# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. Tennessee · October 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11177340

## Case

- **Full name:** John Doe, a minor, by and through his parent and guardian, Mary Doe v. Marion County School District and Marion County, Tennessee
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** October 24, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11177340

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting a plaintiff may demonstrate Monell liability by showing “the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision”
- noting a plaintiff may demonstrate Monell liability by showing “the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision”
- explaining the “deliberate indifference” standard refers to the defendant’s “responsibility for training and supervising its [employees] concerning their legal duty to honor [plaintiff’s] constitutional right[s]”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA

JOHN DOE, a minor, by and through his )
parent and guardian, Mary Doe, ) Case No. 1:24-cv-349
)
Plaintiff, ) Judge Travis R. McDonough
)
v. ) Magistrate Judge Christopher H. Steger
)
MARION COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT )
and MARION COUNTY, TENNESSEE, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is Plaintiff John Doe’s motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 19). For
the following reasons, the Court will DENY the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
In 2021, Tennessee added § 39-16-517 to the Tennessee Code, making it a misdemeanor
to recklessly threaten “to commit an act of mass violence on school property or at a
school-related activity.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-517(b) (2021). A 2024 amendment made
such threats a Class E felony. § 39-16-517(b) (2024). Additionally, the statute provides that
“[a]ny person who has knowledge of a threat of mass violence on school property or at a
school-related activity and knowingly fails to report the threat commits a Class B misdemeanor.”
§ 39-6-517(d)(3).
In 2023, the legislature made such threats of “mass violence” in schools a “zero tolerance
offense,” defined as “an offense committed by a student requiring the student to be expelled from
school for at least one (1) calendar year.” § 49-6-3401(g). On May 1, 2024, the legislature
amended § 49-6-3401(g) mandating school directors “require the student submit to a threat
assessment to determine whether the threat of mass violence made by the student was a valid
threat.” Id. The student may be suspended from attendance at the school and from
school-sponsored activities until the threat assessment is complete. § 49-6-3401(g).

The current version of the statute only requires expulsion for “valid threats;” however, if
“the threat of mass violence made by the student was not a valid threat . . . the student shall not
be expelled for committing a zero tolerance offense, but may be suspended in accordance with
this section.” Id. Aside from threats of “mass violence,” the statute also authorizes principals to
suspend students from attendance at the school “for good and sufficient reasons” which include,
but are not limited to: (1) “[v]iolence or threatened violence,” (2) “[m]aking a threat, including a
false report, to use a bomb . . . on school property,” or (3) “[a]ny conduct prejudicial to good
order or discipline in any public school.” § 49-6-3401(a)(3), (12), (13). If a principal determines
“an offense has been committed that would justify a suspension for more than ten (10) days,” a

principal “may suspend a student. . . upon such terms and conditions as are deemed reasonable”
provided the student is “advised of the nature of the student’s misconduct” and informed of her
right to appeal the decision “to the board of education or to a disciplinary hearing authority
appointed by the board.” § 49-6-3401(c). On appeal, following a hearing, “the board of
education or the disciplinary hearing authority may affirm the decision of the principal, order
removal of the suspension . . . assign the student to an alternative program or night school or
suspend the student for a specified period of time.” Id. A hearing must be held within ten days
of the student’s suspension. Id.
B. Factual Background
On August 20, 2024, while in English class at South Pittsburg High School, Plaintiff John
Doe (“Doe”), a ninth-grade student at the time, (see Doc. 20-2, at 7), became “irritated by the
actions of his classmate” who was tapping pencil on Doe’s desk. (Doc. 17, at 4.) Doe asked the
student to stop tapping his pencil, but the student said “no.” (Doc. 20-2, at 18.) The student

proceeded to tap his pencil louder, further annoying and aggravating Doe, who then said to the
student “if you don’t quit, I’m going to bomb you.”1 (Id.) Doe recalls that he made this
statement loudly enough for the “whole class” to hear him, and that he said the statement in a
tone that indicated he was serious and wanted the student to stop tapping the pencil. (Id. at 19.)
Doe explains he chose the words “bomb you” or “bomb this place” because he was thinking
about a video game, Call of Duty. (Id.) After Doe’s statement, the “entire class became quiet”
(Doc. 29-3, at 1) and Doe heard a classmate say, “you can’t say that,” after which Doe realized
he made a big mistake. (Doc. 20-2, at 20.)
At that point, Doe’s teacher, Mitchell Pelfrey immediately instructed Doe to go,

unescorted, to the principal’s office. (Doc. 20-3, at 10.) Pelfrey stated he thought it was “highly
unlikely” that Doe was going to bomb the school at that moment; however, he made the
disciplinary referral because he believed Doe, “in an irritated and loud tone, made a threat to
another student.” (Id. at 10–11.) According to Pelphrey, Doe’s statement caused a “disruption”

1 Both parties note that there are some inconsistencies in the record regarding whether Doe said,
“I’m going to bomb you” or “I’m going to bomb this place.” (See Doc. 20, at 5, 6 n.2; Doc. 29,
at 2 n.1; Doc. 31, at 2) (emphasis added).
to his class, which he described as “derail[ing] the work and efforts of his students.”2 (Id. at 10).
The class ended only a few minutes after Doe made this comment. (See Doc. 20-3, at 5.)
Pelphrey—who had five years of teaching experience at the time—stated that “based on
his experience as a teacher” and prior training he “received on threats of any nature” he believed
a disciplinary referral to the principal was necessary. (Id. at 11.) Pelphrey also sent an email to

principal Kelli Nelson (“Nelson”), stating Doe “loudly said ‘I’m going to bomb this place if you
don’t stop’ in response to a student tapping their pencil on the desk. I immediately sent him to
the office as we have to take things like this seriously.” (Doc. 20-4, at 1.) Class ended
approximately two minutes after Doe left for the principal’s office and Pelphrey taught his next
class “as usual.” (Doc. 20-3, at 5.)
After reading Pelphrey’s email, Nelson walked over to Doe’s class where she met him
outside the classroom. (Doc. 20-5, at 6.) On the way to her office, Nelson asked Doe, “are you
mad?” and “did this really happen?” (Doc. 20-5, at 6.) Once in her office, she asked Doe again
if he was upset, and “did you say you were going to bomb this place” to which Doe replied “no, I

said I’m going to bomb you.” (Id.) Shortly after, the assistant principal, Heath Grider came to
Nelson’s office. (Id.) Nelson and Grider spoke briefly in the conference room and in her
deposition, Nelson stated she “thought this was very serious” and that they “needed more
guidance.” (Id. at 7.) The two adults returned to Nelson’s office and asked Doe several more
times whether he was mad or upset; Doe “put his head down and was texting” and Nelson felt
she “didn’t really get more out of him.” (Id. at 8.) At that point, she decided to call the school
resource officer, Brandon Price (“SRO Price”), for guidance. (Id.) Once in Nelson’s office,

2 Pelphrey further described that “[Doe] hit his hands down on his desk as he said it . . . Doe’s
tone and body posture led me to believe that he was coming out of his chair. The entire class
became quiet.” (Doc. 29-3, at 1.)
SRO Price determined he needed to call his supervisor and Agent Evans of Tennessee Office of
Homeland Security.3 (Id. at 9.) Nelson called Doe’s mother as well as the superintendent to ask
if she needed to refer Doe to the Disciplinary Hearing Authority (“DHA”). (Id. at 10.)
SRO Price and Nelson then questioned Doe and recorded the conversation on SRO
Price’s body cam. (Doc. 26, Exhibit 8.) After asking Doe to repeat his statement, SRO Price

and Nelson expressed concern that his statement was “a threat of mass violence.” (Id.) SRO
Price asked Doe “what was your meaning behind ‘I’m going to bomb you?’” to which Doe
implied he was not serious when he made the statement. (Id.) SRO Price responded by saying
“the thing is it don’t matter if you’re being serious” and Nelson told Doe, “you can’t say I’m
gonna shoot, or I’m gonna kill, or I’m gonna hit, you can’t say any of these things anymore.”
(Id.) While still recording on his body cam, SRO Price subsequently took Doe to the juvenile
justice center and “charged Doe with a felony to commit mass violence.” (Id.; Doc. 17, at 9.) At
no point during the body cam footage did SRO Price provide any Miranda warnings. (Doc. 26,
Exh. 8). Doe received an “out of school suspension” that same day, pending a threat assessment

and referral to the DHA. (Doc. 20-5, at 15.)
The day after Doe’s suspension, SRO Price—under instruction from Agent Evans—
collected written statements from three of Doe’s classmates who were present during the incident
to assess the context of Doe’s statement and determine whether Doe was joking. (Doc. 20, at 9.)
The three written statements all indicate the students’ believed Doe was joking “because he jokes
a lot.” (Doc. 25.) Two days after Doe’s suspension, Nelson, also under guidance from Agent

3 Prior to this incident, in July or August 2024, Agent Evans was introduced to all the principals
in the district at a principals meeting and told the administrators he would provide additional
training on mass violence law and threat assessments later in the 2024–2025 school year. (Doc.
20-5, at 3–5.)
Evans, convened the threat-assessment team which concluded that Doe was a “Priority 2”
non-imminent “threat of violence to others” as reflected in the “Full Threat Assessment Case
Worksheet.”4 (Doc. 20-6, at 6.) The threat-assessment team referred Doe to the DHA for a
365-day expulsion for making a bomb threat, pending automatic review by the DHA.5 (See Doc.
20, at 10; Doc. 20-8, at 3; Doc. 29-6, at 1.)

On August 23, 2024, three days after the incident in English class, the DHA held a
hearing to discuss Doe’s appeal of the threat assessment determination and Doe’s expulsion.
(Doc. 29-6, at 1.) During the hearing, the DHA “heard from an assistant principal at [Doe’s]
high school; John Doe; Doe’s mother; Doe’s pastor, James Jackson; and Homeland Security
Agent Scott Evans, who had interviewed Doe at the South Pittsburgh Police Department.” (Id. at
1–2.) The DHA also considered “paperwork from the school, the report of the threat assessment
team, and letters submitted on behalf of Doe’s character.” (Id. at 2.) The DHA “overturned the
Level IV referral” and determined that, while “Doe had not made an actual bomb threat,” the
DHA believed Doe “had made a threat based on the results of the threat assessment team and

even the statements of Pastor Jackson who stated that . . . saying ‘bomb’ means you are about to
‘throw hands,’ meaning start a fight.” (Id.) Consequently, the DHA determined Doe
“committed a Level III offense, a threat to another student.”6 (Id.) Instead of the 365-day

4 This worksheet’s self-described purpose is “to assist in determining whether the person /
situation poses a threat of violence to others, to self, or to both (or poses no threat of violence).”
(Doc. 20-6 at 1.) The assessment worksheet also includes a list of the participating parties and
instructions on how to assess threats of violence. (Id. at 1–6.) Additionally, Nelson notes that
Doe’s threat assessment was the first one she ever completed. (Doc. 20-5, at 14.)
5 According to the Marion County Board of Education’s Student Code of Conduct, a bomb threat
is one example of a “zero tolerance” offense that “shall be reported to the director of schools and
the Board for expulsion and will also be reported to law enforcement officers.” (Doc. 29-6, at 4.)
6 According to the Marion County Board of Education’s “Student Code of Conduct,” examples
of a “Level III Offense” include “Other Types of Threat (Verbal, Written, or Electronic)” and
expulsion, the DHA “remanded John to an alternative school for a semester,” removing him from
participating in sports or any other extracurricular activities. (Doc. 20, at 12.) Doe has since
completed his semester at the alternative school (see Doc. 17, at 16 n.11) and his charge under
§ 39-16-517 “was ultimately dismissed and expunged.” (Doc. 34, at 1–2 n.1.)
C. Training Provided for School Personnel and SROs

Nelson explains she was “introduced to the [mass violence] legislation . . . when the law
was passed” in the summer of 2024 at a yearly summer retreat for administrators. (Doc. 20-5, at
3). During this initial introduction, the superintendent went over “legislative updates and
legislative bills that have passed” and informed administrators that a Homeland Security agent
would give specific training on the mass violence legislation that had just been passed later in the
school year. (Id. at 3–5.) Before the incident with Doe, Nelson was tasked with assembling a
threat-assessment team. (Id. at 5.) By August 20, 2024, Nelson had assembled the
threat-assessment team, which included herself, Grider, SRO Price, a junior-high teacher, and the
school’s counselor. (Id. at 5, 15.) However, no one on this threat-assessment team received

specific training on the amended mass-violence law until later in the school year, after
completing Doe’s threat assessment. (Id. at 3.) Nelson notes that based on her knowledge today,
the distinction between when a student’s statement should be referred to law enforcement versus
a threat assessment team first “depend[s] on the context . . . how [the statement] was
presented. . . . if the student was playing around or joking . . . [or] if the student seemed mad or
angry or upset.”7 (Id. at 21.)

such offenses “are not automatically considered zero tolerance but will be treated as such by the
principal unless there are extenuating circumstances.” (Doc. 29-6, at 4.)
7 Nelson also notes that in the context of the statement conveyed to her by Pelphrey she believed
it was a serious statement made by someone who was frustrated or irritated. (Doc. 20-5, at 21).
According to Marion County, SROs complete mandatory training “annually to maintain
their employment as SROs.” (Doc. 31, at 13.) According to SRO Price, SROs receive 16 hours
of annual training on their unique responsibilities as SROs, in addition to the mandated 40 hours
of training for all deputies in the state. (See Doc. 20-7, at 3–4.) In 2024, the district attorney
general’s office conducted a training on “the new law regarding threats of mass violence.” (Doc.

31, at 13.) Additionally, in 2025, the SRO training specifically covered training on threat
assessments. (Id.) Agent Evans also trained David Smith—the DHA chair—“to understand the
requirements of Tennessee’s law governing threats of mass violence” including “that the use of
the word ‘bomb’ did not automatically mean Doe was guilty of [a threat of mass violence].”
(Doc. 29-6, at 2.)
Finally, at the time of the incident with Doe, SROs—including SRO Price—received a
Memorandum of Understanding that “outlin[es] the scope of work of School Resource Officers”
and calls for collaborative “[p]lanning and training for emergencies and school safety” as well as
an “open exchange of information” that complies with “sheriff’s department rules, the school

district policies, and all applicable laws, especially FERPA” (Doc. 20, at 16.)
Doe initiated this action on October 31, 2024. (Doc. 1.) In his amended complaint (Doc.
17), he asserts claims against Defendants Marion County School District (“MCSD”) and Marion
County (“the County”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his First and Fourteenth
Amendment Rights. On July 17, 2025, Doe moved for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. 19.) In
his motion, he requests that the Court provide the following injunctive relief: (1) order MCSD to

When asked whether it would make any difference to her if Doe had said “I’m going to bomb
this place” or “I’m going to punch you in the face” Nelson says that “both are a threat. . . . [b]ut
bomb this place would, would indicate that other kids would get hurt--you know, lots of people
or several people could get hurt.” (Id. at 22). She further notes that she would take both
statements seriously. (Id.)
“develop and implement” training policies compliant with Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-2701; (2)
order the County Sheriff’s Office to train SROs on “the statutory requirements for school-based
threat assessments, including the limits on disclosure under FERPA and § 49-6-2701”; (3) enjoin
the County’s Sheriff’s Office from allowing SROs to participate in threat assessments unless
they are “trained accordingly”; (4) prohibit Defendants from further disciplining Doe based

solely on his speech; and (5) grant any other relief “the Court deems just and proper.” (Id. at 1–
2).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of
the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network,
L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch,
451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). When reviewing motions for preliminary injunction, courts must
consider the following factors: (1) the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether
the movant will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction; (3) whether granting the

injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be
served by granting the injunction. Id. at 542 (citation omitted).
These considerations are “factors to be balanced” rather than prerequisites that must each
be satisfied before relief may be issued. McNeilly v. Land, 684 F.3d 611, 615 (quoting In re
Eagle-Picher Indus., 963 F.2d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 1992)). Nor are they “rigid and unbending
requirements” rather, “[t]hese factors simply guide the discretion of the court.” Id. Moreover, in
the constitutional context, the last three factors often hinge on the first. See Liberty Coins, LLC
v. Goodman, 748 F.3d 682, 690 (6th Cir. 2014) (“In the context of a First Amendment claim, the
balancing of these factors is skewed toward an emphasis on the first factor.”). The Court need
not “make specific findings concerning each of the four factors . . . if fewer factors are
dispositive of the issue.” Tenke, 511 F.3d at 542 (citing In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d
1223, 1228 (6th Cir. 1985).
Finally, the party seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of justifying such relief.
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). While a party seeking a

preliminary injunction need not “prove [its] case in full at a preliminary injunction hearing,”
Tenke, 511 F.3d at 542 (citations and internal quotations omitted), a preliminary injunction is an
“extraordinary and drastic remedy.” Fowler v. Benson, 924 F.3d 247, 256 (6th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689 (2008)). A preliminary injunction “may only be
awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief,” id. (quoting Winter,
555 U.S. at 22), and “the proof required for the plaintiff to obtain a preliminary injunction is
much more stringent than the proof required to survive a summary judgment motion.” Leary v.
Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2000).
III. ANALYSIS

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Doe argues Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by failing to adequately train
SROs and school administrators on properly conducting threat assessments, allegedly leading to
Doe’s arrest and expulsion solely for his use of the word “bomb.” (Doc. 20, at 23.) He brings
his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides in relevant part,
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person . . . to
the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws [of the
United States], shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
To succeed on a § 1983 municipal-liability claim, a plaintiff must show both (1) that he suffered
a constitutional injury; and (2) that the alleged violation was caused by the municipality’s policy
or custom. See Novak v. City of Parma, 33 F.4th 296, 309 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Even assuming Defendants violated Doe’s First
Amendment rights when they arrested him and initially expelled him from school for making a
threat of mass violence under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-517; 49-6-3401(g)(5), Doe has not
made a clear showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his municipal-liability claim.

As Doe’s requested relief turns on this failure-to-train claim, the Court does not discuss the
likelihood of success on the merits for the underlying First Amendment claim.8
i. Monell Liability for Failure to Train

Plaintiff Doe asserts a § 1983 municipal-liability claim based on two alleged failures to
act: (1) Defendants’ lack of training programs and tools for school resource officers and
administrators regarding threats of mass violence and conducting threat assessments, as required
under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 49-6-2701; 3401; and (2) MCSD’s lack of written policies
implementing § 39-16-517. (See Doc. 20.) To succeed on a municipal-liability claim, a plaintiff
must establish (1) “that his or her constitutional rights were violated” and (2) that “a policy or
custom of the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the deprivation of plaintiff’s rights.”
Miller v. Sanilac Cty., 606 F.3d 240, 254–55 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Powers v. Hamilton Cty.

8 In Doe’s amended complaint (Doc. 17), he also raises procedural and substantive due process
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. As Doe has not requested injunctive relief under these
claims, the Court also does not address the merits of those claims. Moreover, Doe raises
interrelated failure-to-train concerns about Defendants’ alleged violations of the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”). 34 U.S.C. §§ 99 et. seq. As there is no private
right of action under FERPA, the Court does not address any concerns raised under this Act. See
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002) (“FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions contain
no rights-creating language, they have an aggregate, not individual, focus, and they serve
primarily to direct the Secretary of Education’s distribution of public funds to educational
institutions. They therefore create no rights unenforceable under § 1983.”).
Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 606–07 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–
95)).
“Failure to train” can act as the basis for a § 1983 claim in “limited circumstances.” City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989); see also Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478
(6th Cir. 2013) (noting a plaintiff may demonstrate Monell liability by showing “the existence of

a policy of inadequate training or supervision”). However, the Supreme Court stated that “[a]
municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on
a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citation omitted).
To establish municipal liability based on a failure to train, “a plaintiff must show that:
‘(1) the training program was inadequate to the task the officer must perform; (2) the inadequacy
is a result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy is closely related
to or actually caused the plaintiff’s injury.’” Epperson v. City of Humboldt, 140 F. Supp. 3d 676,
684 (W.D. Tenn. 2015) (quoting Bonner-Turner v. City of Ecorse, 627 F. App’x 400, 414 (6th
Cir. 2015)) (cleaned up). Here, Doe fails to make a clear showing of either a policy of

inadequate training or Defendants’ deliberate indifference to Doe’s First Amendment rights.
Consequently, the Court does not consider the third prong in its analysis.
1. Inadequacy of Training
Doe asserts that MCSD and the County failed to provide SROs and school administrators
with adequate training on conducting threat assessments to determine whether the context
indicates the student made a “true threat” of mass violence. (See Doc. 20.)
In Helphenstine v. Lewis County, the Sixth Circuit explained that training is adequate
when personnel can immediately contact others with the requisite training or expertise. 60 F.4th
305, 324–25 (6th Cir.) (citing Berry v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 796 F. App’x 857, 864 (6th
Cir. 2019) (finding lack of specific medical training for jailers insufficient to support a
failure-to-train claim because “those jailers could immediately contact medically trained staff”
and rely on their general first aid and CPR training to “bridge the gap” in the meantime).
While Nelson did not have specific training in conducting threat assessments, she was
aware of the need to assemble a threat-assessment team (which she completed prior to Doe’s

threat assessment) and had received a general briefing from Agent Evans about the new changes
to Tennessee’s threat of mass violence laws. (See Doc. 20-5.) She also knew that Agent Evans
would be providing specific training later in the school year and “knew enough” to contact him
for guidance when conducting Doe’s threat assessment. (Id.; Doc. 29, at 19.) Similarly, the
County notes that SRO Price was required to complete at least 16 hours of training specific to
SROs at the time of Doe’s arrest, which included assessing the contexts of threats generally.
(See Docs. 20-7; 31).9 As both SRO Price and Nelson were able to receive guidance
immediately from Agent Evans at the time they conducted the threat assessment, their general
training on assessing threats was enough to “bridge the gap” before contacting Agent Evans for

specific guidance.
Additionally, the Defendants point out the DHA chair, David Smith, had specific training
on threats of mass violence at the time of Doe’s hearing. (Doc. 29, at 20 n.10.) The DHA
overturned Doe’s 365-day suspension after similarly determining Doe did not make a threat of
mass violence. (See Doc. 20-8, at 3.) As such, all parties involved in disciplining Doe had the
requisite training required or means of communicating with key players who had such expertise.

9 Additionally, the County notes that SRO Price has since received specific training on
conducting threat assessments. (See Doc. 31, at 13.)
Consequently, Doe has not met his burden in showing a substantial likelihood of success that the
training on threat assessments was inadequate.
2. Deliberate indifference
Even if the training was inadequate, Doe must still show a substantial likelihood that
Defendants’ failure to specifically train school employees and SROs on conducting threat

assessments amounted to a deliberate indifference of Doe’s First Amendment Rights. See
Shadrick v. Hopkins Cty., 805 F.3d 724, 737 (6th Cir. 2015) (explaining the “deliberate
indifference” standard refers to the defendant’s “responsibility for training and supervising its
[employees] concerning their legal duty to honor [plaintiff’s] constitutional right[s]”) (citations
omitted).
“Deliberate indifference ‘is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal
actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.’” Id. (quoting Bd. Of Cty
Com’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). This standard has both objective and subjective
components; the subjective component requires a “culpable state of mind” that is roughly

equivalent with recklessness. Id. To prove deliberate indifference, plaintiff must show either
“(1) a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees or (2) a single violation
of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that the municipality has failed to train its
employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for constitutional
violation.” Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 323 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As
Doe has not alleged a pattern of similar violations, he must show likelihood of success on the
requirements for a single violation of federal rights.
When a plaintiff pursues a single-incident theory of liability, causation can be gleaned
from the “high degree of predictability” that “the failure to train would so obviously and
foreseeably result in the alleged constitutional injury.” Ouza v. City of Dearborn Heights, 969
F.3d 265, 289 n.10 (6th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Notably, single-violation cases require
some kind of recurring situation that, without training, poses a risk to federally-protected rights.
See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10 (determining because the city “kn[ew] to a moral
certainty” that its armed sheriffs would “be required to arrest fleeing felons,” failure to train on

the limitations of deadly force could be “characterized as deliberate indifference to constitutional
rights” (citation and internal quotations omitted)); see also Curry ex rel. Curry v. School Dist.,
452 F. Supp.2d. 723, 733 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (reasoning that “[a]lthough the absence of prior
complaints addresses a different aspect of the failure-to-train proofs. . . . the lack of prior
incidents reinforces the conclusion that a reasonable administrator cannot be found to have been
deliberately indifferent to the need to train for unlikely happenings”).
Here, Doe argues that there’s an obvious potential for constitutional violations because
under the Tennessee Code, principals are “the disciplinary authorities on their campus,” and thus
a lack of policies and training on assessing threats and conducting threat assessments constitutes

deliberate indifference. (Doc. 20, at 24.) However, unlike City of Canton, Doe does not allege
any facts indicating that conducting threat assessments and arrests pursuant to Tennessee’s mass
violence statutes are recurring situations SROs and school principals regularly tackle. In fact, at
the time of her deposition, Doe’s threat assessment was the first one Nelson had conducted.
(Doc. 20-5, at 14). Consequently, Doe has not demonstrated that threat assessments and arrests
under Tennessee’s mass violence statutes present an obvious potential for constitutional
violations.
Additionally, a plaintiff can also show deliberate indifference by demonstrating the
municipality implemented a “policy of inaction.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. A policy of inaction
is shown when a municipality fails to implement any kind of training for recurring situations. Cf.
Ouza, 969 F.3d at 265 (determining “failure to provide any type of training as to [] two recurring
situations”—probable-cause and use of force—amounted to deliberate indifference). Here, Doe
fails to show a policy of inaction from Defendants. Defendants note that at the time of Doe’s
arrest and expulsion, threat assessments, while “not new, had not been connected to the student

discipline process in general or threats of mass violence in particular until . . . May 1, 2024”—
only a few months before Doe’s threat assessment. (Doc 29, at 4 n.3.) Defendants have since
implemented specific training on threat assessments and Tennessee’s mass violence statutes for
school administrators. (See Doc. 20-3, at 3.) Given the newly implemented changes to the
legislation and the absence of recurring conditions involving the mass threat of violence statute
and threat assessments, Doe has not made a clear showing that Defendants implemented a policy
of inaction in training school administrators on threat assessments or changes to the
threat-of-mass-violence law.
As for SRO Price, while he might not have received training on the

threat-of-mass-violence law at the time, he had received extensive training including training on
verbal threats. (See Doc. 20-7.) Doe has not provided any evidence to demonstrate that the
County acted with deliberate indifference by not including this law specifically in their training
other than the fact that SRO Price arrested Doe for his words. Moreover, as discussed above,
SRO Price has since received specific training on conducting threat assessments, and Doe
provides no evidence to show such training is inadequate. (See Doc. 31, at 13.) Thus, Doe has
not made a clear showing that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference toward his
constitutional right to free speech. As such, Doe has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on
the merits for his § 1983 municipal liability claim based on a failure to train.
B. Irreparable Harm
“The single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction is a
demonstration that if it is not granted the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a
decision on the merits can be rendered.” Wright & Miller, 11A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2948.1
(3d ed.). “If the plaintiff isn’t facing imminent and irreparable injury, there’s no need to grant

relief now as opposed to at the end of the lawsuit.” D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Schs., 942 F.3d 324,
327 (6th Cir. 2019). A preliminary injunction will be denied if the applicant has an adequate
remedy at law. See First Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. of Michigan v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, 495
F. Supp. 154, 157 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
While constitutional cases “often turn on the likelihood of success on the merits” this
“general rule does not do away with the ‘indispensable prerequisite of showing a likelihood of
immediate and irreparable harm.” Moms for Liberty - Wilson Cnty., Tennessee v. Wilson Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., No. 24-5056, 2025 WL 2599923, at *8 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Obama for
Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012; D.T., 942 F.3d at 326–27); see also D.T., 942

F.3d at 327 (“[E]ven the strongest showing on the other three factors cannot eliminate the
irreparable harm requirement.”) (internal quotations omitted). The party seeking the injunction
bears the burden of clearly showing that its “injury [is] both certain and immediate, not
speculative or theoretical.” D.T., 942 F.3d at 327 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Moreover, when a plaintiff seeks an injunction based on alleged past wrongs, it must show there
is an immediate threat that they will be harmed again. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 102–03 (1982) (“Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case
or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . .”).
Doe argues he has suffered irreparable harm because “[t]he loss of First Amendment
freedoms, ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” (Doc. 20, at 26 (citing Connection
Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1988)). Doe suggests that “without an
injunction requiring development of a policy with training . . . Doe’s speech will again be
chilled, and educators confused, as words like ‘gun,’ ‘bomb,’ ‘knife,’ and ‘injure’ are

prohibited.” (Id.) Additionally, Doe argues that, without training for educators and SROs, the
“creation of a mass violence policy,” “changes to procedure,” and “mitigation of the risk of
future violations,” Doe’s free speech rights may be impaired in the future. (Id. at 27).
Doe asserts imminent or irreparable harm based on his claim that he was previously
punished for saying the word “bomb.” However, the trainings and written policies that Doe
requests to remedy this issue already exist. Additionally, Defendants point to the Student Code
of Conduct, which gives examples of various kinds of disciplinary actions, and existing
threat-assessment tools such as the Threat Assessment Worksheet10 completed by Nelson and the
threat-assessment team. (Doc. 20-6, at 6.) Doe does not explain how these existing trainings and

tools are inadequate, especially considering that both the threat-assessment team and the DHA
found that Doe had not made a “true threat” of mass violence. (See Docs. 19, 33, 34). In
contrast, Defendants assert Plaintiff was disciplined for threatening to fight another student and
note their determination was based in part on the words of Doe’s own character witness at the
DHA hearing, in addition to the threat assessment and Pelphrey’s belief that Doe was making a
serious threat at the time. (See Docs. 29; 31; see also 29-6, at 2 (noting that the DHA’s decision

10 This worksheet’s self-described purpose is “to assist in determining whether the person /
situation poses a threat of violence to others, to self, or to both (or poses no threat of violence).”
(Doc. 20-6 at 1.) The assessment worksheet also includes a list of the participating parties and
instructions on how to assess threats of violence. (Id. at 1–6.)
was based in part on Doe’s pastor’s statement at the DHA hearing, that the phrase “bomb you” is
equivalent to “‘throw hands’ meaning to start a fight”).) Consequently, there is no indication
Doe faces certain or imminent harm from a lack of training on threat assessments or written
policies on threats of mass violence, nor that his speech will be chilled in the future for saying
words like “bomb.”

Finally, Doe asks this Court to “enjoin[] SROs in Marion County from sitting in on threat
assessments.” (Doc. 34, at 7.) Doe argues that because Marion County’s training for SRO’s is
allegedly deficient, SROs are “feigning a role of ‘school official’ while in reality acting as law
enforcement.” (Id. (emphasis in original).) This leads Doe to conclude that, “without training on
threat assessments, words alone can be criminalized” and therefore, Doe “remains at risk.” (Id.
at 7–8.) Consequently, Doe further asks to enjoin “the District from enforcing expulsion or
similar discipline against Doe based solely on his protected speech of non-serious words.” (Doc.
20, at 28.) As discussed, Defendants indicate such training already is in place. Moreover, Doe
puts forward no evidence that Defendants plan to further discipline him in the future.

Therefore, the harm Doe requests injunctive relief from is neither certain nor immediate.
Even if SRO Price and Nelson were not properly trained at the time of Doe’s arrest and initial
expulsion, Doe does not raise any facts that indicate Doe risks any actual imminent future
prosecution based on his words alone. See D.T., at 328 (explaining a “hypothetical threat of
prosecution is not an ‘immediate,’ ‘irreparable’ injury that warrants the ‘extraordinary remedy”
of a preliminary injunction”) (citing Mich. Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v.
Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 154) (6th Cir. 1991)).
C. Harm to Others and Public Interest
The third and fourth factors, harm to the opposing party and the public interest, “merge
when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). In the
constitutional context, whether an injunction serves the public interest is inextricably intertwined
with whether the plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits. See Liberty Coins,

748 F.3d at 690 (“[T]he determination of where the public interest lies [ ] is dependent on a
determination of the likelihood of success on the merits of the First Amendment challenge
because it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional
rights.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original)). Doe has not
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. The Court therefore cannot conclude that the
public interest would be served by requiring Defendants to implement new training or polices,
nor by enjoining SROs from sitting in on threat assessments.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Doe’s motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED.

Additionally, while the Court finds the Plaintiff has not met his burden for granting a preliminary
injunction, Plaintiff may still be successful on the merits of his claims at trial. Therefore, the
Defendants’ request to consolidate the briefings pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2) and enter a judgment
as a matter of law is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11177340. Public record. Not legal advice.