# United States v. Jimmy Diggs

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · November 6, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11198376

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** November 6, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** CON
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11198376

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a defendant must raise “specific factual and legal argumentation at every stage of sentencing proceedings”

## Opinion text

USCA11 Case: 24-10232 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2025 Page: 1 of 9

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-10232
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

JIMMY DERRICK DIGGS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:23-cr-00007-SPC-NPM-1
____________________
____________________
No. 24-10233
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
USCA11 Case: 24-10232 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2025 Page: 2 of 9

2 Opinion of the Court 24-10232

versus

JIMMY DERRICK DIGGS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:23-cr-00106-SPC-KCD-1
____________________

Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this consolidated appeal, Jimmy Diggs appeals his sen-
tences for two counts of possession of a firearm as a convicted
felon, entered in separate cases. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Accord-
ing to Diggs, the district court erred by enhancing his sentence un-
der the Armed Career Criminal Act because his prior Florida co-
caine convictions were not serious drug offenses since Florida’s def-
inition of cocaine was categorically broader than the federal defini-
tion. Below, the issue he raised was that Florida’s cocaine defini-
tion included ioflupane while the federal definition did not. Now,
the issue he raises is that Florida’s definition of cocaine included
“any stereoisomer of cocaine,” while the federal definition only in-
cluded “optical and geometric isomers” of cocaine. Reviewing his
unpreserved isomer issue for plain error, we conclude that the dis-
trict court did not plainly err in treating Diggs’s prior convictions
as serious drug offenses under the Act.
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24-10232 Opinion of the Court 3

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Diggs pleaded guilty in two separate cases to possessing fire-
arms as a convicted felon. Diggs moved for a single sentencing
hearing, which the district court granted.
The probation office prepared a presentence report for both
cases, recommending that Diggs be sentenced as an armed career
criminal. According to the report, Diggs had at least three prior
convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses committed
on different occasions: (1) a 1990 Florida conviction for the sale,
manufacture, or possession with intent to sell cocaine; (2) a 1993
armed robbery; and (3) a 2011 Florida conviction for the sale of co-
caine within 1,000 feet of a specified area.
Diggs objected to the designation as an armed career crimi-
nal, asserting that his drug convictions were not serious drug of-
fenses under the Act because Florida’s definition of cocaine was
categorically broader than the federal definition. Specifically, he
contended that, at the time he committed the predicate offenses,
Florida’s drug schedules included ioflupane while the federal drug
schedules did not. Compare Fla. Stat. § 893.03(2)(a)(4) (1990); id.
§ 893.03(2)(a)(4) (2011) to 21 U.S.C. § 812 Sched. II at (a)(4) (1990);
id. § 812 Sched. II at (a)(4) (2011). The district court overruled
Diggs’s objection because it was foreclosed by our decision in
United States v. Jackson, 55 F.4th 846 (11th Cir. 2022), aff’d sub nom.,
Brown v. United States, 602 U.S. 101 (2024). Adopting the presen-
tence report, the district court sentenced Diggs under the Act as an
armed career criminal.
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-10232

Diggs now appeals his sentence. This time, however, he
contends that Florida’s cocaine definition was overbroad because
it encompassed “stereoisomers,” while the federal definition in-
cluded only “optical and geometric isomers.” Compare Fla. Stat.
§ 893.03(2)(a)(4) (1990); id. § 893.03(2)(a)(4) (2011) to 21 U.S.C.
§ 812 Sched. II at (a)(4) (1990); id. § 812 Sched. II at (a)(4) (2011).
Reviewing the issue for plain error, we affirm the district court’s
sentence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review unpreserved challenges for plain error. United
States v. Laines, 69 F.4th 1221, 1229 (11th Cir. 2023).
DISCUSSION
The Armed Career Criminal Act requires any person who
violates 18 U.S.C. section 922(g) to serve a mandatory minimum
imprisonment sentence of fifteen years when the defendant is an
“armed career criminal,” meaning he has three prior convictions
for violent felonies or serious drug offenses committed on separate
occasions. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). A “prior state drug conviction
constitutes” a predicate conviction under the Act “if the drugs on
the federal and state schedules matched when the state drug of-
fense was committed.” Brown, 602 U.S. at 119.
In making this determination, we apply a categorical ap-
proach and consider the statutory definition of the state offense ra-
ther than the facts of the crime itself. Jackson, 55 F.4th at 850. A
state conviction qualifies as a predicate under the Act only if the
state statute under which the conviction occurred defines the
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24-10232 Opinion of the Court 5

offense in the same way as, or more narrowly than, the federal def-
inition of a “serious drug offense.” Id. That is, “all the controlled
substances covered by the state law must also be controlled sub-
stances under federal law.” Laines, 69 F.4th at 1233.
Here, Diggs contends that his Florida convictions do not
qualify as serious drug offenses because Florida’s cocaine definition
was broader than the federal definition. Specifically, Diggs asserts
that Florida’s definition encompassed “stereoisomers,” while the
federal definition included only “optical and geometric isomers.”
Compare Fla. Stat. § 893.03(2)(a)(4) (1990); id. § 893.03(2)(a)(4)
(2011) to 21 U.S.C. § 812 Sched. II at (a)(4) (1990); id. § 812 Sched. II
at (a)(4) (2011). But, as Diggs concedes, in the district court, he
focused only on Florida’s inclusion of ioflupane in its drug sched-
ules and he did not mention isomers. Thus, as we will explain, we
must review the isomer issue for plain error. And the district court
did not plainly err.
I.
Because both his issues relate to whether Florida’s cocaine
definition was overbroad, Diggs contends that he preserved the iso-
mer issue by raising the ioflupane issue in the district court. We
disagree.
“To preserve an issue for appeal, one must raise an objection
that is sufficient to apprise” the district court and the opposing
party of “the particular grounds upon which appellate relief will
later be sought.” United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003, 1011 (11th
Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). “[T]he district court is not
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-10232

expected to read minds or independently conceive of every possi-
ble argument a party might raise in support of an objection.” Id.
Instead, “[i]t is a defendant’s—or his counsel’s—burden to articu-
late the specific nature of his objection . . . so that the district court
may reasonably have an opportunity to consider it.” United States
v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1090 (11th Cir. 2003); see also United States v.
Corbett, 921 F.3d 1032, 1043 (2019) (explaining that a defendant
must raise “specific factual and legal argumentation at every stage
of sentencing proceedings”). Thus, a defendant fails to preserve a
challenge to his sentence when his objections before the district
court are “substantively different” from what he raises on appeal.
See United States v. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir. 2014).
Here, Diggs failed to preserve his challenge. Diggs’s io-
flupane objection that he raised before the district court was “sub-
stantively different” than the isomer objection he raises now. See
id. The isomer issue relies on different chemical compounds and
would require consideration of different arguments about the tex-
tual differences between the Florida and federal statutes—argu-
ments that the government did not have an opportunity to present
and the district court did not have the opportunity to consider—
and different evidence about isomer types in cocaine. See Zinn, 321
F.3d at 1090; cf. also Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d at 819-21 (finding an
argument below that a prior burglary conviction was not a crime
of violence because the judgment described the offense as a non-
violent burglary was “substantively different” than the argument
on appeal that the conviction was not a crime of violence because
the state burglary statute was not divisible and encompassed more
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24-10232 Opinion of the Court 7

conduct than the generic definition of burglary). Diggs could not
have “sufficiently apprise[d]” the district court or the government
of the isomer issue when he did not mention isomers during the
sentence hearing. Straub, 508 F.3d at 1011; see also Corbett, 921 F.3d
at 1043 (“When the statement is not clear enough to inform the
district court of the legal basis for the objection, the objection is not
properly preserved.” (cleaned up)). And the district court was not
sufficiently apprised. That’s why the district court’s only ruling
was that the ioflupane objection was foreclosed by binding prece-
dent under Jackson, a case that had nothing to do with isomers. See
55 F.4th at 850.
It was Diggs’s “burden to articulate the specific nature” of
his objection. Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1090. Since he failed to do so, it is
not preserved. Cf. id. at 1090 n.7 (finding that “[a]ppellant’s coun-
sel’s argument to the district court that polygraph testing was ‘not
a proper condition’ of supervised release was inadequate to
properly apprise the court of the very focused objections he . . .
raise[d] for the first time on appeal, including that the condition
violates his Fifth Amendment rights and improperly delegates au-
thority to the probation officer”). Thus, we review the isomer is-
sue for plain error.
II.
Diggs has not demonstrated that the district court plainly
erred by sentencing him under the Act. Under a plain error stand-
ard, the defendant must establish that an error occurred, the error
was “plain,” and the error affected the defendant’s substantial
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-10232

rights. Laines, 69 F.4th at 1229 (quotation marks omitted). “An
error is ‘plain’ if it is obvious or clear under current law.” Id. (quo-
tation marks omitted). “[W]here the explicit language of a statute
or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain
error where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this
Court directly resolving it.” United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d
1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003).
Diggs has not identified any binding precedent establishing
that the district court erred by determining that his Florida cocaine
convictions constituted serious drug offenses. In fact, our prece-
dent suggests the opposite is true. We have recently held that a
district court did not plainly err by classifying a defendant’s similar
prior conviction under Florida law as a serious drug offense under
the Act even though Florida’s cocaine definition included “any ste-
reoisomer of cocaine” and the federal definition “covered only ‘op-
tical and geometric isomers.’” Laines, 69 F.4th at 1233–35 (first
quoting Fla. Stat. § 893.03(a)(4)(1991); then quoting 21 U.S.C.
§ 812(c), Sched. II(a)(4) 1988 & Supp. 1991). We explained that the
defendant had not identified any authority demonstrating that
Florida’s cocaine definition was clearly overbroad, and thus, the de-
fendant had not met his burden to show plain error. Id. at 1233–
34. The same is true here.
CONCLUSION
Because the district court did not plainly err in treating
Diggs’s prior cocaine convictions as serious drug offenses under the
Act, we affirm his sentences.
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24-10232 Opinion of the Court 9

AFFIRMED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11198376. Public record. Not legal advice.