# Ovidiu Ciceu v. Knox County Assessor

> Indiana Tax Court · October 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11177141

## Case

- **Court:** Indiana Tax Court
- **Decided:** October 24, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion by Judge McAdam
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11177141

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- declining to consider newly presented evidence

## Opinion text

PETITIONER APPEARING PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT: FILED
OVIDIU CICEU NICHOLAS M. BRADY
Vincennes, IN LEWIS WAGNER & TRIMBLE
Oct 24 2025, 12:14 pm

CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
SARAH L. SCHREIBER Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
BARRETT MCNAGNY LLP

IN THE
INDIANA TAX COURT

OVIDIU CICEU, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 24T-TA-00016
)
KNOX COUNTY ASSESSOR, )
)
Respondent. )

ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL DETERMINATION OF
THE INDIANA BOARD OF TAX REVIEW

FOR PUBLICATION
October 24, 2025

MCADAM, J.

Both parties believe the Indiana Board of Tax Review erred when it reduced

Ovidiu Ciceu’s 2023 property tax assessment from $153,600 to $111,000. Ciceu

contends that the assessment should have been reduced further because he believes

the Board failed to consider an appraisal referenced by Ciceu in his testimony at the

evidentiary hearing. The Assessor believes the initial value was correct and claims that

the Board’s rejection of his sales comparison valuation implies a new legal standard

requiring an expert appraisal to succeed in valuation appeals. After reviewing the
certified record and the arguments properly before it, the Court finds that the Board

made no reversible error, properly applied the law, and correctly considered the

evidence. The Court also rejects as untimely two arguments raised by Ciceu for the first

time in his reply brief and denies the Assessor’s motion to strike portions of Ciceu’s

reply brief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ciceu appeals the property tax assessment on his residence for tax year 2023 of

$155,900. He owns a two-story Victorian-style brick house located in Vincennes,

Indiana. The property has 5 bedrooms and 1.5 bathrooms, no air conditioning, and is

heated with a coal or wood-burning stove.

Believing his 2023 assessment to be too high, Ciceu appealed the assessment to

the Knox County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals (the “PTABOA”). The

PTABOA held an administrative hearing on the appeal and reduced the assessed value

of Ciceu’s property to $153,600. This reduced value nonetheless represented an

increase of over 38% from the prior year’s assessment of $111,000. The PTABOA

offered limited explanation for this value, stating only that “the change in assessed value

is attributed to the annual ratio study.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 4.)

Dissatisfied with this result, Ciceu appealed next to the Indiana Board of Tax

Review. A hearing was held on the matter at which each party offered evidence to prove

the value of Ciceu’s home. The Assessor presented a valuation report that he created

himself in which he compared the characteristics of Ciceu’s property with five nearby

properties that were recently sold and adjusted for relevant differences. The Assessor’s

report concluded to a value of $153,600. Ciceu responded by arguing that he was being

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treated unfairly by the Assessor due to his past romantic involvement with the prior

assessor. He also argued that his property was not being treated the same as other

neighboring properties and attempted to prove the value of his home using an appraisal

commissioned by the Assessor in Ciceu’s prior appeal of his 2022 assessment. He

testified that the appraisal valued his home at $95,000 based on an exterior review, but

he did not submit a copy of the appraisal into evidence.

In its final determination, the Board reduced Ciceu’s assessment to the prior

year’s assessment of $111,000 because it found that neither party had proven the value

of the home. The Board found that the Assessor’s valuation fell short because his

adjustments to the comparable properties lacked support with reliable, market-based

evidence and thus did not comply with generally accepted appraisal principles.

Likewise, the Board found that Ciceu failed to provide reliable, market-based evidence

supporting any value for his property. The Board noted that, although Ciceu “offer[ed]

some testimony” about a prior appraisal relating to his 2022 assessment appeal, it could

not rely on the appraisal because it was “not in the record.” (Cert. Admin. R. 115 ¶ 33.)

Finding that neither party offered reliable evidence of value, the Board applied the

burden-shifting rule in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-20 and reverted the assessment to the

prior year’s value. 1

Following the Board’s decision, Ciceu timely filed his petition for review with this

Court. As part of his reply brief, Ciceu attached four exhibits that were not presented to

1
The Board also interpreted Ciceu’s claim of being targeted for a higher assessment due to his
past romantic involvement as a challenge to the uniformity and equality of his assessment.
Ultimately, the Board found this claim failed due to the lack of market data and the lack of a
statistically reliable sample of properties. Ciceu does not raise a uniformity and equality
argument on appeal.

3
the Board. The Assessor filed a motion to strike these exhibits, which the Court decided

to resolve alongside the merits of the case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court’s review of Indiana Board decisions is governed by Indiana

Code § 33-26-6-6, which closely mirrors the language governing judicial review of

administrative decisions from Indiana’s Administrative Orders and Procedures Act.

Compare IND. CODE § 33-26-6-6(e) (2025), with IND. CODE § 4-21.5-5-14(d) (2025).

Under Indiana Code § 33-26-6-6, the party seeking to overturn a final determination of

the Board bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. I.C. § 33-26-6-6(b).

Challengers must demonstrate that they have been prejudiced by a final determination

of the Board that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law; contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in

excess of or short of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations; without observance of

the procedure required by law; or unsupported by substantial or reliable evidence.

I.C. § 33-26-6-6(e). The Board’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo and its factual

determinations are afforded deference when they are supported by substantial and

reliable evidence. Majestic Props., LLC v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Assessor, 241 N.E.3d 642,

644 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2024) (citing Indiana Alcohol & Tobacco Comm’n v. Spirited Sales,

LLC, 79 N.E.3d 371, 375 (Ind. 2017)).

DISCUSSION

In this case, the Court must make three determinations: (1) what facts this Court

may consider, (2) what arguments this Court may consider, and (3) whether the Board

erred in reverting the subject property’s assessment to that of the previous year. As to

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the first, the Court will not consider exhibits outside the certified record, as none have

been shown to qualify for the statutory exception allowing such consideration. As to the

second, the Court finds that Ciceu forfeited arguments that he untimely raised for the

first time in his reply brief. And as for the third, the Court affirms the Board’s

determination, as neither party demonstrates a prejudicial error by the Board.

Exhibits to the Petitioner’s Reply Brief Will Not Be Considered

The Assessor asks this Court to strike from the record four exhibits that Ciceu

included with his reply brief—(1) two property record cards for other properties, (2) a list

of appeals from Knox County to the Board, (3) portions of an unidentified appraisal

report, and (4) a contract for legal services and a related invoice between the Assessor

and her counsel. 2 The Assessor argues that these exhibits should be stricken because

the material is scandalous or impertinent and the Court cannot consider them due to

statutory limits on its review power. While the Court agrees that it cannot consider these

exhibits because they are not part of the certified administrative record, the Court

declines to strike the exhibits because it is unnecessary at this time. 3 The continuing

presence of the exhibits will not burden the litigants at this late stage in the proceeding

because briefing and argument have concluded.

This Court’s review of final determinations issued by the Board is limited. Snyder

v. Dearborn Cnty. Assessor, 248 N.E.3d 1277, 1281 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2024). When

reviewing the Board’s determinations, the Tax Court is not acting as a trier of fact and is

2
The Assessor also moves to strike portions of the reply brief which relate to the four exhibits in
question. For simplicity, the Court’s references to these exhibits shall be understood to
incorporate the related portions of Ciceu’s reply brief.
3
One page of the four exhibits at issue appears in the certified record. (Cert. Admin. R. at 65.)
To the extent this Court relies on that document, it will rely on the version located in the record.

5
generally confined to the record of the Board’s administrative proceedings. Gold Coast

Rand Dev. Corp. v. Lake Cnty. Assessor, 197 N.E.3d 1274, 1279 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2022);

see also, e.g., Idris v. Marion Cnty. Assessor, 12 N.E.3d 331, 333 n.7 (Ind. Tax Ct.

2014) (declining to consider newly presented evidence). As the Assessor correctly

notes, evidence not presented to the Board can only be considered under narrow,

compound circumstances defined by Indiana Code § 33-26-6-5. Under the statute, only

evidence that “could not, by due diligence, have been discovered and raised in the

administrative proceeding” and is “needed to decide disputed issues regarding . . .

[i]mproper constitution as a decision making body . . . grounds for disqualification . . .

[or] [u]nlawfulness of procedure or decision making process” may be considered.

IND. CODE § 33-26-6-5(b) (2007).

The Assessor argues, and the Court agrees, that Ciceu’s exhibits fail to meet this

narrow exception to the Court’s review limitation, thus precluding the Court from

considering the new evidence in the exhibits offered in Ciceu’s reply brief. None of

Ciceu’s exhibits are necessary to decide an issue of improper constitution,

disqualification, or unlawfulness of procedure or process. None of these exhibits were

undiscoverable prior to the Board’s administrative proceeding. And Ciceu filed no

response to the Assessor’s motion to strike arguing that these exhibits qualify for a

statutory exception to this Court’s general restriction limiting its review to the certified

administrative record. Therefore, the Court will not consider these exhibits when ruling

on the merits of this case.

Because the exhibits in question are outside of the certified administrative record

and will not be considered by the Court in deciding this case, the motion to strike is

6
denied as moot. While a reviewing court does have the plenary power to strike portions

of a brief, Pitman v. Pitman, 717 N.E.2d 627, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), the decision

whether to take such action is afforded broad discretion, Cua v. Ramos, 433 N.E.2d

745, 752 (Ind. 1982). The Assessor does not claim that the existence of these exhibits

in the record is prejudicial if the Court does not consider them in reaching its decision.

The Court finds nothing inherently prejudicial about these exhibits and finds that they

will have no effect on the outcome of the case.

Ciceu’s Constitutional and Administrative Claims in his Reply Brief Are Forfeited

Ciceu also raises two arguments about the actions of the Assessor for the first

time to this Court in his reply brief. First, Ciceu claims that the Assessor’s differing

treatment of him and his neighbors constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Second, Ciceu

argues that the Assessor’s continued litigation against him, and refusal to settle cases,

even after Ciceu has repeatedly won at the Board, constitutes administrative overreach

and improper use of funds by the county. Both arguments fail because they are not

properly before the Court.

A party cannot make an argument for the first time in his reply brief; this has long

been established practice in Indiana’s reviewing courts. State v. Marion Cir. Ct., 153

N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 1958); see also Naville v. Naville, 818 N.E.2d 552, 553 n.1 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2004) (citing Ind. R. App. Proc. 46(C)). A petitioner’s reply brief is the last filing

contemplated by the Tax Court’s automatic brief schedule. See Ind. Tax Ct. Rule 3(G).

Given that oral hearings are discretionary in this Court, a reply brief may be the last

word on a topic which the Court must decide. “It is well settled in appellate practice that

7
questions not raised or discussed in appellant’s original brief cannot be presented in

appellant’s reply brief.” Marion Cir. Ct., 153 N.E.2d at 330. Raising a new issue at such

a time would violate the basic principles of fairness, leaving the respondent unable to

make any argument regarding these issues. See City of Richmond v. Pub. Serv.

Comm’n, 406 N.E.2d 1269, 1278 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).

Ciceu does not reference the Constitution or the Assessor’s improper use of

funds in his initial briefing. Thus, allowing Ciceu to raise these issues in a reply brief

would violate the basic principles of fairness by having this Court review an argument

without both parties having the opportunity to discuss it. That Ciceu has chosen to

represent himself cannot excuse the error. Self-represented litigants are “held to the

same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” Dridi v. Cole Kline, LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361,

364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citation omitted). Ciceu must therefore adhere to “the

established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of

[his] failure to do so.” Id. (quoting Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App.

2016)). Therefore, the Court finds that Ciceu forfeited his right to raise these claims. 4

The Board Correctly Reverted the 2023 Assessment to the Previous Year’s Value

Both parties made presentations to the Board supporting their claimed value for

4
Even if Ciceu had presented these arguments at the proper time, the Court notes that parties
have a duty to walk the Court through every element of their analysis and cannot assume that
the evidence speaks for itself. See Clark Cnty. Assessor v. Meijer Stores LP, 119 N.E.3d 634,
643 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2019). For example, the Equal Protection argument in Ciceu’s reply brief
merely asserts a violation, references two property record cards, and notes two differences
between those properties and the subject property. The brief and exhibits contain no discussion
of the legal standard for an Equal Protection violation, no attempt to relate the facts in this case
to any applicable legal standard, and minimal comparison between the subject property and the
comparable properties while also failing to examine what effect, if any, those differences would
make for an Equal Protection claim. Failure to develop an argument leaves it subject to waiver.
See Wendt LLP v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 977 N.E.2d 480, 485 n.9 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2012).

8
the subject property and now criticize the Board for not finding sufficient support to

reach their desired conclusion. However, in both cases, the Board identified critical

supporting evidence missing from each party’s presentation, which led the Board to find

neither party’s value persuasive. The Court finds no reversible error in the Board’s

actions.

The Board Correctly Ignored an Appraisal Not in Evidence

Ciceu claims that the Board erred by refusing to consider an appraisal of his

property from a prior appeal that valued his home at $95,000. Ciceu testified about the

appraisal during the hearing before the Board but did not attempt to place the appraisal

report into evidence. The appraisal he references appears to be an appraisal

commissioned by the Assessor as part of Ciceu’s prior appeal of his 2022 assessment.

According to Ciceu, the appraisal shows that his home was over assessed because the

appraisal was based on an exterior review of his home and did not account for his lack

of central heat or air conditioning. He contends that, once adjusted for the cost of

installing those amenities (which he estimates at $60,000), the appraisal supports his

requested assessment of $55,000. The Court concludes that Ciceu’s claim fails

because the Board correctly declined to consider the appraisal since it was only briefly

mentioned by Ciceu in testimony and it does not appear in the certified record.

A final determination by the Indiana Board, like other administrative orders, must

be “based on evidence produced at the hearing where there is an opportunity for all

interested parties to offer evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and argue their

positions.” Indiana C.R. Comm’n v. Wellington Vill. Apartments, 594 N.E.2d 518, 527

(Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Oriental Health Spa v. City of Fort Wayne, 526 N.E.2d

9
1019, 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)), trans. denied. Documents and other evidence not

placed in the record are not part of the case. Id.; IND. CODE § 6-1.1-15-4(j) (2020)

(“Findings must be based exclusively upon the evidence on the record in the proceeding

. . . .”). For the Board to consider the appraisal Ciceu referenced in passing, the

appraisal report should have been submitted to the Board as evidence or Ciceu should

have testified in detail about its contents. Only once the appraisal’s contents are in

evidence can the Board complete the necessary task of evaluating whether the

appraisal proves the market value-in-use of the property.

Because the underlying detail of the appraisal’s analysis was not in evidence, the

Board correctly declined to consider this appraisal in valuing the property. The

appraisal’s contents were not in evidence as either an exhibit or as testimony, and

Ciceu did not take the necessary steps to demonstrate its probative value. Because the

Board lacked sufficient information about the appraisal, the Board was unable to

evaluate the evidence and could not determine whether it produced a reliable valuation

for the property.

The Board Correctly Identified Legal Requirements the Assessor Failed to Meet

The Assessor claims that the Board’s rejection of his sales comparison analysis

“effectively” requires an appraisal prepared by an expert appraiser. (Resp’t’s Resp. Br.

at 12.) As the Assessor sees it, even though the Board says that it “do[es] not mean to

imply that an appraisal by a licensed appraiser is required to prove a property’s market

value-in-use,” the Board rejected his analysis precisely because he is only a Certified

Level III Assessor-Appraiser and not an appraisal expert. (Resp’t’s Resp. Br. at 11–12

(quoting Cert. Admin. R at 114 ¶ 31).) The Court disagrees, finding that the Board did

10
not establish, implicitly or explicitly, an expert-appraiser requirement in its determination.

Instead, the Board rejected the Assessor’s sales comparison analysis because it found

that the Assessor failed to prove that the analysis conformed with generally accepted

appraisal principles.

To support his assessment, the Assessor presented a sales comparison analysis

prepared by the Assessor himself. In his analysis, the Assessor selected five

purportedly similar property sales and adjusted each sale to account for differences

between the comparable properties and the subject property. He made adjustments for

a variety of “factors such as above grade area, HVAC, basement, attic, garage, and

grade.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 110 ¶ 16. See Cert. Admin. R. 125–31.) He then quantified

the adjustments using cost tables from Indiana’s mass appraisal computer software

system. The Assessor testified about why these sales were selected, what adjustments

were made, and how the adjustments related the sale back to the subject property.

Ultimately, the Assessor arrived at adjusted sale prices ranging from $127,880 to

$202,108 and reconciled to an estimated value of $153,600 for Ciceu’s home.

In reviewing the Assessor’s analysis, the Board took issue with the Assessor’s

use of the cost tables from the mass appraisal system to adjust the comparable

properties considered in his analysis. The Board anchored its review of the Assessor’s

sales comparison analysis in an expert appraisal treatise from The Appraisal Institute

called “The Appraisal of Real Estate” that lays out a general statement of generally

accepted appraisal principles. The Board acknowledged that, according to The

Appraisal Institute, appraisers use several techniques to adjust sales, including

adjustments related to the cost of installing or removing features. The Board explained,

11
however, that “the value added or lost by the presence or absence of an item may not

equal the cost of installing or removing it . . . [because] ‘the market dictates the value

contribution of individual components to the value of the whole.’” (Cert. Admin. R. at

114 ¶ 30 (quoting THE APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 392–93

(15th ed. 2020)).) Contrasting these principles with the Assessor’s analysis, the Board

found that the Assessor “did not show that using [the] cost tables was an appropriate

way of adjusting comparables” or that the analysis was consistent with generally

accepted appraisal principles. (Cert. Admin. R. at 114 ¶ 31.)

The Board’s rejection of the Assessor’s analysis is consistent with Indiana law.

Property tax assessments are based on a property’s “true tax value,” which means the

market value of a property for its current use. 2021 REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT

MANUAL (“2021 Manual”) (incorporated by reference at 50 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2.4-1-2

(2020)) at 2. By statute, true tax value is “determined under the rules of the department

of local government finance.” IND. CODE § 6-1.1-31-6(f) (2016). Those rules require

market value-in-use to be determined “in accordance with generally recognized

appraisal principles” and specifically identify “[s]tandard appraisal and valuation texts

such as those published by the Appraisal Institute and the [International Association of

Assessing Officers as] acceptable sources for determining such principles.” 2021

Manual at 2–3. While true tax value may be discerned from an appraisal, an appraisal is

not required. 2021 Manual at 3. Here, the Board determined that the Assessor failed to

demonstrate that the adjustments used in his sales comparison analysis were applied in

accordance with generally recognized appraisal principles. Conforming with these

principles is necessary to prove true tax value. See 2021 Manual at 2; see also Grabbe

12
v. Carroll Cnty. Assessor, 1 N.E.3d 226, 231 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2013) (“[T]he probative value

of an opinion depends on whether the proponent of that opinion has shown that he

adhered to generally recognized appraisal principles in formulating the opinion.”). While

the Board did distinguish the Assessor’s expertise from that of a licensed expert

appraiser, that comparison was used to show that the Assessor’s expertise should not

be taken as evidence validating the use of cost tables for adjustment purposes. The

Board found that the Assessor’s certification as a Level III Assessor-Appraiser “shows

expertise in mass appraisal and assessment regulations” but “does not necessarily

show an expertise in the use of market-based evidence to value a specific property.”

(Cert. Admin. R. at 114 ¶ 31.) Stated another way, the Board found that the Assessor’s

assessor-appraiser certification did not qualify him as an expert in generally accepted

appraisal principles. The Board’s statement is an acknowledgment that, had the

Assessor been a licensed expert appraiser, his testimony about the methodology he

used to prepare his sales comparison analysis may have provided evidentiary support

for a finding that the analysis was prepared in accordance with generally accepted

appraisal principles. Absent that expertise, it was reasonable for the Board to conclude

that the use of cost tables to adjust comparable sales in a sales comparison analysis

lacked evidentiary support in light of the contrary authority found in The Appraisal of

Real Estate regarding cost-based adjustments.

Accordingly, the Assessor is not entitled to relief as he has not refuted the

Board’s finding or demonstrated to this Court that his analysis comported with generally

accepted appraisal principles. The Board’s determination does not foreclose sales

comparison analyses or other appraisals from certified assessor-appraisers like the

13
Assessor. It simply reaffirms the long-standing requirement that proponents of such

analyses demonstrate that the analyses conform to generally accepted appraisal

practice as required by law. The burdens that flow from that requirement derive from the

statutes and regulations governing true tax value.

CONCLUSION

The Court AFFIRMS the Board’s final determination.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11177141. Public record. Not legal advice.