# Anders

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · October 29, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11181144

## Case

- **Full name:** Shelby Ann Anders v. The Town of Franklinton, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** October 29, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11181144

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHELBY ANN ANDERS CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 25-869
THE TOWN OF FRANKLINTON, et al. SECTION: “G”(5)
ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are Defendants the Town of Franklinton and Justin Brown’s (collectively,
“Defendants”) Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss.1 In this litigation, Plaintiff Shelby Ann Anders
(“Plaintiff”) is suing Defendants the Town of Franklinton, fictitiously named police officers (the
“Officers”), and Justin Brown, the Chief of Police of the Franklinton Police Department (“Chief
Brown”), for damages related to Plaintiff’s arrest by the Franklinton Police Department (“FPD”)
in May 2024.2 In the instant motions, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims are time barred and fail
to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
On July 30, 2025, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim3 and Motion to Dismiss Punitive or Exemplary Damage Claims.4 Plaintiff opposed the
motions.5 Defendants then filed a Reply6 brief in further support of the motions. Considering the
motions, the memoranda in support and in opposition, the record, and applicable law, the Court
grants the motions in part, denies the motions in part, and grants Plaintiff leave to file an Amended

1 Rec. Docs. 11, 12.
2 Rec. Doc. 1 at 4–9.
3 Rec. Doc. 11.
4 Rec. Doc. 12.
5 Rec. Doc. 16.
6 Rec. Doc. 22.
Complaint and a Rule 7(a)(7) reply tailored to the qualified immunity defense.
I. Background
Plaintiff alleges on May 1, 2024 she was in Franklinton, Louisiana, receiving an estimate
to get a fence repaired.7 Plaintiff claims she parked her truck to inspect the fence, when she
“noticed two Caucasian women parking a vehicle behind her truck.”8 Plaintiff contends she

repeatedly asked the two individuals to move their vehicle to allow her to leave in her truck.9
Plaintiff states that the two women refused to move their vehicle and told her that they were “going
to say she tried to hit” them.10 Plaintiff asserts Franklinton Police Officers then arrived to the scene
and began investigating by getting statements from the two women.11 Plaintiff alleges that she told
the officers that she did not have any audio or video recording of the altercation in response to
their questioning.12 Plaintiff claims she was subsequently arrested and “charged with Attempted
Murder and Obstruction.”13
Plaintiff was detained at the Washington Parish Jail for three days and subjected to
allegedly “unsafe and unsanitary conditions” during that time.14 Plaintiff states “[t]he officers

failed to investigate, take relevant statements from Mr. or Mrs. Anders who were both present on

7 Rec. Doc. 1 at 4.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 4–5.
the scene, or assess for any other bystanders or witnesses.”15 Further, Plaintiff asserts “both officers
used unconstitutional force and restraint to stop and detain” her.16 Plaintiff also maintains that the
Franklinton Police Department (“FPD”) “has engaged in a pattern and practice of unconstitutional
behaviors, stops, and arrests based on race.”17 Plaintiff claims to have been arrested by FPD on
September 4, 2020, and she claims she has encountered similar behavior from FPD during prior

interactions on nine other occasions spanning from 2018 to 2023.18
On May 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants in this Court.19 In the
Complaint Plaintiff alleges causes of action under Louisiana state law and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985, 1986, and 1988.20 Specifically, the Complaint alleges: (1) false imprisonment; (2) false
arrest; (3) excessive force;21 (4) violations of the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments; (5) that Defendants have a custom of negligent hiring, training, supervision, and
retention of deputies; (6) that Defendants conspired to cover up the allegedly false arrest; (7) that
Defendants never took action to investigate any of the involved deputies; and (8) liability pursuant
to Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315 and 2316 for negligence, assault, battery, negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and slander.22

15 Id. at 5.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 6.
18 Id.
19 Rec. Doc. 1.
20 Id. at 2.
21 The Complaint uses the term “unconstitutional force,” but the relevant caselaw typically refers to this type
of claim as “excessive force.” Therefore, both terms are used interchangeably to discuss the same claim.
22 Id. at 5–8.
Defendants filed the instant Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss on July 30, 2025.23 Plaintiff
filed a Response24 in opposition to the motions on September 12, 2025. Defendants filed a Reply25
in further support of the motions on September 15, 2025.
II. Parties’ Arguments
A. Defendants’ Arguments in Support of Their Motions

In support of Defendants’ initial Motion to Dismiss,26 they argue that Plaintiff’s claims
under state and federal law were filed after the prescriptive period and statute of limitations
expired, respectively.27 Defendants assert that under Louisiana Civil Code article 3492 the
prescriptive period for the state law claims raised here is one year from the date the alleged wrong
occurred.28 Further, Defendants state that “in the context of false arrest and false imprisonment
cases, those causes of action begin to accrue on the date of arrest.”29 Similarly, regarding
Plaintiff’s unconstitutional force claim, Defendants argue such a cause of action would begin to
accrue “on the date that plaintiff was allegedly subjected to the force; here the date of the arrest.”30
Defendants also point out that a federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,
and 1985 do “not contain a specific statute of limitations.”31 Defendants assert that claims brought

23 Rec. Docs. 11, 12.
24 Rec. Doc. 16.
25 Rec. Doc. 22.
26 Rec. Doc. 11.
27 Rec. Doc. 11-1 at 10.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 10–11.
30 Id. at 11.
31 Id.
under those statutes “borrow the analogous state law prescriptive period.”32 Defendants claim that
the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim begins to run “the moment the plaintiff becomes
aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been
injured.”33 Defendants argue that Plaintiff must have been aware of “her claims of detention
pursuant to warrantless arrest at the moment it occurred.”34 Hence, Defendants posit that because

Plaintiff was arrested on May 1, 2024, and the Complaint was not filed until May 2, 2025, all
claims are time barred because they were filed more than one year after they began to accrue.35
Regarding Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim, Defendants assert that such claims can only
be brought against federal government actors.36 Defendants point out that because they are not
federal actors, Plaintiff does not have a viable claim against them.37 Defendants request that the
Court dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim because Defendants are state actors, and such
claims do not apply to them.38
Regarding Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, Defendants submit that the Complaint
contains no specific allegations as to how said rights were violated.39 Further, Defendants claim
that “the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual prong does not apply to pre-trial detainees.”40

32 Id.
33 Id. at 12 (citing Russell v. Bd. Of Trustees, 968 F.2d 489, 493 (5th Cir. 1992)).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 13 (citing Ristow v. Hansen, 719 F. App’x 359, 364 (5th Cir. 2018)).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 14.
Plaintiff has only been detained in a pretrial capacity, therefore Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claims should be dismissed.41 Likewise, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s
Ninth Amendment claims should be dismissed because, “[t]he Ninth Amendment does not confer
substantive rights upon which civil rights claims may be based.”42
Regarding Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims, Defendants contend that such claims

“include substantive and procedural due process under the Due Process Clause, equal protection
of the law under the Equal Protection Clause, as well as individual rights from the first nine
Amendments to the Constitution incorporated to apply to the states under the Due Process
Clause.”43 Defendants argue that the Complaint contains no specific allegations of a Fourteenth
Amendment claim under any of these categories and therefore this claim must be dismissed.44
Defendants also assert that Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986
must be dismissed.45 Defendants maintain that because Plaintiff has not stated an underlying
Constitutional violation committed by Defendants Section 1983 is not the appropriate vehicle with
which to bring a claim.46 Further, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has merely alleged a conclusory

conspiracy under Section 1985 and therefore fails to meet the pleading standard of alleging an

41 Id.
42 Id. (citing Johnson v. Texas Bd. of Crim. Just., 281 F. App’x 319, 320 (5th Cir. 2008)).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 14–16.
45 Id. at 16–17.
46 Id.
underlying factual basis for such a conspiracy.47 Hence, Defendant asserts Plaintiff’s Section 1986
claim, which is dependent on a plausible Section 1985 claim, should fail as well.48
To be successful on a Monell claim, Defendants state that Plaintiff “must prove an
underlying constitutional deprivation, caused by the execution of a policy or custom of a
municipality.”49 Further, Defendants point out that a Monell claim can arise through “the failure

to train or inadequate training of municipal officers.”50 However, the potentially liable decision
maker “must have notice that the training program does not prevent constitutional violations and
must continue an adherence to an approach that they knew or should have known had failed to
prevent such constitutional violations before those actions can rise to a level of deliberate
indifference.”51 Defendants argue that the Complaint only contains conclusory allegations of Chief
Brown’s deliberate indifference rather than a specific policy or custom which led to the alleged
violation of Plaintiff’s rights.52 Additionally, Defendants claim that the Complaint does not
reference a specific policy by the Town of Franklinton that caused the alleged constitutional
violations.53 Therefore, Defendants state that Monell liability cannot be established and the
corresponding claims should be dismissed.54

47 Id. at 17.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 18.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 18–19.
52 Id. at 19.
53 Id.
54 Id.
Defendants also assert that Chief Brown and the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity
for claims made against them in their individual capacities.55 Alternatively, Defendants argue that
in order to establish liability against Chief Brown in his individual capacity Plaintiff “must allege
specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional violation.”56 Defendants contend that the Complaint
contains no “allegations that Chief Brown was present at the scene, that he was involved in the

investigation or arrest or had any personal involvement whatsoever.”57 Further, Defendants state
that “it is well-settled that supervisory officers cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for the
actions of subordinates on a theory of vicarious liability.”58 Therefore, Defendants argue that the
claims against Chief Brown and the Officers in their individual capacities should be dismissed.59
Lastly, Defendants assert that Plaintiff does not have a cognizable claim based on her
allegation that Chief Brown “never took action to investigate.”60 Defendants cite Shields v. Twiss,
to establish that “there is no constitutional right to an investigation.”61 Therefore, Defendants argue
that any violation of Plaintiff’s rights that may have resulted from Chief Brown’s alleged failure
to investigate would need to be judged under the standards of that separate violation.62

55 Id. at 22; Rec. Doc. 12-1 at 5.
56 Rec. Doc. 11-1 at 23.
57 Id. at 22.
58 Id. at 23.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 24.
61 Id. (citing 389 F.3d 142 (5th Cir.2004)).
62 Rec. Doc. 11-1 at 24.
In support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Punitive or Exemplary Damage Claims,63
they argue that the Town of Franklinton, Chief Brown in his official capacity, and the Officers in
their official capacities are immune from punitive damages.64 Defendants cite Lewis v. Goodie, to
assert that municipalities are immune from “punitive damage awards under federal law.”65
Defendants contend that punitive damages are not appropriate for Plaintiff’s state law claims

because “it is well settled under Louisiana state law that punitive damages are not allowed in civil
cases unless specifically provided for by statute.”66 Defendants state that no applicable Louisiana
statute provides for punitive damages based on the claims made in the Complaint.67 Therefore,
Defendants request that this Court dismiss the request for punitive damages under both federal and
state law.
B. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition
In opposition to Defendants’ motions, Plaintiff argues she has “plead valid causes of action
against Defendants on the face of the Complaint.”68 Additionally, Plaintiff claims she is entitled
to discovery and that Defendants’ motions are premature.69 Therefore, Plaintiff requests that the

63 Rec. Doc. 12.
64 Rec. Doc. 12-1 at 4–6.
65 Id. at 4 (citing 798 F. Supp. 382, 391 (W.D. La. 1992))
66 Id. at 5 (citing Vincent vs. Morgan’s Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 (1917)).
67 Id. at 6.
68 Rec. Doc.16 at 2.
69 Id.
Court deny the motions.70 Alternatively, Plaintiff requests that she be permitted to proceed with
limited discovery or amend the Complaint to cure any defects.71
Regarding Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s claims are time barred, Plaintiff states that
Defendants concealed the police report associated with her arrest and therefore “are not granted
the benefit of an argument of prescription.”72 Plaintiff claims she requested the police report in

this matter on or around “May 2024, February 2025, and at least one other time prior to filing of
the instant suit.”73 Further, Plaintiff alleges neither she nor this Court had received the police report
from FPD as of the date her opposition was due and therefore the Court has not been able to weigh
any argument regarding prescription.74
Plaintiff argues that Defendants have erroneously misapplied the holding in Garcia v. San
Antonio, Texas to the case at bar.75 Plaintiff asserts that Garcia holds “that Fourth Amendment
claims for detention caused by the wrongful institution of legal process accrue when criminal
proceedings end in the Plaintiff’s favor.”76 Plaintiff contends that like the plaintiff in Garcia her
detention was also “caused by the wrongful institution of legal process.”77 Thus, Plaintiff states

that applying Garcia to the instant matter should result in the prescriptive period for her claims

70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 4.
73 Id.
74 Id. Defendants subsequently filed a copy of the corresponding police report with the Court as Rec. Doc.
22-1.
75 Rec. Doc. 16 at 14 (citing 784 F. App’x 229, 232 (5th Cir. 2019)).
76 Id. at 4–5.
77 Id. at 5.
accruing when criminal proceedings from the May 1, 2024, arrest end in Plaintiff’s favor.78
Because Plaintiff’s criminal case is still pending, she claims the one-year prescriptive period has
not yet run.79
Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the excessive force claim arising from her detention in
Washington Parish Jail is not time barred.80 Plaintiff asserts that her alleged mistreatment

continued after her May 1, 2024 arrest, during the following days she was detained.81 Therefore,
Plaintiff states the one-year prescriptive period would not have expired by May 2, 2025, when the
Complaint was filed in this case.82
In response to Defendants’ secondary argument that the Complaint does not contain well-
plead facts to support the claims for excessive force or false arrest, Plaintiff contends such facts
are plead in “vivid detail.”83 Plaintiff also argues that the Complaint contains well plead facts to
support claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.84 Plaintiff asserts that she has brought a
plausible Monell claim under Section 1983 because she has specified multiple “incidents of the
Town of Franklinton and/or Chief Justin Brown’s incompetency in managing various aspects [of

public policy], amounting to deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens, to include the
Plaintiff.”85 Further, Plaintiff alleges that the Complaint “explicitly alleges that Defendants’

78 Id.
79 Id. at 5–6.
80 Id. at 6.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 6–7.
83 Id. at 7.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 7–8.
negligence . . . did in fact amount to deliberate indifference.”86 Plaintiff states that the Complaint
alleges that the Officers were “acting pursuant to direct orders and protocols from” the Town of
Franklinton and Chief Brown.87 Therefore, Plaintiff argues Monell liability of the municipality and
Chief Brown in his official capacity has been sufficiently plead.88
In response to Defendants’ qualified immunity defense Plaintiff asserts such a defense is

premature before this Court at least allows limited discovery on that issue.89 Further, even if Chief
Brown is entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity Plaintiff claims he is still liable
in his official capacity.90 Additionally, Plaintiff states “additional discovery is also necessary to
determine whether the actions of the officers involved in Plaintiff’s arrest and subsequent
detainment are subject to qualified immunity.”91 Thus, Plaintiff asserts that the “Complaint
contains well-plead facts that would defeat Defendants’ qualified immunity defense, but if this
Court disagrees, Plaintiff respectfully request[s] that she be granted additional time to conduct
discovery regarding that issue instead of dismissing claims at this early part of litigation.”92 Should
this Court determine that she has not adequately plead her other claims, Plaintiff requests that she
be permitted limited discovery to reveal information that would support those claims.93

86 Id. at 8.
87 Id. at 8.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 9.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 10.
92 Id. at 9.
93 Id. at 10.
C. Defendants’ Arguments in Reply
Defendants reply by reasserting their chief argument that the Complaint is untimely
because it was filed more than one year after the arrest took place.94 Defendants argue that “no
amount of discovery is going to change the date that she was arrested [and] allegedly subjected to
excessive force.”95 Additionally, Defendants assert it is immaterial that Plaintiff did not have a

copy of the related police report until after the deadline for filing her opposition, because “a copy
of the police report would not change the date she was arrested.”96 Further, if any of Plaintiff’s
claims are contingent on a “favorable termination of criminal proceedings,” Defendants submit
only those claims should survive the instant motions.97
Defendants point out that Washington Parish, rather than Defendants, manages and
operates the Washington Parish Jail where Plaintiff’s pretrial detention occurred.98 Therefore,
Defendants argue any claims that allegedly arose during Plaintiff’s detention must be made against
Washington Parish.99 Thus, Defendants assert if Plaintiff “wanted to pursue a claim for the alleged
excessive force, unsafe or unsanitary conditions she faced during her detention in the Washington
Parish Jail, she needed to timely sue Washington Parish; she did not do so.”100

94 Rec. Doc. 22 at 2.
95 Id. at 1–2.
96 Id. at 2.
97 Id. at 2–3.
98 Id. at 3.
99 Id.
100 Id.
Defendants also reiterate that the Complaint “does not meet the Monell standard.”101
Defendants state, Plaintiff has failed to plead a specific policy of the Town of Franklinton that
deprived Plaintiff of a constitutional right.102 Further, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s
“factually inaccurate allegations do not support a widespread custom or practice” of ignoring her
complaints to FPD.103

Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot pursue punitive damages against any
Defendant in their individual capacity because they are entitled to qualified immunity.104
Additionally, Defendants assert that no allegations against Chief Brown could amount to
individual liability regardless of a qualified immunity defense.105 However, if the Court is not
convinced that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, Defendants request that the Court
limit discovery to this issue.106
III. Legal Standard
A. Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that an action may be dismissed for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”107 A motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim is “viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.”108 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

101 Id.
102 Id. at 3–4.
103 Id. at 4.
104 Id. at 5.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
108 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’”109 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.”110 A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff has pleaded facts that allow
the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”111

On a motion to dismiss, asserted claims are liberally construed in favor of the claimant,
and all facts pleaded are taken as true.112 However, although required to accept all “well-pleaded
facts” as true, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions as true.113 “While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”114
Similarly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements” will not suffice.115 The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it
must offer more than mere labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a
cause of action.116 That is, the complaint must offer more than an “unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”117 From the face of the complaint, there must be enough

factual matter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence as to each

109 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
110 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
111 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
112 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); see also
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007).
113 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
114 Id. at 679.
115 Id. at 678.
116 Id.
117 Id.
element of the asserted claims.118 If factual allegations are insufficient to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an
“insuperable” bar to relief, the claim must be dismissed.119
B. Statute of Limitations
Statute of limitations is an affirmative defense.120 When a defendant seeks dismissal on

statute of limitations grounds, generally the defendant bears the burden of proof to show the claim
is time barred.121 Nevertheless, “[a] statute of limitations may support dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) where it is evident from the plaintiff’s pleadings that the action is barred and the pleadings
fail to raise some basis for tolling or the like.”122
IV. Analysis
A. Claims for Which Relief Cannot be Granted
Before addressing the timeliness argument, the Court begins with Defendants’ argument
that several of Plaintiff’s claims are not cognizable under federal law. Even if Plaintiff can establish
that her federal claims are timely, several of them lack the facial plausibility required to survive a

motion to dismiss. Regarding Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim, Defendants argue that it should
be dismissed because Defendants are state actors, and the violation of rights must be perpetrated
by a federal actor. The Fifth Circuit has reinforced this requirement in Ristow v. Hansen, where it
held that “[t]he Fifth Amendment applies only to violations of constitutional rights by the United

118 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009).
119 Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007); Moore v. Metro. Hum. Serv. Dist., No. 09-6470,
2010 WL 1462224, at * 2 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2010) (Vance, J.) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)).
120 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(C)(1).
121 Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 240 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
122 Doe 1 v. City View Independent Sch. Dist., No. 24-10592, 2025 WL 2537001, at *3 (5th Cir. 2025) (per
curiam); see also Frame, 657 F.3d at 240 (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)).
States or a federal actor.”123 Hence, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim
because no defendants in this matter are federal actors.
Regarding Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, the Supreme Court has recognized that
“the conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention . . . implicate only the protection against
deprivation of liberty without due process of law.”124 The Fifth Circuit expanded on this rule by

stating “[t]he constitutional rights of a pretrial detainee ... flow from both the procedural and
substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”125 Because Plaintiff has only
alleged pretrial detention, rather than detention following a criminal conviction, her rights under
the Eighth Amendment have not been implicated. Thus, there can be no violation of Plaintiff’s
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the
Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. Relatedly, the Supreme Court has
consistently recognized that the Ninth Amendment does not confer an independent source of rights
that can be enforced in federal court.126 Hence, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s Ninth
Amendment claim.

B. Timeliness of State Law Claims
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims have prescribed because they were filed
one year and one day after her arrest. Under Louisiana Civil Code article 3492 a plaintiff has one
year from the date on which the alleged wrong occurred to file a claim for a tort-related violation

123 719 Fed. App’x 359, 364 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
124 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
125 Martinez v. City of N. Richland Hills, 846 Fed. App’x 238, 241 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Hare v. City of
Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996).
126 See Johnson v. Texas Bd. of Crim. Just., 281 Fed. App’x 319, 320 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The Ninth Amendment
does not confer substantive rights upon which civil rights claims may be based.”)
of her constitutional rights.127 All claims arising under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315 and
2316 are subject to this prescriptive period.128 Specifically, Plaintiff’s state law claims for false
arrest, false imprisonment, excessive force, negligence, assault, battery, defamation, slander, and
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress are subject to this prescriptive period.
Under Louisiana law, there is a “well-settled concept that prescription commences to run

from the day injury or damage is sustained.”129 Consistent with this principle, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has held that the prescriptive period for false arrest and false imprisonment claims
begin to accrue on the date of arrest.130 The Complaint states that the incident leading to Plaintiff’s
arrest occurred on May 1, 2024, and the Complaint suggests that Plaintiff was subsequently
arrested and charged with Attempted Murder and Obstruction.131
The police report attached to Defendants’ reply memorandum shows that Plaintiff was
arrested without a warrant on the evening of May 1, 2024.132 However, the police report also shows
that an arrest warrant was signed at 5:17 AM on May 2, 2025.133 The arrest warrant was signed by

127 See Watts v. Graves, 720 F.2d 1416, 1423 (5th Cir. 1983); La. Civ. Code art. 3492. In 2024, La. Civ. Code
art. 3492 was amended to provide for a two-year statute of limitations for torts which occur after July 1, 2024. The
events sued upon herein occurred in May 2024. The version of art.3492 in effect on the date of the incident sued upon
provides for a one year statute of limitations for torts.
128 See C.P. v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Lake Charles, No. 24-01615, 2025 WL 662821, at *1 (W.D. La. Feb.
28, 2025) (stating that claims arising under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315 and 2316 “would ordinarily be time-
barred under Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period”, with the exception of a ten-year period for claims arising from
child abuse); Bowie v. Hodge, No. 20-2441, 2021 WL 53312, at *10 (E.D. La. Jan. 6, 2021) (holding that claims under
Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315 and 2316 were prescribed when they occurred more than one year after the
complaint was filed).
129 See Eaglin v. Eunice Police Dep’t, 2017-1875, p. 8 (La. 06/27/18), 319 So. 3d 225, 229.
130 Id. at 230 (holding false arrest and false imprisonment claims are subject to a one-year prescriptive period
accruing on the date of arrest).
131 Rec. Doc. 1 at 4.
132 Rec. Doc. 22-1 at 16.
133 Id. at 26–28.
Commissioner Dan Foil, and it finds that Plaintiff was “lawfully arrested upon probable cause,
without a warrant.”134 The parties have not provided any briefing on whether this finding of
probable cause has any impact on when the claims began to accrue under Louisiana law.
Considering that Plaintiff did not have a copy of the police report when the Complaint or the
opposition to the Motions to Dismiss was filed, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an

Amended Complaint to clarify this issue.
The Complaint also contains insufficient information for the Court to determine whether
prescription was suspended. When a plaintiff is unable to exercise her cause of action when it
accrues prescription may be suspended under the civil law doctrine of contra non valentem agere
nulla currit praescriptio.135 Plaintiff merely states that the police report regarding the relevant
arrest was withheld from her and therefore the prescriptive time bar should not apply to her.136
Plaintiff has not explained why her ability to obtain the police report would be relevant to
advancing her claims against Chief Brown or the City of Franklinton. However, it appears that the
identities of the arresting officers were unknown to Plaintiff, as she names them as John Does in

the Complaint. The naming of a John Doe defendant does not interrupt prescription under
Louisiana law.137 Therefore, whether she made diligent efforts to obtain the police report may be
relevant to the issue of whether the doctrine of contra non valentem could apply to Plaintiff’s
claims against the unnamed officers. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend
the Complaint to clarify this issue.

134 Id. at 28.
135 Eaglin, 319 So. 3d at 229.
136 Rec. Doc. 16 at 4.
137 Templet v. Johns, 417 So. 2d 433, 437 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 981 (La. 1982)(citations
omitted)(“suit against ‘John Doe (electrical contractor)’ did not interrupt prescription as concerns [the defendant
whose true name was later substituted for the fictitious name] unless same was interrupted by other means.”).
The Complaint also does not contain sufficient factual allegations to determine when the
alleged excessive force, negligence, assault, battery, defamation, slander, and negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress occurred.138 In opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiff
suggests that she was subject to excessive force, assault, and battery during her detention at
Washington Parish Jail.139 However, there are no factual allegations regarding these alleged

incidents in the Complaint. The Complaint also does not include factual allegations regarding the
claims of negligence, defamation, slander, or negligent and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Therefore, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint to clarify the
factual basis for her claims of excessive force, negligence, assault, battery, defamation, slander,
and negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
C. Timeliness of Federal Law Claims
Regarding Plaintiff’s federal law claims, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s Sections 1983,
1985, and 1986 claims in turn. “Section 1983 does not prescribe a statute of limitations. Instead,
‘[t]he statute of limitations for a suit brought under § 1983 is determined by the general statute of
limitations governing personal injuries in the forum state.’”140 Thus, Louisiana Civil Code article

3492’s one year statute of limitation applies here. However, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of
action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.”141 “A section
1983 action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run when the ‘plaintiff knows or has

138 Templet v. Johns, 417 So. 2d 433, 437 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 981 (La. 1982)(citations
omitted)(“suit against ‘John Doe (electrical contractor)’ did not interrupt prescription as concerns [the defendant
whose true name was later substituted for the fictitious name] unless same was interrupted by other means.”).
139 Rec. Doc. 16 at 6.
140 Heilman v. City of Beaumont, 638 Fed. App’x 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Piotrowski v. City of Hou.,
237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001)).
141 Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007).
reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.’”142 However, where “a particular
claim may not realistically be brought while a violation is ongoing, such a claim may accrue at a
later date.”143 Thus, accrual depends on a proper identification and “pinpointing” of the specific
constitutional right at issue.144 “Assuming no bright line accrual rule applies to the articulated right
at issue, courts consider which common-law claim the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim most closely

resembles, all the while maintaining fidelity ‘to the values and purposes of the constitutional right
at issue.’”145
The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio, Texas,146 is directly on point. There,
the plaintiff, Roberto Garcia, was arrested without a warrant on July 17, 2014.147 The morning
after his arrest, Garcia was brought before a magistrate judge and bond was set at $75,000, which
Garcia could not afford.148 On December 4, 2015, the charges against Garcia were dismissed.149
On November 21, 2016, Garcia filed a federal lawsuit against the City of San Antonio, the San
Antonio Police Department, and several individual officers.150 The district court dismissed the
claims as time barred, and Garcia appealed.151

142 Watts, 720 F.2d at 1423 (quoting Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir.1980)).
143 McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 115 (2019).
144 Parria v. Cvitanovich, et al., No. 23-3663, 2025 WL 2756678, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 2025) (citing
McDonough, 588 U.S. at 115).
145 Id. (citing Manual v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 370 (2017)).
146 Garcia v. San Antonio, Texas, 784 Fed. App’x 229 (5th Cir. 2019).
147 Id. at 230–31.
148 Id. at 231.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court opinion in part and vacated it in part.152 The
Fifth Circuit held that the district court correctly determined that Garcia’s claim for false arrest
without probable cause was time barred.153 The appellate court reasoned that “[a] detention
instituted in the absence of legal process is akin to the tort of false arrest and accrues upon
arrest.”154 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Garcia’s warrantless arrest the night before took place

without legal process.155 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held that the claim for false arrest accrued
when he was arrested and, therefore, was time barred.156
In this case, the police report shows that Plaintiff was arrested without a warrant on the
evening of May 1, 2024.157 Under Garcia, Plaintiff’s claim for false arrest accrued when she was
arrested. Plaintiff had one year from the date of her arrest to file her claims. The Complaint was
filed on May 2, 2025, a year and a day later. Therefore, the claim for false arrest without probable
cause is time barred.
Like in Garcia, Plaintiff is also claiming she was unlawfully detained after legal process
commenced. The Fifth Circuit held that Garcia’s claim that he was unlawfully detained for sixteen
months after legal process commenced was timely.158 The Fourth Amendment protects against

pretrial detention instituted pursuant to wrongful legal process.159 “Legal process commences

152 Id. at 233.
153 Id. at 231.
154 Id. at 232 (citing Mapes v. Bishop, 541 F.3d 582, 583–84 (5th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added)).
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Rec. Doc. 22-1 at 16.
158 Garcia, 784 Fed. App’x at 232.
159 Id.
when ‘a judge (or grand jury) first makes a reliable finding of probable cause.’”160 “In Garcia’s
case, a judge first made a probable cause finding when Garcia appeared in court the morning after
his arrest. This is the point at which legal process commenced.”161 Legal process “goes wrong”
when a probable cause determination is baseless, such as when “a judge’s probable-cause
determination is predicated solely on a police officer’s false statements.”162 The Fifth Circuit

determined that “claims for detention pursuant to the ‘wrongful institution of legal process’ are
more akin to malicious prosecution than false arrest, so such claims accrue when criminal
proceedings end in a plaintiff’s favor.”163
In this case, it appears Plaintiff is also claiming that she was unlawfully detained for three
days after legal process commenced. When the Complaint was filed Plaintiff did not have access
to the police report. The police report shows that an arrest warrant was signed at 5:17 AM on May
2, 2025.164 The arrest warrant was signed by Commissioner Dan Foil, and it finds that Plaintiff
was “lawfully arrested upon probable cause, without a warrant.”165 Legal process commenced
when the Commissioner made this finding of probable cause. Under Garcia, a claim for detention

pursuant to the wrongful institution of legal process is more akin to malicious prosecution than
false arrest, so such claims accrue when criminal proceedings end in Plaintiff’s favor.166 It appears
from the Complaint that the criminal proceedings remain pending against Plaintiff. Therefore,

160 Id. (quoting Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 365 (2017)).
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. (quoting Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 493 (5th Cir. 2018)).
164 Id. at 26–28.
165 Id. at 28.
166 Garcia, 784 Fed. App’x at 232.
while it is possible that such a claim is premature, Defendants’ argument that the claim is time
barred appears to be unavailing.167 Nevertheless, considering that the Complaint was filed before
Plaintiff had a copy of the police report, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an Amended
Complaint to clarify this claim.
Regarding Plaintiff’s Section 1985 claims, the alleged conspiracy of the Officers to assault

and batter Plaintiff appears to be untimely, while the alleged conspiracy to cover up the facts of
Plaintiff’s arrest appears to be timely. The Fifth Circuit stated the following regarding Section
1985 claims, “[a]lthough state law controls which limitations period applies, federal law
determines when a cause of action accrues.”168 Therefore, the Louisiana one-year prescriptive
period applies to the Section 1985 claims. The statute of limitations for a civil rights violation
claim accrues when “the plaintiff knows or should have known [her] civil rights had been
violated.”169 From the Complaint the Court gleans that Plaintiff’s last interaction with the Officers
was on that date of arrest. Absent any information to contradict that inference, the claim for
conspiracy to commit assault and battery appears to be time barred. However, the alleged

conspiracy to cover up the facts of Plaintiff’s arrest presumably occurred at a minimum the day
after the arrest. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Section 1985 claim asserting a conspiracy to cover up the
facts of her arrest appears to be timely. Relatedly, the Section 1986 claims have a one-year statute
of limitations from when they begin to accrue.170 Following the same accrual periods for the

167 Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 492 (5th Cir. 2018) (“A malicious-prosecution claim is based upon
detention accompanied ... by wrongful institution of legal process. It does not accrue until the prosecution ends in
the plaintiff's favor.”) (internal citations omitted).
168 Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir. 1987).
169 Auman v. Kansas, No. 17-2069, 2018 WL 587232, at *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 2018); See Id. at 335 (distinguishing
when the statute of limitations begins to run for a federal criminal conspiracy charge compared to a 1985 conspiracy
claim).
170 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
Section 1985 claims, the Court finds the Plaintiff’s Section 1986 claim for the assault and battery
conspiracy appear to be untimely and the Section 1986 claim for the conspiracy to cover up the
facts of the arrest is timely.
It is unclear from the Complaint precisely when Plaintiff is alleging that the assault and
battery occurred. In opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiff suggests that she was subject to

excessive force, assault, and battery during her detention at Washington Parish Jail.171 However,
there are no factual allegations regarding these alleged incidents in the Complaint. Therefore, the
Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint to clarify this issue.
D. Monell Claims
Regarding Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Monell claims, Defendants argue that the Complaint
only contains conclusory allegations of Chief Brown’s deliberate indifference and that there is no
reference to a specific policy by the Town of Franklinton that caused the alleged constitutional
violations. The Court agrees with Defendants’ argument.
A Monell claim alleging a failure to train or supervise requires Plaintiff to show that: “(1)

the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists
between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure
to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.”172 “To satisfy the deliberate indifference
prong, a plaintiff usually must demonstrate a pattern of violations and that the inadequacy of the
training is obvious and obviously likely to result in a constitutional violation.”173 Here, Plaintiff
has alleged over nine interactions with FPD that supposedly demonstrate the required pattern of

171 Rec. Doc. 16 at 6.
172 Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted).
173 Id. (citing Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 637 (5th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
violations. Further, Plaintiff has plead that Chief Brown, as the supervisor, failed to train the
subordinate Officers and that this failure caused Plaintiff’s injuries. However, Plaintiff has not
plead the specific facts surrounding her previous interactions with FPD or Chief Brown’s personal
involvement amounting to the deliberate indifference. Thus, none of the three prongs of a Monell
claim against Chief Brown have been sufficiently plead.

Regarding Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the Town of Franklinton “the plaintiff must
allege that the custom or policy served as the moving force behind the [constitutional] violation at
issue, or that her injuries resulted from the execution of the official policy or custom[.]”174 Further,
“[t]he description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional
violation, moreover, cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.”175 Here, Plaintiff merely
alleges “these officers were acting under the color and pretense of the statutes, ordinances,
regulations, customs, and usages of the State of Louisiana, specifically the Franklinton Police
Department[.]”176
Further, Defendants claim that they cannot be liable for constitutional violations that

occurred at Washington Parish Jail. Although it is unclear from the pleadings, Washington Parish
apparently houses pre-trial detainees for the Town of Franklinton, presumably as a contractor or
agent. Hence, the Court is not persuaded that Defendants may escape liability solely because they
do not directly operate the jail.177 However, Plaintiff has not specifically plead a policy or custom
of the Town of Franklinton that resulted in her constitutional violations either during arrest or pre-

174 Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police Dep’t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted).
175 Id.
176 Rec. Doc. 1 at 5.
177 Cf. Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003) (“private prison-
management companies and their employees are subject to § 1983 liability because they are performing a government
function traditionally reserved to the state.”)
trial detention. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts to establish a Monell claim for which
relief can be granted against the Town of Franklinton. Nonetheless, the Court exercises its
discretion to afford Plaintiff an additional opportunity to replead these claims.
E. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also argue that Chief Brown and the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity

for any claims against them in their individual capacities. The doctrine of qualified immunity
protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.”178 Qualified immunity is an “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to
liability.”179 In this manner, “[o]ne of the most salient benefits of qualified immunity is protection
from pretrial discovery, which is costly, time-consuming, and intrusive.”180 Once a defendant
invokes the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating its
inapplicability.181
In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part framework for analyzing whether
a defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. 182 Part one asks the following question: “Taken in

the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right?”183 Part two inquires whether the allegedly violated right
is “clearly established” in that “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

178 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
179 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009).
180 Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012).
181 Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009).
182 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
183 Id. at 201.
unlawful in the situation he confronted.”184 The Court does not have to address these two questions
sequentially; it can proceed with either inquiry first.185
Commencing with the second prong of the Saucier framework, the Court must determine
whether Plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. When
deciding whether the right allegedly violated was “clearly established,” the Court asks whether the

law so clearly and unambiguously prohibited the conduct such that a reasonable official would
understand that what he was doing violated the law.186 “Answering in the affirmative requires the
court to be able to point to controlling authority—or a robust consensus of persuasive authority—
that defines the contours of the right in question with a high degree of particularity. This
requirement establishes a high bar.”187 When there is no controlling authority specifically
prohibiting a defendant’s conduct, the law is not clearly established for the purposes of defeating
qualified immunity.188 Plaintiff has not sufficiently responded to Defendants’ qualified immunity
defenses or cited any authority to meet the second prong to show Defendants’ conduct was
objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. The individual officers have not been

named in this matter, and there is not sufficient information in the Complaint regarding their
conduct for the Court to analyze whether their conduct violated clearly established law.

184 Id. at 202.
185 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (“On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that,
while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”); see also Cutler
v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 767 F.3d 462, 469 (5th Cir. 2014).
186 May v. Strain, 55 F.Supp.3d 885, 897 (E.D. La. 2014) (Brown, J.) (citing Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496,
503 (5th Cir. 2014)).
187 Id.
188 Id.
The Fifth Circuit in Schultea v. Wood explained that once a defendant asserts qualified
immunity, a district court may order the plaintiff to submit a reply pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 7(a)(7) after evaluating the complaint under the ordinary pleading standard.189
Pursuant to Schultea, this reply “must be tailored to the assertion of qualified immunity and fairly
engage its allegations.”190 Accordingly, considering this precedent, the Court denies Defendants’

motion to the extent they seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Chief Brown and the Officers
in their individual capacity and grants Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to allege the Section
1983 claims are not time barred and allege facts “tailored to the assertion of qualified immunity.”191
F. Punitive Damages Claims
Finally, Defendants argue that the Town of Franklinton as well as Chief Brown and the
Officers in their official capacities are immune from punitive damages. In City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that “a municipality is immune from punitive
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”192 Further, this immunity extends to public servants in their
official capacity because they are an extension of the government entity that they represent.193
However, public servants acting in their individual capacity may be liable for punitive damages.194

Therefore, this Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages against the Town of
Franklinton and Chief Brown and the Officers, but only in their official capacities.
Defendants also claim that punitive damages are not appropriate for Plaintiff’s state law

189 Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1432 (5th Cir. 1995).
190 Id. at 1433.
191 Id.
192 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
193 See Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 169.
194 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35 (1983).
claims because under Louisiana state law punitive damages are not allowed in civil cases unless
specifically provided for by statute. “In Louisiana, there is a general public policy against punitive
damages; thus, a fundamental tenet of our law is that punitive or other penalty damages are not
allowable unless expressly authorized by statute.”195 Plaintiff has not plead, which if any, state law
claims would permit punitive damages. She also does not respond to this argument in her

opposition brief. Therefore, the Court dismisses any request for punitive damages under Louisiana
state law.
V. Conclusion
Regarding Plaintiff’s Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Amendment claims the Court finds that
Plaintiff has not stated a claim for which relief can be granted, and accordingly dismisses these
claims with prejudice. Plaintiff has also not stated a claim for punitive damages under Louisiana
state law or under federal law against the Town of Franklinton, and Justin Brown and the
fictitiously named officers in their official capacities. With respect to the other arguments raised
in the instant motion, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint to attempt to

cure the deficiencies noted herein and a Rule 7(a)(7) reply tailored to the qualified immunity
defense. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants the Town of Franklinton and Justin Brown’s
Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss196 are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The
motions are GRANTED to the extent they seek dismissal of the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth
Amendment Claims; the request for punitive damages under federal law against Chief Brown and
the Officers in their official capacities, and the Town of Franklinton; and the request for punitive

195 Ross v. Conoco, Inc., 2002-0299, p. 14 (La. 10/15/02), 828 So. 2d 546, 555.
196 Rec. Docs. 11, 12.
damages against all defendants under Louisiana state law. The motion is DENIED in all other
respects.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Amendment claims
against Chief Brown and the Officers in their individual and official capacities, and the Town of
Franklinton are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the requests for punitive damages under federal law
against the Town of Franklinton, and Justin Brown and the fictitiously named officers in their
official capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the requests for punitive damages under Louisiana
state law against the Town of Franklinton, Justin Brown and the fictitiously named officers are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the complaint and
to file a Rule 7(a)(7) reply within fourteen days of this Order to cure the deficiencies noted, if
possible. If upon amendment, Plaintiff fails to provide sufficient factual support for each element
of each claim, upon motion by a party, the Court will dismiss the claims
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this _28th__ day of October, 2025.

NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

31

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11181144. Public record. Not legal advice.