 Plaintiff submits that the Okpalobi I judgment was “rendered solely on jurisdictional
grounds” because of “Plaintiff’s alleged lack of standing.”72 Plaintiff argues that because the
previous dismissal was on jurisdictional grounds it was without prejudice and does not preclude a
subsequent lawsuit once the jurisdictional defect has been corrected.73
Further, Plaintiff states that she has put forth new and distinct causes of action, which
occurred after the dismissal of Okpalobi I.74 Thus, Plaintiff maintains that res judicata does not
apply here because the instant matter arises “under a different factual posture, introduces new legal
theories, and expands the scope of allegations.”75 Specifically, Plaintiff now asserts claims of
unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981.76 Additionally, Plaintiff contends that even if the elements of res judicata are met here the
court should decline to apply it due to equitable considerations.77 Finally, Plaintiff argues against

70 Id. (citing La. C.C.P. art. 3211).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. (citing Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961); Maxim Crane Works, L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins.
Co., 11 F.4th 345 (5th Cir. 2021)).
74 Id. at 4–5.
75 Id. at 5.
76 Id.
77 Id.
claims.78

C. Defendants’ Arguments in Further Support of the Motion
In their reply, Defendants reassert their arguments that Plaintiff lacks standing in her
individual capacity, that res judicata applies to the instant matter, and that Plaintiff’s claims fail on
the merits.79 Additionally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not be given leave to amend the
complaint because the deadline to amend expired on July 16, 2025.80 Further, Defendants note that
Plaintiff had an opportunity to amend the complaint in Okpalobi I and in the instant matter before
it was removed to this Court.81

III. Legal Standard
A. Legal Standard for a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and “possess only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute.”82 It is a “first principle of jurisdiction” that a federal court must
dismiss an action “whenever it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.”83 Accordingly,
a claim is “properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate” it.84 “When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in

78 Id. at 5–9.
79 Rec. Doc. 49.
80 Id. at 10.
81 Id.
82 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted).
83 Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
84 In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig. (Mississippi Plaintiffs), 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir.
2012) (citations omitted).
attack before addressing any attack on the merits.”85 This practice “prevents a court without

jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice.”86 When opposing a 12(b)(1)
motion, as at all other times, the party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden to prove that the
Court has jurisdiction.87
B. Legal Standard for a Rule 12(c) Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but
early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”88 A motion
under Rule 12(c) “is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a
judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any
judicially noticed facts.”89 The motion “is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6).”90 “[T]he central issue is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

the complaint states a valid claim for relief.”91 In ruling on a 12(c) motion, “[p]leadings should be
construed liberally,” and judgment is appropriate “only if there are no disputed issues of fact and
only questions of law remain.”92 The Court must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing

85 Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
86 In re FEMA Trailer, 668 F.3d at 287.
87 Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.
88 Fed. R. Civ. P 12(c).
89 Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Hebert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Props., Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990)).
90 Doe v. Myspace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 529
(5th Cir. 2004)).
91 Great Plains Tr. Co., 313 F.3d at 312 (alteration in original) (quoting Hughes v. Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278
F.3d 417, 420 (5th Cir. 2001)).
92 Id. (quoting Hughes, 278 F.3d at 420).
allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact.”93 The Court “may dismiss a claim when it is clear

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.”94
IV. Analysis
A. Whether Plaintiff Has Standing to Sue in Her Individual Capacity
Defendants move this Court to dismiss the claims brought in Plaintiff’s individual capacity
under Rule 12(b)(1) because she does not have standing to sue in her individual capacity. In
support, Defendants cite this Court’s ruling in Okpalobi I finding that Plaintiff lacked standing in
her individual capacity because under a Judgment of Possession95 Plaintiff had no interest in the
Property at issue in this litigation. In response, Plaintiff asserts that she has individual standing
because she resides at the Property and Louisiana law permits her standing as executrix of
Decedent’s estate.

Under Louisiana law, judgments of possession in succession cases are considered prima
facie evidence of the rights of the heirs of the decedent.96 The right to assert inheritance rights is
subject to a 30 year prescriptive period, which runs from the decedent’s death.97 A succession can
be reopened “[a]fter … rendition of a judgment of possession by a court of competent jurisdiction,
if other property is discovered, or for any other proper cause, upon the petition of any interested

93 Id. at 312–13 (first quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999); then quoting Collins v.
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (2000)).
94 Id. at 312 (quoting Jones, 188 F.3d at 324).
95 On November 16, 2021, the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans issued the Judgment of
Possession, which was silent as to the ownership of the Property.
96 La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 3062.
97 See La. Civ. Code art. 3502, 934.
grounds other than discovery of additional property or new wills.”99

On March 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Probate of Statutory Testament in the Civil
District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.100 On November 16, 2021, the state
district court entered a Judgment of Possession that was silent as to Rose Okpalobi’s possession
of the Property.101 Plaintiff nonetheless contends that she has an interest in the Property because
she resides at the Property and therefore is a legal usufructuary.102 In support, Plaintiff claims that
as “the equitable beneficiary of the insured property and of any insurance proceeds paid in
connection with its loss” she has standing because “the injury required by Art. III may exist solely
by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.”103 However, this
Court has already held in Okpalobi I that Plaintiff was not a third-party beneficiary to the Insurance
Policy at issue.104 Thus, this Court will again follow the Judgment of Possession and find that

Plaintiff does not have standing to sue in her individual capacity in this matter. However, because
the court in the Succession of Dr. Ifeyani Charles Anthony Okpalobi recognized that Plaintiff is
executrix of his estate, this Court again finds she has standing to sue on behalf of the Estate.105

98 La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 3393(B).
99 Succession of Murray, 2022-667 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/10/23), 372 So. 3d 1, 6 (citing Estate of Sylvester, 93-
731 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/24/94, 631 So.2d 614, 619)).
100 Okpalobi I, Rec. Doc. 18-5 at 1. Succession of Dr. Ifeanyi Charles Anthony Okpalobi, No. 19-2450 (Civ.
Dist. Ct. Par. Orleans Mar. 6, 2019).
101 Okpalobi I, Rec. Doc. 18-5 at 27.
102 Rec. Doc. 44 at 6.
103 Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
104 Okpalobi I, Rec. Doc. 33.
105 Okpalobi I, Rec. Doc. 18-5 at 8.
Executrix
Federal law “determine[s] the preclusive effect of a federal judgment, even if that judgment
was based on state law.”106 Res judicata “bars all claims that were or could have been advanced in
support of the cause of action on the occasion of its former adjudication.”107 Res judicata has four
elements: (1) the parties are identical or in privity; (2) the judgment in the prior action was rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior action was concluded by a final judgment on the
merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action was involved in both suits.108
Regarding the identity of the parties element, Rose Okpalobi, individually and in her

capacity as executrix for the estate of Decedent, is the Plaintiff in both Okpalobi I and the instant
matter. Further, PHH is a named defendant in both Okpalobi I and the instant matter. While REO
is not a named defendant in Okpalobi I, Defendants assert that it “shares an identity of parties with
PHH[.]”109 Federal courts have held that judgments can bind persons not party to the litigation in
question when those persons were in privity with a party of the initial litigation.110 “[Privity] is
nothing more than a legal conclusion that the relationship between the one who is a party on the
record and the non-party is sufficiently close to afford application of the principle of preclusion.”111
For res judicata purposes, [the Fifth Circuit] has held that privity
exists in just three, narrowly-defined circumstances: (1) where the
non-party is the successor in interest to a party's interest in property;
(2) where the non-party controlled the prior litigation; and (3) where

106 Mowbray v. Cameron County, 274 F.3d 269, 281 (5th Cir. 2001).
107 Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 312–13 (5th Cir. 2004) (italics in original).
108 Id.
109 Rec. Doc. 40-1 at 9.
110 See Meza v. General Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1266 (5th Cir. 1990).
111 Id. (internal citation omitted).
the original suit.112
Hence, the Court finds that the identity of the parties element is met because PHH, as the loan
holder, adequately represented REO’s interests, as the mortgage servicer, in Okpalobi I. Further,
the second element of res judicata is met, because there is no dispute that this Court had jurisdiction
to issue a judgment in Okpalobi I.
Defendants assert that the third element of res judicata is met because Okpalobi I ended in
a final judgment on the merits. “A dismissal which is designated ‘with prejudice’ is ‘normally an
adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata.’”113 This Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims

against PHH in Okpalobi I with prejudice.114 Thus, the third element of res judicata is met here.
Regarding the “same claim or cause of action” element, the Fifth Circuit applies a
transactional test to determine “whether two suits involve the same claim or cause of action.”115
Under the transactional test, the focus is on whether the two cases “are based on ‘the same nucleus
of operative facts,’” rather than the relief requested or the theory asserted.116 Defendants assert that
Agrilectric is directly on point to the case at bar.
In Agrilectric, Agrilectric Power Partners, Ltd. and Agrilectric Power, Inc. (collectively
“Agrilectric”) purchased a turbine from General Electric (“GE”) to be used in their facility.117 GE

112 Id. (internal citation omitted).
113 Fernandez–Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 n. 8 (5th Cir.1993) (citation omitted).
114 Okpalobi I, Rec. Doc. 44.
115 United States v. Davenport, 484 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2007).
116 Id. (citation omitted).
117 Agrilectric, 20 F.3d at 664.
The turbine failed and Agrilectric filed suit thereafter alleging design and installation defects.119

The district court granted GE’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Agrilectric’s
complaint.120 Agrilectric appealed but the Fifth Circuit affirmed.121
Subsequently, Agrilectric filed a second lawsuit against GE based on breach of the
aforementioned service contract causing the turbine failure.122 GE moved for summary judgment
on the second complaint, citing res judicata.123 The district court agreed and dismissed the
complaint.124 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit outlined the res judicata tenets noted above and found
that, in each suit, Agrilectric (1) complained of the same accident, (2) alleged the same product
deficiency, and (3) claimed the same damages.125 In short, the court found that each suit involved
the same nucleus of operative facts and thus the same cause of action.126 The appellate court noted
that “[o]ne who has a choice of more than one remedy for a given wrong ... may not assert them

serially, in successive actions, but must advance all at once on pain of bar.”127

118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 665.
126 Id.
127 Id. (citing Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 559 (5th Cir. 1983)).
Similarly, here in both Okpalobi I and the instant matter Plaintiff alleges she had rights to
the Property; Hurricane Ida caused damage to the Property; the Property was insured under a
lender-placed insurance policy; an insurance claim was filed; and the insurer disbursed insurance
proceeds to the lender. Although Plaintiff pursues different claims and purports a different theory
of recovery in each case, both suits involve the same nucleus of operative facts. Therefore, the
final element is met, and the Court finds that the claims brought in Plaintiffs capacity as executrix
for the Estate of Ifeanyi Charles Anthony Okpalobi are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
V. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not have standing to sue in her
individual capacity. The Court further finds that the uncontroverted facts in the record establish
that the claims brought in Plaintiff's capacity as executrix for the Estate of Ifeanyi Charles Anthony
Okpalobi are barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss!** is GRANTED. The
claims Plaintiff brings against Defendants in her individual capacity are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of standing.'”’ The claims Plaintiff brings against Defendants
in her capacity as executrix of the estate are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as they are barred
by the doctrine of res judicata.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this _7th day of November, 2025.

NANNETTE JQLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

28 Rec. Doc. 40.
129 Green Valley Special Util. Dist. v. City of Schertz, Texas, 969 F.3d 460, 468 (Sth Cir. 2020) (“Ordinarily,
when a complaint is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, including lack of standing, it should be without prejudice.”).

18

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11200111. Public record. Not legal advice.