# Williams v. City of Baton Rouge

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · November 4, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11197032

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** November 4, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** Civil Rights
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

No. 24-30723
FILED
November 4, 2025
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
Archie Williams, Clerk

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

City of Baton Rouge; Alfred Charles Mondrick, Former
Detective; Marjorie Groht, Former Detective; Steven Woodring,
Former Detective; Patrick Lane, Former Forensic Scientist; Sybil
Guidry, Former Investigator for the Office of the District Attorney for the East
Baton Rouge Parish; Jerry Miller, Former Forensic Scientist,

Defendant—Appellees.
______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:20-CV-162
______________________________

Before Jones, Stewart, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Archie Williams brought this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
the City of Baton Rouge (the “City”) and former detectives of the Baton
Rouge Police Department, Alfred Charles Mondrick, Marjorie Groht, and

_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 24-30723

Steven Woodring (collectively, the “Police Defendants”). Williams also
sued former forensic scientists of the Louisiana State Police Crime
Laboratory, Patrick Lane and Nace “Jerry” Miller (collectively, the
“Forensic Defendants”). He brought a failure to train or supervise claim
against the City. Williams alleges that the Police Defendants violated his
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by using an impermissibly
suggestive photographic lineup procedure prior to his arrest. He further
alleges that the Forensic Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process by suppressing exculpatory crime scene evidence. He
also brought state law claims for malicious prosecution, spoliation of
evidence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence against
the Police and Forensic Defendants. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the City and the Police Defendants as well as the
Forensic Defendants. Thereafter, Williams appealed. Because we agree that
the Police Defendants and Forensic Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity and that the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment on Williams’s state law and Monell 1 claims, we AFFIRM the
district court’s judgment.
I
A. Factual Background
On December 9, 1982, Anne Eaton was raped and stabbed in her Baton
Rouge home. 2 During the assault, Eaton was face-to-face with the assailant
_____________________
1
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
2
This appeal involves a review of cross-motions for summary judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. “The court reviews district court judgment rendered
on cross-motions for summary judgment de novo. ‘On cross-motions for summary
judgment, we review each party’s motion independently, viewing the evidence and
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’” Century Sur. Co. v. Colgate
Operating, L.L.C., 116 F.4th 345, 348–49 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Discover Prop. & Cas. Ins.

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and noticed a scar on his right arm. Stephanie Alexander arrived at Eaton’s
home during the incident, walked upstairs, and saw the assailant and Eaton.
After the assailant grabbed Alexander and told her to lie down on the floor,
he fled the scene.
The Police Defendants investigated Eaton’s assault. To identify the
assailant, detectives Mondrick and Groht showed Eaton photographic
lineups on five separate occasions. On December 15, 1982, Mondrick and
Groht interviewed Eaton and showed her the first photographic lineup,
which was based on Alexander’s description of the suspect. Mondrick and
Groht presented Eaton with forty-eight photographs of Black males with
similar appearances, excluding a photograph of Williams. Eaton did not
identify her assailant during this lineup. On December 16, 1982, Mondrick
and Groht showed Eaton six photographs, excluding a photograph of
Williams, and Eaton also failed to make a positive identification.
On January 3, 1983, Groht showed Eaton thirty additional
photographs, excluding a photograph of Williams, and Eaton again failed to
identify the suspect. Later that day, a confidential informant advised
Woodring that Williams had committed the crime. Given this information,
detectives later showed Eaton six photographs, including one of Williams.
During this lineup, Eaton looked at the photograph of Williams, which looked
“very, very close to her attacker.” Eaton “felt pretty sure that this was the

_____________________
Co. v. Blue Bell Creameries USA, Inc., 73 F.4th 322, 327 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted)).
Because the district court granted the Forensic Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, “this [c]ourt takes [Williams’s] evidence as true and construes all facts and
justifiable inferences in the light most favorable to [Williams].” Id. (citing Discover Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 73 F.4th at 327). Therefore, the facts presented herein are as alleged by
Williams.

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man,” but “said she could not be positive.” Upon Eaton’s request, the
detectives then showed Eaton a side view of the lineup, including a
photograph of Williams. Eaton similarly pinpointed the photograph of
Williams, stating that it “looked the most like the [B]lack man who raped
her” even though “she could not positively say.”
On January 4, 1983, the Police Defendants presented another
six-photograph lineup, including a newer photograph of Williams. Eaton
“immediately pointed” to the photograph of Williams and “became very
excited.” The detectives also “immediately heard the victim scream in a loud
voice that the subject in position #1,” the position of Williams’s photograph
in the lineup, “was the [B]lack male [who] raped her.” The detectives
arrested Williams later that day. Before Williams’s trial, Eaton identified
Williams in a physical lineup. During the trial, Eaton also identified Williams
as her assailant. When Williams stood before the jury and lifted his shirt as
instructed by the prosecution, Eaton testified that the scar on Williams’s
right arm was the same scar that she saw on the day of the assault.
After the incident, the Forensic Defendants also assisted in the
investigation. Lane lifted eight latent or invisible fingerprints from the crime
scene and took photographs of the bedroom and bloody smears on the door.
Sibyl Guidry, a latent print examiner at the Louisiana State Bureau of
Identification, received fingerprints from Lane. Guidry identified no
fingerprints as Williams’s fingerprints. Miller assessed blood samples and
Eaton’s rape kit. Miller’s Scientific Analysis Report indicated that the
seminal fluid in Eaton’s rape kit “could have originated from Archie
Williams.”
On April 21, 1983, a jury convicted Williams of aggravated burglary,
aggravated rape, and attempted murder. After roughly thirty-six years in
prison, Williams was exonerated based on fingerprint evidence that
implicated another person as Eaton’s assailant.

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B. Procedural History
On March 17, 2020, Williams filed suit asserting 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims against the City and the Police Defendants. 3 He alleged that the Police
Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by
using an impermissibly suggestive photographic identification procedure and
failing to disclose exculpatory crime scene evidence. He also asserted state
law claims for malicious prosecution, spoliation of evidence, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and negligence against the Police Defendants.
He further alleged § 1983 claims against the City for an unconstitutional
policy, custom, or practice of failing to train or supervise. He also asserted
claims against the Baton Rouge Police Department and Louisiana State
Police Crime Lab Supervisors for supervisory liability.
Williams asserted § 1983 claims against the Forensic Defendants. He
alleged that Lane and Guidry violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to
due process by failing to disclose exculpatory crime scene evidence,
fabricating crime scene evidence, and conducting a reckless investigation. He
alleged that Miller violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
by fabricating and failing to disclose serological evidence. 4 Finally, he
asserted state law claims for malicious prosecution, spoliation of evidence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence.
Williams filed an opposed motion for summary judgment against
Lane, and the Forensic Defendants filed an opposed cross-motion for
summary judgment. The district court granted the Forensic Defendants’

_____________________
3
On May 12, 2020, Williams filed an amended complaint.
4
Serology is “the study of blood serum.” Serology, Oxford English Dictionary (2d
ed. 1989).

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motion for summary judgment, reasoning that they were entitled to qualified
immunity. Williams timely appealed.
The City and the Police Defendants filed an opposed motion for
summary judgment. The district court granted their motion for summary
judgment on Williams’s fabrication of evidence through impermissibly
suggestive identification procedures and failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence claims, reasoning that the Police Defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity. Moreover, the district court granted summary judgment
against Williams on his failure to train and supervisory liability claims
because it found that there was no underlying constitutional violation.
Finally, the district court granted summary judgment against Williams on his
state law claims, citing the lack of evidentiary support and constitutional
violation. Williams timely appealed.
II
This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the district
court entered final judgments. It granted summary judgment in favor of the
Forensic Defendants on June 10, 2024 as well as in favor of the City and the
Police Defendants on October 18, 2024.
We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment
de novo. Sanders v. Christwood, 970 F.3d 558, 561 (5th Cir. 2020). This court
also reviews a district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity de novo. Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 311 (5th
Cir. 2016). “Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Id. at 311–12 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A fact is ‘material’ if
its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the lawsuit
under governing law.” Hamilton v. Segue Software Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th
Cir. 2000) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

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“An issue is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “A party cannot defeat
summary judgment with ‘conclusory allegations,’ ‘unsubstantiated
assertions,’ or ‘only a scintilla of evidence.’” Lamb v. Ashford Place
Apartments L.L.C., 914 F.3d 940, 946 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Little v. Liquid
Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
III
On appeal, Williams raises four arguments. 5 First, he argues that the
district court erred by holding that the Police Defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity. Second, he asserts that the district court erred in
granting the Police Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
Williams’s state law claims. Third, he contends that the district court erred
in granting the City’s motion for summary judgment on Williams’s Monell
claim. And fourth, he maintains that the district court erred by holding that
the Forensic Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. We address
each of these arguments in turn.
A. Police Defendants’ Assertion of Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity “shields public officials sued in their individual
capacities ʻfrom liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Joseph ex rel. Estate of Joseph v.
Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

_____________________
5
As an initial matter, we note that Williams does not raise the following issues on
appeal: the Police Defendants’ failure to disclose exculpatory crime scene evidence, the
City’s supervisory liability, Guidry’s assertion of qualified immunity, and state law claims
against the Forensic Defendants. Accordingly, these issues are forfeited on appeal. See
Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (“A party forfeits an
argument . . . by failing to adequately brief the argument on appeal.”).

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U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “When a public official makes ʻa good-faith assertion
of qualified immunity,’ that ʻalters the usual summary-judgment burden of
proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.’” Id.
at 329–30 (quoting Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016)). “A
court’s decision on qualified immunity involves two questions: (1) whether
the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional or statutory rights; and
(2) whether those rights were clearly established at the time of the violation
ʻsuch that the officer was on notice of the unlawfulness of his or her
conduct.’” Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Cole v.
Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2019)).
A right is clearly established if “the contours of the right” are
“sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 635 (1987).
“The defendant’s acts are held to be objectively reasonable unless all
reasonable officials in the defendant’s circumstances would have then known
that the defendant’s conduct violated the United States Constitution or the
federal statute as alleged by the plaintiff.” Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d
447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original) (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at
641). To determine that a right is clearly established, courts “must be able to
point to controlling authority—or a robust consensus of persuasive
authority—that defines the contours of the right in question with a high
degree of particularity.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371–72 (5th Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the context of photographic lineups, the Court has observed that
“[i]t is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant’s right
to due process.” Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972). While the Court
has acknowledged that “improper employment of photographs by police may
sometimes cause witnesses to err in identifying criminals,” it has been
“unwilling to prohibit its employment, either in the exercise of [its]

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supervisory power or, still less, as a matter of constitutional requirement.”
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1968). The Court has
explained that “each case must be considered on its own facts, and that
convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial
identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the
photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to
give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Id.
at 384. Even if an identification process is impermissibly suggestive, courts
must determine “whether under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ the
identification was reliable.” Neil, 409 U.S. at 199. Courts consider the
following factors in assessing the likelihood of misidentification or reliability:
(1) “the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the
crime”; (2) “the witness’ degree of attention”; (3) “the accuracy of the
witness’ prior description of the criminal”; (4) “the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation”; and (5) “the length of
time between the crime and the confrontation.” Id. at 199–200.
Williams argues that the Police Defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity. He notes that “[a]s early as 1968, our High Court has
recognized that constitutional deprivations may occur when a victim is
presented multiple photographic lineups depicting the same person.” He
also asserts that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether
the Police Defendants’ successive identification procedure carried a
substantial risk of misidentification because many facts show that the Police
Defendants’ conduct was unreasonable. Moreover, Williams cites his
expert’s report, which “strongly condemns the [Police] Defendants’
repeated use of [Williams’s] photographs in successive lineups.”
The Police Defendants respond that they are entitled to qualified
immunity because “[n]othing in the investigative process for the photograph
or in-person lineups was suggestive or otherwise gave rise to an obvious or

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apparent violation of [Williams’s] civil rights.” They interpret Simmons as
supporting their qualified immunity defense, arguing that Williams “ignores
the materiality and value of the criminal trial cross examinations of the victim
and the investigation officer (Groht).” They also argue that Williams “calls
no attention to the shoulder scar description given by the victim and the
confirmation of that scar upon [Williams’s] shoulder as demonstrated in
open court to the criminal trial jury.” Applying the factors outlined in Neil,
409 U.S. at 198, the Police Defendants argue that their identification process
was reliable and non-suggestive. Addressing Williams’s claim that there are
genuine issues of material fact, they contend that his expert’s report was
“speculative” and “in direct contradiction to the evidence, the victim’s
criminal trial testimony.”
The district court correctly held that the Police Defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity. We agree that Williams does not provide
sufficient support to establish that the Police Defendants’ photographic
identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive and unreliable as to
violate his due process rights.
Williams first cites Simmons for its discussion of the risks of
misidentification associated with photographic lineups, but the Court
generally condones the practice. 390 U.S. at 384 (“Despite the hazards of
initial identification by photograph, this procedure has been used widely and
effectively in criminal law enforcement, from the standpoint both of
apprehending offenders and of sparing innocent suspects the ignominy of
arrest by allowing eyewitnesses to exonerate them through scrutiny of
photographs.”). The Court has also noted that “[t]he danger that
[photographic identification] may result in convictions based on
misidentification may be substantially lessened by a course of
cross-examination at trial which exposes to the jury the method’s potential
for error.” Id. Here, Eaton and the Police Defendants were subject to

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cross-examination, potentially lessening the risk of a conviction based on
misidentification.
Williams also fails to establish that the Police Defendants’ conduct
violated his due process rights. He does not provide concrete evidence that
suggests that the identification procedure was impermissible. And even if
Williams had sufficient evidence to prove that the procedure was unduly
suggestive, he has not proven that the procedure was unreliable. Under Neil,
409 U.S. at 198, the Police Defendants’ procedure was likely reliable enough
to afford Williams due process. First, Eaton had the opportunity to view the
assailant at the time of the crime because she was face-to-face with him
multiple times during the assault like the victim in Neil. See 409 U.S. at 200–
01. Second, Eaton paid attention to the assailant because she “decided that
if [she] lived through it [she] was going to know who that person was, and
[she] was going to be able to draw a good composite.” Third, Eaton’s prior
description of the criminal was somewhat accurate because she was able to
recall the scar that he had during trial. Fourth, Eaton exhibited a level of
certainty at the confrontation when she was shown a photograph of Williams
on January 4, 1983, as well as during a physical lineup and at trial even though
she had not previously made a positive identification. Fifth, Eaton identified
Williams less than one month after the incident, which was a shorter length
of time than the seven months that had elapsed between the crime and
confrontation in Neil. See 409 U.S. at 201. Given the totality of the
circumstances, the Police Defendants’ procedure was likely reliable enough
to afford Williams due process.
Williams’s claim also fails because there is no genuine issue of
material fact. Williams argues that “there are a multitude of specific facts
demonstrating that the actions of the [Police] Defendants were objectively
unreasonable, and carried a substantial risk of misidentification.” However,
“[a]n issue is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to

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return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Hamilton, 232 F.3d at 477 (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). “A party cannot defeat summary judgment with
‘conclusory allegations,’ ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ or ‘only a scintilla of
evidence.’” Lamb, 914 F.3d at 946 (quoting Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d at
1075). Here, even if the facts Williams lists are material, the evidence is
insufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for him because he
provides no argument as to why these facts create a genuine issue of material
fact. While Williams cites his expert’s report as support, it includes
unsubstantiated assertions such as a statement that the detectives could have
given “verbal or non-verbal cues” to Eaton “to help break the ‘tie’ between
Williams” and another person in the photographic lineup.
In sum, Williams failed to prove that the Police Defendants’
photographic identification procedure violated his constitutional or statutory
rights under the first prong of the qualified immunity test. Even if the Police
Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity, Williams’s claim still
fails because there is no genuine issue of material fact due to insufficient
support. For these reasons, the district court did not err by holding that the
Police Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
B. Williams’s State Law Claims Against the Police Defendants
The district court did not err in granting the Police Defendants’
motion for summary judgment on Williams’s state law claims. “A party
forfeits an argument . . . by failing to adequately brief the argument on
appeal.” Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021). As an
initial matter, Williams has forfeited this issue because he did not adequately
brief it on appeal. He provides no support for his argument that the Police
Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on his state law claims.
But even if he has not forfeited his state law claims, the district court
had discretion to dismiss them. “A district court’s decision whether to

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exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which
it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF
Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367). “Ordinarily,
when the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the pendent state claims
should be dismissed as well.” Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir.
1989) (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). We
review the decision to retain jurisdiction over state claims for abuse of
discretion. Parker & Parsley Petrol. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585
(5th Cir. 1992). Williams argues that the district court erred because there
are genuine issues of material fact as to the reasonableness of the Police
Defendants’ conduct, which underlies his federal claims. We disagree. The
district court dismissed Williams’s state law claims because he failed to
provide evidence in support of his claims. The district court also found no
constitutional violation under § 1983. For this reason, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in deciding to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Williams’s state law claims after it dismissed his federal claims. See Wong,
881 F.2d at 204.
C. Williams’s Monell Claim Against the City
A city may be held liable under § 1983 if the plaintiff proves three
elements: “a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional
rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.” Piotrowski v. City of
Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). “In limited circumstances, a local
government’s decision not to train certain employees about their legal duty
to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an official
government policy for purposes of § 1983.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.
51, 61 (2011). “To satisfy the statute, a municipality’s failure to train its
employees in a relevant respect must amount to ‘deliberate indifference to
the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into

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contact.’” Id. (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).
Deliberate indifference requires “proof that a municipal actor disregarded a
known or obvious consequence of his action.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)).
Williams argues that the district court erred in granting the City’s
motion for summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material
fact on the issue of whether the City is liable under Monell. He contends that
“the lead detectives did not have a training protocol that informed them of,
or warned them against, the potential for due process violations attendant to
presenting multiple photographic lineups featuring the same person to
victims.”
The City responds that there is no genuine issue of material fact
because Williams “offers no factual information to support or suggest that
the [City], through its police department, had a written or unwritten policy,
practice, or pattern of investigative means and methods as specifically alleged
against the officers herein attributable to [Williams’s] arrest.” The City also
argues that “there was no national standard in policing on how an officer was
to conduct a photograph line-up.”
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on
Williams’s Monell claim against the City. Williams failed to establish that the
City violated Williams’s constitutional rights. Additionally, he failed to prove
that the City’s lack of a training protocol constituted deliberate indifference.
He provides neither evidence that the City violated his constitutional rights
nor evidence that the City consciously disregarded the known risk of due
process violations from improper photographic lineups. Thus, the district
court did not err in granting the City’s motion for summary judgment on
Williams’s Monell claim.

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D. Forensic Defendants’ Assertion of Qualified Immunity
“[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). To establish a
Brady violation, a party must prove: “(1) the prosecutor suppressed evidence,
(2) favorable to the defense, (3) and material to guilt or punishment.” Miller
v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original) (citing
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). “To have been suppressed, the evidence must not
have been discoverable through the defendant’s due diligence.” United
States v. Brown, 650 F.3d 581, 588 (5th Cir. 2011). “Evidence is material if
there is ‘a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Miller, 431
F.3d at 245 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 682 (1985)).
Williams argues that former forensic scientist Lane is not entitled to
qualified immunity because concealing exculpatory evidence has been a
“clearly established” constitutional violation since 1967. Williams cites Geter
v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550 (5th Cir. 1988), arguing that the law is clearly
established that a crime scene investigator’s suppression of exculpatory
evidence sustains a claim under § 1983. He further asserts that the
photograph of a bloody fingerprint that Lane took at Eaton’s home
(“Photograph 10-5”) was material evidence concealed from Williams’s
defense team.
Williams also contends that former forensic scientist Miller is not
entitled to qualified immunity because his report was “misleading and
scientifically inaccurate.” He argues that Miller “conspicuously failed to
report that, in addition to [Williams], over 90% of the population similarly

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‘could not be excluded’ as a donor of the seminal fluids extracted from
[Eaton’s] rape kit.” He further contends that Miller failed to conduct any
form of enzyme testing, which Williams asserts was widely used in the early
1980s and could have excluded Williams as a donor of the semen collected
from Eaton’s rape kit.
The Forensic Defendants respond that they are entitled to qualified
immunity because Williams did not establish that they violated clearly
established law. They note that Brady did not apply to forensic scientists in
1983. Even if Brady applied, the Forensic Defendants argue that Williams has
not proven a Brady violation.
The district court did not err by holding that Lane was entitled to
qualified immunity. First, Williams failed to prove that Lane’s conduct
violated a clearly established precedent at the time of the violation.
Williams’s due process right under Brady was not clearly established at the
time of violation. As of 2001, the Court explained that “neither police
officers nor lab technicians have a Brady duty to disclose exculpatory
information.” Mowbray v. Cameron Cnty., 274 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 2001).
Therefore, Lane would not have been on notice that his conduct may have
violated the Constitution because Brady had not been extended to lab
technicians and forensic scientists in the 1980s. Even if Brady had been
extended to lab technicians and forensic scientists in the context of the
deliberate concealment of evidence, Williams cites no evidence that Lane
acted in bad faith. See Mowbray, 274 F.3d at 278 n.5. According to Lane’s
affidavit, “he possessed no desire or intent to hide or suppress any evidence
on any crime scene visited during his career,” including the crime scene at
Eaton’s home on December 9, 1982. Thus, Williams failed to establish a
violation of a “clearly established” right under the first prong of the qualified
immunity test.

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Case: 24-30723 Document: 53-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 11/04/2025

No. 24-30723

Even if Brady applied to Lane, Williams failed to show that Lane’s
conduct constituted a Brady violation. To establish a Brady claim, a party
must prove: “(1) the prosecutor suppressed evidence, (2) favorable to the
defense, (3) and material to guilt or punishment.” Miller, 431 F.3d at 245
(emphasis in original) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). Here, there is no
evidence that Lane suppressed Photograph 10-5. This photograph was
available to the defense and could have been discovered by the defense
despite Williams’s claims. For example, during the pre-trial hearing on the
defense’s supplemental motion for discovery held on March 11, 1983, the
prosecution stated that it was willing to provide photographs of the crime
scene to the defense. Because Williams failed to establish that Lane
suppressed Photograph 10-5, Williams failed to prove a Brady violation.
Additionally, Photograph 10-5 was not material to Williams’s guilt or
innocence. According to Dr. Glenn Langenburg, the defense’s fingerprint
expert, “Photograph 10-5 would not have assisted the defense of
[Williams’s] trial in any respect because the meaningful information in that
photograph was better included on Exhibit S-12 (more particularly L6b) and
because the right portion of the photograph contains no additional
discriminating ridge detail.” Additionally, at Williams’s trial, the prosecutor
told the jury that “you will be presented with evidence that several
fingerprints were taken from the scene, none of which match the defendant.
As a matter of fact there are two fingerprints taken from the scene that don’t
match anybody that we made.” Similarly, Williams’s defense attorney
instructed the jury to “[p]ay close attention [to] those fingerprints—none of
those fingerprints are [] [Williams’s], none. Some have not been identified.”
Because Photograph 10-5 was immaterial, Williams did not establish that
Lane violated his rights under Brady. Thus, the district court correctly held
that Lane was entitled to qualified immunity.

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Case: 24-30723 Document: 53-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 11/04/2025

No. 24-30723

The district court also did not err by holding that Miller was entitled
to qualified immunity. As discussed above, Brady did not apply to lab
technicians and forensic scientists at the time of the alleged violation, so
Williams failed to prove that Miller’s conduct violated a clearly established
precedent. Like Williams’s claim regarding Lane, Williams presents no
evidence that Miller acted in bad faith such that Brady would extend to his
conduct.
Even if Brady applied to Miller, Williams also has failed to establish
that Miller’s conduct violated his constitutional or statutory rights. First,
Williams has not established that Miller’s failure to reference demographic
statistics is a Brady violation. “Brady does not require the prosecution ‘to
conduct a defendant’s investigation or to assist in the presentation of the
defense’s case.’” United States v. Aubin, 87 F.3d 141, 148 (5th Cir. 1996)
(quoting United States v. Marrero, 904 F.2d 251, 261 (5th Cir. 1990)).
Moreover, “Brady does not obligate the State to furnish a defendant with
exculpatory evidence that is fully available to the defendant through the
exercise of reasonable diligence.” Kutzner v. Cockrell, 303 F.3d 333, 336 (5th
Cir. 2002) (citing Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 1997)). Here,
Miller’s report indicated that the seminal fluid in Eaton’s rape kit “could
have originated from Archie Williams.” That Miller did not also report that
“over 90% of the population similarly ‘could not be excluded’ as a donor”
does not rise to the level of a Brady violation, especially since the defense
could have discovered this information through due diligence. The defense
could have asked Miller about demographic statistics at trial. Miller’s report
is consistent with his trial testimony where he admits that there was “no
way” he could “say absolutely” that Williams was the assailant. Therefore,
Williams has not proven that Miller’s failure to reference additional statistics
violated his due process rights.

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Case: 24-30723 Document: 53-1 Page: 19 Date Filed: 11/04/2025

No. 24-30723

Moreover, Williams has not shown that Miller’s failure to conduct an
enzyme test violates Brady. Under Brady, “the prosecution has an
‘affirmative duty . . . to produce at the appropriate time requested evidence
which is materially favorable to the accused either as direct or impeaching
evidence.’” United States v. Beaver, 524 F.2d 963, 966 (5th Cir. 1975)
(quoting Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir. 1968)). However,
“Brady clearly does not impose an affirmative duty upon the government to
take action to discover information which it does not possess.” Id. Here,
there is no indication in the record that Williams requested an enzyme test
from Miller, and Miller did not have an affirmative duty to perform one.
Thus, Williams has not demonstrated that Miller’s failure to conduct an
enzyme test violated his due process rights.
In sum, Williams failed to establish a violation of his constitutional or
statutory rights and, in turn, failed to rebut the Forensic Defendants’
qualified immunity defense. Thus, the district court did not err by holding
that the Forensic Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
judgment.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11197032. Public record. Not legal advice.