# Talkington

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · October 29, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11180962

## Case

- **Full name:** Jane Talkington v. Sharla Helton
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** October 29, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION

JANE TALKINGTON,
Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:25-cv-01318-JEH-RLH

SHARLA HELTON,
Defendant.

Order
Now before the Court is Defendant Dr. Sharla Helton’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (D. 13).1 This matter is fully briefed and for
the reasons set forth infra, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
I
Plaintiff Jane Talkington originally filed this lawsuit seeking a declaratory
judgment against Defendant Helton on August 1, 2025. On September 16, 2025,
Plaintiff Talkington filed her First Amended Declaratory Judgment Complaint and
Jury Demand (D. 11) invoking federal question subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1121 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338 “because [this action]
involves substantial claims arising under the federal Copyright Act and federal
Defendant Trade Secrets Act.” Pl.’s 1st Am. Compl. (D. 11 at ECF p. 2). The
Plaintiff included four counts: Count I for declaratory judgment of non-
infringement of copyright; Count II for declaratory judgment of joint authorship;
Count III for declaratory judgment of non-misappropriation of trade secret; and
Count IV for a declaration of joint ownership of trade secret in the alternative to

1 Citations to the electronic docket are abbreviated as “D. ___ at ECF p. ___.”
Count III. Id. at ECF pp. 14-16. On September 26, 2025, Defendant Helton filed the
instant Motion to Dismiss all of the Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3) for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper
venue.
Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges2 Defendant Helton, who resides in
Oklahoma, received Botox cosmetic injections in 2006 and around that same time
contracted botulism. Dr. Helton sued Allergan, Inc., the maker of Botox, and a
jury ultimately awarded her $15,000,000; there was a significant amount of
publicity about the case and the factual bases for it. When Plaintiff Talkington was
a graduate student at Oklahoma State University in 2015, Dr. Helton provided
Talkington with hundreds of research publications that she represented to have
used to build her legal case against Allergan. At that time, the Plaintiff had
successfully merged twelve research fields into a single dissertation using a
historical methodology called Process Tracing, and that is why Dr. Helton sought
her services. The Defendant secured the Plaintiff’s part-time assistance to conduct
further research on Botox and botulism, and the Plaintiff was paid by the hour by
Dr. Helton though she was an independent contractor rather than an employee.
Talkington was not asked to and never signed a non-disclosure or confidentiality
agreement concerning the research or her activities and was not asked to and never
signed any document transferring intellectual property (IP) rights of any kind to
Dr. Helton. The Plaintiff worked on her personal laptop and in an office, neither
of which were provided by Dr. Helton.
Under their independent contractor research arrangement, the Plaintiff and
Defendant searched out more articles` concerning Botox, botulism, or both, and

2 At the motion to dismiss stage, a court “accept[s] the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and
draw[s] reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Bronson v. Ann & Robert H. Lurie Child.’s Hosp. of
Chi., 69 F.4th 437, 448 (7th Cir. 2023).
the research covered topics in publicly available studies and articles. The over
1,000 research articles compiled during their collaborative research effort were all
academic articles accessible through libraries and databases. This initial phase of
collaboration occurred between 2015 and 2018, and at all times, Dr. Helton
explained the research compilation was not just hers but hers and the Plaintiff’s.
There was no formal or informal agreement as to ownership beyond that. The
expectation was that each would publish in their own botulism-related area of
interest using their shared resources.
The Plaintiff earned her Ph.D. in May 2016. She thereafter had access to
software used to store and organize the parties’ research which was a tool
provided by the Plaintiff, not the Defendant. They both downloaded a copy of the
compilation at that time, but no formal or informal, written or oral restrictions
were placed on the use of the compilation, and no written or oral representations
of ownership of the research were made. From 2018 to 2024, the Plaintiff
continued her botulism research efforts and collaboration with the Defendant
through publicly available resources. The Defendant did not pay the Plaintiff
during this stage of research collaboration, and, instead, the Plaintiff became a
known botulism academic in her own right.
The parties’ collaboration continued during 2022 through present at which
time the Plaintiff taught at Bradley University (Bradley) in Peoria, Illinois. Dr.
Helton was “well aware” she was engaged in a research collaboration with an
academic at Bradley and “knew” she was working with an academic in Peoria,
Illinois. Id. at ECF p. 6. During that time: at least 88 emails were exchanged
between the parties, all focused on the research collaboration between them; the
Defendant was provided with at least 26 academic publications by the Plaintiff in
furtherance of their research collaboration; and the Defendant provided the
Plaintiff with at least three academic publications in furtherance of their research
collaboration. Also during that time, the parties’ research collaboration included:
a 2022 grant proposal submitted to a Peoria, Illinois hospital; the Plaintiff
interviewing botulism victims in Peoria, one of which was done at the Defendant’s
request and further request that the Plaintiff secure the woman’s medical records
for the Defendant’s review; the Defendant requesting to meet with a Peoria,
Illinois IP consultant concerning IP and business opportunities arising from the
research collaboration; the Defendant requesting the Plaintiff issue Freedom of
Information Act requests to the Centers for Disease Control on Dr. Helton’s behalf;
the Defendant reviewing early drafts of the Plaintiff’s historical botulism book;
and the Defendant requesting the Plaintiff secure research articles for her. In April
2023, the Defendant guest lectured on botulism during one of the Plaintiff’s
courses on Bradley’s campus.
Further, the Defendant requested and encouraged the Plaintiff to contact a
Chicago Tribune reporter to inquire whether he would consider writing an
investigative piece on botulism from Botox. The parties’ research collaboration
included the Defendant requesting and encouraging the Plaintiff to share
counterfeit Botox news reports and the declining of the aforementioned FOIA
request by the CDC with the Chicago Tribune reporter. As Talkington
summarizes, between 2022 and the filing of this suit, Dr. Helton repeatedly
requested Talkington, while in Peoria, Illinois, undertake activities in furtherance
of their research collaboration and to generate business opportunities. Talkington
further summarizes that she and Dr. Helton “had a productive decade and a half
of research, publishing, and awareness collaboration, including efforts and
collaboration here, in Illinois.” Pl.’s 1st Am. Compl. (D. 11 at ECF pp. 10-11).
Megan McCue, injured from a botulinum toxin injection in July 2024,
published and released a book about contracting botulism. McCue met the
Plaintiff “virtually” through a Facebook group in the fall of 2024, and, in January
2025, asked Talkington to put her in touch with Dr. Helton. Id. at ECF p. 11.
McCue interviewed, among others, the Plaintiff and Defendant for her book which
was released in January 2025. Upon information and belief, the only portions of
McCue’s book referencing Dr. Helton are from publicly available information.
McCue published another book about botulism in April 2025 and while Talkington
received a dedication for the book, it was published without her input or advance
knowledge.
The Defendant applied for and secured a copyright registration, TXU 2-488-
289 for a manuscript, the effective date of that registration being May 13, 2025. The
Defendant’s attorneys sent the Plaintiff a letter dated June 11, 2025. Pl.’s original
Compl. Ex. 1 (D. 1-1 at ECF pp. 1-6).3 In the letter, the Defendant’s attorneys stated
Dr. Helton held the research compilation in secrecy, and she entrusted Talkington
with limited, secure, and secret access to it and her manuscript/Copyrighted Work
during Talkington’s employment as a research and executive assistant for Dr.
Helton. They stated that the Plaintiff infringed Dr. Helton’s copyright directly or
contributorily by, for example, contributing to and inducing the publication of
McCue’s first and second books which contain infringed excerpts of Dr. Helton’s
copyrighted work and of her medical research and opinions. They stated that from
social media postings and information, it is clear the Plaintiff is engaging in the
unauthorized reproduction, use, public display, and sale of the Defendant’s
Copyrighted Works and/or contributing or inducing such infringement. They
also stated the research compilation constitutes a trade secret and the Plaintiff
disclosed it without Dr. Helton’s consent by sharing it with McCue and

3 The Plaintiff included the June 11, 2025 letter and its attachments to the original Complaint but not to the
First Amended Complaint, though she incorporates by reference the letter into the First Amended
Complaint. See Pl.’s 1st Am. Compl. (D. 11 at ECF p. 12 ¶95); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c) (“A statement in
a pleading may be adopted by reference elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other pleading or motion.
A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”).
sharing/distributing it on a Facebook group. The attorneys additionally stated the
Plaintiff committed right of publicity, privacy, and consumer protection
violations. They stated the Plaintiff falsified Dr. Helton’s story in February 2025
in an interview on Peoria Public Radio. The attorneys demanded Talkington
immediately cease and desist from IP infringement, rights of publicity
misappropriation, and trade secret misappropriation, and they stated Dr. Helton
expressly reserves all her legal and equitable rights and remedies.
II
A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss asserts a
“lack of personal jurisdiction”. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). A Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to 12(b)(2) is a challenge to a court’s ability to bring a person into its
adjudicative process. N. Grain Mktg., LLC v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.
2014). “In a federal question case . . . a federal court has personal jurisdiction over
the defendant if either federal law or the law of the state in which the court sits
authorizes service of process to that defendant.” Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC
v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Hou. Metroplex, P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2010).
Relevant to this case, neither the Copyright Act nor federal Defend Trade Secrets
Act authorize nationwide service of process. See MG Design Assocs., Corp. v. Costar
Realty Info., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 621, 628 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (providing the Copyright
Act does not authorize nationwide service of process); Mission Measurement Corp.
v. Blackbaud, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 3d 691, 707 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“The Defend Trade
Secrets Act does not have nationwide service of process that would confer
personal jurisdiction over all Defendants . . ..”). Thus, the Court must “look to the
law of the forum [Illinois] for the governing rule.” Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys.,
LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir. 2014). Illinois’s long-
arm statute provides a court may exercise jurisdiction to the extent “permitted by
the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.” 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/2-209(c); see also Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC, 623 F.3d at 443 (stating
“We have held that there is no operative difference between these two
constitutional limits.”). “The key question is therefore whether the defendant[]
have sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with Illinois such that the maintenance of the
suit ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”
Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700-01 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
“To support an exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state must directly relate to the challenged conduct or
transaction[]”.4 Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 702. “Specific personal jurisdiction is
appropriate where (1) the defendant has purposefully directed his activities at the
forum state or purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business
in that state, and (2) the alleged injury arises out of the defendant’s forum-related
activities.” Matlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 705-06 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 702). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the
existence of jurisdiction. NBA Properties, Inc. v. HANWJH, 46 F.4th 614, 620 (7th
Cir. 2022). When a district court rules on a defendant’s motion to dismiss based
on written materials without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff must only make
out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. Id. The plaintiff’s asserted facts are
taken as true and the court “may consider affidavits on the issue of personal
jurisdiction; both parties’ affidavits are accepted as true, and where they conflict,
the plaintiff is entitled to resolution in its favor. Id.
Here, Defendant Helton argues the mere fact that the Plaintiff happens to
assert harm or potential harm in Illinois does not suffice to subject Dr. Helton to

4 In her Response to the Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiff argues the Court has specific, instead of general,
jurisdiction over Defendant Helton. See Pl.’s Resp. (D. 16 at ECF p. 1). The Court limits its analysis
accordingly.
litigation in Illinois where there are no allegations or evidence of any conduct that
would support the conclusion that Dr. Helton “purposefully directed” any suit-
related activities toward Illinois.
As an initial matter, the Court is unpersuaded by the authority the
Defendant relies on. First, the Defendant cites cases from outside the Seventh
Circuit – the Federal Circuit, to be exact – and cases from outside this district – the
Northern Districts of Illinois and Indiana. Out-of-circuit precedent is not binding
on this Court, though it is entitled to “respectful consideration.” OSF Healthcare
Sys. v. Insperity Grp. Health Plan, 82 F. Supp. 3d 860, 865 (C.D. Ill. 2015) (quoting
U.S. v. Glaser, 14 F.3d 1213, 1216 (7th Cir. 1994)). Nor are unpublished district court
opinions from within the Seventh Circuit. See Camreta v. Green, 563 U.S. 692, 709
n.7 (2011) (“A decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in
either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same
judge in a different case.”) (quoting 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.02 (3d ed.
2011)); Day v. Wooten, 947 F.3d 453, 462 (7th Cir. 2020) (providing that district court
opinions are not binding precedential authority). Defendant Helton cites a
handful of cases within this Circuit, arguing that “[t]he contacts relevant to
personal jurisdiction for a claim of declaratory judgment of non-infringement are
based on the defendant’s conduct that gives rise to the plaintiff’s claim, specifically
the defendant’s enforcement activity, not its business activity.” Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss (D. 14 at ECF p. 11) (citing Am. Intercontinental Univ., Inc. v. Am. Univ., No.
16 C 10669, 2017 WL 3478805, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2017) (“The parties agree
that, in actions seeking a declaration of noninfringement, the relevant inquiry is
whether the defendant patent holder purposefully directed enforcement activities
at the forum state and whether the declaratory judgment claim ‘arises out of or
relates’ to those activities.”).
Nearly all those cases, in turn, relied upon the Federal Circuit case Avocent
Huntsville Corp. v. Aten International Co., Ltd. 552 F.3d 1324, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir.
2008). The American Intercontinental University, Inc. district court understood
Avocent to provide that “the relevant contacts are the defendant’s enforcement
activity, not its business activity.” Am. Intercontinental Univ., Inc. v. Am. Univ., 2017
WL 3478805, at *3 (citing Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1332). The Federal Circuit explained
in Avocent that “the nature of the claim in a declaratory judgment action is to clear
the air of infringement charges[]” and concluded, “[f]or the exercise of personal
jurisdiction to comport with fair play and substantial justice, there must be other
activities directed at the forum and related to the cause of action besides the letters
threatening an infringement suit.” Id. (quoting Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Indus.,
Inc., 326 F.3d 1197, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (emphasis added by Avocent)). The
Avocent court cited, among others, its decisions in Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-
Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong
Industries, Inc., 326 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Significantly, though neither party mentions it, the Federal Circuit itself, in
April 2022, explained the district court in Apple Inc. v. Zipit Wireless, Inc.:
erred in reading our precedent as creating a bright-line rule that
communications directed to “the attempted resolution” of the parties’
dispute regarding the patents-in-suit trumps all other considerations
of fairness and reasonableness. Although some of our earlier
precedent relying on Red Wing Shoe suggests that there is such a
bright-line rule, see, e.g., Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1340; Breckenridge, 444
F.3d at 1362; Silent Drive, 326 F.3d at 1206, Supreme Court precedent
(both pre- and post-Red Wing Shoe) has made clear that jurisdictional
inquiries cannot rest on such bright-line rules — there are no
“talismanic jurisdictional formulas.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 485, 105
S. Ct. 2174. Rather, “‘the facts of each case must [always] be weighed’
in determining whether personal jurisdiction would comport with
‘fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. at 485–86, 105 S. Ct. 2174
(alteration in original) (quoting Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S.
84, 92, 98 S. Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978)); Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137
S. Ct. at 1780 (“In determining whether personal jurisdiction is
present, a court must consider a variety of interests.”).

30 F.4th 1368, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2022). In other words, Defendant Helton’s
emphasis upon the body of case law stemming from Avocent, specifically the bright
line rule for claims of declaratory judgment of non-infringement which that body
of case law took from it, do not control this Court’s inquiry.5 Instead, as the
Federal Circuit more recently clarified, the facts of each case must always be
weighed in deciding whether exercising personal jurisdiction would adhere to the
controlling constitutional standards.
A
Defendant Helton argues the First Amended Complaint is devoid of any
facts alleging she engaged in any sort of purposeful availment of, or direction of
activities to, Illinois. She points out she does not live in Illinois, owns no property
here, has no address or phone number in Illinois, has no bank accounts here, does
not conduct any business in Illinois, and does not have any ownership interest in
any business based or incorporated in Illinois. She highlights that, instead, the
manuscript she authored was created in Oklahoma, her copyright registration was
obtained there, and the cease-and-desist letter to the Plaintiff was sent from
Oklahoma by Defendant’s counsel who is also from Oklahoma. Defendant Helton

5 Several of the Defendant’s cases cited from within this Circuit pre-date April 2022. As for the two cited
cases that post-date it and still rely upon it for a bright line rule, they are rejected in light of the Federal
Circuit’s explanation in Apple, Inc., in addition to being non-binding. See Discounted Water Filters, Inc. v.
A.O. Smith Water Treatment (N. Am.), Inc., No. 23-cv-01416, 2024 WL 4522812, at *4 (C.D. Ill. June 12, 2024)
(listing Avocent as authority for placing the focus on whether a defendant purposefully directed its efforts
to enforce its trademark protections at Illinois and its residents before moving on to consider whether an
exercise of jurisdiction based on the defendant’s enforcement efforts comported with traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice); and My Own Meals, Inc. v. PurFoods, LLC, No. 22 C 0892, 2022 WL 2132729,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2022) (relying, in part, on the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Red Wing Shoe Co. where
it addressed, in the patent context, the lack of fairness in grounding jurisdiction on one or two cease-and-
desist letters).
insists that the Plaintiff conflates two categories of conduct - Helton’s authorship
and enforcement of rights in her completed manuscript which occurred entirely in
Oklahoma and later conversations about potential, unrelated projects – the latter
of which, per Dr. Helton, having nothing to do with the Plaintiff’s declaratory
judgment claims.
The Plaintiff counters that Defendant Helton’s “extensive contacts” with
Illinois demonstrate she purposefully directed her activities at Illinois. Pl.’s Resp.
(D. 16 at ECF p. 8). Talkington argues Dr. Helton’s contacts in Illinois are the
opposite of random, fortuitous, or attenuated where, between 2022 and the filing
of this lawsuit, she repeatedly requested Talkington, in Peoria, Illinois, undertake
activities in furtherance of the research collaboration and to generate business
opportunities, and Dr. Helton coordinated publishing and business opportunities
related to their botulism work. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
475 (1985) (explaining the “‘purposeful availament’ requirement ensures that a
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’
‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts”). She also emphasizes that Dr. Helton guest
lectured in April 2023 at Bradley in Peoria, Illinois. With regard to Dr. Helton’s
conflation argument, the Plaintiff counters there are no such separate categories,
stating in her Declaration that she “conducted research, collaborated, and
discussed numerous articles and materials that made their way into Dr. Helton’s
manuscript”, the copyrighted material for which she seeks a declaration of non-
infringement. Plf’s Resp. Decl. (D. 16-1 at ECF p. 3 ¶21).
As for the first requirement of specific jurisdiction, the “minimum contacts”
analysis “looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the
defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S 277,
285 (2014); see also Matlin, 921 F.3d at 706 (“For a court performing a minimum-
contacts analysis for personal jurisdiction purposes, ‘[t]he relevant contacts are
those that center on the relations among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.’”) (quoting Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC, 751 F.3d at 801). The
Seventh Circuit has stated that “the nature of the purposeful-
direction/purposeful-availment inquiry depends in large part on the type of claim
at issue.” Felland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 674 (7th Cir. 2012). Here, the Plaintiff not
only seeks declarations of non-infringement of copyright and non-
misappropriation of trade secret, she also seeks declarations of joint authorship
and of joint ownership of trade secret, all of which have their genesis in IP at least
partially developed in Illinois. Put simply, central to this case are the acts that
occurred in this forum.
Dr. Helton “purposefully reached out beyond [her] State [Oklahoma] and
into another [Illinois]” where she repeatedly requested Talkington undertake
activities in furtherance of their research collaboration and to generate business
opportunities in Illinois including a 2022 grant proposal submitted to a Peoria,
Illinois hospital, the Plaintiff’s interview of and request for the medical records of
a botulism victim in Peoria both done at the Defendant’s request, the Defendant’s
request to meet with a Peoria, Illinois IP consultant concerning IP and business
opportunities arising from the research collaboration, and the Defendant’s request
that the Plaintiff secure research articles for her. Walden, 571 U.S. at 285 (“we have
upheld the assertion of jurisdiction over defendants who have purposefully
‘reach[ed] out beyond’ their State and into another by, for example, entering a
contractual relationship that ‘envisioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts’
in the forum State”) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479-80). Notably, Defendant
Helton guest lectured in April 2023 at Bradley in Peoria, Illinois. See id. (“physical
entry into the State—either by the defendant in person or through an agent, goods,
mail, or some other means—is certainly a relevant contact”).
As for the Defendant’s conflation argument, the Plaintiff states in her
Declaration that she “conducted research, collaborated, and discussed numerous
articles and materials that made their way into Dr. Helton’s manuscript”. Pl.’s
Resp. Decl. (D. 16-1 at ECF p. 3 ¶21). Given the conflict between the parties’
asserted facts, the Plaintiff is entitled to resolution in her favor at this stage. NBA
Properties, Inc., 46 F.4th at 620. Thus, the Court has properly considered the
aforementioned contacts. Moreover, to consider all of the Defendant’s alleged
contacts with Illinois does not amount to impermissible aggregation under the
particular facts of this case. See Matlin, 921 F.3d at 706 (“[w]e cannot simply
aggregate all of a defendant’s contacts with a state—no matter how dissimilar in
terms of geography, time, or substance—as evidence of the constitutionally-
required minimum contacts.”) (internal citation omitted). As the Plaintiff puts it,
the contacts all relate to the same ongoing research collaboration and the IP rights
now in dispute.
The Court finds the Plaintiff has satisfied the first requirement for this
Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Defendant.
B
The Defendant argues none of her actions related to the IP at issue occurred
in or were directed to the State of Illinois as the creation of her manuscript, the
alleged research compilation, and claims of ownership all occurred in Oklahoma.
Citing several cases, Dr. Helton contends a single cease-and-desist letter cannot
establish personal jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment action where the case or
controversy exists only as a result of that letter. The Plaintiff disputes Dr. Helton
can claim in the first instance that this suit is unrelated to the latter’s Illinois
activities when the dispute centers on the IP co-developed through those very
activities.
With regard to the second requirement of specific jurisdiction, “In order for
a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a claim, there must be an ‘affiliation
between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an
occurrence that takes place in the forum State.’” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super.
Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 264 (2017) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). “For a State to exercise
jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant’s suit-related conduct must
create a substantial connection with the forum State.” Advanced Tactical Ordnance
Sys., LLC, 751 F.3d at 801 (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. at 284) (emphasis supplied).
Here, the Plaintiff insists that the alleged injury arose out of forum-related
activities where over 30 articles and publications stemming from Peoria, Illinois-
based collaboration, whether uncovered, discussed, or otherwise brought to Dr.
Helton’s attention by Talkington in Peoria, Illinois, were referenced over 100 times
in Dr. Helton’s manuscript and where this lawsuit is directly related to Helton’s
contacts with Illinois, those being Peoria, Illinois-based collaboration about
botulism as well as research, publications, and business opportunities from it. The
Plaintiff also insists that this is not just a declaratory judgment action on non-
infringement as it seeks to have ownership of Illinois-developed IP settled.
Indeed, this case for declaratory judgment of non-infringement, as the
Defendant repeatedly attempts to distill it, is a nuanced one. This is not a case
where the allegations are merely the defendant authored an original literary work
solely within another state, the defendant had no contact with the forum
whatsoever until discovering a potential copyright infringement by an individual
within the forum State, and only then the defendant made contact with the forum
state via a cease-and-desist letter sent to the infringing person within the forum
state. On the contrary, the Plaintiff here essentially alleges that the copyrighted
manuscript is a result of a research collaboration, generally, and the Plaintiff’s
efforts done at the Defendant’s direction, specifically, both having occurred in
Illinois. Stated differently, the Plaintiff’s claims are really about the existence of
the copyright itself. Of consequence here, the Supreme Court somewhat recently
stated, “None of our precedents has suggested that only a strict causal relationship
between the defendant’s in-state activity and the litigation will do.” Ford Motor
Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026 (2021). The Court will not
take so constrained a view as the Defendant of the alleged facts of this case; to do
so would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
In terms of fairness, the Court must consider several factors once minimum
contacts with the forum state are established:
The burden on the defendant, the forum State’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest
in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the underlying dispute,
and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.

NBA Properties, Inc., 46 F.4th at 627 (quoting Ill. v. Hemi Group LLC, 622 F.3d 754,
759 (7th Cir. 2010)); Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477. In this case, the burden on
the Defendant is not excessive in light of the Plaintiff’s allegations that the
Defendant came to Peoria, Illinois to guest lecture at Bradley and requesting to
meet with a Peoria, Illinois IP consultant. This forum has an interest in
adjudicating this dispute; as the Plaintiff puts it, Illinois has a strong interest in
adjudicating IP disputes because “[i]ntellectual property drives innovation and
supports large enterprises”, and Illinois “has an interest in fostering academic
research like that done at Bradley University” within this forum. Pl.’s Resp. (D. 16
at ECF p. 15). Plaintiff Talkington has an interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief at one time and in one place as to all of her claims stemming from
the same underlying set of facts, namely, her research collaboration with Dr.
Helton which occurred, in meaningful part, in Illinois. The interstate judicial
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the underlying
dispute means the case should stay where it properly began. Neither party makes
a compelling argument as to the last factor.
The Defendant’s application of the Burger King factors misses the point.
Again, this lawsuit arises from more than just Dr. Helton’s conduct in registering
her manuscript in and sending her cease-and-desist letter from Oklahoma.
Preceding that conduct was a research collaboration between Talkington and Dr.
Helton which took place in Illinois, the fruits of the collaboration appearing in the
manuscript of which Dr. Helton claims as only her original work of authorship.
Defendant Helton ultimately fails to “present a compelling case that the presence
of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Burger
King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477.
The Court finds the Plaintiff has satisfied the second requirement for this
Court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, and such
exercise does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
III
The parties also dispute the propriety of venue in the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of Illinois, Peoria Division. Title 28 of the United States Code,
Section 1391(b) provides:
A civil action may be brought in—
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants
are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought
as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any
defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect
to such action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(3). Defendant Helton argues neither 1391(b)(1) nor (2) is
satisfied here and thus venue in Illinois is improper. Plaintiff Talkington counters
that “[m]ost obviously,” Dr. Helton reached into this district to destroy IP, and
ownership of IP developed in this district is half this case. Pl.’s Resp. (D.16 at ECF
p. 16). Certainly, the Plaintiff’s alleged facts considered in the Court’s analysis of
specific personal jurisdiction negate the Defendant’s contention that Section
1391(b)(2) does not apply here. The Defendant’s persistence in taking a
constrained view of the allegations in this case is simply unavailing in terms of
venue as well. Section 1391(b)(2) speaks for itself as to where the focus must be
placed, and here, the Peoria Division of this district is a proper venue.
IV
For the reasons set forth supra, Defendant Dr. Sharla Helton’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (D. 13) is DENIED. Defendant
Helton must file her answer within 14 days of the date of this Order. This matter
is referred to the Magistrate Judge for a Rule 16 scheduling conference.
It is so ordered.
Entered on October 29, 2025
s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11180962. Public record. Not legal advice.