# Hufft

> District Court, N.D. Oklahoma · September 29, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11180286

## Case

- **Full name:** Richard A. Hufft v. The Trustee for Child Support Payments for the State of Missouri and Shara A. Martin
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** September 29, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11180286

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction does not address the merits and therefore is without prejudice

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
RICHARD A. HUFFT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) Case No. 25-cv-00057-JFH-SH
THE TRUSTEE FOR CHILD SUPPORT )
PAYMENTS FOR THE STATE OF )
MISSOURI and SHARA A. MARTIN, )
)
Defendants. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the undersigned is Defendant Martin’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim.1 Plaintiff
has failed to make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists over Martin, and
the undersigned recommends dismissing the claims against her. Pursuant to the Court’s
ongoing screening obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the undersigned further
recommends dismissing the claims against Defendant Trustee. Alternatively, the under-
signed recommends dismissing the claims against the Trustee pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 41(b). Finally, as all of Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal, the
undersigned recommends denying his motion for summary judgment as moot.
I. Background
On February 3, 2025, Plaintiff Richard Hufft (“Hufft”) filed a pro se complaint
against (1) Shara Martin, an assistant prosecutor in Lawrence County, Missouri, and
(2) the “Trustee for Child Support Payments for the State of Missouri” (the “Trustee”).

1 On March 28, 2025, Chief Judge John F. Heil, III, referred the case to the undersigned
for all further proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636. (ECF No. 12.)
(ECF No. 2.) The “Trustee” appears to refer to the Family Support Division of the
Missouri Department of Social Services.2
Hufft alleges Defendants engaged in an “ongoing pattern of false arrests and
extortion” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 2 at 1.3) Specifically, Hufft alleges
Martin repeatedly arrested him for unpaid child support from April 2022 to October 2024

and “threatened to imprison [him] unless [he] paid $5,000.00 [in] alleged child support.”
(Id.) Regarding his most recent arrest, Hufft alleges he “was taken in[to] custody without
a warrant by the Blackwell Oklahoma police,” “imprison[ed] in the Kay County Jail,” and
“held for extradition to Missouri.” (Id. at 1–2.) Hufft alleges the Trustee “extorted [him]
for many years . . . for nonpayment of child support” and has interfered with his right to
travel by revoking his driver’s license and effectively holding it for “ransom.” (Id. at 2.)
He further alleges the Trustee’s actions violate the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693r. (Id. at 2–3 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1673).)
Hufft seeks various forms of relief, including: (1) a determination that Defendants
“abused process and maliciously prosecuted” him; (2) an order directing the Trustee to
stop taking his money; (3) the return of all funds taken; (4) reinstatement of his driver’s

license; and (5) monetary damages for “false arrest, false imprisonment, inconvenience,
and interference.” (Id.)
Martin was served by the U.S. Marshals on May 27, 2025. (ECF No. 33.) She then
filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2),(3), and (6).

2 The undersigned made this finding in the prior report and recommendation. (ECF No.
32 at 1.) While Plaintiff objected to that R&R, he did not dispute this characterization.
(See generally ECF No. 39.)
3 References to page numbers refer to the ECF header.
(ECF No. 28.) Trustee has not appeared in this action, and the docket does not show
service on Trustee.4 Hufft’s deadline to file proof of service on the Trustee was June 25,
2025. (See ECF No. 13.) The Court warned Hufft that failure to timely file proof of service
(or waiver of service) may result in the dismissal of this case. (Id. at 2.)
II. Analysis
The undersigned first addresses Martin’s motion to dismiss and second evaluates

Plaintiff’s claims against the Trustee under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
A. Martin’s Motion to Dismiss
Martin moves to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack
of personal jurisdiction; 12(b)(3) for improper venue; and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim. The undersigned concludes the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Martin and
recommends dismissal on this basis. Martin’s remaining arguments are not addressed.
See Benton v. Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d 1070, 1074 n.1 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Because we
dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, we do not address the district court's
dismissal for failure to state a claim.”).
1. Standard of Review
Generally, a “court must have the power to decide the claim before it (subject-
matter jurisdiction) and power over the parties before it (personal jurisdiction) before it

can resolve a case.” Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 580 U.S. 82, 95 (2017). When
considering a 12(b)(2) motion without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff bears the
burden of making a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists. OMI Holdings,

4 Martin’s attorneys have signed at least two filings as “Attorneys for Defendants, Trustee
for Child Support Payments for the State of Missouri, and Shara A. Martin,” but they have
not entered an appearance for the Trustee or sought relief on its behalf. (ECF No. 28 at
29; ECF No. 29 at 7; see also ECF Nos. 24 & 25.)
Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 1998). “[I]n the preliminary
stages of litigation, the plaintiff’s burden is light.” AST Sports Sci., Inc. v. CLF Distrib.
Ltd., 514 F.3d 1054, 1056 (10th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff makes a prima facie case by
demonstrating, through affidavit or other written materials, facts that if true would
support jurisdiction over the defendant. OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1091. The Court must

also accept as true any non-conclusory allegations in the complaint not controverted by a
defendant’s affidavits. Ten Mile Indus. Park v. W. Plains Serv. Corp., 810 F.2d 1518, 1524
(10th Cir. 1987). If the parties present conflicting affidavits, all factual disputes will be
resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.
Here, neither Hufft nor Martin provide affidavits addressing personal jurisdic-
tion.5 The undersigned will therefore examine the allegations in the complaint to
determine whether those facts, if true, make a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction. Cf. DelaCruz-Bancroft v. Field Nation, LLC, No. 23-0023 JB/KK, 2024 WL
3565395, at *4 (D.N.M. July 25, 2024) (examining complaint where plaintiff did not
provide any materials addressing personal jurisdiction).
2. Personal Jurisdiction, Generally
To determine whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a

federal question case, the undersigned must consider “(1) whether the applicable statute
potentially confers jurisdiction by authorizing service of process on the defendant and
(2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process.” Trujillo v. Williams,

5 The motion to dismiss includes a copy of Martin’s summons but does not include any
other materials. Hufft does not attach any materials to his response.
465 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).6 Section 1983 does
not, by itself, authorize nationwide service of process. Id. Therefore, the undersigned
looks to Oklahoma’s long-arm statute. See id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
“Because Oklahoma’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of any jurisdiction that is
consistent with the United States Constitution, the personal jurisdiction inquiry under

Oklahoma law collapses into the single due process inquiry.” Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atl.
Internet Sols., Inc., 205 F.3d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000).
To comport with due process, “defendants must have “minimum contacts” with
the forum state . . . .” Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotations omitted). The minimum contacts standard may be met in one of two ways—
(1) specific jurisdiction, where a defendant has purposefully directed her activities at
residents of the forum and the plaintiff alleges injuries arising out of or relating to those
activities; or (2) general jurisdiction, where a defendant’s contacts with the forum state
are such that she is subject to any suit, related or unrelated to those contacts. Benton, 375
F.3d at 1075. “[T]he contacts with the forum State must be such that the defendant
‘should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’” XMission, L.C. v. Fluent LLC,

955 F.3d 833, 839–40 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). Further, the connection “must arise out of contacts
that the defendant himself creates with the forum State.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,
284 (2014) (internal quotations omitted). In this analysis, the court examines “the
quantity and quality of Defendants’ contacts with [the forum state] to determine whether

6 As Trujillo demonstrates, Plaintiff is incorrect in asserting that personal jurisdiction is
not relevant to federal question cases. See id. (addressing personal jurisdiction in case
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
the district court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendants comports with due
process.” OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1092.7
The undersigned will address both general and specific jurisdiction.
3. General Jurisdiction
General jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is proper where the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state are “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render

them essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A.
v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citation omitted). “For an individual, the paradigm
forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile . . . .” Id. at 924.
Hufft has not argued or alleged facts that would that establish Martin—a Missouri
prosecutor—is domiciled or “at home” in Oklahoma.
The Court cannot exercise general jurisdiction over Martin.
4. Specific Jurisdiction
As noted above, “specific jurisdiction is proper if (1) the out-of-state defendant
purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum State, and (2) the plaintiff’s
alleged injuries arise out of or relate to those activities.” XMission, L.C. v. PureHealth
Rsch., 105 F.4th 1300, 1308 (10th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). “[P]urposeful direction
ensures that defendants will not be haled into court in foreign jurisdictions solely as a

result of ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.’” Dental Dynamics, LLC v. Jolly
Dental Grp., LLC, 946 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Burger King Corp. v.

7 Even if a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction is made, the defendant may
“demonstrate that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction
unreasonable.” TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace Eur. Grp. Ltd., 488 F.3d 1282, 1286
(10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). Because Hufft has failed to make a prima
facie showing, the undersigned need not reach this issue.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). For tort-based claims,8 purposeful direction has
three elements: “(1) an intentional action; (2) expressly aimed at the forum state; and
(3) with knowledge that the brunt of the injury would be felt in the forum state.” Id. at
1231 (emphasis added).
But, “knowledge of an alleged victim’s out-of-state status, standing alone, cannot

confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant engaging in allegedly tortious activity,”
since the focus remains on the defendant’s relationship with the forum. Id. (citing
Walden, 571 U.S. at 282–83). “Due process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority
principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the convenience of
plaintiffs or third parties.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 284. Therefore, the minimum contacts
analysis does not look solely to “the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there,”
given “the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.” Id. at
285.
Hufft has failed to meet his burden of establishing that Martin purposefully
directed her conduct toward Oklahoma. The allegations involving Martin appear to
concern Missouri criminal charges brought by a Missouri prosecutor for alleged violations

of Missouri law before a Missouri court. (ECF No. 2 at 1–2.) Put differently, all conduct
raised by Hufft occurred in Missouri. While Hufft may live in Oklahoma and may have to
drive to Missouri for court, this does not mean Martin purposefully directed her conduct
in Oklahoma. See Coffman v. Vinita Forensic Ctr. Hosp., No. 2:24-cv-02308-HLT-ADM,
2025 WL 907333, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 16, 2025) (finding Kansas plaintiff failed to show
Oklahoma defendant purposefully directed its activities at Kansas where lawsuit

8 Section 1983 claims are a species of tort liability. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483
(1994).
“involv[ed] criminal charges in Oklahoma, incarceration in Oklahoma, and Oklahoma
competency evaluations”); Rodgers v. Fallin, No. CIV-12-171-D, 2013 WL 149723, at *4–
6 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2013) (same, where Oklahoma plaintiff filed suit against Missouri
officials for actions taken in Missouri) (collecting cases). Likewise, the allegation that
Hufft was arrested by Oklahoma police and extradited to Missouri is insufficient to

establish specific personal jurisdiction. Alfred v. Whetsel, No. CIV-07-950-C, 2008 WL
506335, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 21, 2008) (finding no specific personal jurisdiction in
§ 1983 action where Oklahoma plaintiff alleged Georgia officials took action that resulted
in plaintiff’s extradition to Georgia). The Court cannot exercise specific jurisdiction over
Martin.9
5. Transfer or Dismissal
Having determined the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Martin, the
undersigned next considers whether the Court should dismiss the claims against her or
transfer the action. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, whenever a claim is filed in a court that lacks
jurisdiction, “the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action . . . to
any other such court . . . in which the action . . . could have been brought at the time it was
filed or noticed . . . .” See also Trujillo, 465 F.3d at 1222 (“A court may sua sponte cure

jurisdictional . . . defects by transferring a suit under [§ 1631] when it is in the interests of

9 Hufft argues that ruling in favor of Martin would violate his right to “bring suit in the
federal district where [he] lives or where a substantial part of the . . . acts occurred.” (ECF
No. 34 at 3.) Hufft appears to be referencing the federal venue statute. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391. But § 1391 allows a plaintiff to bring a civil action in “a judicial district in which
any defendant resides” or “in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred.” Id. § 1391(b)(1)–(2) (emphasis added). As explained above,
there are no allegations that Martin resides in Missouri, and the events giving rise to
Hufft’s claims occurred in Missouri.
justice.”). In determining whether the interests of justice warrant transfer, the relevant
considerations are whether: (1) a new action in the appropriate forum would be time
barred; (2) the claims are likely to have merit; and (3) the plaintiff should have realized
the forum in which he filed was improper. Id. at 1223 n.16.
The undersigned recommends dismissal of Hufft’s claims against Martin rather

than transfer. First, Hufft alleges a pattern of false arrests beginning in April 2022. (ECF
No. 2 at 1.) In Missouri, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is five years. See
Sulik v. Taney Cty., 393 F.3d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4));
Jordan v. St. Louis City Just. Ctr., No. 17-cv-2896, 2018 WL 837701, at *1–2 (E.D. Mo.
Feb. 13, 2018) (applying five-year limitations period to § 1983 claim premised upon false
arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution).10 Thus, Hufft has ample time to
file suit against Martin in the appropriate forum. Second, as outlined in Martin’s motion,
Hufft’s claims are likely without merit for numerous reasons.11 Third, despite his pro se
status, Hufft “should have realized that the [Northern] District of Oklahoma was the

10 Under Missouri law, state law claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution
are subject to a two-year limitations period. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.140. To the extent
§ 516.140 is applicable to Hufft’s § 1983 claims, the undersigned would still find dismissal
proper, as factors two and three weigh in favor of dismissal.
11 For instance, Martin is likely entitled to prosecutorial immunity, as the complained-of
conduct relates to Hufft’s criminal prosecution for the failure to pay child support. See
Nielander v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs., 582 F.3d 1155, 1164 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Prosecutors are
entitled to absolute immunity for their decisions to prosecute, their investigatory or
evidence-gathering actions, their evaluation of evidence, their determination of whether
probable cause exists, and their determination of what information to show the court.”);
Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Absolute prosecutorial immunity
is a complete bar to a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Further, Hufft has likely
failed to plead a § 1983 claim against Martin, because he never alleges a specific
constitutional violation. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (“To state a claim under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States . . . .”).
wrong place to sue [a Missouri defendant] without any known connection to Oklahoma.”
Weaver v. Okla. Cty. Sheriff’s Office, No. CIV-07-847-W, 2008 WL 1733385, at *3 (W.D.
Okla. Apr. 14, 2008).
The undersigned thus recommends dismissing Hufft’s claims against Martin
without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms.

Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1216–17 (10th Cir. 2002) (explaining dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction does not address the merits and therefore is without prejudice).
B. Claims Against Trustee
The undersigned further recommends the claims against the Trustee be also
dismissed, as Hufft’s complaint contains various pleading deficiencies and Trustee is
immune from suits for monetary relief.12
1. Screening Obligation
When, like here, a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”), the Court has
a continuing obligation to screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Congress enacted § 1915(e)(2)(B), recognizing that IFP litigants lack “an economic
incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989) (citing an earlier version of the statute). The statute
obligates the Court to dismiss a case “at any time” if it determines the action “(i) is

frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

12 Personal jurisdiction may be raised sua sponte “only when the defense is obvious from
the face of the complaint and no further factual record is required to be developed.”
Trujillo, 465 F.3d at 1217 (internal quotation omitted). If the Court disagrees with the
undersigned’s recommended grounds for dismissing the claims against the Trustee, it
may examine whether it has personal jurisdiction over the Trustee.
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
2. Failure to State a Claim Standard
Dismissal under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is governed by
the same standard that applies to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Kay v. Bemis, 500
F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff must

plead sufficient factual allegations ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1104 (10th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  “A claim is facially
plausible ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”  Id. (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).  All such reasonable inferences are resolved
in the plaintiff’s favor. Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2013).
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level
on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in
fact).”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56 (citations and footnotes omitted).  A motion to

dismiss is properly granted when a complaint provides no “more than labels and
conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation” of the elements.  Id. at 555.
The Court liberally construes a pro se plaintiff’s complaint and applies “less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Nonetheless, a pro se plaintiff maintains the burden of “alleging sufficient facts on which
a recognized legal claim could be based.” Johnson v. Garrison, 805 F. App’x 589, 591
(10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)).13 “[I]f
the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff
could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiff’s failure to cite proper legal authority,
his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his
unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110 (but noting the court

should not assume the role of plaintiff’s advocate). Dismissal of a pro se complaint for
failure to state a claim is proper “only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail
on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.”
Kay, 500 F.3d at 1217 (internal quotations omitted).
3. Eleventh Amendment
Before addressing whether Hufft has stated a claim, the undersigned notes that
any claim against the Family Support Division would be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, as would any Ex parte Young claim against its officers for monetary or
retrospective declaratory relief.14
“The Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits against a state in federal court
commenced by citizens of that state or citizens of another state.” K.A. v. Barnes, 134 F.4th
1067, 1073 (10th Cir. 2025) (internal quotations omitted). This bar is jurisdictional and

extends to “governmental entities that are arms of the state.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted). Here, Hufft is suing the Family Support Division as the “Trustee for Child
Support Payments for the State of Missouri.” (See ECF No. 2 at 2 (“I have been extorted

13 Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but they may be cited for their persuasive
value. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
14 As pled, it appears that the claims against the unnamed Trustee are official-capacity
claims.
for many years by Family Support Services for non-payment of child support. . . . The
State of Missouri Family Support Center’s presuming authority to make me pay child
support also violates . . . .”).) The Family Support Division is an office within the
Department of Social Services, which is an arm of the State of Missouri. See Mo. Stat. §
454.400(1) (“There is established within the department of social services the ‘Family

Support Division’ to administer the state plan for child support enforcement.”); McKay
v. Mo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 4:23-cv-00495-SRC, 2023 WL 4846608, at *4 (E.D. Mo.
July 28, 2023) (finding Eleventh-amendment immunity applies to the Family Support
Division); Davis v. St. Louis City Police Dep’t, No. 4:21-cv-00498-SRC, 2021 WL
4775405, at *3–4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 13, 2021) (same). Eleventh amendment immunity
applies unless it has been abrogated by Congress or waived by the state. Nelson v.
Geringer, 295 F.3d 1082, 1096 (10th Cir. 2002). Congress did not abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity by enacting § 1983, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979),
and Missouri has not waived its immunity, see McKay, 2023 WL 4846608, at *3–4.
Even when claims are brought against a state official under Ex parte Young,15 the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits seeking monetary damages and retrospective declaratory

relief. Meiners v. Univ. of Kan., 359 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2004). Therefore, even if
the Trustee is an individual, it is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
from Hufft’s claims for money damages or retrospective declaratory relief.
4. Alleged Claims
Regardless of any immunity, Hufft has failed to state a claim against the Trustee.
Hufft’s claims against the Trustee appear to relate to the forced payment of child support

15 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
and revocation of his driver’s license for the failure to pay such support. As best the
undersigned can tell, Hufft asserts an extortion claim under § 1983; a right to travel claim,
perhaps also under § 1983; and a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1673. Hufft also generally
complains Missouri’s child support process is unconstitutional.
a. Extortion
Hufft’s primary claim for extortion fails for numerous reasons. First, extortion is

generally a criminal offense and not a civil cause of action. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2); see
also, e.g., Samzelius v. Bank of Am., No. 12-03295, 2012 WL 12949683, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 9, 2012) (“Extortion is a federal criminal offense, and there is no private right of
action for extortion.”).16 Second, Hufft cannot bring this claim under § 1983, which
“requires the deprivation of a civil right by a ‘person’ acting under color of state law.”
McLaughlin v. Bd. of Trs., 215 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2000). The Trustee—i.e., the
Family Support Division—is an arm of the state of Missouri and not a “person” for
purposes of § 1983.17 Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)
(“neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under
§ 1983”). The Trustee is therefore not subject to § 1983 liability. See id.; see also Hester
v. Okla. Dep’t of Health, No. Civ-22-1011-R, 2023 WL 185103, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 13,

2023) (dismissing § 1983 claims against Oklahoma governmental entity).

16 To the extent Hufft asserting an extortion claim under state law, neither Oklahoma nor
Missouri recognize extortion as a civil cause of action. See Calon v. Bank. of Am. Corp.,
No. 14-00913-CV-W-FJG, 2015 WL 3948171, at *6 (W.D. Mo. June 29, 2015); Chapman
v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Grp., No. 04-CV-0859-CVE-FHM, 2007 WL 2815246, at *7
(N.D. Okla. Sept. 24, 2007).
17 “Official-capacity suits . . . generally represent only another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165
(1985) (internal quotations omitted).
b. Right to Travel
Hufft’s right to travel claim appears to be brought under § 1983 and, again, fails
because the Trustee is not a person subject to § 1983 liability. In any event, the claim fails
on its merits.
Construed liberally, Hufft asserts a right to travel claim against the Trustee based
on the revocation of his driver’s license. (ECF No. 2 at 2.) However, “the denial of only

one mode of transportation does not violate the right to interstate travel.” Brown v.
Eppler, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1268 (N.D. Okla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other
grounds, 725 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2013). This claim also fails. See Wright v. Family
Support Division of Mo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 458 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1110–11 (E.D. Mo.
2020) (dismissing right to travel claim based on suspension of driver’s license) (collecting
cases); Madera v. Holguin, No. 2:24-cv-01117-KRS, 2024 WL 4707996, at *2 (D.N.M.
Nov. 7, 2024) (same).
c. 15 U.S.C. § 1673
Hufft also asserts a violation of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (“CCPA”).
(ECF No. 2 at 2–3 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1673).) The CCPA sets forth the maximum amount
of earnings allowed to be garnished and instructs that “[n]o court of the United States or
any State, and no State (or officer or agency thereof), may make, execute, or enforce any

order or process in violation of this section.” 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a), (c). The garnishment
restrictions set forth in § 1673(a) do not apply to support orders “issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction or in accordance with an administrative procedure, which is
established by State law, which affords substantial due process, and which is subject to
judicial review.” Id. § 1673(b)(1)(A). Section 1673 is enforced through the Secretary of
Labor. Id. § 1676.
Hufft appears to allege that, under § 1673(b)(1)(A), the Trustee was required to
hold a hearing that met certain guidelines before his wages could be garnished, and that
no such hearing occurred.18 (ECF No. 2 at 2–3.) Even assuming this to be true, § 1673
does not create a private right of action. Phillips v. Schenectady Child Support Unite, No.
1:24-CV-853 (BKS/PJE), 2025 WL 895035, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2025) (collecting

cases); Mair v. Off. of Recovery Servs., No. 2:12-cv-00473, 2012 WL 7060822, at *2 (D.
Utah Nov. 13, 2012), R&R adopted, 2013 WL 498808 (Feb. 8, 2013); see also Evans v.
Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 09-cv-01465-BNB, 2009 WL 2596647, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 20,
2009) (noting that state courts retain authority to adjudicate challenges to their
garnishment orders). Because there is no private cause of action under § 1673, the
undersigned recommends this claim be dismissed.
d. Administrative Child Support Process
Hufft last asserts Missouri’s administrative child support process is
unconstitutional, but he does not explain how or allege any supporting facts in the
complaint. (ECF No. 2 at 2.) Instead, Hufft cites a Minnesota Supreme Court case,
Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999). (Id.) In Holmberg, the court
held that Minnesota’s administrative child support process violated the separation of

powers doctrine under the Minnesota constitution, because, among other things,
administrative law judges had the authority to modify child support orders granted by the
district court. 588 N.W.2d 724–26. Contrary to Hufft’s apparent contention, Holmberg
did not hold that all administrative child support processes are per se unconstitutional

18 Specifically, Hufft alleges “the relevant Court must perform judicial balancing
comparing disposable income received by the respondent in such cases compared not
only to income of the beneficiary of child support but their prospects for employment for
which they are reasonably suited.” (ECF No. 2 at 3.)
under the United States Constitution. Moreover, the complaint contains no factual
allegations suggesting Missouri employs a similar administrative scheme.
In later court filings, Hufft contends his procedural due process rights were
violated, because his driver’s license was suspended “without constitutional safeguards.”
(ECF No. 34 at 6.) To plead a procedural due process claim, the complaint must allege

“(1) a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a governmental
failure to provide an appropriate level of process.” Citizen Ctr. v. Gessler, 770 F.3d 900,
916 (10th Cir. 2014). This second element generally requires the plaintiff to allege what
process was due and what deprivation occurred. Meadows at Buena Vista, Inc. v. Ark.
Valley Pub. Co., No. 10-cv-02871-MSK-KMT, 2012 WL 502688, at *7 (D. Colo. Feb. 15,
2012) (citing Reedy v. Werholtz, 660 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2011)). Hufft’s complaint
does not allege what process he should have received regarding his license suspension,
and such claim fails.
5. Alternatively, Hufft Has Failed to Prosecute His Case
Against the Trustee
Further, Hufft has not filed a proof of service indicating that Trustee has been
served, despite a warning that failure to do so could result in dismissal. A pro se plaintiff
is subject to the same rules of civil procedure that govern other litigants. DiCesare v.
Stuart, 12 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir. 1993). Although the U.S. Marshals assist with service
in IFP cases, it remains Hufft’s responsibility to provide sufficient information for the
Marshals to effect service. See Fields v. Okla. State Penitentiary, 511 F.3d 1109, 1113 (10th
Cir. 2007). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits a court to dismiss an action for
failure to prosecute or comply with the civil procedure rules or a court order. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 41(b).19 Hufft has failed to comply with the undersigned’s April 21, 2025 Order, and
dismissal is warranted on that basis, as well.
C. Leave to Amend
Although Hufft does not request leave to amend, a court should ordinarily provide
pro se plaintiffs leave to amend a defective complaint. Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d
124, 126 (10th Cir. 1990). Denial of leave to amend may be appropriate in instances of

undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive; repeated failures to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed; undue prejudice to the opposing party; or futility of
amendment. Minter v. Prime Equip. Co., 451 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Granting leave to amend “is within the
discretion of the trial court.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). In deciding whether leave
to amend should be granted, the undersigned has considered not only the complaint,
itself, but also Hufft’s briefing on the motion to dismiss, as well as filings that have been
improperly made and stricken by this Court (e.g., ECF Nos. 30, 42).
In this case, the undersigned recommends that Hufft not be granted leave to
amend. As to Martin, even if Hufft could allege facts that would cure the personal
jurisdictional deficiencies, his claims would still be barred by Martin’s absolute

prosecutorial immunity. As for Defendant Trustee, Hufft’s monetary claims are barred
by sovereign immunity, and the Trustee is not a person subject to a § 1983 claim. Finally,
it appears that the primary complaint Hufft has against the defendants is based on his
belief that a noncustodial parent cannot constitutionally be ordered to pay any child

19 Rule 41(b) “has long been interpreted to permit courts to dismiss actions sua sponte for
a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute or comply with the rules of civil procedure or court’s
orders.” Olsen v. Mapes, 333 F.3d 1199, 1204 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Link v. Wabash
R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)).
support. The authorities provided by Hufft do not support this proposition, and the
undersigned can locate none.
It would be futile to provide Hufft leave to amend as to either defendant.
Conclusion & Recommendation
Considering the above, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that
Defendant Shara A. Martin’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 28) be GRANTED, and that

Plaintiff’s claims against Martin be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claims against Trustee
for monetary damages be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under the Eleventh
Amendment, and that all other claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for
the failure to state a claim. Alternatively, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that
Plaintiff’s claims against the Trustee be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for
failure to comply with a court order.
Lastly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff Richard A. Hufft’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 36) be DENIED as moot.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

72(b)(2), a party may file specific written objections to this report and recommendation.
Such specific written objections must be filed with the Clerk of the District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma by October 16, 2025. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d), 72(b)(2).
If specific written objections are timely filed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
72(b)(3) directs the district judge to
determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has
been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify
the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the
matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Tenth Circuit has adopted a “firm waiver rule”
which “provides that the failure to make timely objections to the magistrate’s findings or
recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions.” United
States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Moore
v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991)). Only a timely specific objection will
preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review.
SUBMITTED this 29th day of September, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11180286. Public record. Not legal advice.