# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · October 31, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11182455

## Case

- **Full name:** Greater Guide, Inc. d/b/a American Service Pets v. SAPS LLC et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** October 31, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11182455

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “‘[d]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on res judicata grounds is appropriate when the elements of res judicata are apparent on the face of the pleadings’”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GREATER GUIDE, INC. D/B/A CIVIL ACTION
AMERICAN SERVICE PETS

VERSUS NO. 25-428
SAPS LLC ET AL. SECTION: “J”(5)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint for Damages
and Injunctive Relief (Rec. Doc. 48) filed by Defendants SAPS LLC; Prevent ESA
Fraud, Inc.; Prevent ESA Fraud (“PEF”); and Dominick Latino, III (hereinafter

collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff Greater Guide Inc. d/b/a American Service Pets
(“ASP”) filed an opposition (Rec. Doc. 64), to which Defendants replied (Rec. Doc. 74).
Having considered the motions and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable
law, the Court finds that the motion should be GRANTED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At its most basic level, this litigation arises out of business competition
between Plaintiff and Defendants in the emotional support animal industry. More

specifically, Defendants mailed complaints to state regulatory agencies concerning
independent mental health professionals who contracted with Plaintiff, and these
complaints led the mental health professionals to terminate their contracts with
Plaintiff.
1
Both Defendant SAPS and Plaintiff are companies that sell Emotional Support
Animal (“ESA”) certification letters by connecting consumers to contracted mental
health care providers through their websites, and both companies appear to have

nearly identical business models. Plaintiff operates a website,
www.americanservicepets.com, through which individuals can apply for ESA
certification. The individual fills out an online questionnaire, complete with a request
for an evaluation from a contracted medical provider. Within this application, users
must accept the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s website, which include an
agreement not to submit any false information.

Defendant Dominick Latino, III serves as president and owner of Prevent ESA
Fraud, which holds itself out as a nonprofit organization that does what its name
suggests. He also serves as counsel for SAPS LLC, which owns the US Service
Animals website, a direct competitor of Plaintiff. According to a quote from Mr. Latino
on the Prevent ESA Fraud website, the goal of Prevent ESA Fraud is, in part, “to stop
invalid ESA letters from harming people and businesses.” The website also includes
a quote from Matt Handal, who is listed as the founder of US Service Animals, which

is the website owned by Defendant SAPS.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are connected entities, with Mr. Latino
serving as legal counsel for SAPS and as president-owner of PEF. As a basis for its
claims, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to harm Plaintiff’s business.
Specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendants used an investigator to submit at least
thirty-one fictional online applications on Plaintiff’s website which served as
2
Defendants’ basis for state regulatory complaints. These complaints led to various
mental health care providers terminating their agreements with Plaintiff. Further,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants lodged these complaints with regulatory agencies in

retaliation after Defendants’ lawsuit in Louisiana state court was dismissed.
Plaintiff insists that Defendants’ actions (1) amount to civil conspiracy and
fraud, (2) violated its website’s terms and conditions, and (3) were designed to harm
business competition. Plaintiff raises actions that include violations of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and civil Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, in addition to a number of state-law claims.

The Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, the Sherman Act, and Plaintiff’s civil RICO claims pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the
remaining state-law claims. Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), averring that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
bars Plaintiff’s claims generally and, in the alternative, contending that the
individual claims lack merit. Plaintiff opposes.

LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead sufficient
facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim
is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The
3
factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[D]etailed factual allegations” are
not required, but the pleading must present “more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court must
accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the plaintiff. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).
However, “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Beavers v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 566 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION
Defendants assert that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine bars all of Plaintiff’s
claims in the First Amended Complaint, and alternatively, that Plaintiff’s claims fail
as a matter of law. Because the Court is not persuaded that Defendants’ affirmative
defense bars all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court will address each of these
claims separately.
In its opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff correctly notes that

Defendants’ invocation of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine constitutes an affirmative
defense; however, Plaintiff misstates the legal consequences of this fact. Plaintiff
relies on the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Bayou Fleet, Inc. v. Alexander, 234 F.3d 852
(5th Cir. 2000) to argue that Noerr-Pennington is “not a basis for dismissal at the
pleading stage” (Rec. Doc. 64, at 5), but Bayou Fleet does not support this conclusion.
A primary issue in Bayou Fleet was whether the defendants had waived their
4
right to assert immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine because they had
failed to raise the defense timely. Bayou Fleet, 234 F.3d at 860. The district court had
erroneously held that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was not an affirmative defense,

id., but even despite this error, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision
to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims, holding that defendants’ conduct was immune under
Noerr-Pennington, id. at 862–63.
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has consistently held that “when a successful
affirmative defense appears on the face of the pleadings, dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) may be appropriate.” Kansa Reins. Co. v. Cong. Mortg. Corp. of Tex., 20 F.3d

1362, 1366 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th
Cir. 1986)); see also Stevens v. St. Tammany Par. Gov’t, 17 F.4th 563, 571 (5th Cir.
2021) (holding that “‘[d]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on res judicata grounds is
appropriate when the elements of res judicata are apparent on the face of the
pleadings’”); Miller v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 726 F.3d 717, 726 (5th Cir.
2013) (quoting Kansa Reins., 20 F.3d at 1366, and concluding that the defendant “was
permitted to raise the statute of frauds as a defense in its Rule 12(b)(6) motion”).

Furthermore, “[w]hile the district court must accept as true all factual allegations in
the complaint, . . . it need not resolve unclear questions of law in favor of the plaintiff.”
Kansa Reins., 20 F.3d at 1366 (citations omitted).
Here, the availability of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as an affirmative
defense appears on the face of the pleadings and exhibits that Plaintiff attached
thereto. Therefore, the Court will consider the applicability of this defense in
5
evaluating Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). However, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the five exhibits Defendants
attached to their Motion to Dismiss should be excluded under Rule 12(b)(6), and

therefore, the Court has not considered these exhibits.
The Court will first address Plaintiff’s claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act because these claims are based directly on the regulatory complaints
Defendants made. Because the Court finds that the Noerr-Pennington serves to
immunize Defendants’ conduct regarding the filing of regulatory complaints with
state agencies, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims under the Sherman Act

should be dismissed.
A. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and the Sherman Act
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine has developed from two Supreme Court cases:
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961), and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, a party who petitions the government for
redress is generally afforded immunity from antitrust liability. Bryant v. Mil. Dep’t

of Miss., 597 F.3d 678, 690 (5th Cir. 2010). “The essence of the doctrine is that parties
who petition the government for governmental action favorable to them cannot be
prosecuted under the antitrust laws even though their petitions are motivated by
anticompetitive intent.” Video Int’l Prod., Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Commc’ns, Inc.,
858 F.2d 1075, 1082 (5th Cir. 1988). However, the doctrine's immunity does not
extend to petitioning activity that qualifies as a “sham.” Bryant, 597 F.3d at 690.
6
Determining whether litigation, or other petitioning conduct, is a sham
requires the Court to distinguish between objectively reasonable claims and those
claims that “‘lead[ ] the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and judicial

processes have been abused.’” Id. (quoting Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972)). Courts employ a two-part test articulated by
the Supreme Court in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc. to determine whether litigation is a sham. 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993). The
first step is to determine whether the action is “objectively baseless in the sense that
no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.” Id. If the

litigation is objectively meritless, then the court examines the litigant’s subjective
motivation and explores “whether the baseless lawsuit conceals ‘an attempt to
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor,’ through the ‘use
[of] the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as an
anticompetitive weapon.’” Id. at 60-61 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
The petitioning conduct at issue in the instant case are the complaints that
Defendants made to state regulatory boards after creating allegedly fraudulent

accounts and thereby engaging the services of third-party mental health
professionals through ASP’s website. ASP argues that the sham exception applies to
Defendants’ conduct, and thus, Noerr-Pennington does not protect it. Defendants, on
the other hand, urge that the complaints they made regarding mental health care
practitioners who provided services in conjunction with ASP were objectively
reasonable and that a “reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the
7
merits.” Id. at 56.
Under the Professional Real Estate test, this Court must first evaluate whether
Defendants’ conduct was “objectively baseless.” At this stage in the litigation, ASP

only needs to allege facts that plausibly entitle it to relief. Plaintiff alleges that acting
in concert, Defendants used an unknown investigator to set up fraudulent accounts
on Plaintiff’s website, American Service Pets, and through these accounts, were
connected to independent, third-party mental health professionals. Then, according
to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Defendants, “using their ill-motivated and
fraudulently obtained access to the Plaintiff’s website and network of licensed

providers,” filed “a number of fake/manufactured and maliciously motivated
regulatory ‘complaints’ with several State . . . regulatory bodies and agencies.” (Rec.
Doc. 31, at 2).
Throughout its pleadings, Plaintiff characterizes Defendants’ complaints to
state regulatory boards as “indiscriminate” and “baseless” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 17); as
“fake complaints” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 26); as “fabricated” (Rec. Doc. 16); and as
“objectively baseless” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 39). Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants’ complaints to state boards relied on “fictitious industry standards” (Rec.
Doc. 31, at 4) that Defendants, namely Prevent ESA Fraud, unilaterally created and
imposed, “without reference to local law or regulation” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 18), and that
“no bona-fide grievances existed” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 16). In fact, Plaintiff defines what
it means by “indiscriminate complaints” by saying, “As used herein, the term
‘indiscriminate complaints’ means complaints that rely solely on Defendants’
8
privately drafted ‘Code of Conduct & Ethics’ and may only reference state law or laws
of other states.” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 18).
One thing Plaintiff has not alleged, however, is that Defendants’ complaints to

state regulatory boards are untrue.
Attached to its First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff included a detailed list of
the complaints Defendants mailed to state regulatory agencies (Exhibit 5: Detailed
PEF Mailed Complaints List, Rec. Doc. 31-5). Of the eight complaints that Plaintiff
included in this list, all but one of them is based on Defendants’ (Prevent ESA Fraud
and Dominick Latino III specifically) allegation that an independent mental

healthcare provider issued an ESA certification letter to an “investigator” based
solely on an online evaluation. (Rec. Doc. 31-5, at 2). In its pleadings, Plaintiff does
not refute this allegation.
While the Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants’ complaints “were based
entirely on fake or fraudulent consumer/patient interactions with ASP’s systems and
providers” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 21), that does not mean that the complaints themselves
were “objectively baseless.” Assuming that Defendants’ allegations were true, these

complaints are not based solely on a standard that Defendants unilaterally created
and imposed. Instead, for the complaint filed in Louisiana, for example, the allegation
is based on state law.1

1 Based on Plaintiff’s exhibit (Rec. Doc. 31-5), Defendants mailed complaints to state regulatory boards in the
following states: Arizona, California, Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and Washington. Similarly to Louisiana’s statute,
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 122318 prohibits a health care practitioner from providing documentation “relating to an
individual’s need for an emotional support dog unless the health care practitioner,” among other requirements,
“establishes a client-provider relationship with the individual for at least 30 days prior to providing the documentation
9
In 2024, the Louisiana Legislature passed the Louisiana Support and Service
Animal Integrity Act. See La. Stat. Ann. § 46:1971 et seq. Section 1974 of the Act
establishes that healthcare providers are prohibited from producing “documentation

relating to an individual’s need for a support animal unless” the provider complies
with a list of six requirements, two of which are that the healthcare provider must
“engage[] with an individual in person or remotely in at least two sessions before
issuing documentation determining that the individual requires a support animal,”
and “perform[] a clinical evaluation of an individual no less than thirty days before
producing documentation regarding the individual’s need for a support animal.” La.

Stat. Ann. § 46:1974(A)(5), (6). Based on this statutory scheme and a similar statute
in California, for example, Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants’ complaints to state
regulatory boards relied solely on Prevent ESA Fraud’s unilaterally created
standards is unfounded.
Therefore, Prevent ESA Fraud and Dominick Latino’s complaints to state
regulatory boards were grounded in standards that are more widely accepted than
Plaintiff suggests. Based on the summaries that Plaintiff provided, these complaints

appear to have a basis in at least some states’ laws, and thus, the complaints

requested regarding the individual’s need for an emotional support dog” and “[c]ompletes a clinical evaluation of the
individual regarding the need for an emotional support dog.” Cal. Health & Safety Code
§ 122318(a)(3)(B), (a)(4).
Under Florida law, a request for accommodation of an emotional support animal under the Fair Housing Act must
be “reasonable,” and an “emotional support animal registration of any kind, including, but not limited to, an
identification card, patch, certificate, or similar registration obtained from the Internet is not, by itself, sufficient
information to reliably establish that a person has a disability or a disability-related need for an emotional support
animal.” Fla. Stat. § 760.27. While not all states have enacted laws that lay out requirements for a healthcare provider
and emotional support animal letters, the cited statutes suggest that the complaints that Defendants filed were not
based solely on unilaterally created standards.

10
presumably have an objective and reasonable basis unless they contain untrue
allegations.
Plaintiff has had the opportunity in more than one pleading to assert that

Defendants’ complaints were false, but Plaintiff has not done so. Instead, Plaintiff
has made conclusory statements regarding the “indiscriminate” and “baseless”
nature of Defendants’ complaints without providing factual support. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that Plaintiff cannot make this showing. Plaintiff’s “continued
iteration that [Defendants’] actions are objectively baseless does not make them so.”
721 Bourbon, Inc. v. Willie’s Chicken Shack, LLC, 2020 WL 587886 (E.D. La. 2020).

Under these circumstances, Defendants have demonstrated that their complaints to
state regulatory boards were not “objectively baseless,” and therefore, the sham
exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity would not apply.
Moreover, the fact that Defendants’ anonymous “investigator” was able to
create fictitious accounts on Plaintiff’s website and presumably receive ESA letters
from Plaintiff’s affiliated independent mental health professionals based on these
fictitious personas seems to confirm the complaints Defendants made to state boards.

In sum, the availability of Defendants’ affirmative defense, the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, appears on the face of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and
attached exhibits, and therefore, this defense may be considered in ruling on
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, Defendants have met their burden of
proving that the “sham exception” to Noerr-Pennington does not apply in this case
because their complaints to state regulatory agencies were not “objectively baseless,”
11
and therefore, Defendants’ petitioning conduct is immunized under Noerr-
Pennington. Finally, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine arose specifically in the antitrust
context, and accordingly, this immunity acts to bar Plaintiff’s claims under the

Sherman Act. Therefore, these claims are dismissed.
The Court will now consider Plaintiff’s claims under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act.
B. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Plaintiff also claims that Defendants violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (“CFAA”) when they allegedly accessed Plaintiff’s website (American Service
Pets, www.AmericanServicePets.com) “without authorization” multiple times

between January of 2023 and September 30, 2024. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that
on approximately thirty-one occasions, Defendants created fraudulent customer
profiles with falsified information, including fictitious names, birthdates, addresses,
and billing information, in order “to obtain medical services and confidential business
information.” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 33). Furthermore, Plaintiff claims that Defendants
created these fictitious accounts in express violation of its website’s terms and

conditions.
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants do not deny this conduct but instead
acknowledge that the investigations conducted by Defendant Prevent ESA Fraud
(“PEF”) “involve[d] the creation of user profiles to access websites selling ESAs for
the purpose of testing compliance with applicable legal and professional standards
for ESA issuance.” (Rec. Doc. 48-1, at 5). According to its self-professed business
12
model, when PEF “determines there is non-compliance, then PEF files complaints
with the appropriate state boards.” Id.
Through this investigative technique, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

violated three provisions of the CFAA. First, Section 1030(a)(2) of the CFAA imposes
criminal and civil liability on “[w]hoever . . . intentionally accesses a computer
without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains— . . . (C)
information from any protected computer.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2)(C). Next,
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(4), which imposes
liability on “[w]hoever . . . knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected

computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access,” thereby furthering
the fraud and obtaining “anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the
thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the value of such use is
not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(4). Finally, Plaintiff
claims that Defendants also violated § 1030(b) by conspiring or attempting “to commit
an offense under subsection (a).” Id. § 1030(b).
What neither party has acknowledged, however, is that the Computer Fraud

and Abuse Act is primarily a criminal statute, and it is 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(g) that
provides the civil cause of action under the Act. This section begins as follows: “Any
person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section may
maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and
injunctive relief or other equitable relief.” Id. § 1030(g) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the statute explicitly defines “damage” as “any impairment to the
13
integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information,” id. § 1030(e)(8),
and “loss” as “any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to
an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program,

system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost
incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service,”
id. § 1030(e)(11).
In the instant case, Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ alleged violation of the
CFAA “caused a loss to Plaintiffs [sic] in excess of $5,000 during a one-year period . .
. including but not limited to costs associated with identifying and responding to

fraudulent activity, enhancing security measures, and addressing harm to business
operations.” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 34). However, Plaintiff makes these conclusory
allegations without providing any substantive support. Furthermore, based on
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and its opposition to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, the “harm to business operations” that Plaintiff suffered was not of “the type
unauthorized users cause to computer systems and data,” but instead, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants’ complaints to state regulatory boards caused its loss because

these complaints led independent mental health professionals to terminate their
contracts with Plaintiff. This loss is not the kind of “technological harm” anticipated
under the CFAA, nor is it one for which the CFAA provides a civil remedy.
Moreover, Plaintiff discovered that Defendants had violated its website’s terms
and conditions only after Defendants filed complaints with state regulatory agencies.
In other words, Plaintiff’s costs to “identify[] and respond[] to fraudulent activity”
14
were directly related to the complaints Defendants made to state regulatory agencies,
conduct which is immune under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Even accepting all of Plaintiff’s well-pled allegations as true and drawing all

reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff’s claims to relief under the CFAA
are not plausible on their face.
C. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
Plaintiff also brings claims against Defendants under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). RICO statute 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) makes it
unlawful “for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in,

or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants operated as an association-in-fact enterprise, and
that this enterprise committed the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud under
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 “with the shared purpose of suppressing ESA-PSA
certification market presence through fraud, CFAA violations, and sham regulatory

complaints.” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 41).
In response, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to state valid RICO
claims on three primary grounds: (1) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint “alleges no
distinction between the alleged enterprise and the persons who formed that
enterprise,” (Rec. Doc. 48-1, at 34); (2) Plaintiff has not pleaded its claims regarding
Defendants’ predicate acts with particularity; and (3) Plaintiff lacks standing based
15
on a lack of injury.
In accord with the Supreme Court’s decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co,
473 U.S. 479 (1985), the Fifth Circuit has made clear that “a violation of § 1962(c)

‘requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering
activity.’” Montesano v. Seafirst Com. Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1987)
(quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496). The RICO statutory scheme defines a “pattern of
racketeering activity” as requiring “at least two acts of racketeering activity.” 18
U.S.C. § 1961(5) (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed two predicate acts: wire

fraud and mail fraud. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants committed mail
fraud when they mailed their complaints against independent mental health
professionals to the various state regulatory boards. However, because this conduct
is protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity, Plaintiff’s complaint does not make a
plausible showing on its face of two predicate acts. Therefore, assuming that Plaintiff
could prove that Defendants committed wire fraud, Plaintiff would not be able to meet
its burden in proving the elements of its RICO claims.

Furthermore, because the Court concludes that all of Plaintiff’s claims under
federal law should be dismissed, the Court will no longer have supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First
16
Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief (Rec. Doc. 48) is
GRANTED, and that Plaintiff Greater Guide, Inc.’s federal claims against SAPS
LLC; Prevent ESA Fraud, Inc.; Prevent ESA Fraud; and Dominick Latino, III are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs state law claims against
Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 31st day of October, 2025.

dh KY Shue
LALXLA CG
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11182455. Public record. Not legal advice.