# Kraft

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · October 23, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11177439

## Case

- **Full name:** John Kraft v. County of Shelby & Tad Mayhall
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** October 23, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11177439

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that any procedural due process claim requires plaintiff to allege “(1
- explaining that any procedural due process claim requires plaintiff to allege “(1) deprivation of a protected interest, and (2) insufficient procedural protections surrounding that deprivation”

## Opinion text

rriday, 24 October, 2025 09:10:04
Clerk, U.S. District Court, IL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JOHN KRAFT, )
Plaintiff, )
v. Case No. 25-cv-3016
‘COUNTY OF SHELBY & TAD ) me
MAYHALL, )
Defendants. )
AMENDED OPINION
COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 12).
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 19, 2025, Plaintiff John Kraft filed a three-count Amended Complaint
alleging violations of his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights after Defendants
Shelby County (the “County”) and Tad Mayhall, the Shelby County Board Chairman,
removed him from a county board meeting following a vote for his removal. (Doc. 4). In
Count I, Kraft alleges Defendants coordinated to broadly deprive him of his
constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count II, Kraft asserts a violation
of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. In Count III, Kraft alleges a violation
of his substantive and procedural due process rights and his equal protection rights.
Defendants moved to dismiss Kraft’s Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). (Doc. 12).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
John Kraft is a member of the Edgar County Watchdogs, which publishes articles
online with the goal of holding local governing bodies accountable and fostering
transparency. (Doc. 4 at § 7). For several years, Kraft has published a series of articles
criticizing the Shelby County Board (the “Board”). (Id. at § 13). He regularly attends and
speaks at the county board meetings. (Id. at | 16-17).
On January 9, 2025, Kraft attended the county board meeting and began recording
it. (Id. at J 18-19). During the meeting, another member of the public, Jake Cole,
interrupted the meeting several times to ask questions and make statements to the Board.
(Id. at 7] 21-26). After hearing the interruptions, Kraft asked whether the discussion was
open to everyone in the room. (Id. at (19, 27). Chairman Mayhall responded, “are you
asking about you? No... this is a board discussion.” (Id. at § 19). Kraft began talking
over Mayhall who then, after informing Kraft again of the setting, moved to remove Kraft
from the board meeting. (Id. at (19, 28). Kraft was ordered to be removed from the
board meeting after a vote for his removal passed by a majority of affirmative votes. (Id.
at J 28-29). The Board never removed (or voted to remove) Cole from the meeting. (Id.
at 31).
Ill. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. See
Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). When considering a
ee et ee be oe te eel te too ah eck □□ □□

favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true, and construing
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Christensen, 483 F.3d at 458. To state a
claim for relief, a plaintiff need only provide a short and plain statement of the claim
showing he is entitled to relief and giving defendants fair notice of the claims. Maddox v.
Love, 655 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2011). However, the complaint must set forth facts that
plausibly demonstrate a claim for relief. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547
(2007). A plausible claim is one that alleges factual content from which the court can
reasonably infer that defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
B. Compliance with Local Rules
As an initial matter, Kraft argues Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be denied
based on their failure to follow Local Rules 5.9(B) and 7.1. (Doc. 14 at 1-2). Courts are
entitled to “require strict compliance with their local rules,” Next Millenium Telecom Co. v.
American Signal Corp., 112 F.4th 481, 486 (7th Cir. 2024), and may exercise “considerable
discretion in interpreting and applying their local rules.” Dr. Robert L. Meinders, D.C., Ltd.
v. UnitedHealthcare, Inc., 800 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2015). Local Rule 5.9(B) requires
proposed orders be submitted as an attachment to a motion. However, there is no rule
requiring a proposed order be attached to a motion to dismiss. Therefore, Kraft’s reliance
on this Rule is unavailing.
Local Rule 7.1 requires that any motion raising a question of law “must include a
memorandum identifying the specific points or propositions of law and supporting

under which the motion is filed.” Civil L.R. 7.1(B)(1). Additionally, the memorandum
must not exceed 15 pages in length or 7,000 words. Civil L.R. 7.1(B)(4). If the
memorandum is submitted based on the word count, then it must include a certificate of
compliance noting the number of words in the memorandum.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum was a combined total of 23
pages. It was initially submitted without a certificate of compliance, but Defendants did
attach the certificate to their Reply. The Certificate indicates the Argument section of the
Motion is 6,846 words.! Although Defendants acknowledge their noncompliance with
Local Rule 7.1, they argue the error should be excused because it did not prejudice
Plaintiff. He was able to respond fully to Defendants’ arguments within the allotted 15
pages. See Civil L.R. 7.1(B)(4)(c). Because striking Defendants’ Motion would amount to
a disproportionate remedy under these circumstances, the Court denies Plaintiff's
request. Both parties are warned that failure to comply with the Local Rules in the future
may lead to their briefs being stricken.
C. Analysis
Defendants argue Count J should be dismissed because it is duplicitous of Counts
Il and II and is barred by the intra-corporate immunity doctrine. They also argue Count
II should be dismissed because it fails to state a viable First Amendment claim.
Additionally, they argue the Fifth Amendment claim in Count III should be dismissed
because Kraft erroneously seeks to enforce the Fifth Amendment against the County and

Caurt natee that the waluma Emitatiane aatlimed in Taal Pade 71 wofen te the nebo oe

its board member. As to Count III’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, Defendants argue the
claim does not implicate a fundamental right or protected interest for substantive and
procedural Due Process Clause purposes and, moreover, the equal protection claim
should be dismissed because it fails to assert a plausible class-of-one claim.
1. Count I
Section 1983 holds government officials liable where those officials “subject[] or
cause] to be subjected, any citizen . .. or other person . . . to the deprivation of any rights”
guaranteed to them by federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a mechanism
for enforcing individual rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002). “One cannot go into court and claim a
violation of § 1983—for § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
Defendants argue Count I should be dismissed because it is duplicative of Counts
II and III. Indeed, Count I explains that Defendants violated Kraft’s right to “free speech
and association” and “equal protection under the law” as well as his “right to due
process” under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Doc. 4 at § 34, 36-37). These are
the same claims advanced in Counts II and III. In response, however, Kraft argues that
Count I is related to his protected constitutional rights as a member of the press.2
Defendants claim that one individual may not simultaneously raise separate First
Amendment claims based on his role as a reporter and as an individual. But it is well-

2 Although Kraft did not plead this legal theory in his amended Complaint (Doc. 4), the Court notes that a
plaintiff mav alter legal theories. so lono as the factual basis was alleged in the cnmnilaint Cee □□□□□□

settled that a plaintiff may raise multiple theories arising from the same facts. See, e.g., St.
Augustine Sch. v. Underly, 78 F.4th 349, 352-53 (7th Cir. 2023) (permitting plaintiffs to raise
two First Amendment theories based on the same incident).
Additionally, Defendants argue Count I should be dismissed pursuant to the intra-
corporate immunity doctrine, which bars conspiracy claims against government officials
acting within the scope of their employment for the same entity. See Wright v. Illinois Dep’t
of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1508 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Dombrowski v. Dowling,
459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J.); Travis v. Gary Community Mental Health
Center, 921 F.2d 108, 109-11 (7th Cir. 1990)).
In Wright v. Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, the Seventh Circuit
held that state employees working for the same government agency could not conspire
among themselves under Section 1985 unless they were acting outside the scope of their
employment. 40 F.3d at 1507-08. In that case, Department of Children and Family
Services (“DCFS”) employees were accused of conspiring to deny the plaintiff “access to
federal court in violation of § 1985(2).” Id. at 1507. The district court dismissed the claims
against the DCFS workers under the intra-corporate immunity doctrine. Id. at 1507-08.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that “managers of a corporation jointly pursuing its
lawful business do not become ‘conspirators’ when acts within the scope of their
employment are said to be discriminatory or retaliatory.” Id. at 1508. The Seventh Circuit
also held that the intra-corporate immunity doctrine extends to governmental entities,
like DCFS. Id. The DCFS agents’ coordinated actions fell within their official duties, and —

barred the claim from proceeding. Id. Since then, the holding of Wright has been applied
to claims arising under Section 1983. See, e.g., Strauss v. City of Chicago, 346 F. Supp. 3d
1193, 1210 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (dismissing Section 1983 conspiracy claim as barred by intra-
corporate immunity doctrine when brought against city and city officials).
Here, Kraft alleges that Mayhall, acting as the Shelby County Board Chairman,
coordinated Kraft’s removal with other board members. Kraft frames Count I
accordingly: “Defendants acted in concert with each other to unlawfully deprive Plaintiff
his constitutional right[s].” (Id. at ({ 34, 37). However, there are no allegations that
Mayhall acted outside his official duties. Calling a vote to remove a disruptive audience
member falls squarely within a board chair’s role of presiding over orderly meetings.
Like the DCFS employees in Wright, the board members and Mayhall acted as one entity
when performing their public duties. Therefore, Count I is dismissed as it is barred by
the doctrine of intra-corporate immunity.
2. Count IT
Defendants argue Kraft’s allegations in Count II do not plausibly demonstrate that
his removal from the meeting was motivated by the content of his speech or any
viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. Instead, Defendants
contend Kraft was removed due to his repeated interruptions and failure to follow the
Board’s rules of procedure. Such enforcement of meeting decorum is content neutral and
reasonable under the First Amendment.
“The First Amendment permits [the] government to regulate [the] use of its

665 F.3d 860, 869 (7th Cir. 2011). Board meetings are generally considered designated
public forums, so the Government has “only a limited ability to regulate expressive
activity.” Id. at 869-70. Thus, the Board may “may enforce reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions provided they are content neutral, they are narrowly tailored to serve
a significant government interest, and ample alternative channels of communication
exist.” Id. at 870 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)).
“The first determination of the time, place, and manner analysis is whether the
[restriction] in question is content-neutral.” Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1037
(7th Cir. 2002) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989)). “Government
regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (emphasis and
quotation omitted). Thus, when a restriction, “[rlather than focusing on what [an
individual] say[s], . . . focuses on the manner in which [he] say[s] it,” it is content neutral.
Milestone v. City of Monroe, 665 F.3d 774, 783 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original). By
contrast, “[g]overnment regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular
speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). Accordingly, “[rlestrictions that favor or disfavor certain
speech based on the speaker rather than the content of the message are [] content based.”
Surita, 665 F.3d at 870.
Here, Kraft alleges he interrupted the meeting to ask about procedure. His

content-neutral enforcement of rules, not retaliation for the substance of his speech. The
Amended Complaint lacks factual allegations suggesting Kraft was removed because of
his viewpoints on government accountability or transparency. Kraft’s repeated
interruptions justified the Board’s actions to restore order. Even after accepting Kraft’s
allegations as true, his Amended Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support a
plausible claim of viewpoint discrimination or retaliation. Accordingly, Count II fails to
state a First Amendment claim and must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
3. Count ITI
a. Fifth Amendment
Kraft alleges a violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights. The Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, however, guards only against the federal
government. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002). The Seventh Circuit has
repeatedly rejected Fifth Amendment due process claims against state and local
governmental actors. See, e.g., Vandenboom v. Strohmeyer, No. 23-2405, 2024 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1894, at *4-5 (7th Cir. Jan. 29, 2024) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
applies only to federal actors, so the Fourteenth Amendment is the source of the right
that [Plaintiff] asserts here.”).
Here, the Board Chairman and the Board are local governmental actors, not federal
officials. Thus, any constitutional due process claim against them must arise under the
Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth. Accordingly, Kraft’s Fifth Amendment claim is
dismissed as a matter of law.

b. Fourteenth Amendment — Due Process
Kraft alleges both substantive and procedural due process clause violations. (Doc.
4 at §] 51-61). The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State may “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1. In order to plead a substantive due process violation, a plaintiff must allege that the
government violated a fundamental right or liberty. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 □□□□
702, 719-20 (1997); Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742, 753-54 (7th Cir. 2007). Substantive due
process protects against only the most egregious and outrageous government action. See
Belcher, 497 F.3d at 753.
In pleading his substantive due process claim, Kraft cannot—though does
indeed — rely upon an asserted liberty interest in the freedom of speech or press, as there
is a specific constitutional provision—the First Amendment—that protects those
rights. See Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 474 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d
492, 518 n.23 (7th Cir. 2003)). Because the First Amendment must be the guide for
analyzing any claimed violation of his First Amendment rights—an independent claim
he has also brought (see supra subsection III.C.2) —Kraft’s substantive due process claim
cannot go forward on that basis. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998);
Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs. v. Substance, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 919, 937-38 (N.D. Il. 2000)
(collecting cases). As a result, Kraft’s substantive due process claim must be dismissed.
With respect to procedural due process, Kraft alleges there were no procedural
nmunrntantinannan nllravwAinA tr his hafawn hen carer arene fener La. wawhl. .. . 1°... str... □ et

55-59). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits States from
“depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Procedural due process typically requires meaningful “notice and
an opportunity to be heard.” Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002). But due
process is only guaranteed where a plaintiff was deprived of a protected interest. See
Michalowicz v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 528 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that any
procedural due process claim requires plaintiff to allege “(1) deprivation of a protected
interest, and (2) insufficient procedural protections surrounding that deprivation”).
Kraft argues that his removal from the meeting deprived him of a property interest
as well as liberty interests: his right to “voice his opinion” and “right to be present in the
public meeting.” (Doc. 4 at J 44). Kraft, however, does not identify what property interest
was at stake. “Because ‘property’ is defined by law, showing that one has ‘property’ often
depends on showing a legitimate claim of entitlement under state law.” Archie v. Racine,
847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756
(2005) (“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire and more than a unilateral expectation of it.”) (quotation marks
omitted). Kraft has not properly alleged a legitimate claim of entitlement to create a
property interest and, accordingly, has not shown a deprivation of his “property” in
which he would be entitled to adequate procedural safeguards.
Kraft fails to plausibly plead a deprivation of any protected liberty interest. A
plaintiff may show such deprivation when fundamental or constitutional rights are

denied, or when “a right or status previously recognized by state law [is] distinctly
altered or extinguished.” Mann v. Vogel, 707 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 2013).
Kraft’s identified liberty interests are best construed as a denial of his right, as a
member of the public, to address officials during a period of non-public discussion in a
county board meeting. Neither the Constitution provides for that right, see Minn. State
Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283-84 (1984) (“The Constitution does not
grant to members of the public generally a right to be heard by public bodies making
decisions of policy.”), nor does state law provide for it, see [Illinois] Open Meetings Act,
5 ILCS 120/2.06(g) (“Any person shall be permitted an opportunity to address public
officials under the rules established and recorded by the public body.”) (emphasis added); see
also Kyle v. Morton High Sch., 144 F.3d 448, 452 (7th Cir. 1998) (the Illinois Open Meetings
Act does not “confer|] substantive rights for Due Process Clause purposes”).
“Only after finding the deprivation of a protected interest do [courts] look to see
if the State’s procedures comport with due process.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,
526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999). Accordingly, the Court need not decide whether the Board’s
warning and vote to remove Kraft was adequate due process. Because Kraft failed to
plausibly plead any deprivation of a protected interest, his procedural due process claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment is dismissed.
c. Fourteenth Amendment — Equal Protection
Kraft alleges that Defendants denied him his right to equal protection under the
law when Defendants affirmatively voted to remove him from the County Board meeting
but did not hold a similar vote to remove another member of the nibhiic whoa alen

interjected during the meeting. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause
is typically implicated when the State discriminates against a member of a protected class.
But a person “who is not a member of a protected class may nonetheless bring a claim
under a [] “class-of-one” theory.” 145 Frisk, LLC v. Nicklas, 986 F.3d 759, 771 (7th Cir. 2021)
(quotation marks omitted). A class-of-one plaintiff carries the “heavy burden’ of alleging
(1) the State intentionally treated him differently from others who were similarly situated
in all material aspects and (2) the State had no conceivable rational basis for doing so.
Nicklas, 986 F.3d at 771; FKF], Inc. v. Vill. of Worth, 11 F.4th 574, 588 (7th Cir. 2021). For
purposes of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (as here), even where facts exist indicating
animosity, “a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of
rationality that applies to government classifications.” D.B. v. Kopp, 725 F.3d 681, 686 (7th
Cir. 2013).
Here, the Amended Complaint provides a link to a video recording of the board
meeting at issue, incorporating the video by reference, which includes the
aforementioned interruptions.’ Kraft interrupted discussion and became disruptive after
being told that the meeting was not open to public comment. The Board’s vote to remove
Kraft was rationally justified by his particular disregard for meeting rules and decorum.

5 Outside references incorporated into a plaintiff's complaint “become part of the complaint and may be
considered as such when the court decides a motion attacking the sufficiency of the complaint.” Williamson
v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 607-08 (7th Cir. 2013)

Therefore, Kraft’s equal protection claim is hereby dismissed. Because all of Kraft’s claims
are dismissed, the Court does not consider whether they would be otherwise barred by
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED without
prejudice as to Counts I, IT, and III. Plaintiff may amend his Complaint within 21 days of
the entry of this order to cure deficiencies.
ENTER: October C3 _, 2025 MLE.
g (7
LMA
/OULEEN . LAWLESS
NITED SFATES DISTRICT JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11177439. Public record. Not legal advice.