# Deters

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · October 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11177333

## Case

- **Full name:** Eric Esquire Deters v. Richard Porotsky, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** October 24, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11177333

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that attorney and law firm’s statements about plaintiff were made in the course of representing their client in litigation, and therefore were subject to absolute privilege.
- affirming grant of summary judgment on defamation claim where plaintiff had failed to show that statements were made outside of grievance process

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

ERIC ESQUIRE DETERS,
Case No. 1:25-cv-386

Plaintiff, McFarland, J.
Bowman, M.J.
v.

RICHARD POROTSKY, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On June 10, 2025, Plaintiff Eric Esquire Deters paid the requisite filing fee and filed
suit against Richard Porotsky and the law firm of Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP. (Doc. 1). On
July 25, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss this lawsuit for failure to state a claim.
For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ motion be
granted.
I. Standard of Review
Under the relevant standard, this Court must “construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, accept the well-pled factual allegations as true,
and determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007).
While such determination rests primarily upon the allegations of the complaint, “matters
of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached
to the complaint, also may be taken into account.” Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493,
502 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546, 1554 (6th Cir. 1997))
(emphasis omitted). Under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, wherein “a document
that is not formally incorporated by reference or attached to a complaint may still be
considered part of the pleadings” if it is “referred to in the complaint and is central to the
plaintiff's claim ....” Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir.
1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

II. Allegations of Complaint and Pertinent Background
The allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint are quite sparse. He alleges little more than
that Defendant Porotsky included a libelous statement about Deters in an email dated
May 19, and did so in the scope of Porotsky’s employment with Dinsmore & Shohl LLP.
Because the May 19 email was transmitted in the course of an ongoing case in state
court, and generally alludes to a second case previously filed in this Court, some
background from publicly available records is judicially noticed to provide context.
A. Relevant Background from Public Records
Start with the parties. Deters, a former attorney,1 was previously involved in

multiple cases involving allegations of fraud and medical malpractice against Dr.
Abubakar Atiq Durrani2 in both state and federal court (hereafter, the “Durrani litigation”).
Defendant Porotsky is an attorney who represents one or more insurers that defended
the underlying tort claims against Durrani under a reservation of rights. During the course
of representation by attorneys in Plaintiff’s namesake law firm, hundreds of Durrani
claimants won verdicts totaling millions of dollars. But the insurer, known as “Med Pro,”

1Plaintiff was formerly known as Eric Charles Deters.
2Durrani fled to Pakistan in 2013 after being indicted for Medicare fraud. See United States. v. Durrani, S.D.
Ohio Case No. 1:13-cr-084, (Doc. 37, superseding indictment).
has resisted paying out claims asserted by those successful Durrani claimants. A
significant amount of ongoing litigation concerns the lack of payment by Med Pro.3
Although Deters initially represented many of the original Durrani plaintiffs, he was
later suspended from the practice of law in Kentucky, and is no longer licensed to practice
law in any jurisdiction.4 So in recent years, “[a]ttorney David Drake has taken over the

plaintiffs’ representation in the Durrani cases.” In re Disqualification of Reece, 178 Ohio
St.3d 1277, 1277-78 (Ohio 2025).5 Deters remains employed by Drake as a consultant,
a role to which Porotsky has objected.6 In addition, because Drake is not licensed to
practice law in Ohio, Ohio attorney Alan Statman oversees the Durrani cases in Ohio.7
Id.

3Much of that litigation remains ongoing. But on March 31, 2025, U.S. District Judge Barrett dismissed two
cases in which claimants had sued Med Pro under Ohio Rev. Code § 3929.06, a provision that permits
plaintiffs who win damages at trial to file a posttrial, supplemental complaint against a judgment debtor’s
insurer. See, e.g., Adams et al. v. MedPro, et al., S.D. Ohio Case No. 1:24-cv-207-MRB, Doc. 28; see also
McCann v. The Medical Prot. Co., Inc. et al., S.D. Ohio Case No. 1:24-cv-208-MRB. Judge Barrett granted
the insurer’s motions to dismiss all claims in the Adams and McCann cases based on a contractual
exclusion in the subject policies for any “willful tort,” because the underlying state court jury verdicts found
that Durrani committed the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation.
4“Since 2012, Deters has been suspended from the practice of law on multiple occasions for violations of
the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct, including several instances of dishonesty.” Deters v. Kentucky
Bar Ass’n, 646 Fed. Appx. 468, 470 (6th Cir. 2016); see also Deters v. Ky. Bar Assoc., 627 S.W.3d 917,
919 (Ky. 2021) (denying reinstatement). Deters was also suspended from practice in this Court. See In Re
Eric C. Deters, Case No. 1:12-mc-042. He was permitted to permanently retire from Ohio practice on
September 17, 2014. However, he was later sanctioned for the unauthorized practice of law in Ohio. See
Disciplinary Counsel v. Deters, 180 N.E.3d 1086, 165 Ohio St. 3d 537 (Ohio 2021) (per curiam) (imposing
permanent injunction and civil penalty as sanction for unauthorized practice). In the opinion issued by the
Ohio Supreme Court, the majority wrote that it “was most troubled by Deters's struggle to accept his
diminished role in the legal profession following his Kentucky suspension and his Ohio retirement.” Id., 180
N.E.3d at 1093, 165 Ohio St.3d at 544; see also, generally, Deters v. Hammer, No. 1:20-cv-362-DRC-SKB,
2021 WL 664011, at *2, n.2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 2021) (Report and Recommendation chronicling Plaintiff’s
extensive history of discipline, Rule 11 sanctions, and suspensions in Kentucky, Ohio, and Florida.)
5In the case of In re Disqualification of Reece, 178 Ohio St. 3d 1277, Porotsky attempted to disqualify the
presiding state court judge. Previously, counsel for the Durrani claimants sought to disqualify the same
judge. See In re Disqualification of Reece, 163 Ohio St. 3d 1285 (Ohio 2021). None of the attempts to
disqualify Judge Reece have been successful.
6Defendant Porotsky has accused Deters of “engag[ing] in the unauthorized practice of law by continuing
to provide legal and strategic advice to plaintiffs in the Durrani cases while acting as a consultant.” See In
re Disqualification of Reece, 178 Ohio St.3d 1277.
7Statman also represents Deters in satellite litigation in which former Durrani clients have sued Deters. See,
e.g., Breitenstein v. Deters, S.D. Ohio Case No. 1:21-cv-533-JPH.
The May 19 email at issue in this case was sent by Porotsky to Statman in
connection with a state court case. In The Medical Protective v. CAST, et al., Hamilton
County Court of Common Pleas No. A 2304696, (hereafter, the “Hamilton County Case”),
Med Pro seeks to have its Durrani insurance policies declared void ab initio. (See Doc.
10-2, copy of state court second amended complaint.)

Retired Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Judge Guy L. Reece II presides
over the Hamilton County Case as well as other state court Durrani litigation. Judge
Reece entered an Agreed Protective Order on October 7, 2024 to protect “potentially
….commercially sensitive, proprietary and/or confidential information.” (See Doc. 10-3,
copy of order.) Med Pro has filed two motions asserting violations of that protective order.
Med Pro’s first motion alleged that its confidential documents were improperly attached
to an affidavit filed by Deters on November 25, 2024. Judge Reece granted relief by
sealing the affidavit. (See Doc. 10-5, order of 12/9/24.) When Statman filed an amended
motion for summary judgment that again disclosed confidential documents, Porotsky sent

Statman the May 19, 2025 email that is the subject of this lawsuit. Porotsky followed up
the email by filing a second motion concerning the violation; Judge Reece granted relief
to Med Pro a second time by striking Statman’s amended motion for summary judgment
on June 4, 2025.
Although Porotsky’s May 19 email primarily expresses his dismay with the violation
of the protective order in the Hamilton County Case, it also alludes to a related federal
court Durrani case, Adams et al. v. The Medical Protective Co. Inc., et al., No. 1:20-cv-
170-MRB. The cited Adams case, filed by 398 Durrani claimants against Med Pro, broadly
alleges that Med Pro and its lawyers are liable for fraud and conspiracy based on Med
Pro’s Durrani litigation conduct. The reference in Porotsky’s May 19 email is to comments
made by Judge Barrett at an April 30, 2025 hearing about Deters’ continued role in the
Durrani litigation. At that hearing, Judge Barrett denied Porotsky’s request for a gag order
against Deters. (Id., Doc. 276 (hearing transcript).)8 Citing Ohio’s injunction against the
practice of law by Deters, however, Judge Barrett directed Statman to certify that future

filings in any Durrani case before Judge Barrett would be “drafted or directly supervised”
by Statman or other counsel of record. (Id., PageID 11759.)
[T]he Ohio Supreme Court said the practice of law is not just restricted to
court appearances but also encompasses legal advice and counsel, et
cetera, et cetera….

I’m going to deny the motion for a gag order…. But from here on out,
anything that gets filed in this case or any of the cases involving the Durrani
litigation in front of me, you guys have to certify that either you guys drafted
or directly supervised the drafting of the order [sic].

(Id., Doc. 276, PageID 11757; see also id., PageID 11759, instructing that Deters is not
to be “involved in discovery disputes and things like that because that’s engaging in the
practice of law.”)
Having provided the necessary contextual background of both the Hamilton
County Case and the Adams case filed by 398 Durrani plaintiffs in this Court, the
undersigned returns to the analysis of the complaint filed in this case.

8Judge Barrett made other rulings at the same hearing, reiterating that he was leaving open the possibility
of fraud and conspiracy claims arising from conduct that occurred after August 24, 2018. (Id., Doc,. 71; see
also Doc. 276, PageID 11764-11765.) Judge Barrett also clarified which claims were foreclosed by his prior
ruling on Med Pro’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, took a motion to dismiss the third
amended complaint under advisement, and denied Plaintiffs’ motion to file a fourth amended complaint.
(Doc. 275; see also Doc. 276.)
B. The Amended Complaint
On June 11, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint consists
of eleven numbered allegations against Defendants Porotsky and his law firm, Dinsmore
& Shohl. The first four allegations assert the existence of diversity jurisdiction. The
remaining allegations allege that Porotsky’s May 19, 2025 email to Statman includes a

libelous statement about Statman’s disclosure of confidential documents in the Hamilton
County Case that negatively reflects on Deters. (Doc. 3, PageID 11, ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges
that the statement “was 100% regarding Eric Deters,” and constitutes libel because it is
false and was communicated to a third person. (Id., ¶¶ 6-7.) Deters further alleges that
the statement “caused harm” and “was stated with malice” against him as a “public figure.”
(Id., ¶ 7.) He also alleges that the statement holds him in a “false light” and is ”libel per se
because it is about Eric Deters’ profession.” (Id., ¶¶ 8-9.) Plaintiff’s sole reference to
Dinsmore & Shohl is the allegation that the email “was made in the course of Porotsky’s
scope of employment at Dinsmore.” (Id., ¶ 10.)

Defendants’ motion to dismiss includes a copy of the subject email, which is fully
considered because it is incorporated by reference in the complaint. The email reads:
Subject: Violation of Protective order – Re: Med Pro v. CAST –
Intervening Defs. Amended Motion for Summary Judgment

Dear Alan,

Please reply by 12 noon Tuesday to let me know you received this and will
agree (as noted below) to correct this new violation of the Court’s Protective
Order dated October 7, 2024, and to stop these problems from occurring as
noted below.

In short, we received your Amended Motion for summary judgment Friday,
and in reviewing it today, we see that you again attached (and publicly filed)
MedPro’s confidential documents. This is the same mistake that you
admitted to making last Fall, when you filed these confidential items publicly,
attached to the Affidavit of Eric Deters. You claimed it was an inadvertent
“oversight” at the time. But as we noted then, the handling of these matters
does not appear to be an “oversight.” Rather, it is part of a pattern of
improper handling (including allowing unlicensed people to handle
important legal matters). This needs to end, as Judge Barrett ordered
recently for his Courtroom. It needs to end in State Court as well.

Accordingly, please reply immediately… to:
1. agree to formally withdraw the MSJ filing you made Friday (which
includes MedPro’s confidential materials)….
2. agree that you will not file MedPro’s confidential materials publicly
again[.]
3. agree to an order that you will certify each filing in state court in
the same way that Judge Barrett ordered you to do in federal
court (i.e. that you personally did the work for each filing or
personally supervised it).

(Doc. 10-1, PageID 448-449 (emphasis added).)
Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that the highlighted statement, standing
alone, constitutes libel against Deters.
III. Analysis

A. Plaintiff’s Conclusory Complaint and Failure to Oppose Dismissal
Plaintiff’s amended complaint is entirely conclusory. The eleven numbered
allegations assert the “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” without
the inclusion of “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that
is plausible on its face.”” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 and 570 (2007). Defendants fill in the blanks
by providing a copy of the subject email and citations to the most relevant Durrani cases.
But the addition of those factual details only cements the undersigned’s conclusion that
the complaint is legally insufficient to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Deters’ response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss fails to put forward any cogent
legal arguments in opposition to dismissal. Instead, Deters uses his response to insult the
legal profession and judiciary and to threaten to initiate new litigation against Porotsky’s
counsel in this case, Joel Sechler, and Mr. Sechler’s law firm, based on the contents of
the Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 11, PageID 836.)
As Judge Barrett previously explained in No. 1:20-cv-170-MRB:
“It is well established in the Sixth Circuit that failure to respond to an
argument made in support of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a claim
results in a forfeiture of the claim.” Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney,
LLC, 148 F. Supp. 3d 644, 650 (E.D. Tenn. 2015) (citing Notredan, L.L.C.
v. Old Republic Exch. Facilitator Co., 531 Fed. Appx. 567, 569 (6th Cir.
2013)); see also United States v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 574 F.3d 329, 332
(6th Cir. 2009) (“To preserve [an] argument... the litigant not only must
identify the issue but also must provide some minimal level of
argumentation in support of it.”).

(Id., Doc. 71, PageID 2585-2586.) Deters’ failure to minimally respond to the substance
of Defendants’ arguments in this case amounts to an acknowledgment of their merits.
B. Deters Fails to State a Claim for Defamation

For example, Defendants persuasively argue that Plaintiff Deters fails to state an
actionable claim for libel as a matter of law.
“Under Ohio law, ‘it is for the court to decide as a matter of law whether
certain statements alleged to be defamatory are actionable or not.’” Susan
B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 779 F.3d 628, 632 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 453 N.E.2d 666, 669 (1983),
overruled on other grounds by Welling v. Weinfeld, 113 Ohio St.3d 464, 866
N.E.2d 1051 (2007)). In order to establish a claim for defamation, a plaintiff
“must show (1) that a false statement of fact was made, (2) that the
statement was defamatory, (3) that the statement was published, (4) that
the plaintiff suffered injury as a proximate result of the publication, and (5)
that the defendant acted with the requisite degree of fault in publishing the
statement.” Driehaus, 779 F.3d at 632–33 (quoting Am. Chem. Soc. v.
Leadscope, Inc., 133 Ohio St.3d 366, 978 N.E.2d 832, 852 (Ohio 2012)
(internal citation omitted)). Failure to establish any one element is fatal to a
defamation claim. Id.

Boulger v. Woods, 917 F.3d 471, 478 (6th Cir. 2019).
Ohio has adopted a “reasonable reader” standard. If a reasonable reader,
reading a statement in the context of the entire publication, would interpret
the statement as defamatory, then the plaintiff has an actionable claim.

Croce v. New York Times Company, 930 F.3d 787, 793 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Am. Chem.
Soc., 978 N.E.2d at 853). The undersigned concludes that no reasonable individual would
interpret the allegedly objectionable statement as defamatory, because it was contained
in an email between counsel related to ongoing litigation, was not published other than to
opposing counsel, and was neither defamatory nor false as to Deters.
1. The Email is Subject to Absolute Litigation Privilege

On its face, the subject email was sent by Attorney Porotsky to opposing counsel
in the course of his representation of Med Pro in the Hamilton County Case. More than a
half century ago, the Sixth Circuit held that Ohio’s absolute litigation privilege applies to
communications between attorneys when those communications are made in relation to
litigation. Theiss v. Scherer, 396 F.2d 646, 650 (6th Cir. 1968) (“The rights of clients
should not be imperiled by subjecting their attorneys to the fear of suits for libel or
slander.”) The email clearly expressed Porotsky’s concern with an apparent violation of
the protective order in the Hamilton County Case. The concern appears to have been
well-founded, since the state court granted relief to Med Pro by striking the amended
motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the alleged defamatory statement is subject to
an absolute privilege.
Notably, Deters does not dispute the application of the privilege. “Attorneys enjoy
an absolute privilege for statements made in the course of representing a client in
litigation.” Harsh v. Franklin, No. 24331, 2011-Ohio-2428, ¶ 18, 2011 WL 2089198 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2d Dist., May 20, 2021). “The litigation privilege provides absolute immunity to
parties, witnesses, lawyers, and judges from future lawsuits for statements made during
and relevant to judicial proceedings.” Reister v. Gardner, 164 Ohio St. 3d 546, 548, 174
N.E.3d 713, 715 (Ohio 2020) (emphasis original, additional citations omitted). “The
litigation privilege is… applicable to statements that bear ‘some reasonable relation to the
judicial proceeding in which’ they appear.” Id., 164 Ohio St.3d at 549 (citing Surace v.

Wuliger, 25 Ohio St.3d 229, 495 N.E.2d 939 (Ohio 1986), at syllabus); see also Stout v.
Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 2021-Ohio-609, ¶ 82, 2021 WL 840961, at *17 (Ohio App. 2
Dist., 2021) (holding that attorney and law firm’s statements about plaintiff were made in
the course of representing their client in litigation, and therefore were subject to absolute
privilege.)
2. Alternative Reasons for Dismissal
While the absolute litigation privilege is grounds enough for dismissal of Plaintiff’s
complaint, Defendants’ motion includes other persuasive grounds for dismissal. For
example, the email was not “published” to anyone other than to opposing counsel in

connection with a pending case. The transmission to opposing counsel, without more,
does not constitute a plausible publication to a third party under Ohio law. See Young v.
Jones, 122 Ohio App.3d 539, 544, 702 N.E.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming grant of
summary judgment on defamation claim where plaintiff had failed to show that statements
were made outside of grievance process). Both context and the lack of publication
preclude any “reasonable reader” from finding the statement to be defamatory.
In addition, only a false statement that refers to the plaintiff may be defamatory. In
the email, Porotsky levels an accusation not against Deters, but against Statman,
asserting that Statman’s repeated violation of the protective order was inexcusable
because it was “part of a pattern of improper handling (including allowing unlicensed
people to handle important legal matters).” In addition to being leveled at Statman, the
accusation speaks to a plurality of “unlicensed people” who Statman has failed to
appropriately supervise. Even if Statman inferred that Porotsky was complaining about
Statman’s supervision of Deters as among that group, the sentence still is not defamatory

to Deters. Deters is indeed “unlicensed” to practice law. A true statement is not
defamatory.
C. Rule 11 Sanctions Should be Imposed
In the years since his suspension in Kentucky, Plaintiff has filed multiple lawsuits
against attorneys and judges who are absolutely immune from suit. The undersigned
previously discussed Deters’ history of ignoring the doctrine of immunity in Deters v.
Hammer, No. 20-cv-362-DRC-SKB, 2021 WL 664011 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 2021) (Report
and Recommendation). In the Hammer case, Plaintiff had filed suit against an attorney
and his law firm, alleging defamation and false light. The suit was based on statements

made by Hammer to a Kentucky Bar Association investigator in connection with Deters’
unsuccessful attempt to obtain reinstatement. After citing Deters’ significant history of
ignoring the doctrine of absolute immunity, the undersigned recommended that sanctions
be imposed sua sponte under Rule 11.
Plaintiff has filed suit against defendants who enjoy absolute immunity on
multiple occasions, including this case, and either fails to understand or
willingly disregards that clear legal doctrine. Therefore, the undersigned
recommends consideration of two non-monetary sanctions: (1) an express
warning to Plaintiff that filing a further lawsuit against any defendant who
enjoys absolute immunity may result in sanctions, including but not limited
to a declaration that Plaintiff is a vexatious litigator; and (2) requiring Plaintiff
to provide a pre-filing certification by a licensed attorney prior to initiating
another pro se suit that, under existing law or other non-frivolous argument,
the named defendant(s) are not immune from suit.
Deters v. Hammer, No. 1:20-cv-362, 2021 WL 664011, at *7.
In a published opinion, U.S. District Judge Douglas R. Cole adopted the Report
and Recommendation (“R&R”) and granted summary judgment to the defendants based
on immunity. Id., 568 F. Supp.3d 883 (S.D. Ohio 2021). As to the question of sanctions,
however, the Court wrote:
The R&R suggests that Deters is “skating on thin ice” as he “has filed suit
against defendants who enjoy absolute immunity on multiple occasions,”
“either fail[ing] to understand or willingly disregard[ing] that clear legal
doctrine.” (R&R, Doc. 22, #319). The Court largely agrees with that
characterization. At the same time, Deters is correct that there does not
appear to be any Ohio case law expressly applying absolute immunity in
the factual setting of statements made for use in connection with another
State's disciplinary process. While that seems a slim reed, the Court
concludes that sanctions are not currently warranted. That being said,
Deters is now on notice that absolute immunity applies to such
statements, so a further lawsuit of this type may lead to a different
outcome on the sanctions question.

Id., 568 F.Supp.3d at 889 (emphasis added). In other words, the Court declined to impose
sanctions in Hammer because there was no controlling Ohio authority applying the
doctrine of absolute immunity to the facts presented (statements made by an Ohio
attorney for use in connection with Kentucky disciplinary proceedings). But the Court
expressly warned Deters that another defamation lawsuit “of this type” (based on a
lawyer’s statements in the course of a judicial proceeding) could lead to future sanctions.
In the instant case, Deters once again has filed suit against an attorney and his
law firm based on statements made during the course of a judicial proceeding. Unlike in
Hammer, there is no daylight for Deters to argue that the email falls outside the scope of
absolute litigation privilege. Thus, this case represents a blatant violation of Rule 11, Fed.
R. Civ. P. While the filing of this lawsuit alone supports the imposition of sanctions, Deters’
threat to file yet another baseless lawsuit against Porotsky’s counsel in this case, over
statements that are protected by the same absolute privilege, underscores the urgency
of imposing sanctions.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendations
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 10) be GRANTED;
2. Because the filing of this lawsuit clearly violates Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11(b)(2) and (3), and because Plaintiff’s response to the
motion to dismiss threatens to initiate another frivolous lawsuit based on
conduct protected by absolute immunity, the Court immediately should
impose the following non-monetary sanctions:
a. Prior to filing another pro se lawsuit in this Court, Plaintiff should be
required to provide a pre-filing certification by a licensed attorney
admitted to practice in Ohio that, under existing law or other non-

frivolous argument, the named defendant(s) is not subject to
immunity and the complained-of conduct is not subject to absolute
litigation privilege or other immunity;
b. Plaintiff’s failure to include the requisite certification by a duly
licensed attorney should result in the automatic dismissal of the pro
se complaint without further review of its merits.

s/Stephanie K. Bowman____
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

ERIC ESQUIRE DETERS,
Case No. 1:25-cv-386

Plaintiff, McFarland, J.
Bowman, M.J.
v.

RICHARD POROTSKY, et al.,

Defendants.

NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of
the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely
motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of
the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of
the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN (14)
DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11177333. Public record. Not legal advice.