# Mendoza

> District Court, M.D. Florida · November 5, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11198310

## Case

- **Full name:** Israel Mendoza v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** November 5, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

ISRAEL MENDOZA,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-1054-MSS-LSG

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.
___________________________________/

O R D E R

Mendoza filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
challenging his state court convictions for conspiracy to traffic cocaine and money
laundering. (Doc. 1) After reviewing the response (Doc. 13), the reply (Doc. 15), and
the relevant state court record (Doc. 14), the Court DISMISSES the petition as
untimely.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mendoza pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic cocaine and money laundering,
and the trial judge sentenced Mendoza to ten years in prison for the cocaine trafficking
conspiracy conviction and five years in prison for the money laundering conviction.
(Doc. 14-2 at 58–65) The judgment and sentences entered on March 25, 2022
(Doc. 14-2 at 58), and Mendoza did not appeal.
On March 28, 2024, Mendoza filed a motion for post-conviction relief.
(Doc. 14-2 at 82–97) On April 23, 2024, the post-conviction court denied relief
(Doc. 14-2 at 98–100), Mendoza appealed, and the state appellate court dismissed

Mendoza’s appeal because he untimely filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. 14-2 at 130)
Mendoza’s federal petition followed. In his petition, Mendoza asserts that
police arrested him and conducted a search with a defective warrant, the trial judge
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by denying a motion to suppress his statements
recorded by a confidential informant, and the trial judge violated his federal right to

due process by accepting his guilty plea without a factual basis. (Doc. 1 at 6–9)
ANALYSIS
A one-year statute of limitation applies to a federal habeas petition challenging
a state court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitation period begins to run

“the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or
the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
The judgment entered on March 25, 2022. (Doc. 14-2 at 58) Fla. R. App. P.
9.020 (explaining that rendition of a judgment occurs “when a signed, written order is
filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal”). Mendoza did not appeal, and the time to

appeal expired thirty days after rendition of the judgment — April 25, 2022.1

1 Because thirty days after the rendition of the judgment was Sunday, April 24, 2022,
the time to appeal extended to Monday, April 25, 2022. Fla. R. Jud. Admin.
2.514(a)(1)(C).
Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(3). Consequently, the limitation started to run the next day.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(A). Bridges v. Johnson, 284 F.3d 1201, 1202 (11th Cir. 2002).
The limitation period ran for a year and expired on April 26, 2023. Because

Mendoza filed his Section 2254 petition almost two years later, on March 12, 2025
(Doc. 1 at 16), the petition is untimely. Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301
(11th Cir. 2001) (“Absent evidence to the contrary in the form of prison logs or other
records, we will assume that Washington’s motion was delivered to prison authorities
the day he signed it . . . .”).

“[A] properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral
review” tolls the limitation. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). On March 28, 2024, almost a year
after the limitation period expired, Mendoza placed in the hands of prison officials for
mailing a motion for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 14-2 at 82–97) Haag v. State, 591 So.

2d 614, 617 (Fla. 1992). Because Mendoza filed his post-conviction motion after the
limitation period expired, the motion did not toll the limitation. Sibley v. Culliver, 377
F.3d 1196, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[O]nce a deadline has expired, there is nothing left
to toll. A state court filing after the federal habeas filing deadline does not revive it.”).
Mendoza contends that his petition is timely because (Doc. 1 at 14–15):

In order to exhaust my claims through all remedies
provided through the State, it took time and consistent effort
researching, writing, and filing. I have followed all state
procedural rules seeking justice through the provided
remedies. I have not prevailed and now seek justice from a
higher court. There is a clear showing of evidence that there
has been a constitutional error, and I am imprisoned in
violation of the Constitution. The facts presented in my case
show the conception of federal [and] state relations that
undervalued procedural rules and Constitutional rights.
A result of the alleged violation of federal law is
fundamental, and the failure to consider these claims will
result in a miscarriage of justice.

In his reply, Mendoza further asserts that the one-year federal limitation that
applies to a Section 2254 petition violates the Suspension Clause of the United States
Constitution, that the limitation equitably tolled, and that actual innocence excuses
the time bar. (Doc. 15)
Suspension Clause
Mendoza asserts that the one-year federal limitation that applies to a Section
2254 petition violates the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution. (Doc.
15 at 3–7) He contends that the federal limitation suspends the writ by categorically
barring an untimely claim, despite any diligence by the petitioner or the merit of the
claim. (Doc. 15 at 4) He further contends that the federal limitation suspends the writ
by requiring a petitioner to exhaust his remedies in state court within one year, even
though state procedural rules provide a defendant two years to seek relief in state court.

(Doc. 15 at 5)
As Mendoza acknowledges (Doc. 15 at 6), Wyzykowski v. Dep’t Corrs., 226 F.3d
1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000), concluded that “as a general matter, the Section 2244(d)
limitation period does not render the collateral relief ineffective or inadequate to test
the legality of detention, and therefore is not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ

of habeas corpus.”
Also, Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1334–35 (11th Cir. 2001) (omitting
footnotes three and four), rejected the argument that Section 2244(d) violated the
Suspension Clause:

Alternatively, Tinker argues that if his claim is time barred,
Section 2244(d) is unconstitutional as applied to him
because it violates the Suspension Clause, U.S. Const. art.
I, § 9, cl. 2., and forces him to choose between exercising
his right to meaningful access to the state courts which
provide a two-year limitation period and the right to
petition for federal habeas relief.

We find no merit in Tinker’s argument. In Wyzykowski v.
Dep’t Corrs., 226 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2000), we said that “as
a general matter, the Section 2244(d) limitation period does
not render the collateral relief ineffective or inadequate to
test the legality of detention, and therefore is not an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.”
Id. at 1217.2 Thus, “Section 2244(d) does not per se
constitute an unconstitutional suspension” of the writ. Id.
See also Lucidore v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 209 F.3d 107, 113
(2d Cir. 2000); Molo v. Johnson, 207 F.3d 773, 775 (5th Cir.
2000) (per curiam); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th
Cir. 1998). Moreover, the availability of equitable tolling in
cases “when a movant untimely files because of
extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his
control and unavoidable even with diligence,” Steed, 219
F.3d at 1300 (quotation and citation omitted), ensures that
Section 2244’s limitation is constitutionally applied, as it
was here.

2 The Suspension Clause provides: “The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Despite
this restriction, the Supreme Court has held
that “judgments about the proper scope of the
writ are ‘normally for Congress to make.’”
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996)
(quoting Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323
(1996)). In Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372
(1977), the Supreme Court held that “the
substitution of a collateral remedy which is
neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the
legality of a person’s detention does not
constitute a suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.” Id. at 381.

Further, we reject Tinker’s “impermissible choice”
argument. By virtue of statute, Tinker is provided both a
state and federal forum in which to seek post-conviction
relief. Despite his argument to the contrary, he need not
forego his state remedy entirely in order to avail himself of
the federal remedy. However, he must exercise it within one
year of the date his judgment became final and do so in a
manner that leaves him sufficient time to timely file his
federal petition.

However, Mendoza argues that Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), holds
that any substitute for habeas relief must provide an adequate and effective remedy
and that a restriction that denies meaningful review violates the Suspension Clause.
(Doc. 15 at 3–4) Mendoza’s reliance on Boumediene is misplaced.
In Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–35, the petitioners, who were enemy combatants
detained at the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, challenged a
statute that prohibited an enemy combatant from seeking habeas relief. Boumediene,
553 U.S. at 771, 792, held that the statute that prohibited an enemy combatant from
seeking habeas relief suspended the writ of habeas corpus and that a military tribunal
created to provide an enemy combatant due process was an inadequate substitute for
habeas relief.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 782–83, distinguished between detention authorized by
a judgment in a criminal case and detention authorized by an executive order:
Accordingly, where relief is sought from a sentence that
resulted from the judgment of a court of record, as was the
case in Watkins and indeed in most federal habeas cases,
considerable deference is owed to the court that ordered
confinement. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (noting that a federal habeas
court should accept a state court’s factual findings unless
“a vital flaw be found in the process of ascertaining such
facts in the State court”). Likewise in those cases the
prisoner should exhaust adequate alternative remedies
before filing for the writ in federal court. See Ex parte Royall,
117 U.S. 241, 251–252 (1886) (requiring exhaustion of state
collateral processes). Both aspects of federal habeas corpus
review are justified because it can be assumed that, in the
usual course, a court of record provides defendants with a
fair, adversary proceeding. In cases involving state
convictions this framework also respects federalism; and in
federal cases it has added justification because the prisoner
already has had a chance to seek review of his conviction in
a federal forum through a direct appeal. The present cases
fall outside these categories, however; for here the detention
is by executive order.

Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than,
say, after being tried and convicted in a court, the need for
collateral review is most pressing. A criminal conviction in
the usual course occurs after a judicial hearing before a
tribunal disinterested in the outcome and committed to
procedures designed to ensure its own independence. These
dynamics are not inherent in executive detention orders or
executive review procedures. In this context the need for
habeas corpus is more urgent. The intended duration of the
detention and the reasons for it bear upon the precise scope
of the inquiry. Habeas corpus proceedings need not
resemble a criminal trial, even when the detention is by
executive order. But the writ must be effective. The habeas
court must have sufficient authority to conduct a
meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the
Executive’s power to detain.
Because Mendoza challenges his detention authorized by a judgment in a state
criminal case, Boumediene does not entitle Mendoza to relief.
Even though Section 2254(b) requires Mendoza to exhaust his remedies in state
court, Section 2244(d)(2) tolls the federal limitation while a properly filed post-
conviction motion and post-conviction appeal are pending. Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d

1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2000). Even if Mendoza fails to timely file a federal petition, he
may argue either that the limitation equitably tolled or that actual innocence excuses
the time bar. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013); Holland v. Florida,
560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010).

Because Congress has the authority to narrow the scope of the writ of habeas
corpus by enacting the one-year limitation and because statutory tolling under Section
2244(d)(2), equitable tolling, and actual innocence ensure that the remedy is both
adequate and effective, Mendoza’s claim based on the Suspension Clause is meritless.
See Evans v. Thompson, 518 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Just as Congress can expand

the availability of habeas relief, so can it add some restrictions to the issuance of the
writ without effectuating its suspension. . . . AEDPA falls on the permissible restriction
side of the Suspension Clause line.”). Delaney v. Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 2001)
(“[T]he one-year limitation period of section 2244(d)(1), as embellished by the tolling
provision of section 2244(d)(2), does not suspend the writ because, when read in

tandem, these provisions neither gut the writ of habeas corpus nor render it impuissant
to test the legality of a prisoner’s detention. Tolling the limitation period during the
pendency of state post-conviction proceedings leaves habeas petitioners with a
reasonable opportunity to have their claims heard on the merits.”) (citations omitted).
Equitable Tolling

Mendoza asserts that “[t]he conflicting time frames — Florida’s two-year Rule
3850 window versus AEDPA’s one-year [window] — constitute an extraordinary
circumstance” that justifies equitable tolling. (Doc. 15 at 7–8) He contends that a
diligent Florida prisoner who files a timely Rule 3.850 motion becomes “trapped” by

missing the deadline for a Section 2254 petition. (Doc. 15 at 7–8)
Equitable tolling applies to a Section 2254 petition and requires the petitioner
to demonstrate “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland,
560 U.S. at 649 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).

The two-year limitation under Rule 3.850 and the one-year federal limitation
under Section 2244(d) apply to all state prisoners in Florida. “[P]ro se litigants, like all
others, are deemed to know of the one-year statute of limitations.” Outler v. United
States, 485 F.3d 1273, 1282 n.4 (11th Cir. 2007). Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 172
(5th Cir. 2000) (“[M]ere ignorance of the law or lack of knowledge of filing deadlines

does not justify equitable tolling or other exceptions to a law’s requirements.”).
Mendoza’s confusion about the difference between the two-year limitation
under Rule 3.850 and the one-year limitation under Section 2244(d) is not an
extraordinary circumstance that prevented him from timely filing a Section 2254
petition. Johnson v. Fla. Dep’t Corrs., 513 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[F]ederal
habeas petitioners who rely upon the timeliness of state post-conviction proceedings
to satisfy the requirements of AEDPA do so at their peril.”); Cole v. Warden, Ga. State
Prison, 768 F.3d 1150, 1158 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Determining whether a factual

circumstance is extraordinary to satisfy equitable tolling depends not on ‘how unusual
the circumstance alleged to warrant tolling is among the universe of prisoners, but
rather how severe an obstacle it is for the prisoner endeavoring to comply with
AEDPA’s limitations period.’”) (citation omitted); San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d

1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2011) (“As for the ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prong, like the
Supreme Court’s articulation in Holland, we too have required a defendant to show a
causal connection between the alleged extraordinary circumstances and the late filing
of the petition.”).
Also, on April 26, 2023, the limitation period expired. On July 15, 2024, the

state appellate court dismissed as untimely Mendoza’s appeal of the order denying
post-conviction relief. (Doc. 14-2 at 130) Almost eight months later, on March 12,
2025, Mendoza filed his Section 2254 petition. (Doc. 1 at 16) Because Mendoza did
not diligently seek federal habeas relief, the federal limitation did not equitably toll.
Pace, 544 U.S. at 419 (“And not only did petitioner sit on his rights for years before he

filed his [state post-conviction] petition, but he also sat on them for five more months
after his [state post-conviction] proceedings became final before deciding to seek relief
in federal court. Under long-established principles, petitioner’s lack of diligence
precludes equity’s operation.”) (italics in original and citations omitted); Melson v.
Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t Corrs., 713 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2013) (“While a petitioner is
only required to exercise ‘reasonable diligence,’ not ‘maximum feasible
diligence,’ Melson took no independent steps to ensure that his federal habeas petition
was timely filed.”) (citation omitted).

Miscarriage of Justice
To obtain relief based on a miscarriage of justice, Mendoza must demonstrate
actual innocence. McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 392. “[T]enable actual-innocence gateway
pleas are rare: ‘[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he

persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting
reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995)).
“To be credible, such a claim requires [a] petitioner to support his allegations of
constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was
not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.
Mendoza fails to submit any new reliable evidence that demonstrates his
actual innocence. He instead contends that unreliable and unproven allegations
supported the factual basis for his guilty plea. (Docs. 1 at 9 and 15 at 8–9)

An affidavit by an agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration
demonstrated a factual basis for Mendoza’s guilty plea (Doc. 14-2 at 9–13):
Since August 2015, the DEA Tampa District Office, the
Manatee County Sheriff’s Office, [the] Sarasota County
Sheriff’s Office, and [the] Bradenton Police Department,
hereinafter referred to as Investigating Agency, have been
investigating a drug trafficking organization operating
throughout Manatee and Sarasota Counties. The
investigation identified that Israel Mendoza was
responsible for acquiring narcotics outside the State of
Florida, then distributing those narcotics throughout
Manatee and Sarasota Counties.

Most recently, Israel Mendoza obtained a supply of cocaine
in Houston, Texas, which he ultimately planned to
distribute throughout Manatee and Sarasota Counties. This
was supported by lawfully recorded communications in
conjunction with physical and electronic surveillance, and
lawful stops that led to [a] seizure of cocaine from Israel
Mendoza and Norma Mendoza.

In February of 2017, a confidential source of the DEA
reported to your affiant that Israel Mendoza intended on
acquiring a supply of cocaine from Texas. During this time,
the CS met with Israel Mendoza in Sarasota County,
Florida. The CS recorded the meeting; your affiant has
reviewed the recording. During the meeting, Israel
Mendoza informed the CS that the cocaine was in Houston,
Texas and he intended on picking up “five.” The CS told
your affiant that he [or] she knows “five” to be in reference
to five kilograms of cocaine. Throughout the meeting, Israel
Mendoza directed the CS to rent a vehicle for travel to
Houston, Texas, and return to Florida with the cocaine.

In March 2017, the CS met with Israel Mendoza in
Manatee County, Florida. During the meeting, Israel
Mendoza provided the CS with $580.00. The CS advised
the funds were to be used for expenses incurred for travel to
Houston, Texas.

Throughout March 3, 2017, the CS was in [a] recorded
conversation with Israel Mendoza reference the pending
cocaine transaction. Also, on March 3, 2017, the CS
recorded a conversation between Israel Mendoza and
Norma Mendoza. The conversation was in the Spanish
language and summarized by a Spanish speaking law
enforcement agent. Throughout the conversation, Norma
and Israel Mendoza discussed the arrangements concerning
the transport of the cocaine they were expecting. Norma
Mendoza conveyed to Israel Mendoza that she had a
conversation with her contact and that she commented,
“How is that kid going to hide that?” Your affiant believes
that Norma Mendoza is referring to the CS as “kid.” In
regards to “[ ] hide that,” your affiant believes that Norma
Mendoza asked Israel Mendoza how the CS would conceal
the cocaine. Norma Mendoza also mentioned she
explained to her contact that he [or] she (the CS) will have
to accommodate [and] hide that (cocaine) in a good
manner. Israel Mendoza commented to Norma Mendoza,
“What about if I ask them to bring it to a hotel?” Norma
Mendoza stated to Israel Mendoza that she will tell her
contacts that they should rent a hotel room; Israel Mendoza
commented that they (Israel and Norma Mendoza) will rent
the hotel room. Norma Mendoza immediately asked,
“Why us?” (referring to the room rental). Norma Mendoza
then told Israel Mendoza that they should rent an
inexpensive room.

Israel Mendoza suggested that they should rent a room
nearby and then he commented to Norma Mendoza, “Why
the fuck are we going to transport that (cocaine), they
should take that (cocaine) over there to the room at the hotel
and we will move over there, [ ]1, we get to the room and
they bring it (cocaine) to us over there so that we don’t have
to take it to the hotel.”

1 Your affiant has removed the name of the CS
from this statement by Israel Mendoza to
protect the identity of the CS.

Furthermore, Norma and Israel Mendoza discussed their
displeasure as to how the arrangements were made by their
source of supply. Israel Mendoza asked Norma Mendoza
to give him the phone so that he could call “Huero” to
explain to him how unhappy he was with the arrangements.
During this exchange [ ], Norma Mendoza explained to
Israel Mendoza that we cannot go and open these things
(referring to the cocaine). Norma Mendoza further stated
that she is going to give them (her contacts) the address so
that they can come over (referring to the hotel) and that it
would be better if he [or] she (the CS) rented the hotel room
near a highway exit.
Subsequently, Israel Mendoza told the CS that he intended
on acquiring the supply of cocaine, which was to occur in
the parking lot of an Academy Sports in Houston, Texas.
On this date, law enforcement conducted physical
surveillance of Israel Mendoza, and his wife Norma
Mendoza. Surveillance observed the Mendozas arrive in the
Academy Sports parking lot. They parked and exited their
vehicle, a 2008 Dodge Caravan displaying Florida license
plate 777QJT. Surveillance watched both Israel and Norma
Mendoza enter the Academy Sports business.
A short time later, Norma Mendoza was observed exiting
the store with Veronica Soto2. Soto was observed removing
a bag from a vehicle parked next to Norma Mendoza’s van.
Soto then entered Norma Mendoza’s van with the bag.
A short time later Soto exited the van and returned to her
vehicle. Norma Mendoza exited a parking space and drove
the van to the front entrance of the store. Israel Mendoza
then exited the store along with Jaime Soto Vaca. Israel
Mendoza entered the front passenger seat of the van.
Norma and Israel Mendoza then departed the parking lot.

2 Veronica Soto was subsequently identified
during a traffic stop.

After the aforementioned meeting, Israel Mendoza
contacted the CS and notified him [or] her, “I already got
the family and everything.” The CS told your affiant that
“got the family” is in reference to receiving the cocaine.
Surveillance was maintained on Norma and Israel
Mendoza’s van. Harris County Sheriff’s Office (Houston,
Texas) subsequently made contact with Norma and Israel
Mendoza in a business parking lot, located in Houston,
Texas.

During the contact, a drug alerting canine was deployed on
van; the canine alerted to the presence of narcotics. A search
of the vehicle yielded [ ] the seizure of approximately 4.664
kilograms of cocaine. The cocaine was later field-tested by
law enforcement and [was] positive [for] the presence of
cocaine.

Your affiant and Task Force Officer Jonathan Sandel
interviewed Israel Mendoza later [on] this date. During the
post-Miranda interview, Mendoza advised his wife did not
know what was going on. TFO Sandel explained to
Mendoza if she (Norma Mendoza) assisted in any way, she
was involved in the cocaine transaction. When asked again
who[m] he (Mendoza) obtained the cocaine from,
Mendoza stated Veronica Soto.

Your affiant has not included every detail known to your
affiant, but merely enough information to establish
probable cause.

In conclusion, your affiant believes there is probable cause,
and does believe, that Israel and Norma Mendoza
conspired with each other and others to bring into the State
of Florida a quantity of cocaine in excess of four-hundred
grams, and that an overt act furthering the conspiracy
occurred in Manatee County, Florida. Furthermore, your
affiant believes there is probable cause, and does believe,
that Israel Mendoza transported funds exceeding $300.00
with the intent to promote [a] specified unlawful activity
(trafficking in cocaine).

“‘A conspiracy is an express or implied agreement or understanding between
two or more persons to commit a criminal offense.’” Gould v. State, 251 So. 3d 1034,
1036 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (citation omitted). “‘To prove the crime of conspiracy, the
state must prove an agreement and an intention to commit an offense.’” Gould, 251
So. 3d at 1036 (citation omitted). Statements in the affidavit demonstrate that Israel
and Norma Mendoza agreed to purchase cocaine from Veronica Soto and intended to
commit the offense by hiring the confidential informant to assist with the drug
transaction and by traveling to Texas and purchasing from Soto almost five kilograms
of cocaine. Consequently, the affidavit demonstrates that Mendoza engaged in a
conspiracy to traffic cocaine. Green v. State, 999 So. 2d 1098, 1099–1100 (Fla. 5th DCA
2009) (“The jury could reasonably have inferred that Gibson conspired with Green to
purchase cocaine based on the evidence that they travelled together from Pennsylvania
to Orlando for a short visit, that they met the purported seller at a prearranged meeting,
that they were both present throughout the negotiations, that Green indicated that

‘they’ were there to purchase cocaine, and that they walked together back to their hotel
room to retrieve the money necessary to purchase the cocaine.”).
Section 896.101(3)(b)(1), Florida Statutes, criminalizes promotional money
laundering as follows: “It is unlawful for a person [t]o transport or attempt to
transport a monetary instrument or funds [w]ith the intent to promote the carrying

on of specified unlawful activity.” A specified unlawful activity includes drug
trafficking. §§ 895.02(8)(a)(49) and 896.101(2)(h), Fla. Stat. Statements in the
affidavit demonstrate that Mendoza transported money from Florida to Texas to
purchase the cocaine. Consequently, the affidavit demonstrates that Mendoza
engaged in money laundering. See, e.g., United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 680

(2d Cir. 1994) (“Section 1956(a)(2) contains no requirement that ‘proceeds’ first be
generated by unlawful activity, followed by a financial transaction with those
proceeds, for criminal liability to attach. Instead, it penalizes an overseas transfer
‘with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity.’”).
Because Mendoza fails to demonstrate that, in light of any new reliable

evidence, “‘no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt,’” he fails to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice based on actual
innocence excuses the time bar. McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S.
at 329).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Mendoza’s (Doc. 1) petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is DISMISSED as time barred. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter a
judgment against Mendoza and CLOSE this case.
DENIAL OF CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND
LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Because Mendoza neither makes a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right nor demonstrates that reasonable jurists would find debatable
both the merits of the underlying claims and the procedural issues that he seeks to
raise, a certificate of appealability and leave to appeal in forma pauperis are DENIED.
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000).
DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on. Noyember5, 2025.

MARYS. SORIVEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11198310. Public record. Not legal advice.