# Baptist

> District Court, N.D. New York · November 7, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11199951

## Case

- **Full name:** Ezra Baptist, Juliet Pearce, Margaret Lewis, Jamie Sanin, Carolyn Lechusza Aquallo, and Chelsea Villalba, on their own and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals who suffered excessive force during their unlawful arrests, and Michelle Riddell, on her own and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals unlawfully arrested v. Darrell P. Wheeler in his individual capacity, Sheriff Juan Figueroa, in his individual capacity, Olivia Bachor and Thomas Brusca, as representatives of a defendant class of New York State Police Officers who violated plaintiff’s rights as set forth herein and who are sued in their individual capacities, Deputy Sheriff Harder, as a representative of a defendant class of members of the Ulster County Sheriff’s Office who violated plaintiff’s rights as set forth herein and who are sued in their individual capacities, PO J. Yukoweic, Shield No. 16, as a representative of the class of members of the New Paltz State University Police who violated plaintiffs’ rights as set forth herein
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** November 7, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11199951

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- declining to dismiss punitive damages at the pleading stage because plaintiffs alleged conscious wrongdoing or callous indifference as to at least some of the individual defendants and had not yet had the benefit of any discovery

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________________

EZRA BAPTIST, JULIET PEARCE, MARGARET
LEWIS, JAMIE SANIN, CAROLYN LECHUSZA
AQUALLO, and CHELSEA VILLALBA, on their
own and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
individuals who suffered excessive force during their
unlawful arrests, and MICHELLE RIDDELL, on her
own and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
individuals unlawfully arrested,

Plaintiffs,

v. 1:24-cv-1478 (AMN/TWD)

DARRELL P. WHEELER in his individual capacity,
SHERIFF JUAN FIGUEROA, in his individual
capacity, OLIVIA BACHOR and THOMAS
BRUSCA, as representatives of a defendant class of
New York State Police Officers who violated
plaintiff’s rights as set forth herein and who are sued
in their individual capacities, DEPUTY SHERIFF
HARDER, as a representative of a defendant class of
members of the Ulster County Sheriff’s Office who
violated plaintiff’s rights as set forth herein and who
are sued in their individual capacities, PO J.
YUKOWEIC, Shield No. 16, as a representative of
the class of members of the New Paltz State
University Police who violated plaintiffs’ rights as
set forth herein and are sued in their individual
capacities,

Defendants.
_________________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

SUSSMAN, WATKINS LAW FIRM MICHAEL H. SUSSMAN, ESQ.
1 Railroad Avenue
P.O. Box 1005
Goshen, New York 10924
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SOKOLOFF STERN LLP KIMBERLY H. LEE, ESQ.
63 Washington Street
P.O. Box 509
Poughkeepsie, NY 12602

179 Westbury Avenue MARK A. RADI, ESQ.
Carle Place, NY 11514
Attorneys for Defendants Sheriff Juan Figueroa
and Sgt. James Harcher, s/h/a Deputy Sheriff
Harder
Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION & ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 5, 2024, Plaintiffs Ezra Baptist, Juliet Pearce, Margaret Lewis, Jamie Sanin,
Carolyn Lechusza Aquallo, Chelsea Villalba, and Michelle Riddell (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)
commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of a putative class of individuals.
Plaintiffs sue President Darrell P. Wheeler of the State University of New York at New Paltz
(“SUNY New Paltz”) and Ulster County Sheriff Juan P. Figueroa in their individual capacities, as
well as New York State Police Officers Olivia Bachor and Thomas Brusca, “Deputy Sheriff
Harder” of the Ulster County Sheriff’s Office, and New Paltz State University Police Officer Po
J. Yukoweic in their individual capacities and as representatives of putative defendant classes of
officers. In their amended complaint (“Amended Complaint”), Plaintiffs allege that the defendants
violated their constitutional rights through actions taken in response to a protest at SUNY New
Paltz on May 2, 2024. See generally Dkt. No. 9.
Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss brought by Defendants Sheriff Figueroa
and Sgt. James Harcher (collectively “Defendants”) for failure to state a claim on which relief can
be granted (the “Motion”).1 See Dkt. Nos. 29, 31, 33; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
For the following reasons, the Court denies the Motion in part and grants it in part.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Overview

Plaintiffs allege that on May 2, 2024, they were peacefully protesting “the atrocities
committed by the Israeli government with the active military support of the United States” at
SUNY New Paltz. Dkt. No. 9 at 1-2. Plaintiffs further allege that the defendants responded to the
demonstration by using hostile, violent, and aggressive tactics with the intent of suppressing
Plaintiffs’ speech, thereby violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Id.
B. The Parties
Plaintiffs are a group of SUNY New Paltz students and members of the local community.
Plaintiff Ezra Baptist is an undergraduate student at SUNY New Paltz. Id. at ¶ 1. Plaintiff Juliet
Pearce is a recent graduate of SUNY New Paltz. Id. at ¶ 2. Plaintiff Margaret Lewis is a resident
of the town of New Paltz. Id. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff Jamie Sanin is a graduate of SUNY New Paltz and
a “community member.” Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff Carolyn Lechusza Aquallo is a musician and educator
and a resident of Kingston, New York. Id. at ¶ 5. Plaintiff Chelsea Villalba is a community social
worker, a local human rights advocacy group member, and a resident of Kingston, New York. Id.

1 Defendants assert that “[t]here is no Deputy Harder employed by the Sheriff’s Office, but there
is an Officer Harder employed by the State Police who, upon information and belief, was present
during the subject events. Sgt. James Harcher is employed by the Sheriff’s Office.” Dkt. No. 29-
3 at 7, n.1. The Motion then seeks the dismissal of Harcher and Plaintiffs respond with respect to
Harcher, not Harder. Therefore, the Court for now assumes that Defendant “Deputy Sheriff
Harder” refers to Sgt. James Harcher.
at ¶ 6. Plaintiff Michelle Riddell is a special education teacher. Id. at ¶ 7. Plaintiffs Baptist,
Pearce, Lewis, Sanin, Lechusza Aquallo, and Villalba bring this suit on behalf of a putative class
comprising “similarly situated individuals who suffered excessive force during their unlawful
arrests[.]” Plaintiff Riddell brings suit on behalf of a putative class comprising “similarly situated
individuals unlawfully arrested[.]” Id. at 1.

At all relevant times, Defendant Juan Figueroa was the Sheriff of Ulster County, id. at ¶ 9,
and Defendant James Harcher was a member of the Ulster County Sheriff’s Office, id. at ¶ 11.
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Harcher represents a class of “members of the Ulster County
Sheriff’s Office who violated [P]laintiffs’ rights” on May 2, 2024. Id. at ¶ 11.
C. Events of May 1-2, 2024
On May 1, 2024, SUNY New Paltz students and community members, including Plaintiffs
(collectively, the “demonstrators”), erected a tent encampment on Parker Quad, an outdoor lawn
on campus, “to protest the ongoing genocide in Gaza and demand SUNY New Paltz divest from
entities profiting from this violence.” Id. at ¶¶ 15, 18, 19. Plaintiffs allege that law enforcement

officers, campus officials, and the New Paltz Village Deputy Mayor advised encampment members
that tent camping was not permitted on SUNY New Paltz property, admonished students to remove
their tents, and warned of “potential police action.” Id. at ¶¶ 21, 23, 27, 30, 34-36.
Plaintiffs allege that on May 2, 2024, encampment members had removed all tents by about
6:30 pm. Id. at ¶¶ 20-37. Plaintiffs further allege that “[a]t about 7:15 pm,” University officials
“returned, acknowledged that the students had removed their tents, and, without providing
justification, instructed them to disperse by 9:00 pm.” Id. at ¶ 41. Plaintiffs then contend that the
demonstrators did not leave but “engaged in peaceful protest” by interlocking their arms and legs
on the ground in a circle in the middle of Parker Quad, “chanting protest songs and reviewing
safety steps in case of police violence.” Id. at ¶¶ 47, 43-44.
The Amended Complaint then states that around 9:30 pm, “more than 15 police vehicles
from the New York State Police and Ulster County Sheriff’s Office, accompanied by at least 30
officers on foot, advanced toward Parker Quad.” Id. at ¶¶ 52-53. Plaintiffs allege that law

enforcement directed this response from “a joint command center involving SUNY New Paltz
University Police, New York State Police, Ulster County Sheriff’s Office deputies and members
of the New Paltz Police Department[]”. Id. Around 10:03 pm, an unidentified officer issued a
dispersal order via loudspeaker from one of the patrol vehicles, declared the demonstrators’
gathering unlawful, and gave demonstrators ten minutes to vacate Parker Quad. Id. at ¶ 54.
Plaintiffs allege that the order was “barely audible” because demonstrators were chanting and
“surveillance drones and helicopters” were “circling overhead[.]” Id. Plaintiffs also allege that
law enforcement issued two additional dispersal warnings at 10:18 and 10:28 pm. Id. at ¶ 55.
Plaintiffs allege that around 10:20 pm, law enforcement officers, including Ulster County

Sheriff’s Office members, “lined up outside Gage Hall” wearing riot gear and accompanied by K-
9 units. Id. at ¶ 59. Subsequently, at about 10:30 pm, the officers “stormed the former encampment
area, tearing down and trampling the demonstrators’ banners, which contained constitutionally
protected speech.” Id. at ¶ 60. The officers “moved in a tight, coordinated formation” and
“surrounded seated demonstrators, shined flashlights in their faces, and systematically removed
them while they continued chanting.” Id. at ¶¶ 62-63. Working with other law enforcement
officers and “directed by a commanding officer,” Ulster County Sheriff’s Office members “would
create openings in their line, through which teams of two to five [officers] would rush forward”
and “grab demonstrators by their arms, legs, or clothing,” “drag them several feet behind the police
line[,]” close the gap in the line and re-form ranks. Id. at ¶¶ 64-65.
Plaintiffs also allege specific instances in which officers removed or arrested
demonstrators. Unidentified officers threw Plaintiff Baptist headfirst into a pallet, causing “a deep
gash in his scalp that bled heavily[,]” and then dragged him across the ground by his arms and

handcuffed him. Id. at ¶ 66a. Among other things, Plaintiffs allege that unidentified officers
dragged Plaintiffs Baptist, Villalba, and Pearce by their limbs, inappropriately touched Plaintiffs
Villalba and Lechusza Aquallo’s breasts, forced Plaintiffs Villalba, Lechusza Aquallo, and Lewis
onto their stomachs, and tightly handcuffed Plaintiffs Sanin and Lechusza Aquallo’s wrists with
zip-ties, causing them pain. Id. at ¶¶ 66a-f, 75-76. Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiff Baptist did not
receive medical attention for more than an hour; after he was processed at the Highland Barracks,
he received several staples to close his head wound. Id. at ¶¶ 66a, 87-88. Plaintiff Lewis, who
was in her 80s and had been separated from her cane by unidentified officers, “collapsed and was
transported by ambulance for emergency medical care.” Id. at ¶¶ 66f, 84. In sum, Plaintiffs allege

that 170 law enforcement members “arrested over 130 demonstrators . . . for trespassing and/or
engaging in ‘disorderly conduct’ while they peacefully assembled to express their views on public
property.” Id. at ¶¶ 94, 102.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Figueroa “personally ordered . . . Ulster County Sheriff
deputies to unlawfully disperse and arrest” Plaintiffs. Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiffs also allege that
Defendant Wheeler acted “in opposition to the ‘anti-genocide’ message that plaintiffs promoted,”
and that Defendant Figueroa “supported” Wheeler’s use of law enforcement to “stifle plaintiffs’
exercise of their rights of assembly and free speech.” Id. at ¶¶ 46, 57.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of a party’s claim for relief. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111–12 (2d Cir. 2007).
In considering legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-pled facts in the complaint
and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund,
Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). This presumption, however, does not extend to legal
conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead “a short and plain statement of the
claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual “heft to sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to
relief,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (alteration in original) (quotation
omitted). Under this standard, a pleading’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level,” id. at 555 (citation omitted), and present claims that are
“plausible on [their] face,” id. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely
consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Ultimately, “when
the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, or where a plaintiff has “not nudged [his or her] claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed,” id. at 570.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs assert four causes of action against Defendants: First Amendment retaliation,
Fourth Amendment excessive force, Fourth Amendment false arrest, and Fourth Amendment
unlawful seizure. Id. at ¶¶ 112-115. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not adequately pled
that Defendant Figueroa or Defendant Harcher were personally involved in any of the alleged
constitutional violations. Dkt. No. 29-3 at 11.
“[I]t is well settled that, in order to establish a defendant’s individual liability in a suit
brought under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, the defendant’s personal

involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Morabito v. New York, 803 Fed. App’x
463, 466 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013)).
“Pursuant to this requirement, a Section 1983 plaintiff must allege a tangible connection between
the acts of the defendant and the injuries suffered.” Keyes v. Venettozzi, No. 9:18-CV-0372
(GTS/DJS), 2022 WL 991402, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022) (quotation and internal quotation
marks omitted). In other words, “the actions or omissions attributable to each defendant must be
the proximate cause of the injuries and consequent damages that the plaintiff sustained.” Durr v.
Slator, 558 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20 (N.D.N.Y 2021) (citations omitted).
While supervisory liability is not permitted under Section 1983, a defendant “need not

actually ‘pull the trigger,’ or use force themselves, to be liable . . . as a direct participant.” Figuereo
v. City of Saratoga Springs, No. 1:23-cv-00922 (AMN/PJE), 2025 WL 460784, at *9 (N.D.N.Y
Feb. 11, 2025). “A defendant who plans or directs an unreasonable use of force is liable for the
resulting constitutional violation as a ‘direct participant.’” Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 234
(2d Cir. 2014). “In this Circuit, a ‘direct participant’ includes a person who authorizes, orders, or
helps others to do the unlawful acts, even if he or she does not commit the acts personally.” Id.;
see also Campbell v. City of Yonkers, 19 CV 2117 (VB), 2023 WL 4867459, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July
31, 2023).
The Court considers Defendants’ contentions as to their lack of personal involvement with
respect to each of Plaintiffs’ claims.
A. First Amendment Retaliation Claims
“To plead a First Amendment retaliation claim a plaintiff must show that: (1) he has a right
protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant’s actions were motivated or substantially

caused by his exercise of that right; and (3) the defendant’s actions caused him some injury.”
Dorsett v. Cnty. of Nassau, 732 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2013). As to the second element, because a
defendant’s motive and intent are difficult to plead with specificity, courts in this Circuit have
found it “sufficient to allege facts from which a retaliatory intent . . . reasonably may be inferred.”
Gagliard v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Case v. City of New York,
233 F. Supp. 3d 372, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). “With respect to the third element, the plaintiff[]
[generally] must show that [his] First Amendment rights were ‘actually chilled.’” Searle v. Red
Creek Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 22-2049-cv, 2023 WL 3398137, at *2 (2d Cir. May 12, 2023)
(summary order) (quoting Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001)). But a

plaintiff may instead show some other concrete, non-speech related harm. Dorsett, 732 F.3d at
160. Finally, when the alleged retaliation takes the form of an arrest, a plaintiff must also plead
the absence of probable cause. Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019).
1. Defendant Figueroa
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations are conclusory, and that Plaintiffs fail to
adequately allege that Defendant Figuroa personally violated any Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Dkt. No. 29-3 at 11. Specifically, Defendants assert: “Plaintiffs do not allege that Sheriff Figueroa
personally participated in any arrest or took any retaliatory action against any Plaintiff or purported
class member. Nor do Plaintiffs allege facts plausibly suggesting Sheriff Figueroa’s actions were
motivated by Plaintiffs’ exercise of any First Amendment rights, or that Sheriff Figueroa caused
injury to any plaintiff.” Id.
The Court finds Plaintiffs’ allegations plausible. To sufficiently plead that Defendant
Figueroa was personally involved in First Amendment retaliation, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege
that his actions were “motivated or substantially caused” by Plaintiffs’ exercise of their first

Amendment rights and that his actions caused Plaintiffs some injury. Dorsett, 732 F.3d at 160.
Here, Plaintiffs have done so by alleging that Defendant Figueroa personally ordered officers to
disperse and arrest lawful demonstrators and did so to “stifle” their rights to free speech and
assembly, resulting in the end of the demonstration as well as physical injuries to some
demonstrators. See Dkt. No. 9 at ¶¶ 9, 46, 57, 66a, 90, 108; see also Torreso, 764 F.3d at 234.
Therefore, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim
against Defendant Figueroa.
2. Defendant Harcher
Plaintiffs’ specific allegations against Defendant Harcher concern one arrest at the

demonstration. After alleging that Defendant Harcher participated in the removal of demonstrators
from the Quad, see Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 11, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Harcher was personally
involved in the arrest of Plaintiff Riddell, id. at ¶ 66g. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant
Harcher was part of a group of officers who approached Plaintiff Riddell to arrest her. Id. at ¶
66(g). After Plaintiff Riddell pled with them not to handcuff her behind the back because she had
a broken arm, the officers, including Defendant Harcher, handcuffed her in the front and led her
away. Id. “[T]hereafter defendant Harder [sic] was identified as the arresting officer.” Id.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege a First Amendment claim against Defendant
Harcher because they “do not allege Sgt. Harcher interacted with any other individual, and they
failed to allege Riddell was actually engaged in any First Amendment-protected activity, an
absence of probable cause to arrest for trespassing (the complaint does not allege she was a student
or employee entitled to be on campus after 10:00 p.m.), or that Sgt. Harcher’s actions were
motivated by Plaintiffs’ exercise of any First Amendment right.” Dkt. No. 29-3 at 11.
The Court finds Defendants’ arguments unavailing. Viewed in the light most favorable to

Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Plaintiff Riddell gathered with a group of peaceful
and lawful demonstrators, see Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 39, and her presence among that group is an activity
protected by the First Amendment.2 Plaintiffs have also plausibly alleged that Defendant Harcher
arrested her without cause, and it is reasonable to infer that this arrest was motivated or
substantially caused in part by the exercise of her First Amendment rights, i.e., her connection to
and presence among the group of demonstrators. See id. at ¶¶ 7, 54, 66g. At this stage, these
allegations are sufficient for Plaintiffs’ claims to proceed.3
Thus, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim
against Defendant Harcher.

2 Defendants point out that the Amended Complaint specifically alleges that Plaintiffs Baptist and
Pearce were “engaging in peaceful protest,” but as to the other Plaintiffs it merely alleges that they
were lawfully present. Dkt. No. 29-3 at 7; see Dkt. No. 9 at ¶¶ 1-7. Reading the Complaint in the
light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court infers that Plaintiffs allege that those Plaintiffs not
specifically described as engaging in protest, including Plaintiff Riddell, were at the very least part
of the same First Amendment assembly as Plaintiffs Baptist and Pearce. See, e.g., Marom v. City
of New York, 15-cv-2017 (PKC), 2016 WL 916424, at *10 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 7, 2016) (holding that
“[i]t is plausible to conclude that an individual [who] chooses to physically associate with [a rally
intended to convey a particularized message of political support] was engaging in expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment” even when that individual only alleged that she was
present).
3 As discussed further in Section C.2, Plaintiffs need not plead more to show a plausible lack of
probable cause.
B. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Claims
When assessing whether force is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a court
should pay “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight.’” Soares v. Connecticut, 8 F.3d 917, 921 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). In doing so, a court takes the perspective of “a reasonable officer on the
scene” rather than that of hindsight. Brown v. City of New York, 798 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2015)
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397).
The Supreme Court’s “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right
to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of
physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. “The police are not
required to utilize the least amount of force possible to place someone into custody.” Brennan v.
City of Middletown, No. 18 Civ. 6148, 2020 WL 3820195, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2020).

“Moreover, to support an excessive force claim, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant used
more than de minimis force.” Durr, 558 F. Supp. 3d at 16 (citing Feliciano v. Thomann, 747 Fed.
App’x 885, 887 (2d Cir. 2019)). “Even conduct that caused some physical pain and resulted in
side effects need not be compensated if a jury finds that such injuries were de minimis.” Id. (citing
Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 123 (2d Cir. 2004)). However, regardless of the amount
of force, “a show of force by an officer that is overly disproportionate to the risk of harm may
support a claim for excessive force.” Id. (citing Gersbacher v. City of New York, No. 1:14-cv-
7600, 2017 WL 4402538, *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2017)).
In the arrest context, “unnecessary handcuff tightening . . . can constitute excessive force.”
Ketcham v. City of Mount Vernon, 992 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2021). This standard includes
handcuffs that are “overly tight.” Burdick v. Oswego Cnty., 2014 WL 12781320, at *9 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2014). A plaintiff asserting an excessive force claim, however, need not mechanically
plead a certain level of handcuff tightness. See Cugini v. City of New York, 941 F.3d 604, 613 (2d

Cir. 2019). Rather, a court asks “more broadly whether an officer reasonably should have known
during handcuffing that his use of force was excessive. A plaintiff satisfies this requirement if
either the unreasonableness of the force used was apparent under the circumstances, or the plaintiff
signaled her distress, verbally or otherwise, such that a reasonable officer would have been aware
of her pain, or both.” Id.
Excessive force claims are intensely fact specific and often not amenable to early
resolution. Jimenez v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 23-CV-9476 (AMD) (RLM), 2025 WL 948348, at *15
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2025). Indeed, “in the arrest context, the reasonableness of the force used is
often a jury question.” Oakley v. Dolan, 980 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2020).

1. Defendant Figueroa
Plaintiffs plausibly allege instances in which multiple officers used excessive force. For
example, Plaintiffs allege that “two unidentified male officers” threw Plaintiff Baptist “headfirst
into a pallet stacked with water bottles and food supplies,” “resulting in a deep gash in his scalp
that bled heavily.” Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 66a. Plaintiffs also allege at least four specific instances in
which unidentified officers handcuffed demonstrators too tightly, resulting in pain. Id. at ¶¶ 66c,
66d, 68b, 87. With respect to Defendant Figueroa, Plaintiffs allege that he personally ordered
officers to disperse the protest and arrest lawful demonstrators. Id. at ¶ 9. As such, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that Defendant Figueroa was personally involved in the
deprivation of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights through the use of excessive force.
2. Defendant Harcher
As the Court has noted, Plaintiff Riddell’s arrest is the only specific incident in which
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Harcher was involved. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’

allegations concerning Plaintiff Riddell’s arrest fail to state a claim for excessive force. Dkt. No.
29-3 at 13. The Court agrees. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint describes Riddell’s arrest in detail,
but in contrast with other arrest allegations, Plaintiffs make no mention of officers using more than
de minimis force, nor do they allege that officers handcuffed Riddell in a manner that was overly
tight. AC at ¶ 66g. At no point do Plaintiffs allege that Riddell complained of pain while in
handcuffs nor do they describe instances in which Defendant Harcher used any force, let alone
excessive force. Id. In fact, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Harcher and the other officers
accommodated Plaintiff Riddell’s request to be handcuffed in front because of her previously
broken arm. Id. Indeed, Plaintiff Riddell, unlike the other Plaintiffs, does not bring an excessive

force claim. See Dkt. No. 9 at 1 (caption).
Plaintiffs fail to respond directly to Defendants’ argument, seeking instead to restyle their
claim against Defendant Harcher as a Fourth Amendment violation for failure to intervene in a use
of excessive force. Dkt. No. 31 at 25. The Amended Complaint does not list failure to intervene
as one of Plaintiffs’ four causes of action, and the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ one allegation that
all moving and non-moving defendants failed to intervene is conclusory; it lacks sufficient factual
detail concerning a failure to intervene in any particular use of excessive force or any individual’s
personal involvement. See Dkt. No. 9 at ¶¶ 109, 111-15.
Because Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege Defendant Harcher’s use of excessive
force, the Court dismisses this claim against Defendant Harcher. See Acevedo v. Ross, No. 18-
CV-06140 (JMA) (AKT), 2019 WL 343246, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2019) (“Plaintiff’s bare
allegation that he was handcuffed is insufficient to constitute excessive force that is prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment.”).4

C. Fourth Amendment False Arrest Claims
To state a claim for false arrest under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that “(1) a defendant
intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff
did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Adams
v. City of New York, No. 21-CV03956, 2023 WL 2734611, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2023) (citations
omitted). A confinement is “privileged” if it is based on “probable cause.” See, e.g., Simpson v.
City of New York., 793 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 2015). “A police officer has probable cause to arrest
when he has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has

committed or is committing a crime.” Hulett v. City of Syracuse, 253 F. Supp. 3d 462, 494
(N.D.N.Y. 2017) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “However, when an arrest is made
without a judicial warrant, the existence of probable cause is an affirmative defense, for which
defendants bear the burden of proof.” White v. Cnty. of Dutchess, No. 15 CV 8744 (VB), 2016

4 The Court notes that to the extent that Plaintiffs intended for Defendant Harcher to serve as a
named representative for the defendant class of Ulster County Sheriff’s Office members who
allegedly engaged in excessive force, the dismissal of the claim of excessive force against him
prevents him from serving in such a capacity. See, e.g., Mental Disability L. Clinic v. Hogan, No.
CV-06-6320 (CPS)(JO), 2008 WL 4104460, at *21 n. 32 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2008) (declining,
after dismissing defendant, to certify a defendant class because defendant could no longer serve as
adequate class representative).
WL 4449720, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2016) (citing Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 751
(2d Cir. 2010)).
1. Defendant Figueroa
Plaintiffs allege numerous instances that satisfy the first three elements of a false arrest
claim. See Dkt No. 9 at ¶¶ 66a-g, 68b, 72. As to the fourth element, Plaintiffs allege that they

were assembled lawfully and were not committing any crimes when officers arrested them and
other members of the putative class. See id. at ¶¶ 45, 94, 115. Plaintiffs also argue that there were
no laws or regulations that prohibited their activities at the time of the arrests, and that all arrests
were made without probable cause. Id. at ¶ 115; Dkt. No. 31 at 20 n. 2.
The Court thus finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that Defendant Figueroa was
personally involved in the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights via false arrest. As
above, Plaintiffs allege that he personally ordered officers to disperse the protest and arrest lawful
demonstrators. Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 9.
Thus, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for false arrest

against Defendant Figueroa.
2. Defendant Harcher
Defendants raise two separate grounds on which the allegation of false arrest against
Defendant Harcher should be dismissed. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ false arrest
allegations against Defendant Harcher rely on impermissible group pleading. Second, Defendants
raise the affirmative defense of probable cause.
First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ account of Plaintiff Riddell’s arrest engages in
impermissible group pleading and therefore does not specifically allege that Defendant Harcher
was personally involved in any act constituting false arrest. Dkt. No. 29-3 at 15. However,
Defendants misapply the prohibition on group pleading. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs
frequently attribute alleged violations to both individual officers and groups of unidentified
officers, but such attributions are not impermissible group pleading. In cases involving alleged
police misconduct, courts give particular attention to the factual context to determine whether the
pleadings have met the requirements for adequate notice. See Bryant v. Monroe Cnty., No. 19-CV-

6474, 2022 WL 119184, at *11-12 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2022) (collecting and applying cases). “In
situations involving an alleged assault by a group of police officers or corrections officers, courts
do not insist that the complaint set forth in detail the actions of each officer where it would be
unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to be able to do so.” Id. at *10.
This case is one such situation. Plaintiffs allege that about 170 officers from multiple
jurisdictions were present at the protest. Dkt. No. 9 at ¶¶ 52, 102; Dkt. No. 31 at 11. When law
enforcement dispersed the protest, Plaintiffs allege various incidents in which mostly unidentified
officers “shined flashlights in their faces,” “moved in a tight, coordinated formation,” “jabbed” at
demonstrators with batons, and chased and grabbed demonstrators from behind, among other

actions. Dkt. No. 9 at ¶¶ 62, 63, 68, 71. Given these allegations of a chaotic scene, “[i]t would be
asking too much for an arrestee to remember and plead the role each of several police officers
played” in this alleged instance of false arrest. Messina v. Mazzeo, 854 F. Supp. 116 (E.D.N.Y.
1994).
The Court finds that even though Plaintiffs identify Defendant Harcher as one of a group
of arresting officers, they sufficiently allege that he was “involved in the alleged constitutional
deprivations, and how [he was] involved.” Little v. Soulia, 9:19-CV-0263 (TJM/TWD), 2019 WL
13378467, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2019). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Harcher
violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights because he (1) participated in the dispersal of
lawful demonstrators; and (2) arrested Plaintiff Riddell without cause. Dkt. No. 9 at ¶¶ 11, 66g;
see also Dkt. No. 31 at 18. Defendant Harcher has thus received fair notice of Plaintiffs’ claims
and the grounds on which they rest. See Atahuene v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App’x 33, 34 (2d. Cir.
2001).
Second, as to probable cause, Defendants argue that “[t]he complaint fails to allege . . . that

there was no probable cause to arrest [Riddell] for trespassing.” Dkt. No. 29 at 15. However, at
this stage, Plaintiffs do not need to preemptively refute all possible assertions of probable cause
through their pleadings but need only plead facts sufficient to show a plausible lack of probable
cause.5 In this Circuit, that standard is satisfied where a plaintiff, as here, alleges a warrantless
arrest. Vincent, 2018 WL 1441370, at *9 (“Because of the presumption that a warrantless arrest is
unlawful, plaintiffs are not required to allege a lack of probable cause when stating a false arrest
claim based on such an arrest.” (citing Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 458 (1975))); White,
2016 WL4449720, at *7 (“Because probable cause is an affirmative defense when a plaintiff is
arrested without a warrant, here, plaintiff’s warrantless arrest is sufficient to meet the fourth

element at the motion to dismiss stage.”).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendant Harcher
was personally involved in the false arrest of Plaintiff Riddell. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant
Harcher, along with other officers, intended to confine Plaintiff Riddell and that Plaintiff Riddell
was conscious of the confinement. Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 66g. Viewing the allegations in the light most

5 At this stage, to successfully raise a probable cause defense, Defendants would need to show that
the Amended Complaint alleges facts giving rise to probable cause or arguable probable cause as
a matter of law. Here, Defendants merely argue that Plaintiffs inadequately refute the possibility
of probable cause. See, e.g., Vincent v. Winski, No. 14-CV-7744 (VSB), 2018 WL 1441370, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2018) (holding that defendant’s argument that probable cause existed to
effectuate plaintiff’s arrests failed on motion to dismiss because plaintiff’s complaint did not allege
facts demonstrating probable cause).
favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court infers that Plaintiff Riddell, despite negotiating to be handcuffed
in front rather than behind her back, did not consent to the confinement. See id. Finally, Plaintiffs
allege that all arrests described in the Amended Complaint were warrantless and made without
probable cause—assumed true, Riddell’s confinement was not privileged. See Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 115.
The Court therefore denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for false arrest

against Defendant Harcher.
D. Fourth Amendment Seizure of Persons
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims for false arrest and seizure of their persons under
the Fourth Amendment are duplicative. Dkt. No. 29-3 at 16; see Dkt. No. 9 at ¶¶ 113, 115.
Plaintiffs do not respond, and the Court agrees with Defendants. Thus, the Court dismisses
Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants for the seizure of their persons as duplicative of their claims
for false arrest because Plaintiffs premise both sets of claims on the same alleged facts. See, e.g.,
Parkinson v. Town of Niskayuna, 2023 WL 8574309, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.) (“To the extent Plaintiff
premises his Fourth Amendment claim on the seizure of his person, such a claim is dismissed

because it is tantamount to a claim for false arrest.”) (citing Dixon v. City of Syracuse, 493 F. Supp.
3d 30, 42 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (dismissing a claim for unlawful seizure as duplicative of a claim for
false arrest where no facts differentiate the claims)). For the same reason, the Court also sua sponte
dismisses the seizure of persons claims as against all non-moving defendants. See, e.g.,
Jacquemyns v. Spartan Mullen Et Cie, S.A., No. 10 Civ. 1586 (CM)(FM), 2011 WL 348452, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2011) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim for relief against all defendants after
dismissing it as against moving defendants, in part because it was duplicative).
E. Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their
conduct “‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit

when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the
law governing the circumstances she confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
“[I]f officers of reasonable competence could disagree on [whether the conduct is constitutional],
immunity should be recognized.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
A court applies “a two-step analysis to determine whether qualified immunity bars a
plaintiff’s claim against government officials for civil damages related to actions taken in the
course of their official duties.” Sabir v. Williams, 52 F.4th 810, 817 (2d Cir. 2022), cert. dismissed,
143 S. Ct. 2694 (2023) (citing Francis v. Fiacco, 942 F.3d 126, 139 (2d Cir. 2019)). “Pursuant to
that analysis, qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless

the plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,
and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). In assessing whether the right was clearly established, courts “do not
require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). The
determining question is “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established,”
id. (emphasis added), and the analysis “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the
case, not as a broad general proposition[,]” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per
curiam) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense; therefore, Defendants bear the burden of
proving that qualified immunity applies. See Coolick v. Hughes, 699 F.3d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 2012).
The defense of qualified immunity may properly be raised at the motion to dismiss stage because
“[q]ualified immunity provides government officials ‘immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability.’” Looney v. Black, 702 F.3d 701, 705 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Pearson, 555

U.S. at 231). At the motion to dismiss stage, the qualified immunity defense “‘faces a formidable
hurdle ... and is usually not successful’” because it is the defendant who must plead and prove the
defense. Estate of Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 960 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting
Field Day, LLC v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 463 F.3d 167, 191-92 (2d Cir. 2006)). Defendants “must
therefore show not only that the facts supporting the defense appear on the face of the complaint,
but also that it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim that would entitle him to relief.” Horn v. Stephenson, 11 F.4th 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2021).
Defendants Figueroa and Harcher argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity
because “Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege their personal involvement in the violation of any

clearly established constitutional right.” Dkt. No. 29-3 at 17. The Court incorporates its previous
determinations and finds it inappropriate to grant qualified immunity at this stage. On the face of
the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Defendants Figueroa and Harcher either
ordered or participated in the dispersal of a lawful assembly, resulting in arrests without cause and
the use of excessive force. Thus, Defendants have not met their burden—Plaintiffs may ultimately
prove some set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to relief.
F. Punitive Damages
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations “fail to meet the high threshold necessary to
obtain an award of punitive damages against Sheriff Figueroa and Sgt. Harcher.” Dkt. No. 29-3
at 16 n. 2; see Dkt. No. 9 at 20 (prayer for relief). Plaintiffs failed to dispute Defendants’ argument
to strike punitive damages, and Defendants now request that the Court deem that request
abandoned. Dkt. No. 33 at 8. In its discretion, the Court finds that it is premature to preclude
Plaintiffs from pursuing punitive damages against Defendants Figueroa and Harcher. See, e.g.,
Lipton v. Cnty. of Orange, N.Y., 315 F. Supp. 2d 434, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding, in a case

where plaintiff was counseled, that a court “may . . . deem a claim abandoned when a plaintiff fails
to respond to a defendant’s arguments that the claim should be dismissed[,]” and that “[a]pplication
of this proposition is . . . tempered by this Court’s discretion”); see also Keitt v. New York City,
882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (declining to dismiss punitive damages at the pleading
stage because plaintiffs alleged conscious wrongdoing or callous indifference as to at least some
of the individual defendants and had not yet had the benefit of any discovery) (citing Frank Sloup
Crabs Unlimited, LLC v. Loeffler, 745 F. Supp. 2d 115, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quotation marks
omitted).
V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Retaliation
claim, Fourth Amendment Excessive Force claim, and Fourth Amendment False Arrest claim
against Defendant Juan P. Figueroa is DENIED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Retaliation
claim and Fourth Amendment False Arrest claim against Defendant James Harcher is DENIED;
and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment Excessive Force claim against Defendant
James Harcher is DISMISSED without prejudice; and
ORDERS that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment Seizure claims against all defendants are
DISMISSED with prejudice; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the
parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 7, 2025 Oued y . Jay WARE
Albany, NY Anne M. Nardacci
U.S. District Judge

23

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11199951. Public record. Not legal advice.