# Nolan

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · October 6, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11198278

## Case

- **Full name:** Antonio Lashun Nolan v. Officer Buchanan, Officer Zane Crittenden, Officer Luke Price, the Minden Police Department, and City Attorney Jimbo Yocom
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** October 6, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11198278

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- reasoning that if the plaintiff “were to prevail on his unlawful seizure claim, he would necessarily undermine the validity of these convictions.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

ANTONIO LASHUN NOLAN CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-1144

SECTION P
VS.
JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

OFFICER BUCHANAN, ET AL. MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Antonio Lashun Nolan, who proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this
proceeding on approximately August 8, 2025, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He names the following
Defendants: Officer Buchanan, Officer Zane Crittenden, Officer Luke Price, the Minden Police
Department, and City Attorney Jimbo Yocom.1 For reasons that follow, the Court should
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.
Background

Plaintiff states that on May 6, 2025, the Minden Police Department “dispatch reported a
‘suspicious person in a black hoodie,’ naming no specific crime and providing a vague
description.” [doc. # 9, p. 7]. Plaintiff, “a black man with a documented mental health
disability,” “was walking home from a local store with groceries,” and not engaging in any
unlawful activity. Id. He walked on the right side of the street “in compliance with pedestrian
safety laws.” Id. He claims that Officers Buchanan, Crittenden, and Price unlawfully detained
him on the street and informed him that he violated LA. REV. STAT. 32:216(B), which is entitled,
“Pedestrians on highways or interstate highways.” Id. Plaintiff maintains that he did not violate

1 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation under
28 U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of the Court.
the statute and that the Defendants lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop. Id. He also states
that, because of the unlawful stop, all “subsequent evidence” is fruit “of the poisonous tree.”
[doc. # 15, p. 4].
Plaintiff claims that during the stop, Officer Crittenden verbally insulted him, repeatedly

calling him “Ball or Baal.” [doc. #s 9, p. 7; 15, p. 2].
When an officer asked for Plaintiff’s identification, Plaintiff declined and “invoked his
right to silence.” [doc. # 9, p. 7]. He claims that Officer Crittenden then arrested him without
probable cause for “pedestrian on highway” and “resisting.”2 [doc. #s 9, p. 7; 15, p. 2].
Plaintiff suggestively claims that Officer Crittenden utilized excessive force by
aggressively handcuffing him. [doc. # 15, p. 2]. He claims that Officer Buchanan failed to
intervene and stop “Crittenden’s excessive handcuffing and verbal harassment.” Id. at 3.
Plaintiff claims that Officer Price “[f]ailed to intervene to prevent constitutional
violations.” [doc. # 15, p. 3].
Plaintiff claims that Officers Crittenden and Buchanan engaged in an unlawful search

“without probable cause or consent.” [doc. # 15, p. 3].
Plaintiff gave the officers his name, and officers then discovered his prior 2015 “false
arrest” for burglary and resisting an officer. [doc. # 9, p. 7]. He states that the 2015 arrest was
“unsupported by evidence of physical proof.” Id. He asks the Court to order Defendants to
“correct the false 2015 arrest record created against” him. Id. at 8.
Plaintiff’s 2025 “pedestrian on highway” charge was eventually dismissed, but he was
convicted of the 2025 charge of resisting. [doc. # 9, p. 7]. He maintains that he is innocent. His

2 Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his former claim that he was not read his Miranda rights. [doc.
# 15, p. 4].
conviction has “not been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or challenged in federal court through
habeas corpus.” [doc. # 15, p. 6].
Plaintiff claims that Defendants denied him exculpatory body camera footage. [doc. # 9,
pp. 4, 7].

Plaintiff claims that City Attorney Jimbo Yocom prosecuted him and (1) violated
Plaintiff’s right to a speedy trial by delaying trial from July 23, 2025, to August 20, 2025, after
Plaintiff filed motions to suppress and sought legal representation; (2) coordinated “with defense
counsel who then withdrew representation after reviewing Plaintiff’s suppression motions and
evidence, causing Plaintiff to proceed pro se without replacement counsel on the final trial date”;
(3) engaged in ex parte communications with the presiding judge; (4) examined Plaintiff at trial
about Plaintiff’s “willingness to plead guilty and his mental and physical disabilities, leveraging
this knowledge to exert improper pressure and exploit Plaintiff’s vulnerabilities in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act”; (5) interrupted Plaintiff’s trial presentation; (6) operated
under a conflict of interest, serving as the City Attorney and prosecutor; (7) conspired with

Minden Police Officers and others to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights; (8) used his
authority to intimidate and interfere with Plaintiff’s defense; (9) prosecuted false charges; (10)
treated Plaintiff “disparately and unfairly compared to others with counsel, violating the Equal
Protection Clause”; and (11) denied Plaintiff due process by “obstructing counsel, limiting
defense, and prejudicing the trial.” [doc. #s 15, pp. 6-7; 19, p. 1]. Plaintiff maintains that
Yocom’s actions constituted a “coordinated effort to frustrate Plaintiff’s fair trial rights and
obstruct justice.” [doc. # 15, p. 7].
Plaintiff seeks compensation, punitive damages, and the correction of his 2015 record.
[doc. # 9, p. 8].
Law and Analysis

1. Preliminary Screening

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, his Complaint is subject to screening
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) provides for sua sponte dismissal of the
complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is
“based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. Courts are also afforded the
unusual power to pierce the veil of the factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id.
A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it fails to plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is
facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies
somewhere in between. Id. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, supra. A well-pled complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of
the asserted facts is improbable and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, supra.
In making this determination, the court must assume that all the plaintiff’s factual
allegations are true. Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998). However, the

same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, supra. A pleading comprised of
“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not
satisfy Rule 8. Id. A complaint fails to state a claim where its factual allegations do not “raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614
F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[U]nadorned, the-defendant
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.
“[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to
make out a valid claim.” City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp, 632 F.3d 148, 152-53
(5th Cir. 2010). Courts are “not free to speculate that the plaintiff ‘might’ be able to state a claim
if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint.” Macias v. Raul A.

(Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).
A hearing need not be conducted for every pro se complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926
F.2d 480, 483 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991).
“To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638
(5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consistent with the standard above, a
“[S]ection 1983 complaint must state specific facts, not simply legal and constitutional
conclusions.” Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990).
2. Minden Police Department
Plaintiff names the Minden Police Department as a Defendant. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 17(b)(3) provides that the “[c]apacity to sue or be sued is determined . . . by the law of
the state where the court is located . . . .” Under Louisiana law, an entity must qualify as a

“juridical person,” which is an “entity to which the law attributes personality, such as a
corporation or a partnership.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 24.
The Minden Police Department does not qualify as a juridical person. See Cozzo v.
Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Government, 279 F.3d 273, 283 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[A]
sheriff’s office is not a legal entity capable of being sued . . . .”); Aucoin v. Terrebonne Par.
Sheriff's Off., 2022 WL 16657429, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 2022). Accordingly, the Court should
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against this entity.
3. Verbal Insults
Plaintiff claims that during the stop, Officer Crittenden verbally insulted him, repeatedly
calling him “Ball or Baal.” [doc. #s 9, p. 7; 15, p. 2].

Verbal threats, without more, do not support a claimed constitutional violation. Siglar v.
Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997); McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir.
1983). Allegations of mere verbal abuse simply do not give rise to a cause of action under
Section 1983.3 Bender v. Brumley, 1 F.3d 271, 274 n.4 (5th Cir. 1993); Siglar, 112 F.3d at 191.

3 See Gressett v. New Orleans City, 779 F. App’x 260, 261 (5th Cir. 2019) (concluding, where the
plaintiff alleged that an officer stood in his way, insulted him while holstering his taser and
revolver, threatened him, and intimidated him, that though the officer’s actions “may be
unprofessional” and amounted to an “excess of zeal,” they “did not violate [the plaintiff’s]
Fourteenth Amendment rights” and did not “constitute an abuse of power that ‘shocks the
conscience.’”).
Because Plaintiff does not state a claim of constitutional dimension, the Court should dismiss
this claim.
4. Heck v. Humphrey
Plaintiff claims that the three officer-defendants stopped him without reasonable

suspicion. He also claims that Officer Crittenden falsely arrested him for “pedestrian on
highway” and “resisting.” He claims further that Defendants denied him exculpatory body
camera footage. [doc. # 9, pp. 4, 5, 7].
Plaintiff’s 2025 “pedestrian on highway” charge was eventually dismissed, but he was
convicted of the 2025 charge of resisting. [doc. # 9, p. 7]. He maintains that he is innocent. His
conviction has “not been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or challenged in federal court through
habeas corpus.” [doc. # 15, p. 6].
Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), a successful civil rights action that would
necessarily imply the invalidity of a plaintiff’s conviction or sentence must be dismissed unless
the plaintiff first shows that the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared

invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Here, prevailing on the false arrest claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of
Plaintiff’s conviction for resisting. “‘[F]alse arrest . . . claims challenge the existence of
probable cause and, thus, by their essence are collateral attacks on a criminal judgment’s
validity.’” Thomas v. Pohlmann, 681 F. App’x 401, 406 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Cormier v.
Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 493 Fed. App’x. 578, 583 (5th Cir. 2012)). When a plaintiff
is convicted of a charge for which he was arrested, allowing him to proceed on his false arrest
claim “would necessarily implicate the validity of [his] convictions because the same conduct
that formed the probable cause for [his] arrest also provided the basis for [his] convictions.” Id.
(citing Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[The plaintiff’s] proof to establish his
false arrest claim, i.e., that there was no probable cause to arrest [for the crime for which he was
ultimately convicted], would demonstrate the invalidity of [the conviction].”)).4
That the State dismissed one charge arising from Plaintiff’s arrest is of no consequence.

Plaintiff plainly seeks relief for the allegedly unlawful arrest from which his conviction arose.
“The specific crimes charged are irrelevant if the § 1983 claims would cause a civil judgment in
the plaintiff's favor to ‘collide’ with the criminal judgment. It also is immaterial that the plaintiff
was not convicted on every count charged.” Cormier, 493 F. App'x at 583-85 (internal quotation
marks and quoted sources omitted). “False-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims—as attacks
on probable cause—focus on the validity of the arrest.” Id. “Claims for false arrest focus on the
validity of the arrest, not on the validity of each individual charge made during the course of the
arrest.” Price v. Roark, 256 F.3d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus, “[i]f there was probable cause
for any of the charges made . . . then the arrest was supported by probable cause, and Heck
applies.” Wells, 45 F.3d at 95.

Likewise, Plaintiff’s unlawful stop claim, which is predicated on a lack of reasonable
suspicion, is a collateral attack on the conviction because the conviction is founded on evidence

4 See also Connors v. Graves, 538 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that if the plaintiff
“were to prevail on his unlawful seizure claim, he would necessarily undermine the validity of
these convictions.”); Queen v. Purser, 109 Fed. App’x. 659, * 1-2 (5th Cir. 2004) (former
inmate’s false arrest claim necessarily challenged whether evidence, which officer seized
following an allegedly illegal stop, and which led to his subsequent conviction, supplied
probable cause for his arrest; thus claim was not cognizable absent showing that the conviction
had been invalidated); Chande v. Moore, 606 F. App'x 238, 239 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Because a
showing that there was no probable cause for the challenged entry, search, seizure, and arrest
would call into question the validity of [plaintiff’s] resulting conviction for unlawful possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in a drug-free zone,” the plaintiff’s claims were
barred by Heck); Goldston v. City of Monroe ex rel. Monroe Police Dep’t, 621 F. App’x 274 (5th
Cir. 2015).
derived from the officer’s reasonable suspicion and subsequent stop. In fact, Plaintiff concedes
that because of the unlawful stop, all “subsequent evidence” is fruit “of the poisonous tree.”
[doc. # 15, p. 4]. See Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 176 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying Heck to an
unlawful vehicular stop clam); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, n.5 (2007) (“[A] Fourth

Amendment claim can necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction . . . .”) Agard v. Sanders,
2006 WL 2128079, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2006) (finding that the plaintiff’s unlawful traffic
stop claim would, if proved, implicate the validity of his guilty plea because the evidence
discovered following the stop would be subject to suppression).
So too, prevailing on the claim that Defendants withheld exculpatory evidence would
necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s conviction. See Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 283
(5th Cir. 1994) (“[H]is complaint also alleges that Sheriff Coleman and Investigator Brinkley
violated Boyd’s rights by withholding exculpatory evidence obtained during the investigation of
Bobby Rogers' murder. If proved, these claims would call Boyd's conviction into question under
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny.”).5 By

its very nature, exculpatory evidence tends “to establish a criminal defendant’s innocence.” See
EVIDENCE, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024).
Thus, Plaintiff may not seek damages for an unlawful stop, false arrest, and withholding
exculpatory evidence until his conviction is reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The Court should dismiss these
claims.

5 See also Gonzalez v. Garza, 59 F.3d 1241 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that claims that evidence was
manipulated or withheld to corroborate perjured testimony “would be foreclosed by Heck.”);
Heath v. Thomas, 34 F. App’x 962 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding a claim of withholding evidence
barred by Heck.).
5. Excessive Force
Plaintiff suggestively claims that Officer Crittenden utilized excessive force by
aggressively handcuffing him. [doc. # 15, p. 2].
"To establish a Fourth Amendment violation based on an officer’s use of excessive force,

the plaintiff must show: (1) an injury; (2) which resulted from the use of force that was clearly
excessive to the need; (3) the excessiveness of which was objectively unreasonable.” Ramirez v.
Martinez, 716 F.3d 369, 377 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985, 991 (5th
Cir. 2011)). “Since an excessive force claim arises out of the Fourth Amendment, the test
applied is whether the force was reasonable.” Frank v. Parnell, 2023 WL 5814938, at *3 (5th
Cir. Sept. 8, 2023) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)). “This reasonableness
inquiry is an objective one: ‘the question is whether the officers’ actions are objectively
reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their
underlying intent or motivation.’” Id.
“In making this determination, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances,

‘including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.’” Darden v. City of Fort Worth, Texas, 880 F.3d 722, 728-29 (5th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). “Additionally, while not exclusive and outlined ‘only to
illustrate the types of objective circumstances potentially relevant to a determination of excessive
force,’ the court can also consider ‘the relationship between the need for the use of force and the
amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper
or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably
perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.’” Frank, 2023 WL at
5814938 (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015)).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any injury when Crittenden handcuffed
him. “Tight handcuffing alone, even where a detainee sustains minor injuries, does not present
an excessive force claim.” Templeton v. Jarmillo, 28 F.4th 618, 622 (5th Cir. 2022) (cited

sources omitted). In Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001), for example, the
plaintiff alleged that officers “handcuffed her so tightly that her right hand became swollen,” and
she complained to the officers that the handcuffs were too tight. The court determined that the
handcuffing did not amount to excessive force because the plaintiff did not allege that the officer
acted maliciously and “handcuffing too tightly, without more, does not amount to excessive
force.” Id. at 314.
In Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 411 (5th Cir. 2007), the plaintiff alleged that officers
handcuffed her too tightly, “twisted her arms behind her back while handcuffing her[,] and
jerked her all over the carport,” leaving bruises on her hands and arms that required medical
treatment. The Fifth Circuit concluded that such allegations did not amount to excessive force

because the injuries were minor and incidental to the use of handcuffs during arrest. Id. at 416-
17. In Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 751-52 (5th Cir. 2005), the Fifth Circuit held that a
plaintiff who alleged that “he suffered acute contusions of the wrist” from handcuffing did not
state an excessive force claim because he alleged no more than de minimis injury from the
handcuffing and did not allege that the officers had any malice in handcuffing him.6
Here, Plaintiff does not allege greater-than-de minimis injuries, and he essentially alleges
tight handcuffing “alone.” Accordingly, the Court should dismiss this claim.

6 See also Emesowum v. Cruz, 756 F. App'x 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2018) (“To the extent that
Emesowum makes the conclusory assertion that the officers used excessive force in handcuffing
or verbally threatening him, these claims fail.”).
6. Failure to Intervene
Plaintiff claims that Officer Buchanan failed to intervene and stop “Crittenden’s
excessive handcuffing and verbal harassment.” However, as above, Plaintiff does not raise a
plausible excessive force or verbal harassment claim. Thus, there was no excessive force or

verbal harassment from which Buchanan failed to protect Plaintiff. See Ballard v. Hedwig Vill.
Police Dep't, 408 F. App'x 844, 845 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding that because the plaintiff’s
excessive force claim failed against one defendant, that the plaintiff “failed to establish a use of
excessive force from which the other officers could or should have protected him”); Griffin v.
City of Sugarland, Texas, 787 F. App'x 244, 245 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Because his excessive force
claim fails because there was no violation of his constitutional rights, Griffin’s bystander liability
theory also fails.”).
Plaintiff also claims that Officer Price “[f]ailed to intervene to prevent constitutional
violations.” [doc. # 15, p. 3]. However, Plaintiff does not identify any specific constitutional
violation Officer Price failed to prevent. The Court should dismiss this all-too-conclusory claim.

See Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 285 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding, where the plaintiffs alleged
that defendants knew a fellow officer was violating their rights and had an opportunity to prevent
the harm but chose not to act, that the plaintiffs did not state a plausible claim because a
“pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.”) (internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted).
7. Unlawful Search
Plaintiff claims that Officers Crittenden and Buchanan engaged in an unlawful search
“without probable cause or consent” before arresting him. [doc. #s 15, p. 3; 9, p. 5]. Plaintiff’s
claim, however, is impermissibly conclusory, amounting to no more than a legal conclusion or “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” which does not satisfy Rule 8.
Distilled, he states only (i) that officers conducted a search and (ii) that officers lacked probable
cause and consent. He does not, for example, specify where the officers searched, what they
searched, whether both officers searched, whether the officers only conducted a weapons frisk,
or the extent or duration of the search.7 The Court should dismiss this claim.8

8. Plaintiff’s 2015 Arrest
After Plaintiff gave the officers his name, they discovered his prior 2015 “false arrest” for
burglary and resisting an officer. [doc. # 9, p. 7]. He states that the 2015 arrest was
“unsupported by evidence of physical proof.” Id. He asks the Court to order Defendants to
“correct the false 2015 arrest record created against” him. Id. at 8.

7 To the extent the officers conducted a weapons frisk or pat down, and to the extent Plaintiff
claims that the frisk was unlawful because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him,
his claim would be barred under the Heck doctrine. To properly effectuate a weapons frisk, the
officer must have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and reasonable,
individualized suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. See United States v.
McKinney, 980 F.3d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Hill, 752 F.3d 1029, 1033
(5th Cir. 2014)); United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 840 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(discussing Terry, 392 U.S. 1; Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 n.2 (1990)).

8 See Toney v. Shopmeyer, 146 F.3d 867 (5th Cir. 1998) (opining that an allegation that
defendants conducted an “illegal search” was conclusional and insufficient); Magda Hagan of
the Fam. v. Rosales, 2023 WL 4417302, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 25, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3973625 (W.D. Tex. June 13, 2023) (reasoning, where the
plaintiff alleged only that officers conducted an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, that the allegation was not enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level and that the plaintiff failed “to describe the alleged search or any of the events with
sufficient detail for the Court to discern what happened.”); Davis v. Cedar Hill Police Dep't,
2018 WL 1633023, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018
WL 1617858 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2018) (“[T]he Court need not credit conclusory allegations and
legal conclusions made elsewhere that neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause (nor even
warrants) supported the defendants' actions.”).
Section 1983 provides in relevant part: “Every person who . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). If a person is not personally involved, then, a fortiori, he

cannot subject another to, or cause, a deprivation of constitutional rights. See Thompson v.
Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Personal involvement is an essential element of a
civil rights cause of action.”). “A plaintiff must establish that the defendant was either
personally involved in the deprivation or that his wrongful actions were causally connected to the
deprivation.” James v. Texas Collin Cty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008).
Here, Plaintiff does not appear to raise any claim concerning his 2015 charges; rather, he
seems to only seek relief—the correction of his record—unmoored from any claim. At best,
construing the allegations liberally, he suggests that he was falsely arrested in 2015. However,
he does not allege that any Defendant in this proceeding arrested him in 2015 or that any
Defendant was otherwise personally involved in, or responsible for, the alleged false arrest.

Accordingly, the Court should dismiss this claim.
9. City Attorney Jimbo Yocom
Plaintiff claims that City Attorney Jimbo Yocom prosecuted him and (1) violated
Plaintiff’s right to a speedy trial by delaying trial from July 23, 2025, to August 20, 2025, after
Plaintiff filed motions to suppress and sought legal representation; (2) coordinated “with defense
counsel who then withdrew representation after reviewing Plaintiff’s suppression motions and
evidence, causing Plaintiff to proceed pro se without replacement counsel on the final trial date”;
(3) engaged in ex parte communications with the presiding judge; (4) examined Plaintiff at trial
about Plaintiff’s “willingness to plead guilty and his mental and physical disabilities, leveraging
this knowledge to exert improper pressure and exploit Plaintiff’s vulnerabilities in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act”; (5) interrupted Plaintiff’s trial presentation; (6) operated
under a conflict of interest, serving as the City Attorney and prosecutor; (7) conspired with
Minden Police Officers and others to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights; (8) used his

authority to intimidate and interfere with Plaintiff’s defense; (9) prosecuted false charges; (10)
treated Plaintiff “disparately and unfairly compared to others with counsel, violating the Equal
Protection Clause”; and (11) denied Plaintiff due process by “obstructing counsel, limiting
defense, and prejudicing the trial.” [doc. #s 15, pp. 6-7; 19, p. 1]. Plaintiff maintains that
Yocom’s actions constituted a “coordinated effort to frustrate Plaintiff’s fair trial rights and
obstruct justice.” [doc. # 15, p. 7].
In an amended pleading, Plaintiff clarifies that he does not seek damages against City
Attorney Jimbo Yocom. Rather, he lists Yocom’s alleged actions only “as a formal notice for
context, record preservation, and to support the factual history of the case, not as a basis for civil
damages.”

Plaintiff does, however, appear to still seek “injunctive relief” against Yocom. [doc. # 15,
p. 7]. But the only specific injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks is the correction of his 2015 arrest
record, and this requested relief is wholly unrelated to his claims against Yocom. [doc. # 9, p. 8].
Apart from that, Plaintiff does not specify the injunctive relief he seeks against Yocom.
Consequently, he fails to seek any cognizable relief for these claims. The Court should,
therefore, dismiss the claims for failure to state claims on which relief may be granted. See
generally Collins v. King, 743 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming the dismissal of a claim
where the plaintiff did not “seek any relief on the basis of that incident” of which he complained
and where the relief the plaintiff did seek was not appropriate redress).
Recommendation
For the reasons above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Antonio Lashun Nolan’s
claims of unlawful stop, false arrest, and withholding exculpatory evidence be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE as legally frivolous and for failure to state claims on which relief may be
granted, until the Heck conditions are met.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's remaining claims be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failing to state claims on which relief may be granted.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by
this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation
to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another
party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any objections or
response to the district judge at the time of filing.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the
proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen
(14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed. R.
Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the
legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See
Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996).
In Chambers, Monroe, Louisiana, this 6 day of October, 2025.

Kayla Dye McCtisky
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11198278. Public record. Not legal advice.