# Opinion

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · November 5, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11198156

## Case

- **Full name:** Angela Miller, et al. v. Richland County Children Services, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** November 5, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11198156

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that dismissing a case rather than staying it is appropriate under Younger where a plaintiff fails to state a viable claim for relief

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Angela Miller, et al., Case No. 1:25cv01675

Plaintiffs,
-vs- JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Richland County Children Services, et al., AND ORDER

Defendants.

Pro se plaintiffs Angela Miller and Jason L. Miller, Sr. filed a civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the Richland County Children Services, CASA of Richland County
(presumably Court Appointed Special Advocates), ViaQuest, Magistrate Karen Cannon,
Mansfield Police Department, Lexington Police Department, and New Hope Behavioral Health,
concerning the custody of their minor child.1 (Doc. No. 1). On September 30, 2025, Plaintiffs filed
a motion to amend the complaint. (Doc. No. 3). The motion included a request to correct a clerical
error and to add additional claims as well as a new defendant, Lexington High School. The Court
grants Plaintiffs’ motion and considers this document as part of the operative complaint.
Plaintiffs also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2). The Court
grants the application.
I. Background
This complaint stems from a Richland County Juvenile Court case and the removal of
Plaintiffs’ child from their home. According to the complaint, Children Services visited Plaintiffs’

1 Although the complaint references two children, the allegations appear to pertain only to Plaintiffs’ younger son.
(See Doc. No. 1-2 at 1).
home “following a previously failed visit” and “accused [Plaintiffs] of neglect and sexual
misconduct.” (Doc. No. 1-2 at 1). Plaintiffs signed a safety plan “under immense pressure and
fearing arrest,” their children were removed from the home, and the plaintiffs were denied contact
with the children. Following an investigation, Plaintiffs’ older son was permanently placed with a

family member and the younger son, who appears to be the subject of this complaint, was placed
in an Intermediate Care Facility (“ICF”), which was later ViaQuest. Court-ordered visitation
changed from three overnights per week to one overnight visit. Thereafter, Children Services filed
a motion for temporary custody, which the court granted. (Id.). Plaintiffs state that Children
Services and the local school district conducted an IEP without notifying Plaintiffs and they
determined that Plaintiffs’ minor child would not be permitted to attend the technical school
program he selected, “based solely on his disability.” (Id.).
Plaintiffs claim that their child was removed from their home without a warrant or exigent
circumstances, Children Services acted in concert with local law enforcement and other agencies
or officials to remove their child despite having no evidence of immediate danger, the defendants

failed to provide Plaintiffs with notice or a hearing prior to depriving them of their parental rights,
Plaintiffs were denied access to CASA reports (including notes provided by ViaQuest), Lexington
High School ignored the child’s IEP and denied Plaintiffs access to their son’s records, and
Magistrate Cannon denied Plaintiff Angela Miller the right to cross-examine her husband, Jason
L. Miller, Sr., and denied her the right to present evidence. (Doc. Nos. 1, 3). Plaintiffs allege that
this conduct constitutes a violation of the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Plaintiffs additionally allege that Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) by excluding their son from the educational program of his choice based strictly on his
disability, without accommodations or parental involvement. (Doc. Nos. 1, 1-2 at 2).
Plaintiffs request the following relief: return custody of their child; an order compelling
CASA to provide to Plaintiffs all documents relating to their case; a permanent restraining order
against CASA and Children Services to prevent further harassment or retaliation against Plaintiffs’
family; all state actors “be held accountable, including criminal penalties”; all charges against

Plaintiffs be dismissed; and monetary relief. (Doc. Nos. 1, 1-2).
II. Standard of Review
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.
Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594,
30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The Court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action
under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks
an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d
338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99
F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised
on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless.

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in the Complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise
the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed
factual allegations but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id.
In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.1998).

III. Law and Analysis
A. The ADA Claim
Plaintiff appears to claim that the defendants violated their minor child’s rights under the
Americans with Disabilities Act when they excluded their child from certain educational programs
“based on his disability.” They also allege the defendants failed to provide their child
accommodations. (See Doc. No. 1-2 at 2). Non-attorney parents, however, cannot appear pro se
on behalf of their minor child in lawsuits in federal court.
A party may plead and conduct his or her case in person or through a licensed attorney. See
28 U.S.C. § 1654; Eagle Associates v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1991). The
statute, however, “does not permit plaintiffs to appear pro se where interests other than their own

are at stake.” Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). This rule
“‘protects the rights of those before the court by preventing an ill-equipped layperson from
squandering the rights of the party he purports to represent.’” Bass v. Leatherwood, 788 F.3d 228,
230 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Zanecki v. Health Alliance Plan of Detroit, 576, F. App’x 594, 595
(6th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)).
Therefore, parents cannot appear pro se on behalf of their minor children “because a
minor’s personal cause of action is [his or] her own and does not belong to [his or] her parent or
representative.” Shepherd, 313 F.3d at 970 (citation omitted); see also McCoy v. Akron Police
Dep’t, No. 5:21-cv-51, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88484, 2021 WL 1857119, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May
10, 2021) (“[W]hile a parent may technically bring suit on behalf of a minor child, he or she may
not do so pro se—that is, the parent can only bring suit on behalf of the minor child through an
attorney.”) (citing Shepherd, 313 F.3d at 970). “The general rule prohibiting a non-attorney parent
from representing his or her minor child in federal court ‘is designed to protect the interests of the

minor party[.]’” Adams v. Astrue, 659 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see also
Wirtz v. Medina City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:21-cv-1730, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121230,
*5 (N.D. Ohio July 8, 2022) (dismissing without prejudice Section 1983 claims brought by pro se
parent on behalf of her minor children).
Here, there is no suggestion in the complaint that either plaintiff is a licensed attorney who
may lawfully assert the claims of their minor child. Therefore, to the extent that the complaint
asserts claims on behalf of Plaintiffs’ minor child, including claims that the defendants violated
the child’s rights under the ADA, those claims are dismissed without prejudice to any of the child’s
claims being refiled by an attorney.
B. Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs’ complaint stems from state court proceedings in the Richland County Juvenile
Court. To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the state court’s orders and decisions regarding the
custody of Plaintiffs’ minor child and asking this Court to vacate a state court judgment and enter
judgment in their favor, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this Court’s consideration of their
claims.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party losing his or her case in state court is barred
from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United
States District Court based on the party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates his or her
federal rights. Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298-99 (6th Cir. 2012). Federal appellate review
of state court judgments can only occur in the United States Supreme Court. See Dist. of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206
(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only where a party losing his or her case in state

court initiates an action in federal district court complaining of injury caused by a state court
judgment itself and seeks review and rejection of that judgment. Berry, 688 F.3d 298-99; In re
Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009). To determine whether Rooker-Feldman bars a claim,
the Court must look to the “source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.”
McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir.2006); see Berry, 688 F.3d at 299. If the
source of the plaintiff’s injury is the state court judgment itself, then the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars the federal claim. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393. “If there is some other source of
injury, such as a third party’s actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.” Id.; see
Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 368-69 (6th Cir. 2008). In conducting this inquiry, the Court
also considers the plaintiff’s requested relief. Evans v. Cordray, 424 Fed. App’x. 537, 2011 WL

2149547, at *1 (6th Cir. 2011).
Here, the source of Plaintiffs’ alleged injury appears, in part, to be the child custody
orders, and Plaintiffs ask the Court to return custody of their child to Plaintiffs and prohibit
further interference by the state court agencies or officials. Pursuant to Rooker-Feldman, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to vacate the judgment of the state court and grant Plaintiffs’ requested
relief.
To the extent Plaintiffs are seeking to litigate the child custody matter for a second time
in another court in the hope of obtaining a different result, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to grant that relief.
The doctrine of res judicata bars duplicative litigation based on the same event or events.
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S. Ct. 970, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979); Parklane
Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979). The term
“res judicata” literally means “a thing [already] adjudicated.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 2nd Ed.

When one court has already resolved the merits of a case, another court will not revisit them.
Montana, 440 U.S. at 153; Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., 439 U.S. at 326. The doctrine of res
judicata therefore precludes a party from bringing a subsequent lawsuit on the same claim or
from raising a new defense to defeat the prior judgment. Gargallo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 918 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1990). The doctrine bars relitigation of every
issue actually brought before the Court and every issue or defense that should have been raised in
the previous action. Id. Furthermore, res judicata bars Plaintiff from relitigating in federal court
claims and issues that were previously decided by a state court. Bragg v. Flint Bd. of Educ., 570
F.3d 775, 776 (6th Cir. 2009).
Here, Plaintiffs are challenging the judgment of the Richland County Juvenile Court,

namely the state court’s order granting temporary custody of Plaintiffs’ child to Children
Services and the child’s purported placement in an intermediate care facility. Plaintiffs are barred
by res judicata from relitigating those issues in federal court.
Moreover, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider child custody issues. Generally, the
Constitution and Congress have given federal courts authority to hear a case only when diversity
of citizenship exists between the parties or when the case raises a federal question. Caterpillar
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987). The first type of
federal jurisdiction, diversity of citizenship, is applicable to cases of sufficient value between
“citizens of different states.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The second type of federal jurisdiction
relies on the presence of a federal question. This type of jurisdiction arises where a “well-pleaded
complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the Plaintiff’s
right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28, 103 S. Ct. 2841,

77 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1983).
Diversity of citizenship does not exist in this case. Even if it did, child custody issues fall
under the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504
U.S. 689, 704, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 119 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1992); Chevalier v. Estate of Barnhart, 803
F.3d 789, 794-98 (6th Cir. 2015). If federal jurisdiction exists in this case, it must be based on
federal law. Child custody determinations, however, are a matter of state law. The Court therefore
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to make a child custody determination.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiffs’ state court proceedings are still pending, the Court must
abstain from hearing challenges to these state court proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 44-45, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971). When an individual is the subject of an ongoing

state action involving important state matters, he or she cannot interfere with the pending state
action by maintaining a parallel federal action involving claims that could have been raised in the
state case. Watts v. Burkhart, 854 F.2d 839, 844-48 (6th Cir. 1988). If the state defendant files such
a case, the Younger abstention requires the federal court to defer to the state proceeding. Id.; see
also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15, 107 S. Ct. 1519, 95 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1987).
Based on these principles, abstention is appropriate where: (1) the state proceedings are
ongoing, (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests, and (3) the state proceedings
afford the plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise federal questions. Leveye v. Metro. Pub.
Def. Office, 73 F. App’x 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45). Abstention
is mandated where federal court intervention “unduly interferes with the legitimate activities of
the state.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. Additionally, the principles expressed in Younger apply to
ongoing state civil and criminal proceedings. Watts, 854 F.2d at 844.
Regarding the third requirement of Younger, the relevant inquiry is whether the state

proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415, 430, 99 S. Ct. 2371, 60 L. Ed. 2d 994 (1979). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating
that state procedural law bars presentation of his claims. Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 14. When a
plaintiff has not attempted to present his federal claims in the state court proceedings, the federal
court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of
“unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 15; see also Szarell v. Summit
Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas, No. 5:18 CV 2975, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142061, 2019 WL 3946191,
at *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2019) (the third factor of the Younger abstention was satisfied where
the plaintiff failed to allege in the pleadings that the state court proceedings did not or could not
provide her with an opportunity to present her federal claim).

Here, if the state court proceedings in Richland County Juvenile Court are still pending, all
three factors supporting abstention are present. State court proceedings involving domestic
relations and child custody, visitation, or support matters implicate important state interests. See
Butterfield v. Steiner, No. C2-01-1224, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19057, 2002 WL 31159304, at *6
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2002) (“Federal courts have consistently recognized that matters relating to
domestic relations cases and child custody disputes implicate important state interests[.]”) (citing
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 99 S. Ct. 2371, 60 L. Ed. 2d 994 (1979)). And there is no suggestion
in the complaint that any purported claim in this federal lawsuit is barred in the state action. The
Court must therefore abstain from interfering with Plaintiffs’ pending state court proceedings.
C. Failure to State a Claim
Even if the Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ child custody claims, to the extent
Plaintiffs seek damages against Magistrate Karen Cannon, Richland County Children Services,
Richland County CASA, Mansfield Police Department, and Lexington Police Department for

violating their constitutional rights, they fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Magistrate Karen Cannon is immune from suit. Judicial officers are absolutely immune
from civil suits. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991); Barnes v.
Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). They are accorded this broad protection to ensure
that the independent and impartial exercise of their judgment in a case is not impaired by the
exposure to damages by dissatisfied litigants. Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1115. For this reason, absolute
immunity is overcome only when (1) the conduct alleged is performed at a time when the defendant
is not acting as a judge, or (2) the conduct alleged, although judicial in nature, is taken in complete
absence of all subject matter jurisdiction of the court over which he or she presides. Mireles, 502
U.S. at 11-12; Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1116. A judge will not be deprived of immunity even if the

action at issue was performed in error, done maliciously, or the judge exceeded his or her authority.
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978).
Here, neither exception to immunity applies. Plaintiffs’ allegations against Magistrate
Cannon concern decisions she made in connection with Plaintiffs’ child custody proceedings.
Specifically, Plaintiff Angela Miller alleges that Magistrate Cannon denied Miller the right to
cross-examine her husband, Plaintiff Jason L. Miller, Sr., and denied her the right to present
evidence on the plaintiffs’ behalf. Magistrate Cannon was acting as a judicial officer when she
rendered her decisions and issued her judgments. And there is no suggestion in the complaint that
the decisions rendered by Magistrate Cannon were taken in complete absence of all subject matter
jurisdiction of the court over which she presides. Magistrate Cannon is therefore absolutely
immune from suit.
Additionally, Richland County Children Services and Richland County CASA are not sui
juris, meaning they are not legal entities separate from the county that can sue or be sued in their

own right. Loper v. Cuyahoga Cty. Children & Family Servs., No. 1:18 CV 1598, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64375, 2019 WL 1597552, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 15, 2019) (Cuyahoga County Children
and Family Services is not sui juris and cannot be sued in its own right); Wilson v. Trumbull County
Dep’t of Job & Family Servs., No. 4:12 CV 02163, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154926, 2013 WL
5820276, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 29, 2013) (finding that “numerous district courts” have found that
county agencies are not sui juris, and granting motion to dismiss of defendant Trumbull County
Adult Protective Services because the county agency lacks the capacity to be sued) (collecting
cases). The claims against Richland County Children Services and Richland County CASA
therefore fail as a matter of law.
Finally, police departments are likewise not legal entities capable of being sued in their

own right. See Lawson v. City of Youngstown, 912 F. Supp. 2d 527, 531 (N.D. Ohio 2012)
(collecting cases and holding that Ohio courts and police departments are not sui juris for purposes
of suit under Section 1983); see also Tysinger v. Police Dep’t of Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 572
(6th Cir. 2006) (“We note at the outset that the named defendant in this action, the Police
Department of the City of Zanesville, is not a juridical entity subject to suit under Ohio law.”).
Plaintiffs’ claims against the Mansfield Police Department and the Lexington Police Department
therefore also fail as a matter of law.
The Younger abstention generally requires a federal court to stay rather than dismiss a
damages action. See Gray v. Bush, 628 F.3d 779, 785 (6th Cir. 2010) (“In the context of a
complaint seeking ‘both equitable [relief] and money damages,’ . . . ‘a federal court’s discretion
to abstain from exercising jurisdiction does not extend so far as to permit a court to dismiss or
remand, as opposed to stay, an action at law.’”) (quoting Superior Beverage Co., Inc. v. Schieffelin
& Co., 448 F.3d 910, 913-14 (6th Cir. 2006)). However, a court may dismiss such an action rather

than hold it in abeyance when the plaintiff has failed to state a viable claim for relief. See Moore
v. City of Garfield Heights, No. 1: 12-cv-17000, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164911, 2012 WL
5845369, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2012) (citing Wheat v. Jessamine Journal Newspaper, No.
96-6426, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22597, 1996 WL 476435 (6th Cir. Aug. 20, 1996) (stating that
dismissing a case rather than staying it is appropriate under Younger where a plaintiff fails to state
a viable claim for relief)). In light of the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ claims against Magistrate Karen
Cannon, Richland County Children Services, Richland County CASA, Mansfield Police
Department, and Lexington Police Department are dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.

No. 2). And the Court dismisses without prejudice any claims asserted on behalf of Plaintiffs’
minor child, including claims that the defendants violated the child’s rights under the ADA.
Additionally, the Court dismisses with prejudice, all claims against Magistrate Karen
Cannon, Richland County Children Services, Richland County CASA, Mansfield Police
Department, and Lexington Police Department pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Further, the Court orders any claims against ViaQuest, New Hope Behavioral Health, and
Lexington High School (as they pertain to Plaintiffs’ claim that the school denied Plaintiffs access
to their child’s records), stayed pending the conclusion of the Richland County Juvenile Court case
involving Plaintiffs and their minor child who is the subject of this complaint, including all appeals.
This case is administratively closed, subject to reopening upon a written motion to reopen
filed by Plaintiffs demonstrating that the state court case listed above and all appeals in that case
have been resolved or concluded. No claims or defenses are waived as a result of the stay. All
pending motions are denied without prejudice to refiling in the event the case is reopened. Because

this case is stayed, from this point forward, the only motion that the Court will entertain is a motion
to reopen that demonstrates that the state court case (including all appeals) has been resolved. Until
a motion to reopen is granted, no other filings will be considered by the Court, and the Clerk’s
Office is instructed to return to Plaintiffs, unfiled, any other documents.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision
could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Pamela A. Barker ______
PAMELA A. BARKER
Date: November 5, 2025 U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11198156. Public record. Not legal advice.