# Brittain

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · October 31, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11182624

## Case

- **Full name:** Timothy Williams v. Kathy Brittain
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 31, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TIMOTHY WILLIAMS, : No. 3:25-CV-0338
Petitioner :
: (Judge Munley)
v. :
KATHY BRITTAIN,
Respondent ;

MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Timothy Williams initiated this action by filing a pro se petition for

a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his most recent
denial of parole, claiming that the Pennsylvania Parole Board violated his
substantive due process rights. Because Williams has not established a
constitutional violation, the court will deny his Section 2254 petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Williams is currently serving a sentence of six years and six months to
thirteen years’ incarceration imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of York
County, Pennsylvania, for aggravated assault and person not to possess a
firearm. (See Doc. 11-2 at 9). This sentence implicates a minimum release date
of January 7, 2024, and a maximum release date of July 7, 2030. (See id.).
When he filed his petition, Williams has been denied parole on two occasions:
September 29, 2023, and November 12, 2024. (ld. at 13-14, 16-17).

In February 2025, following his second parole denial, Williams lodged the

instant Section 2254 petition in this court. (Doc. 1). He alleges that the

November 2024 parole denial was “[a]rbitrary, [e]gregious, and [c]apricious,” and

thus violated his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. 7711, 2, 6, 7). He seeks

immediate release from confinement. (Id. at p. 11).
Respondent timely filed a response to Williams’ Section 2254 petition.
(See generally Doc. 11). Williams did not file a traverse and the time in which to

do so has passed, so his habeas petition is ripe for disposition.
il. DISCUSSION
The Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause “contains a substantive

component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless

the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Newman v. Beard, 617

F.3d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125
(1990)). With respect to parole determinations, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that a parole board’s decision can violate

an inmate’s substantive due process rights if it applies “standards that are
divorced from the policy and purpose of parole” or other “impermissible criteria.”
See Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 & n.2, 238, 240 (3d Cir. 1980); see also
Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996) (“In Block, the . . . panel majority

concluded that in [using arbitrary criteria for denying parole], the [Parole Board]
violated substantive due process in grounding its action on constitutionally
impermissible reasons.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Specifically, the

specter of a substantive due process violation is raised only when “a parole
board considers a factor that ‘shocks the conscience.’”” Holmes v. Christie, 14

F.4th 250, 267 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Newman, 617 F.3d at 782). If, however,
there is “some basis” for the parole board’s decision, and that basis is not
“constitutionally impermissible” or conscience shocking, a substantive due

process challenge must fail. See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir.
2001).
Williams alleges that during his September 2023 parole process, the Parole
Board recommended that he complete certain rehabilitation programs concerning
domestic violence. (See Doc. 1 at p. 8). He recounts that he completed the
recommended programming and maintained a clear conduct record, but was
again denied parole on November 12, 2024. (See id. at pp. 8-9). He contends
that his parole denial was improperly based on an affidavit by York County Police
Department Officer Sherri Hansen that indicated that Williams had “chased the
victim around the vehicle while firing the weapon into the air and then shooting
her in the leg.” (Id. at p. 9; see also Doc. 11-2 at 7 (Affidavit of Probable □□□□□□
Williams asserts that this information is inaccurate and was “repeatedly denied

and refuted both at the preliminary hearing and the trial[.]” (Doc. 1 at p. 10). He

maintains that the shooting was accidental and “without any malice.” (Id.)
Williams believes that the Parole Board interviewer “allowed their personal and

emotional opinions based upon what they read in an affidavit [to] influence[] their

reasoning|[],” which he claims is “arbitrary, egregious, an[d] an abuse of their

entire discretion.” (Id.)
Williams’ claim is meritless. Without repeating the parole denial verbatim,
the Parole Board’s reasons for denying parole on November 12, 2024, include:

e Reports, evaluations and assessment/level of risk indicates [Williams’] risk
to the community;

e [Williams] minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the
offense(s) committed;

e [Williams’] failure to develop a parole release plan;

e The nature of [Williams’] crime.
(Doc. 11-2 at 16). None of the reasons provided by the Parole Board appear to
be improper.
Furthermore, while Williams may disagree with the facts contained in the

affidavit of probable cause, he has not provided any legal authority indicating tha
the Parole Board is forbidden from considering such evidence when making
parole determinations. The Parole Board is required to consider, among other
things, “[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense committed,” 61 PA. CONs.

STAT. § 6135(a)(1), as well as “such additional information regarding the nature
and circumstances of the offense committed for which sentence was imposed as

may be available,” id. § 6135(a)(6). Presumably, this could include the arresting
officer's affidavit of probable cause, even if the facts stated therein were
contested at trial. See, e.g., Jackson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 169 A.3d
1226, 1227 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (recounting that Parole Board expressly
informed inmate that they would consider the affidavit of probable cause from his
prior conviction); Sowers v. Pa. Parole Bd., No. 272 C.D. 2023, 2025 WL
2986028, at *4 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 23, 2025) (nonprecedential) (noting that
facts included in affidavit of probable cause were considered during revocation of
parole proceedings).
Additionally, the court observes that other factors—unrelated to the affidavi
of probable cause—were proffered by the Parole Board in its November 2024
denial. Those factors include Williams’ minimization and denial of the nature and
circumstances of the offenses, as well has his failure to develop a parole release
plan.
Thus, despite Williams’ protestations to the contrary, none of the Parole
Board's reasons for denying parole appear to be arbitrary, “egregious,”
conscience-shocking, or based on constitutionally impermissible factors. Nor has
Williams shown “willful noncompliance, bad faith, [or] a sufficient inference of

retaliation or vindictiveness on the part of the Board[.]” Mickens-Thomas v.

Vaughn, 355 F.3d 294, 310 (3d Cir. 2004). “[F]ederal courts, on habeas review,

are not to ‘second-guess parole boards,’ and the requirements of substantive duc

process are met if there is some basis for the challenged decision.” Hunterson v

DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Coady, 251 F.3d at 487).
Because there is “some basis” for the Parole Board’s decision, even beyond the

contested affidavit of probable cause, Williams has failed to establish a

substantive due process violation and his Section 2254 petition must be denied.

lll. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court will deny Williams’ petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court will likewise deny a certificate

of appealability, as Williams has failed to make a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), or that “jurists of

reason would find it debatable” whether this court’s procedural rulings are

correct, Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). An appropriate order
follows.
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11182624. Public record. Not legal advice.