# Opinion

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · November 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11196687

## Case

- **Full name:** Terrence Mitchell v. Costello Sury & Rooney, P.C., and MC Property Management Corp.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** November 3, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TERRENCE MITCHELL,

Plaintiff,
No. 25 CV 2801
v.
Judge Manish S. Shah
COSTELLO SURY & ROONEY, P.C., and
MC PROPERTY MANAGEMENT CORP.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant Costello Sury & Rooney, P.C. filed an eviction and collection action
against plaintiff Terrence Mitchell on behalf of the Condos of Mill Creek, where
Mitchell resided. The lawsuit was settled and nonsuited. Attached to the eviction
complaint was a notice of debt for $250 in mailing costs charged by Costello Sury &
Rooney and a $125 “unit owner expense” charged by defendant MC Property
Management Corporation for turning over paperwork to Costello Sury & Rooney.
Mitchell sues the defendants for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, and unjust enrichment. Costello Sury & Rooney
moves for judgment on the pleadings. MC Property Management moves to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. For the reasons discussed below, the motions are granted.
I. Legal Standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) states that “[a]fter the pleadings are
closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the
pleadings” to “dispose of the case on the basis of the underlying substantive merits.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); Wolf v. Riverport Ins. Co., 132 F.4th 515, 518 (7th Cir. 2025)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To survive a Rule 12(c) challenge to
the sufficiency of the complaint, the complaint must meet the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss standard. Wolf, 132 F.4th at 518–19. For both dismissals under Rules 12(b)(6)
and 12(c), a complaint requires only “a short and plain statement” showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
677–78 (2009). The factual allegations in the complaint, accepted as true, must “raise
a right to relief above the speculative level.” Wolf, 132 F.4th at 519 (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The plaintiff must allege facts

that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are
insufficient. Id. At this stage, I accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true
and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.
III. Facts
Plaintiff Terrence Mitchell lived at the Condos of Mill Creek. [1] ¶ 15.1 In 2024,

defendant Costello Sury & Rooney filed an eviction and collection action in the Circuit
Court of Cook County against Mitchell on behalf of the Condos. [1] ¶ 16. Attached to
the complaint was a “validation notice” or “notice of debt” showing Mitchell had been

1 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers
are taken from the CM/ECF header placed on the top of filings. The facts are taken from the
plaintiff’s complaint, [1].
charged $250 in “mailing costs.” [1] ¶ 17; [1-1] at 3.2 Also attached to the complaint
were ledgers prepared by defendant MC Property Management Corporation,
including a $125 “unit owner expense” that the management company charged

Mitchell for turning over his file to Costello Sury & Rooney. [1] ¶¶ 19–20; [1-1] at 7.
The charges for $250 and $125 were subsumed in a total amount of debt alleged to be
$2,218.08, and the eviction complaint sought $2,657.32. [1-1] at 2–3. The lawsuit was
settled and nonsuited. [1] ¶ 24. Plaintiff paid the $2,657.32 sought in the eviction
complaint. [1] ¶ 24.
IV. Analysis

Mitchell alleges that MC Property Management violated the Illinois Consumer
Fraud Act by adding unauthorized sums to debts and collecting the unauthorized
sums. [1] ¶¶ 49–51. He alleges that Costello Sury & Rooney violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act by filing a lawsuit demanding payment of the same
unauthorized sums. [1] ¶¶ 33–41. He also alleges an unjust enrichment claim against
both defendants. [1] ¶¶ 59–61.
A. The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act

The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act “protects consumers against unfair or
deceptive acts or practices, including fraud, false promise, and the misrepresentation
or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact.” Rao v. J.P. Morgan
Chase Bank. N.A., 153 F.4th 541, 555 (7th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and

2 Costello Sury & Rooney says, and Mitchell agrees, that these were really “legal fees,” but
the notice was misprinted and shifted the dollar amounts down one row. [26] at 3; [27] at 15.
citation omitted). The elements of an ICFA claim are: (1) “a deceptive or unfair act or
practice by the defendant;” (2) “the defendant’s intent that the plaintiff rely on the
deceptive or unfair practice;” and (3) “the unfair or deceptive practices occurred

during a course of conduct involving trade or commerce.” Id. at 555–56. A plaintiff
may allege an ICFA violation based on a misrepresentation of a debt allegedly owed.
See, e.g., People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Sys. Corp., 146 Ill.2d 1, 12, 16 (1991)
(company alleged to have misrepresented the amounts allegedly owed for violating
Chicago parking ordinances).
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits debt collectors from using

“false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the
collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The “false representation of … the
character, amount, or legal status of any debt” is a violation of this section of the
FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). So is the “use of any false representation or
deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). Debt
collectors “may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect
any debt,” including collecting any amount unless it is “expressly authorized by the

agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).
Mitchell alleges that the $125 “unit owner expense” and $250 “mailing cost”
fees were not authorized under the Illinois Condominium Property Act, 765 ILCS
605/1, et seq., and so charging him for those fees violated the state and federal
statutes against deceptive or unfair debt collection practices. Defendants argue that
the fees were authorized under the Condominium Property Act because the fees were
allowed under the recorded condominium declaration for the Condos of Mills Creek.
The Illinois Condominium Property Act bars “fees pertaining to the collection

of a unit owner’s financial obligation, including fees charged by a manager or
managing agent,” unless the “authority to add the management fees to an owner’s
respective share of the common expenses is specifically stated in the declaration or
bylaws of the Association.” 765 ILCS 605/9.2(c).
Mitchell does not attach the full recorded declaration of the Condos of Mill
Creek to his complaint. He does attach one portion of the declaration, the ninth

amendment to the declaration. [1-1] at 11–17. MC Property Management attaches
the entire condo association’s declaration to its motion to dismiss. [23] at 15–56.3 I
may consider documents that are “incorporated into the complaint by reference.”
Holmes v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 141 F.4th 818, 822 (7th Cir. 2025). Because the
complaint references the declaration, and attaches an amendment to the declaration,
I consider the full declaration.
The declaration states, in relevant part, [23] at 32:

If an Owner is in default in the monthly payment of the
aforesaid charges or assessments for thirty (30) days, the
members of the Board may bring suit for and on behalf of
themselves as representatives of all Owners, to enforce
collection thereof or to foreclose the lien therefore as
hereinafter provided; and there shall be added to the
amounts due the costs of said suit, and other fees and
expenses together with legal interest and reasonable
attorneys’ fees to be fixed by the Court.

3 Mitchell does not contest that the declaration was recorded.
Mitchell says that the provision is not specific enough to cover MC Property
Management’s fees. Generally, each party is responsible for its own attorney fees and
costs. Willis Cap. LLC v. Belvedere Trading LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 132183, ¶ 24.

Parties to a contract may agree otherwise, and if they do, the fee-shifting provision of
the contract is strictly construed. Hahn v. McElroy, 2023 IL App (2d) 220403, ¶ 45.
To “strictly construe” a text, “one construes it to mean nothing more—but also
nothing less—than the letter of the text.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Here, the declaration allows for the costs of any lawsuit to enforce collection,
and fees and expenses, legal interest, and reasonable attorneys’ fees associated with

that suit. Strictly construed, that includes “other fees and expenses,” including fees
for turning over a file to the debt collector and mailing costs associated with the suit.
Mitchell’s authority is not to the contrary. In each of the cited cases, the court
found that attorneys’ fees had not been included in the contract language or were not
applicable under the relevant contract language. There was no discussion of other
costs and fees. See Concrete Structures/Sachi, J.V. v. Clark/Bulley/OVC/Power,
2024 IL App (1st) 240082, ¶ 24–29 (attorneys’ fees not allowed because defendants

did not breach provisions of the contract that would give rise to attorneys’ fees); Negro
Nest, LLC v. Mid-Northern Mgmt., Inc., 362 Ill.App.3d 640, 642, 649, 651 (4th Dist.
2005) (contract provision called for “all collection costs,” and “makes no mention of
attorney fees,” so no attorneys’ fees were awarded, as “Illinois courts have
consistently refused to read attorney fees into imprecise language”); Willis Cap., 2015
IL App (1st) 132183, ¶ 25 (contract provided for attorneys’ fees for the prevailing
party in an action brought “to enforce the terms” of the agreement, so attorneys’ fees
in in action to invalidate the agreement were improperly awarded).
The declaration allows for both attorneys’ fees and “other fees and expenses.”

[23] at 32. The complaint alleges that Costello Sury & Rooney filed an eviction and
collection action against Mitchell. [1] ¶ 16. Attached to the complaint was a ledger
that included a $125 “unit owner expense,” which was “a charge by [MC Property
Management] for handing over the file to CSR.” [1] ¶¶ 19–20. The complaint also
alleges that a “validation notice” or “notice of debt” attached to the complaint showed
that Mitchell had been charged $250 in “mailing costs” by Costello Sury & Rooney.

[1] ¶ 17. As alleged, both charges were fees or expenses incurred in bringing the
eviction action. They fall under the declaration’s language and so are allowed.
Mitchell argues that the $125 “unit owner expense” was not authorized
because the fee is imposed regardless of whether suit is ever filed. But an eviction
action was filed here, and so Mitchell’s argument is not supported by the allegations
in his complaint. The declaration specifically authorizes adding other fees and
expenses onto the amounts due when the condo association brings suit to enforce

collection of amounts due, as Mitchell alleges happened here. The declaration warns
condo owners that if the board files suit, all fees and charges are on the table for
recovery. No further specificity is necessary.
Costello Sury & Rooney says, and Mitchell agrees, that the $250 for “mailing
costs” was really for legal fees, and the notice of debt had a printing error that shifted
the dollar amounts down one row. Mitchell argues that the misprint still violated the
FDCPA because it was deceptively labeled a mailing cost. But the debt notice did not
misrepresent the character or amount of fees that Mitchell owed to Costello Sury &
Rooney. The notice told Mitchell how much he owed the firm for the costs of the suit.

Whether that was $250 for legal fees or mailing costs, either were allowed under the
condo declaration and it was clear the fees were related to the eviction action. The
misprint did not violate the FDCPA.
Because the fees were allowed in the declaration, there is no violation of the
Condominium Property Act, and no violation of ICFA or the FDCPA. The ICFA claims
are dismissed. Judgment is granted for Costello Sury & Rooney on the FDCPA

claims.4
B. Unjust Enrichment
Finally, Mitchell alleges an unjust enrichment claim against both defendants.
[1] ¶¶ 59–61. There is no standalone cause of action for unjust enrichment in Illinois.
Horist v. Sudler & Co., 941 F.3d 274, 281 (7th Cir. 2019). Because Mitchell’s unjust
enrichment claim rests on the same improper conduct alleged in his ICFA and
FDCPA claims, his unjust enrichment claim is “tied to [these] related claim[s],” and

“will stand or fall with the related claim[s].” Id. (quoting Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc.,
656 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 2011)). Because Mitchell fails to allege either an ICFA or
FDCPA violation, he also fails to allege an unjust enrichment claim.

4 Because I find that there was no ICFA or FDCPA violation, I do not reach MC Property
Management’s arguments that Mitchell should have brought this case as a derivative action
or that the ICFA does not allow a remedy that runs counter to the Condominium Property
Act.
IV. Conclusion
MC Property Management Company’s motion to dismiss, [23], and Costello
Sury & Rooney’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, [26], are granted. Mitchell’s
claims against MC Property Management for unjust enrichment and for violations of
ICFA are dismissed with prejudice.® Judgment is entered in favor of Costello Sury &
Rooney on his claims for unjust enrichment and violations of the FDCPA. Terminate
civil case.

ENTER:

Manish 8. Shah
United States District Judge
Date: November 3, 2025

5 Mitchell’s claims are dismissed with prejudice because any amendment would be futile. See
Russell v. Zimmer, Inc., 82 F.Ath 564, 572 (7th Cir. 2023). The fees charged here are allowed
under the condo’s declaration and therefore are valid under the Condominium Property Act.
No amendment would change the outcome.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11196687. Public record. Not legal advice.