# Lange

> District Court, M.D. Florida · October 29, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11181240

## Case

- **Full name:** Mark Patrick Lange v. Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), Carmine Marceno, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Lee County
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** October 29, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

MARK PATRICK LANGE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 2:25-cv-00366-JES-NPM

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT (FDLE), CARMINE
MARCENO, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SHERIFF OF LEE
COUNTY,

Defendants,

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Mark
Lange’s (Plaintiff or Lange) corrected motion for preliminary
injunction (Doc. #55) filed on September 23, 2025. Defendants,
Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) and Carmine Marceno,
in his official capacity as Sheriff of Lee County, Florida,
(Sheriff Marceno) (collectively the Defendants) filed a joint
Response in Opposition (Doc. #59) on October 3, 2025. Without
leave, Lange filed a Reply (Doc. #60) on October 8, 2025.1 For the
reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

1 “Except for a reply to a motion for summary judgment or a reply
brief in a social security case, no party may reply without leave.”
M.D. Fla. R. 3.01(d). The Reply is thereby improper, stricken, and
not considered.
I.

In 1995, Lange was convicted of fourth degree criminal sexual
conduct in Minnesota in violation of Minnesota Statute § 609.345,
subd. 1(b).2 (Doc. #55-1, pp. 5-6.)3 The conviction required Lange
to register as a predatory offender in Minnesota. Minn. Stat. §
243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii).
In 2003, after the Minnesota Probation Office reported that
Lange “had complied with all the terms and conditions of
probation,” and recommended that he be honorably discharged from

probation, a Minnesota state court ordered Lange “discharged from
probation, restored to all civil rights and to full citizenship
with full right to vote and hold office the same as if said
conviction had not taken place.” (Doc. #55-1, p. 5.) Additionally,
the Order provided that the “conviction is deemed to be for a

2 Under § 609.345, subd.1(b), a person who engages in sexual
contact with another person is guilty of fourth-degree criminal
sexual conduct if the victim is at least 13 but less than 16 years
of age and the actor is more than 48 months older than victim.
State v. McFatridge, No. C8-98-1657, 1999 WL 595329, at *3 (Minn.
Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1999); State v. Koerner, No. C3-96-329, 1996 WL
636185, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1996).

3 Plaintiff labeled this exhibit as “Exhibit E.” However, the
exhibit appears on the Court’s CM/ECF system as Exhibit 1. The
Court will cite each exhibit herein by the numerical number
assigned to it by the Court's CM/ECF system.
misdemeanor” pursuant to Minnesota Statute § 609.13, subd. 1(2).4
(Id.)
Lange relocated to Florida in 2003 and began registering as
sex offender in Florida pursuant to Florida Statute § 943.0435.5

(Doc. #8, p. 3.)
In 2009, a letter from the Minnesota Department of Public
Safety (MDPS) informed Lange that his “registration requirement
[as a sex offender] was fulfilled” as of January 26, 2009, and
that he was “no longer required to register as a Predatory Offender
in the State of Minnesota.” (Doc. #55-1, p. 1.) The letter
continued: “This notice only applies to your registration
requirement for the State of Minnesota. You must contact the
Registry for any other State where you have lived, worked, or
attended school to determine the status of your registration
requirement within that State.” (Id.) Lange’s Minnesota predatory

offender registration file was closed. (Id.)

4 “Notwithstanding a conviction is for a felony,” “the conviction
is deemed to be for a misdemeanor if the imposition of the prison
sentence is stayed, the defendant is placed on probation, and the
defendant is thereafter discharged without a prison sentence.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2). See also State v. Skramstad, 433
N.W.2d 449, 452 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).

5 “Under [§] 943.0435,” known as Florida’s sex offender
registration statute, “any person who is a ‘sexual offender’ (as
defined by subsection [(1)(h)1]) is required to provide specific
information to certain state or law enforcement agencies in order
to satisfy the reporting requirements.” In re Standard Jury
Instructions in Crim. Cases--Rep. No. 2007-4, 983 So. 2d 531 (Fla.
2008)(per curiam).
In 2023, Lange moved for an expungement in a Minnesota state
court. (Id. at p. 12.) The court summarized the prior proceedings,
noting that Lange had been required to register as a sex offender

and that the offense of conviction was now deemed a misdemeanor.
(Id.) The Court expunged Lange’s judicial records pursuant to its
inherent authority, ordering “[a]ll judicial branch records
concerning [Lange’s conviction], including records of arrest,
citation, and charges, relative to the offense(s) shall be sealed.”
(Id. at p. 12.) This Order has been filed in the public records of
Lee County, Florida. (Id. at pp. 11-16.)
Lange now moves to enjoin the Defendants from enforcing any
of Florida’s registration requirements against him on and after
October 1, 2025. He argues Florida Statute § 943.0435(11)(b)
entitles him to this relief because his Minnesota sex offender
designation was removed (as evidenced by the 2023 Minnesota state

court order and the MDPS letter), and he “has no other convictions
or designations that triggers registration under §
943.0435(1)(h)1.” (Doc. #55, pp. 2-3.) He requests the “FDLE to
correct its records and cease unlawful enforcement.” (Id. at p.
4.)
II.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of
the Middle District of Florida authorize a court to issue a
preliminary injunction under certain circumstances. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 65(a); M.D. Fla. R. 6.02. A preliminary injunction will be
issued only if the movant demonstrates: “(1) he has a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits, (2) he will suffer irreparable

injury unless the injunction issues, (3) the injunction would not
substantially harm the other litigant, and (4) if issued, the
injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Long v.
Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 924 F.3d 1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2019). “A
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not
to be granted unless the movant clearly establishes the burden of
persuasion as to the four requisites.” Vital Pharms., Inc. v.
Alfieri, 23 F.4th 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2022)(quoting Forsyth Cnty.
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 633 F.3d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir.
2011)).
A movant need only demonstrate a substantial likelihood of
success on one of his claims—not all his claims—to secure a

preliminary injunction. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424
F.3d 1117, 1134 (11th Cir. 2005). Ultimately, “[t]he grant or
denial of a preliminary injunction is a decision within the sound
discretion of the district court.” United States v. Lambert, 695
F.2d 536, 539 (11th Cir. 1983).
III.
Lange fails to satisfy the first requirement for a preliminary
injunction — that he has a substantial likelihood of success on

the merits. Assuming arguendo that the operative complaint
sufficiently states at least one underlying cause of action,6 a
preliminary injunction is not warranted because Lange fails to
show Florida Statute § 943.0435(11)(b) likely exempts him from

Florida’s reporting requirements.
To be eligible for exemption from Florida’s reporting
requirements under this subsection, Lange must: (1) be a sex
offender as defined by sub-subparagraph (1)(h)1.b; (2) show that
his sex offender designation has been removed by the foreign
jurisdiction; and (3) show that he does not meet the criteria for
registration under any other sub-subparagraph of subparagraph
(1)(h)1. Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(11)(b).7 Lange meets the first

6 The Court construes Lange’s motion to be for a “‘traditional’
injunction, which must be based on a cause of action ‘for certain
breaches of common law, statutory, or constitutional rights.’” In
re Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233, 1256 n.41 (11th
Cir. 2006)(quoting Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092,
1097). The operative complaint raises five claims, (Doc. #8, pp.
4-5), which Lange asserts all stem from “a single, ongoing
constitutional violation: FDLE’s refusal to acknowledge [Lange]’s
statutory exemption and Minnesota discharge, resulting in his
continued false classification as a sexual offender in Florida.”
(Doc. #55, p. 4.)

7 The full text of subparagraph (11)(b) is as follows:
Except as provided in s. 943.04354, a sexual offender
must maintain registration with the [FDLE] for the
duration of his or her life unless the sexual offender
has received a full pardon or has had a conviction set
aside in a postconviction proceeding for any offense
that meets the criteria for classifying the person as a
sexual offender for purposes of registration. However,
a sexual offender shall be considered for removal of the
requirement to register as a sexual offender only if the
person:
requirement but fails at the second, and therefore the third
requirement is not reached herein.
Beginning with the first requirement, to classify as a sex

offender under sub-subparagraph (1)(h)1.b, it must be shown “(1)
that [Lange] was ‘designated’ as a sexual predator or other sexual
offender designation in another state or jurisdiction; and (2)
that [Lange] was ‘subjected to registration’ as a result of that
‘designation.’” 8 Jershun v. State, 169 So. 3d 232, 238 (Fla. 4th

....
(b) Maintains registration with the [FDLE] as
described in sub-subparagraph (1)(h)1.b. for the
duration of his or her life until the person
provides the department with an order issued by the
court that designated the person as a sexual
predator, as a sexually violent predator, or any
other sexual offender designation in the state or
jurisdiction in which the order was issued which
states that such designation has been removed or
demonstrates to the department that such
designation, if not imposed by a court, has been
removed by operation of law or court order in the
state or jurisdiction in which the designation was
made, provided that such person no longer meets the
criteria for registration as a sexual offender
under the laws of this state. To qualify for removal
of the registration requirements under this
paragraph, a sexual offender described in sub-
subparagraph (1)(h)1.b. must establish that his or
her designation has been removed and establish that
he or she does not meet the criteria for
registration under any other sub-subparagraph under
subparagraph (1)(h)1.
Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(11)(b).

8 The full text of the sub-subparagraph (1)(h)1.b is as follows:
DCA 2015)(quoting Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(1)(a)1.b).9 “Designation
as a ‘sexual offender’ for purposes of [§] 943.0435 turns on a
single issue—whether one has been ‘[c]onvicted of committing, or

attempting, soliciting, or conspiring to commit’ any of a number
of specified offenses.” Ames v. State, 870 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla.
1st DCA 2004)(citation omitted).
It is undisputed that Lange classifies as a sex offender under
sub-subparagraph (1)(h)1.b. As stated earlier, Lange was
designated as a predatory offender in Minnesota and required to
register there after being convicted of fourth degree criminal
sexual conduct. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii); (Doc.
#55-1, p. 12)(the 2023 Order stating same). Therefore, the first
requirement is met.

Establishes or maintains a residence in [Florida] and
who has not been designated as a sexual predator by a
court of [Florida] but who has been designated as a
sexual predator, as a sexually violent predator, or any
other sexual offender designation in another state or
jurisdiction and was, as a result of such designation,
subjected to registration or community or public
notification, or both, or would be if the person were a
resident of that state or jurisdiction, without regard
to whether the person otherwise meets the criteria for
registration as a sexual offender[.]
Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(1)(h)1.b.
9 The subsections in the statute were later reorganized by
amendment in 2016 but the substantive requirements remain the same.
See SEX OFFENSES—PREDATORS—REGISTRATION, 2016 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
Ch. 2016-104 (C.S.H.B. 1333) (WEST).
To be removed from the Florida registration requirements,
Lange must next show that his Minnesota sex offender designation
was removed. Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(11)(b). To show that his

Minnesota sex offender designation was removed, Lange must produce
a Minnesota court order “which states that such designation has
been removed . . . .” Id. Lange has not done so.
The only Minnesota state court order Lange points to is the
2023 Order that “expunge[d] [his] judicial records pursuant to
th[at] court’s inherent authority,” ordering “[a]ll judicial
branch records concerning [Lange’s conviction], including records
of arrest, citation, and charges, relative to the offense(s) shall
be sealed.” (Doc. #55-1, p. 14.) While Lange calls this a
“discharge order,” he fails to show that it states his conviction
was removed. (Doc. #55, p. 3.) Nowhere does the Order explicitly
say the conviction was removed, vacated, set aside, or anything

similar. Additionally, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that
a Minnesota state court expungement order sealing the judicial
records of a conviction through the court’s inherent authority
does not “remove[], erase[], or destroy[]” the records or the
conviction in the executive branch records. Bergman v. Caulk, 938
N.W.2d 248 (Minn. 2020). Bergman held a law enforcement agency
could still recognize a conviction despite such an order. Id. at
252. Without more, Lange fails to show a substantial likelihood
that his sex offender designation was removed by the 2023 Minnesota
state court order.
Although Lange does not rely on it, the only other Minnesota

state court order he produces also fails to show a substantial
likelihood that his sex offender designation was removed. After a
probation officer recognized Lange had “complied with all the terms
and conditions of probation,” a 2003 Minnesota state court
discharged him from probation and “deemed [the conviction] to be
for a misdemeanor” pursuant to Minnesota Statute § 609.13, subd.
1(2). (Doc. #55-1, p. 5.) But again, that order does not
explicitly, (see id.), or even implicitly, state that his
conviction was removed. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 243.166,
subd.1b(1)(iii)(stating a “person shall register” as a sex
offender under Minnesota law if he “was charged with” fourth degree
criminal sexual conduct and “convicted of or adjudicated

delinquent for that offense or another offense arising out of the
same set of circumstances”). Without more, Lange fails to show a
substantial likelihood that his sex offender designation was
removed by the 2003 Minnesota court order or any other order.
Lange fails to show there is a substantial likelihood that
his sex offender designation was removed, so he is not
substantially likely exempt from the reporting requirements
pursuant to Florida Statute § 943.0435(11)(b). Having failed to
show his foreign sex offender designation was removed in Minnesota,
the Court need not reach the question of whether Lange classifies
as a sex offender in Florida under an alternative definition. Since
all of Lange’s claims hinge on whether he is exempt from the

reporting requirements pursuant to Florida Statute §
943.0435(11)(b), (see Doc. #8);(Doc. #55, p. 4 (Lange admitting
so)), he has not shown a substantial likelihood of success on any
of his claims.
Additionally, Lange has not shown that a preliminary
injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Lange’s
motion simply asserts “that the requested injunction serves the
public interest.” (Doc. #55, p. 6.) That lone sentence does not
satisfy his burden. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). Especially here, where the
Florida Legislature has expressly recognized a strong public
interest weighing against Lange’s requested relief:

The Legislature finds that sexual offenders, especially
those who have committed offenses against minors, often
pose a high risk of engaging in sexual offenses even
after being released from incarceration or commitment
and that protection of the public from sexual offenders
is a paramount government interest. Sexual offenders
have a reduced expectation of privacy because of the
public's interest in public safety and in the effective
operation of government. Releasing information
concerning sexual offenders to law enforcement agencies
and to persons who request such information, and the
release of such information to the public by a law
enforcement agency or public agency, will further the
governmental interests of public safety. The designation
of a person as a sexual offender is not a sentence or a
punishment but is simply the status of the offender which
is the result of a conviction for having committed
certain crimes.
Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(12). Lange fails to show that, if issued,
the preliminary injunction would not be adverse to the public
interest.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

Lange’s corrected motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. #55) is
DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 29th day of
October 2025.

/ — Ap p
JGHE E. STEELE
Sq IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11181240. Public record. Not legal advice.