# CORDAN

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · October 28, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11181050

## Case

- **Full name:** Jill Cordan v. Jeffrey Mitchell, Tommy Ryan and East Cocalico Township
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 28, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

FORI NT HTEH EE AUSNTIETREND DSTISATTREISC DTI OSTFR PIECNTN CSOYULVRAT NIA
___________________________________________

JILL CORDAN :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : Civil No. 5:25-cv-03179-JMG
:
JEFFREY MITCHELL, TOMMY RYAN and :
EAST COCALICO TOWNSHIP :
Defendants. :
_________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Gallagher, J. October 28, 2025
Plaintiff here alleges that Defendants, Jeffery Mitchell (“Defendant Mitchell”), Tommy Ryan
(“Defendant Ryan”), and East Cocalico Township (“ECT” or “Defendant Township”) (collectively the
“Defendants”) embarked on a campaign to discredit Plaintiff and to destroy her reputation, due to her
speaking out against ECT and because she is a gay woman. Plaintiff has brought claims against
Defendants for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violation
of the Equal Protection Clause, civil conspiracy, denial of equal rights under the law, conspiracy to
interfere with civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted in its entirety.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jill Cordan took office as the elected Tax Collector for ECT on January 3, 2022. ECF
No. 1 at ¶ 11. Prior to her election, Plaintiff was outspoken on matters concerning ECT. Id. at ¶¶ 12-
14. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants, individually and in coordination with each other, impeded on her
ability to perform her duties as the Tax Collector for ECT. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 19. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants changed township policy affecting Plaintiff’s commission on collected taxes and
further accused her of misconduct and spread rumors about her, damaging her personal and
professional reputation. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18, 29-32, 38-40. Plaintiff states that Defendants’ motivation for
this conduct was because Plaintiff is an openly gay woman who had previously been outspoken against
ECT, which included Plaintiff filing a formal hostile work environment complaint. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 37.
Plaintiff claims she suffered a loss in income, and ultimately, her reelection bid as a result of Defendants
unlawful actions. Id. at ¶¶ 32, 40, 45. Plaintiff filed suit in this Court against Defendants on June 23,
2025. ECF No. 1. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against it under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) on August 22, 2025. ECF No. 9.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Although the
plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp.,
809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A court is “not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and
unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Wheeler v. Wheeler,
639 F. App’x 147, 149 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013)).
III. DISCUSSION
a. Plaintiffs First Amendment Retaliation Claim (Count I) is Dismissed
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against her, because prior to her being elected, she
was an outspoken critic of ECT, and the Board of Supervisors. See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 58(a)-(d). In order
to plead a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that [s]he engaged
in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) that [s]he suffered retaliatory action sufficient to deter a
person of ordinary firmness from exercising h[er] constitutional rights; and (3) a causal connection
between the protected activity and the retaliatory act.” Forish v. Brasile, No. 2:23-CV-1316, 2024 WL
3046996, at *3 (W.D. Pa. June 18, 2024) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff can establish the requisite
causal connection by showing either: (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the
protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with
timing to establish a causal link.” Id. (citation omitted). “When a plaintiff relies solely on circumstantial
evidence of temporal proximity, the time between the protected conduct and the adverse action is often
measured in days rather than weeks or months.” Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to establish that a causal connection exists between her statements and the
retaliatory action that allegedly occurred, as we are left in the dark as to when these statements were
made. Instead, Plaintiff makes general allegations of timeframes when these statements were made
such as, “[p]rior to her election . . .”, ECF No. 1 at ¶ 12 (emphasis added) and “[b]efore she was sworn
in to office . . .” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 14 (emphasis added). In Forish, the Court found there was no temporal
connection between Forish’s alleged citizen speech in December 2019 (and June 2020) and the
retaliatory actions that occurred almost a year later. See Forish, 2024 WL 3046996, at *3. Here, this
Court cannot make any conclusion to determine if there was temporal connection, as there are no
specifications as to when the statements were made.1

However, in the Third Circuit it is a well-accepted principle that “in civil rights cases district
courts must offer amendment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when dismissing a case for
failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote
Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 151 (3d
Cir. 2017). Therefore, Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend her Complaint as to Count I.

1 In addition, pursuant to Rule 9, “[a]n allegation of time or place is material when testing the
sufficiency of a pleading.” The lack of specificity as to the time or place, makes the pleading
deficient.
b. Plaintiffs Monell Claim (Count II) is Dismissed
Plaintiff brings a claim against all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants have moved
to dismiss Count II against them on the grounds that a Monell claim fails against the individual
defendants and Plaintiff has failed to establish municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Social
Services. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Firstly, a Monell claim can only be stated against a municipality, not an
individual person. See Moore v. Solanco Sch. Dist., 471 F. Supp. 3d 640, 669–70 (E.D. Pa. 2020)
(“Monell liability applies only to municipalities, not to individuals.”). Therefore, the Monell claim
against the individual Defendants is dismissed with prejudice.
Further, a § 1983 claim against a municipality may proceed in two ways. “A plaintiff may put
forth that an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality led to his or her injuries, or that they
were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the municipality that reflects a deliberate or conscious
choice.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
i. Policy-Custom Claims
Under the first theory of liability, a Plaintiff must establish the existence of a custom or policy
and demonstrate the “‘affirmative link between the policy or custom and the particular constitutional
violation [she] alleges.’” Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting
Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)). “Policy is made when a decisionmaker

possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official
proclamation, policy, or edict,” and “[c]ustom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a
given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and
permanent as virtually to constitute law.” Id. (citations omitted).
Plaintiff fails to allege any policy or custom that Defendants have violated, but instead makes
the lengthy, conclusory allegation that “[t]hese Defendants developed and maintained policies,
procedures, customs, and/or practices, specifically, the policies, procedures, customs, and/or practices
of encouraging employees to file frivolous grievances, encouraging employees to file false police
reports, advising and encouraging employees to take extended leaves of absence in order to punish a
public servant, publicly humiliating political opponents, and utilizing law enforcement to restrict
building access to certain individuals who you disagree with.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 76.
These conclusions are insufficient to state a claim for municipal liability on the basis of a
policy or custom because at the outset, Plaintiff has not “‘specif[ied] what exactly that custom or policy
was’” that allegedly caused the violation of her constitutional rights. Carr v. City of Phila., 560 F. Supp.
3d 845, 849 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (quoting McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009)
(“To satisfy the pleading standard, [a plaintiff] must identify a custom or policy, and specify what
exactly that custom or policy was.”)).
ii. Failure-or-Inadequacy Claims
Plaintiff also attempts to state a claim for municipal liability on the basis of failure to “conduct
sufficient training or supervision with respect to the protected speech rights of citizens to question the
actions of the Board of Supervisors, the Township and their employees, agents and assigns.” ECF No.
1 at ¶ 48(a). “[A] plaintiff advancing a claim predicated on a municipality’s failure or inadequacy in
training, supervision, or otherwise is spared from demonstrating the existence of an unconstitutional
policy or custom” but must make a showing that the municipal policymakers acted with deliberate
indifference. Forrest, 930 F.3d, at 117. “Under Monell, deliberate indifference requires ‘proof that a

municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.’ Ordinarily, this means that
a plaintiff must show that ‘[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations’ put the city on notice that, by
failing to act, it was being deliberately indifferent to [a citizens] rights.” Hightower v. City of Phila.,
130 F.4th 352, 357(3d Cir. 2025) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997))
(quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)).
Plaintiff’s claim under this second theory of liability is insufficient because she has not alleged
facts showing that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. “Usually, ‘a pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees is necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference
for purposes of failure to train.’ . . . This is because ‘[w]ithout notice that a course of training is deficient
in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training
program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.’” Hargrove v. City of Phila., 671 F. Supp.
3d 595, 606 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (quoting Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 222, 223 (3d Cir.
2014)). As discussed above, Plaintiff has not put forth specific allegations of a pattern of similar
constitutional violations that would have put the Defendants on notice of the consequences of its
actions. Although Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he aforementioned policies, practices, habits, custom, usage
and/or training creates an environment where citizens are retaliated against for the expression of First
Amendment Rights and for merely existing as a protected status under the 14th Amendment,” she fails
to show that Defendants were aware of this “practice” and failed to do anything to prevent that
outcome. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 49. Further, Plaintiff has not explained what specific training, supervision, or
discipline would have prevented her injury. Leathers v. Russo, 2025 WL 327313, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
29, 2025) (citing Weber v. Erie Cnty., 2020 WL 5983275, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2020)). Rather,
Plaintiff argues in a sweeping fashion that the Defendants policies, practices, habits, custom, usage
and/or training that was in place created “an environment where citizens are retaliated against for the

expression of First Amendment Rights and for merely existing as a protected status under the 14th
Amendment.” ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 48(a), 49. Plaintiff’s Complaint is deficient of facts which show
deliberate indifference, an essential element of a claim of municipal liability based on failure to train,
discipline, or supervise.
“Where a complaint contains only conclusory allegations, it ‘fail[s] to satisfy the ‘rigorous
standards of culpability and causation’ required for municipal liability.’” Leathers, 2025 WL 327313,
at *5 (quoting Young v. City of Chester 764 F. App’x 262, 265 (3d Cir. 2019)); see Oliver v. City of
Phila., 2025 WL 1902298, at *10 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2025) (quoting McTernan v. City of York, PA,
564 F.3d 636, 659 (3d Cir. 2009)) (“Allegations that ‘simply paraphrase[]’ the standard for municipal
liability are too vague and generalized to support a Monell claim.”).
Again, pursuant to well established law in the Third Circuit, Plaintiff will be granted leave to
amend her Complaint as to Count II against Defendant Township.
c. Plaintiffs Discrimination Claim (Count III) is Dismissed
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection
by subjecting her to “severe and persuasive harassment” due to her status as a “gay, female.” ECF No.1
at ¶ 79. Defendants argue in their Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff fails to allege any similarly situated
people were treated differently, and thus her claim fails. See ECF No. 9 at p. 13. This Court agrees.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, no state shall “deny to any person ... the equal protection
of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In order to establish an equal protection claim, Plaintiff
must show that: “(1) she was treated differently from others who are similarly situated (Defendants’
actions had a discriminatory effect); and (2) that this selective treatment was motivated by an intention
to discriminate on the basis of impermissible considerations, such as race or religion, to punish or
inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights, or by a malicious or bad faith intent to injure the person
(Defendants’ actions had a discriminatory purpose).” Westrich v. Malvern Borough, No. 2:24-CV-
02632-KBH, 2025 WL 2147360, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2025).
Plaintiff does not allege in her Complaint that she is similarly situated to any other individuals.
Instead, she claims “the harassment endured by Plaintiff detrimentally affected here [sic] and would

have detrimentally affected a similarly situated reasonable person.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 80 (emphasis
added). However, this type of conclusory allegation fails to support a claim under the Equal Protection
Clause. See Taylor v. Northampton Cnty., No. 5:24-CV-1411, 2025 WL 1577824, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June
4, 2025) (dismissing Equal Protection claim, in part, because Plaintiff’s allegations “[she] has been
treated different than similarly situated individuals” was conclusory). Further, Plaintiff’s statement that
“[a]s the only openly gay female elected official in ECT, there is no comparison,” ECF No. 15 at p.
14, is misplaced. The correct comparison is to individuals who do not share the Plaintiff’s protected
characteristics, such as straight male officials or employees.
Count III is dismissed, without prejudice as the Court cannot tell whether Plaintiff can cure
this claim with more robust allegations.
d. Plaintiffs Claim Under 42 U.S.C § 1981 (Count V) is Dismissed
Plaintiff claims that acting under the color of state law, with “an animus towards Plaintiff as a
gay, female” Defendants “unlawfully deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional rights.” ECF No. 1 at ¶
108. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that [s]he belongs to a racial
minority; (2) an intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendants; and (3) discrimination
concerning one or more of the activities enumerated in § 1981.” Manuel v. City of Philadelphia, 2010
WL 3566767, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2010) (citations omitted). Further, § 1981 only allows claims
“arising from discrimination based on race or color.” Id. (emphasis added).
Plaintiff makes no allegation that the discrimination she was subject to was based on her race.
Instead, Plaintiff specifically alleges that the discrimination she faced was based on her status as a gay
female, not on the basis of color or race. See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 103, 108. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a
claim and Count V is dismissed with prejudice.
e. Plaintiffs Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Count VI) is Dismissed
To state a claim under § 1985(3), Plaintiff must allege: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by a
racial or class based discriminatory animus designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or

class of persons to the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4)
an injury to person or property or the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the united
states.” Fennell v. Kostura, No. CV 19-669, 2019 WL 2615484, at *12 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 2019).2
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to “deny the Plaintiff rights afforded [to]
heterosexual, male citizens by unlawfully retaliating against her and then conspiring to conceal what

2 Plaintiff incorrectly states in their Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss that she is bringing
this claim under § 1985(2), however, § 1985(2) applies to obstructing justice, intimidating party,
witness or juror. However, given the nature of the factual allegations the Court will construe the
claim as one for relief under § 1985(3). See ECF No. 15 at p. 15.
actually occurred.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 115. But Plaintiffs § 1985 claim fails for the same reasons that her
Equal Protection claim fails, as Plaintiffs § 1985 claim is premised on the same factual basis as her
Equal Protection claim. As explained above, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that she was treated
differently than any comparable or similarly situated individuals. See id. (finding that Plaintiffs equal
protection claim fails because he does not allege different treatment from similarly situated individuals
and “[w]ithout an equal protection claim, [Plaintiff] cannot state a claim under Section 1985.”); see
also supra pp. 7-8.
Count VI is dismissed without prejudice.
f. This Court Declines to Exercise Jurisdiction Over the Remaining State Law
Claims (Counts IV, VII, and IIX)

This Court initially had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a), which provides supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims “within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case of controversy.” After dismissing Counts I, II, III, V,
and VI, the only claims that remain are the state law claims against Defendants which allege Civil
Conspiracy (Count IV), Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (Count VII) and Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count IIX). At this point, as the federal claims have been dismissed,
this Court exercises its discretion and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state
law claims, as there is no affirmative justification to do otherwise. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (“district
courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); see also Stone v.
Martin, 720 F. App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2017) (directing that district courts “must decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction in such circumstances unless considerations of judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.”) (citation
omitted). Thus, the remaining state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) is granted in its entirety.
An appropriate order follows.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ John M. Gallagher
JOHN M. GALLAGHER
United States District Court Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11181050. Public record. Not legal advice.