# Frye

> District Court, D. Maryland · October 28, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11180171

## Case

- **Full name:** Timothy Frye, Jr. v. Logan Hayes
- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** October 28, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT _
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
"TIMOTHY FRYE, JR, □ .
Plaintiff, os

v. * CIV. NO. JKB-25-0162
LOGAN HAYES, * .
Defendant. * □ .

. MEMORANDUM .
On April 22, 2025, the Court dismissed Plaintiff Timothy Frye, Jr.’s case pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2) for seeking monetary relief-against a defendant who
is Immune from such relief. (ECF Nos. 7, 8.) On May 1, 2025, the Court received Frye’s “Motion
to (object) to the Court’s Memorandum Opinion” which was docketed as a Motion for
Reconsideration. (ECF No. 9.) Frye subsequently filed a Motion requesting leave to file late
notice of claim under the Maryland Tort Claims Act (ECF No. 10), three Motions requesting leave
to supplement his Complaint (ECF Nos. 11-13), and a Motion to Compel Rulings on the pending |

Motions (ECF No. 15). For the reasons that follow, Frye’s pending Motions will be denied.
I. Background .
Frye originally brought this action against one defendant, Assistant State’s Attorney Logan
Hayes. (ECF No. 1.) In his initial Complaint, Frye alleged that Hayes was responsible for the
state court issuing a no contact order that cut off his communications with “any individual,”
including attorneys of record. (/d. at 2.) Frye further alleged that pursuant to that order, the
Warden of the Harford County Detention: Center prevented him from making any phone calls,

including to the public defender’s office and paid attorneys. (id. at 4.) Frye states that this order
by Hayes was a “trick” to impair his defense and hamper his trial. (/d.) Frye sought damages for
this conduct, °

In dismissing the suit, the Court determined that Hayes was entitled to absolute immunity
from damages. because her actions were part of the judicial process and directly related to Frye’s

attempts to violate a no contact order with the victim. (ECF No. 7 at 3.) The Court reasoned that
“[p]rosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their conduct in ‘initiating a
prosecution and in presenting the State’s case,’ insofar as that conduct is ‘intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” (Jd. (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 479
(1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976))).)

_ Prior to dismissal of the Complaint, Frye filed a “Motion Requesting Leave to Supplement
Complaint” with “certified legal evidence” but-did not provide supplemental allegations or
information. (ECF No. 5.) The Court then denied this Motion as moot when dismissing the
Complaint due to Hayes’ immunity. (ECF No. 8.} In his Motion for Reconsideration, Frye now
attempts to expand his allegations against Hayes by filing proposed supplements to the Complaint.
He states claims for retaliation under the First Amendment, deprivation of the right to present a
defense under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and a Due Process claim for malfeasance at
trial. (ECF No. 12-1 at 5-7.) As before, he seeks damages. (Ud. at 11) However, Frye also now
states that he is seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. (/d.) Finally, he seeks to add the State
of Maryland as a Defendant. (ECF Nos. 11-13.) □
Il. Analysis .

A. Legal Standards

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not contain an express provision for a “motion for
reconsideration” of a final judgment. Katyle v, Penn Nat'l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 470 n.4
(4th Cir, 2011). However, Rule 59(e) permits a party to file a “motion to alter or amend a judgment

... no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Frye’s Motion for Reconsideration was
filed within 28 days of the Court’s dismissal order (see ECF No. 9), so the Court will assess this
Motion under Rule 59(e).
“(R]econsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should □

be used sparingly.” Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)
(internal quotation and citation omitted). Under Rule 59(e), a court may amend an earlier judgment
only “(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new
evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”
Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted), Importantly,
however, “[m]ere disagreement [with a court’s ruling] does not support a Rule 59(e) motion.” Id
at 1082.
B. Claims Against Hayes
Frye first seeks damages against Hayes. In his supplements, Frye alleges that Hayes took

various actions that were beyond the scope of the state court’s order restricting his contact with
the victim. Frye states that Hayes did this by “personally instructing” the Warden of the Harford
County Detention Center to put Frye in administrative segregation. (ECF Nos. 11 at 3; 13-1; 13-
2 at 1.) Frye also obj ects to the state court order that restricted his contact with anyone other than
his counsel of record, David Fischer, because this resulted in him not having “unfettered and
unrestricted” access to Fischer. (ECF No. 11 at 4.) Frye also objects to Hayes’ own contact with

a witness in the criminal case, stating that Hayes intimidated, coerced, and threatened to charge
the witness with perjury if she testified on Frye’s behalf. (ld. at 5-6; ECF No. 12-1 at 3-4.)
The supplements to the Complaint do not contain allegations that alter the Court’s original
conclusion that Hayes is entitled to absolute immunity from damages. (ECF No. 7 at 3.) Each of
Frye’s allegations pertains to actions taken by Hayes during the judicial phase of the. criminal.
proceedings, including efforts made to stop Frye from violating the no-contact order issued in the
state case. For the reasons previously stated (see ECF No. 7 at 3), Hayes is entitled to absolute
immunity for these actions. Although Frye clearly objects to Hayes’ professional conduct, this
does not permit Frye to recover damages against Hayes in this federal action.
However, prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity from injunctive or declaratory
relief. Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 736-37 (1980). Here, Frye
asks the Court to declare that his rights were violated and to enjoin “further retaliation” against
him by Hayes. (ECF No. 12-1 at 11.) He seems to seek this relief as part of Count I of his
“Supplemental Complaint.” (/d. at 5.) This Count alleges that Hayes purportedly threatened to
charge Frye’s wife with perjury if she testified on Frye’s behalf. (Id) Frye contends that this is
retaliation against his First Amendment right to “exercise[e] legal redress” in the form of having
his wife testify on his behalf. (/d. at 3.)
The Court need not reach the merits of this argument because Frye does not have standing
to seek an injunction on this claim. To obtain an injunction, there must be a “certainly impending”
threat of future injury. Clapper vy. Amnesty Int ‘1 USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013). But here, Frye
has already pled guilty to the state court charges in the case where Hayes allegedly retaliated
against him. State v, Frye, Criminal Case No. C-12-CR-24-000665 (Cir. Ct. Harford □□□□
available at https://mdecportal.courts.state.md.us/MDODYSSEYPORTAL/ (last visited October

24, 2025).' Even assuming that Hayes’ prior actions constituted First Amendment retaliation,
there is not a certainly impending threat that she will act this way in the future because, as far as
the Court is aware, there are no criminal proceedings ongoing against Frye. As aresult, Fryeis □□

not entitled to equitable relief on this claim.
C. Claims Against State of Maryland :
Frye’s attempt to add the State of Maryland as a Defendant also fails. To sustain a claim
under § 1983, Frye must demonstrate that: (1) he suffered a deprivation of “rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States; and (2) the act or omission □

causing the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of law. West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The State of Maryland is not a “person” subject to suit or liability under
§ 1983. Will v Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). In addition, under the Eleventh |
Amendment, a state, including its agencies and departments, is immune from federal lawsuits
brought by its citizens or the citizens of another state, absent consent. See Pennhurst State Sch. &

. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Global Mail Lid. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 142 F.3d 208,
210 (4th Cir. 1998) (“Sovereign immunity deprives a court of jurisdiction to hear a case.”). While

the State of Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity for certain types of cases brought State □

courts, see Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-201(a); it has not waived its immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal court. Thus, Frye’s federal claim for damages apainst the
State of Maryland is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Finally, to the extent that Frye wishes to bring state law claims against the State of

' At any stage of the proceeding, a court may take judicial notice of a.fact “that is not subject to reasonable dispute”
if it “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned.” Fed.
R Evid. 201. “[A] court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court not for the truth of the matters
asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.” Corbitrv. Baltimore
City Police Dep’t, 675 F. Supp. 3d 578, 586-87 (D. Md. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Maryland, because all federal claims are dismissed, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any state law claims he attempts to raise. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Ill. Conclusion
The Court concludes that Frye has presented no basis to reopen this case. The Motion for
Reconsideration (ECF No. 9) will be denied as will Frye’s subsequently filed Motions. A separate
Order follows.

DATED this 2B day of October, 2025.

BY THE COURT:

James K. Bredar
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11180171. Public record. Not legal advice.