# Klein

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · October 23, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11176718

## Case

- **Full name:** Henry L. Klein v. Jennifer M. Medley
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** October 23, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11176718

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming a district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on the basis of judicial immunity
- explaining dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without prejudice
- stating that state-law claim is barred where “the plaintiff's claim was against the State of Louisiana and not the named defendant acting in his individSueael Ccaopzzaocity”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

HENRY L. KLEIN CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER: 25-1047

JENNIFER M. MEDLEY DIVISION “5”

ORDER AND REASONS

This is a suit for damages – compensatory and punitive – against a sitting state-court
judge for decisions she made in a still-pending case. It is the latest episode in a years-long
crusade undertaken by Plaintiff in multiple state and federal courts seeking relief related to
numerous complicated transactions resulting from the failure of First NBC Bank.
The pleadings and documents filed by Plaintiff in this case are no less byzantine than
the underlying transactions giving rise to this (and a lot of related) litigation. Those
pleadings and their accompanying exhibits – awash in different fonts, typefaces and sizes
(and even different colors) – are often quite hard to follow, as they bounce from one case to
another and back again, only occasionally touching upon what appear to be Plaintiff’s
complaints about what the Defendant-Judge did in this case. And no matter how these
1
documents are styled, they all are painfully repetitive and continuously argue about legal
1
Plaintiff has filed a bizarre collection of heretofore un-heard of (at least to this judge) documents in this record,
including a “Request for Guidance” and “Supplemental Request for Guidance” (rec. docs. 3, 4); “Ex Parte Motion
to Appoint U.S. Marshall [sic] to Serve Summons and Thereupon to Appoint Magistrate-Judge KWR to Conduct
a Chambers v. NASCO Investigation of Fraud Upon the Courts” (rec. doc. 6); “Ex Parte Request for Order to
Protect Records and Expedited Production” (rec. doc. 15); “Response to Correction” (rec. doc. 16); “Popsrto-
asergument Observations” (rec. doc. 28); and a response to a deficiency notice entered by the Clerk’s office that
runs some 480 pages with exhibits. (Rec. doc. 31). This is all too much. And while Plaintiff is proceeding
and factual issues that are not part of this case, but pertain to the various injustices he and
2
his clients allegedly suffered in the underlying case(s).
This case is now before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
(Rec. doc. 17-1). Currently pending are two motions filed by Defendant, Judge Jennifer M.
Medley (“Judge Medley”). First is the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Entry of Prefiling
Injunction, which seeks (1) dismissal of Plaintiff’s Henry L. Klein’s (“Klein”) claims against
her, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and (2) an order
that Klein be enjoined from filing pleadings in this Court unless and until he obtains leave of
Court from the Chief Judge. (Rec. doc. 13). Second is a Motion to Stay Discovery. (Rec. doc.
18). Klein filed an opposition memorandum to the Motion to Dismiss (rec. doc. 22) but not
3
as to the Motion to Stay. Medley filed a reply to the Motion to Dismiss. (Rec. doc. 25). The
Court held oral argument on the motions, and Klein has filed a number of post-hearing
documents that will be discussed below.
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the pleadings and substantial exhibits in the record
and, based upon that review, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, rules as
fIo. llowsB. A CKGROUND

On May 27, 2025, Klein filed his Complaint naming Judge Medley of the Civil District
Court for the Parish of Orleans (“Civil District Court”) as the sole defendant. (Rec. doc. 1).

2
A perfect exHamenpsolen –v .j uSsatn dtaanysd earg o PTlahien tSifufp frileemda ac yp lCelaaduisneg osft ythleed U “nMitoetdio Snt atote Rs eCsounmsteit uOtriaoln P. r esentation,” in
which he argues that “[i]n the last few days, the Docket in 2022-03662 has been inundated with pleadings that
can't survive or Resuming oral
argument will allow each item of evidence (A-W) filed on August 14 to be introduced for Rule 57 purposes.”
(Rec. doc. 32). This is not case number 2022-03662 and whether that case can survive Plaintiff’s arguments is
Klein alleges that Judge Medley is part of a long-running conspiracy against him and his
clients. He claims that Judge Medley has violated his constitutional rightsG ainrodd tLhoea nriCgoh,t Ls LoCf
ov.t hHeernsr yu nLd. Kerle 4in2. U.S.C. § 1983 based on her rulings in the matter entitled

, Docket No. 2021-5090, currently pending in the Civil District Court for the
Parish of Orleans (the “Underlying Matter”). (Rec. doc. 13). Klein claims that the Underlying
Matter arises out of a June 15, 2021 suit by GirodLoanCo against him “as a commercial
guarantor on a Levy Gardens promissory note dated September 26, 2008.” (Rec. doc. 1).
Chief Judge Vitter previously summarized the factual and procedural background of
the Underlying MatterG iinro tdh eL OoarndCeor avn. dK lReienasons she issued remanding the case to state court
in Case No. 25-1127, . Because the details of that case are not of great
importance in deciding the jurisdictional issues raised by the pending motion to dismiss,

Chief Judge Vitter’s summary of those proceedings suffices for present purposes.
It is clear that Klein wants very badly to have his various complaints adjudicated in
this Court rather than state court. He twice removed the Underlying Matter to this Court: on
October 1, 2024, after which the case was remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
and then again on June 4, 2025, a, fter his Motion to recuse Judges eMeedley was denied in state
court. (No. 24-2366, Rec. doc. 1 30; No. 25-1127, Rec. doc. 1; Id. Klein’s Exhibits H, I, J, K,
and L). That case was remanded as well by Chief Judge Vitter. ( , rec. doc. 51).
Klein claims that Judge Medley violated his rights as secured by the First, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by denying him access to courts
and “threaten[ing] sanctions for free speech and expression.” (Rec. doc. 1). According to
Klein, Judge Medley committed these wrongs when she “engaged in a pattern of summary
subpoena to Klein’s wife as part of post-judgement discoverIyd .regarding Klein’s assets, and
threatened sanctions against him if he violated her orders. ( ).
As his remedy, Klein requests that Judge Medley be fouIdn.d liable and that she be

ordered to pay him damages, both compensatory and punitive. ( ).
It is worth noting that Klein’s license to practice law in Louisiana was suspended in
2023, largelyp froor hseis actions in the litigation underlying this case. He has elected to represent
himself asId a. litigant in the current matter rather than seek reinstatement of his law
license. ( ).
On August 27, 2025, Judge Medley filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against
her under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Rec. doc. 13). Judge Medley asserts that this Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Kleins’ claims based on the following legal defenses:

(1) she is entitled to ElevenRtho oAkmere-nFdelmdmenatn immunity and is not a “person” for purposes of a
Section 1983 claim; (2) the Younger doctrine applies; (3) the Court may abstain from
hearing the claims based on the Id.)a. b stention doctrine; and (4) that Judge Medley is
entitled to absolute judicial immunity. ( These are the jurisdictional arguments currently
before LthEeG CAoLu SrtT. ANDARDS
II. A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Federal RuleP roifc eC viv. iIlr oPnrsocedure 12(b)(1) governs challenges to a court's subject

matter jurisdiction. , No. CV 19-11451, 2020 WL 1638376, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 2,
2020). “A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdHiocmtioen B wuihldeenr tsh Aes sc'onu ortf
lMaicskss., tIhnec .s tva. tuCtitoyr yo fo rM caodnisstointutional power to adjudicate the case.” Nowak v.
Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund
, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)). Because a 12(b)(1)
motion is jurisdictional, a court considers such a motion “before addressing any attack on
the merits” in order to “ pInr ervee FnEt[M ]A a Tcroauirlet rw Fiothrmouatl djuerhiysddeic Ptiroond f. rLoimab p. Lreitmiga.turely dismissing

a case with prejudice.” Ramming v. United States (Miss. Plaintiffs),
668 F.3d 281, 286-87 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting , 281 F.3d 158, 161
(5th Cir. 2001)). Nevertheless, a court uses “the saSmeee D sotoalnedya vr. dP”r iwnchiepni analyzing a Rule
12(b)(1) motion as it would a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. , 250 F. App'x 114,
115-16 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
Unlike in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, though, “[c]ourts may dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction on any one of three bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the Ccloamrkp vl.a Tinatr rsaunptp Clteym.,ented by

undisputed facts plus the court's rWesilolilaumtiosonn o vf .d Tisupcukteerd facts.” 798 F.2d
736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing , 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Importantly, the party invoking federal jurisdiction – inS eteh iCse cleasstein Kel ev.i nT r–a hnasWs tohoed burden of
demonstrating that subject matter jurisdiction exists.R amming , Inc., 467
F. App'xB .3 1F7e,d 3e1r8a l( 5Rtuhl eC ior.f 2C0iv1i2l )P (rpoecre dcuurriea m12) ((bc)it(i6n)g , 281 F.3d at 161).

To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a party must plead “suffiAcisehnctr ofaftc vtu. Iaqlb malatter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claBimel lt oA trle. lCieofr pth. av.t Tisw polmaubsliyble on its face.’” , 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the couIrdt. to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” A court
Lormand v. US Unwired
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” , Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232
(5th Cir. 2009).
A legally sufficienSet ec oImqbpallaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the

party's claim is true. , 556 U.S. at 678. It need not contain “‘detailed factual
allegations,’” but it must go be”y o Snede “i‘dla.bels and cTownoclmubsiloyns’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.’ (quoting , 550 U.S. at 555). In other words,
“[t]he complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken as true) (3) to
raise a reasonable hope oLr oerxmpaenctdation (4) that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of
each element of a claim.” , 565 F.3d at 257 (citations omitted). The claim must be
dismissed if thereT awroem inbslyufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level,” , 550 U.S. at 55S5ee, o Jro nife ist vis. Bapocpkarent from the face of the complaint

that there is an insuperable bar to relief. , 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).
“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a disCtorlilcitn sc ovu. Mrto mrguasnt
lSitmanitl eitys eDlfe taon t hWe ictotenrtents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto.”
, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). “The court may also consider
documents attached to either a motion to dismiss or an opposition to that motion wheBnra tnhde
dCooucupomne Nntest waroer kr, eLf.eLr.Cre. vd. Ctoa tianl itnhae Mpkletagd. Cinogrsp .and are central to a plaintiff's claims.”
, 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014). Otherwise,
if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion

must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s complaint does not indicate clearly whether he is suing Judge Medley in her
official capacity or individual capacity. Defendant thus moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

against herA o. nO bfofitchi aglr-oCuanpdasc. i ty Claims

In support of her motion, Judge Medley first contends that Klein’s claim for damages
against her in her official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Rec. doc. 13). In
opposition, Klein argues in purely conclusory fashion, that “[n]o aspect of the Eleventh
Amendment protects [Judge Medley] from the consequences of her actions in the case at bar”
and that “[s]ection 1983 plaintiffs seeking damages for constitutional violations are entitled
to compensatory damages and punitive damages, a fact-intensive issue too early to decide.”

(Rec. doc. 22). Because tSheies Jqeuffeesrtsioonn vis. L oan. eS toaf tseu Sbujepcrte mmae tCteoru rjutrisdiction, the Court considers
it under Rule 12(b)(1). , 2002 WL 1973897, at *1 (5th
Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“[E]leventh amendment immunity deprivMecsD tohnea cldo uvr. tB odf. osuf bMjiescst.
mLeavtetee rC ojumrimsd'risction of the action.” (alteration in origiYnsalle)t a(q dueolt Sinugr Pueblo v. Texas
, 832 F.2d 901, 906 (5th Cir. 1987))); , 36 F.3d
1325, 1336 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment operates as a jurisdictional bar.”).
The Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides as follows:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. This language expressly encompasses not only suits brought agaiSneset
Ha astnast ev. b Lyo cuiitsiizaennas of another state, but suPitasp aagsaainn svt. Aa lslatainte by citizens of that same stasetee. a lso
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman ); Edelman v. Jordan
, 465 U.S. 89, 98, 104 (1984 ,
415 U.S. 651, 663, 694 (1974). Under the Eleventh Amendment, “anE udne-lcmoannsenting State is
immune from suits brought in federal courts by her owSene cCiotizzzeon vs.. ”T angipaho,a 4 P1a5r .U C.oSu. 6nc5i1l-,

P6r6e3s i(d1e9n7t4 G)o. vL'touisiana is such an un-consenting state.
, 279 F.3d 273, 281 (5th Cir. 2002) (“By statute, Louisiana has refused any
such waiver of its Eleventh Amendment sosevee raelsigon H oimllimdauyn vit. yB dr.e ogfa Srudpinegr vsisuoirtss oifn L SfeUd Aergarl.
c&o Muretcsh.”. (Ccoiltli.ng La. Rev. Stat. § 13:5106(A)));
, 149 So. 3d 227, 229 (La. 2014) (“While Louisiana may have waived sovereign
immunity with respect to some claims, La. Const. art. 1 § 26 makes it clear the State has not
waived its sovereignty within the federal system.”).
PGreincee rva. lIlryo, ntsherefore, Louisiana enjoys immunity against suits brought in federal

court. , No. CV 19-11451, 2020 WL 1638Se3e7 R6,i cahta *r3d (sEo.nD v. .L Sa. .U Anpivr.. 2, 2020). This
immunity extends to suits brought under state law. , 118 F.3d 450,
453 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that state-law claim is barred where “the plaintiff's claim was
against the State of Louisiana and not the named defendant acting in his individSueael
Ccaopzzaocity”). Importantly for present purposes, it also applies to suits under Section 1983.
, 279 F.3d at 281 (stating that “Congress may only abrogate a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity by ‘unequivocally’ expresFslian. gP rietsp aiindt ePnots ttsoe cdonod saory aEnddu cb. yE xapcetninseg
‘Bpdu. rvs.u Caonltl. tSoa va. vBaalnidk exercise of power,’” (quoting

, 527 U.S. 627, 634 (1999)), and “that in enacting § 1983, Congress did
‘not explicitly and by clear langQuaugeern i vn.d Jiocradtaen on its face an intent to sweep away the
immunity of the States’” (quoting , 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979))).
The Eleventh Amendment bar ePxetennndhsu rtost suits against state officials when “the state
is a real, substantial party in interest.” , 465 U.S. at 101–02. Thus, the general rule
is that relief sought againstH aanll ovf. fLicoeuri siisa nina fact against the sovereign if the decree would

operate against the latter. , 974 F. Supp. 2d 964 (M.D. La. 2013). And, as
when the state itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a
Psueintn ahguarisntst a state is barred rseegea ardlsloesOsk opfa lwobhie vth. Feor sitte rseeks damages or injunctive relief.
, 465 U.S. at 101–02; , 244 F.3d 405, 412 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding that plaintiff cannot evade Eleventh Amendment immunity by naming an individual
state officer as a defendant in lieu of the state itself).
Therefore, this immunity extends not only to suits against Louisiana itself, but also to
Psuriictse avg. Iarionnsst Louisiana officials acting in their official capacity, including state-court judges.

, 2020 WL 1638376, at *3. Indeed, “[s]uit.”s aHgaafienrs vt. sMtaetloe officials in their official
cseaep aaclsitoy W. . .i lslh vo. uMldic bhe. Dtreepa'tte odf aSst sauteit sP aogliacienst the State , 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991);
, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state
official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against
the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.”).
Here, Judge Medley, as a Louisiana state district court judge, is a state actor and is being
sued as such. Accordingly, the Court considers Plaintiff’s claim for damages against Judge
Medley as Soenee D aagvaiisn vs.t T haerrr ainnt h Cetry .o, Tffeicxial capacity; the Eleventh Amendment therefore bars

the claim. ., 565 F.3d 214, 228 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Texas judges are
entitled to Eleventh AmendmCeanint ivm. mCiutyn oitfy N foerw c Olarilmeasn assserted against them in their official
capacitiCesa ians vs.t aWteh aitcetors.”); , 281 F. Supp. 3d 624, 646 (E.D. La.
immunity would applyS utmo ma esrus ivt . fLooru irseiatrnoaspective relief against Orleans Parish Criminal
District Court judges); , No. 13-4573, 2013 WL 3818560, at *4 (E.D. La.
July 22, 2013) (finding that “an official-capacity claim against [a Louisiana judge] would in

reality be a claim against the state itself, and any such claims would be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment”).
As best as the Court can glean from the pleadings and statements made at oral
argument, Klein urges that the Eleventh Amendment does not shield Judge Medley’s conduct
here because her acts were “administrative,” not “adjudicative.” The argument is that Judge
Medley’s “unconventional and unprecedented practice of summary denials of all Klein
Motions . . . without a hearing were not ‘adjudications’ but administrative abberations.” (Rec.
doc. 22). There is nothing of substance offered in support of this conclusory argument, save

for citation to a Louisiana Supreme Court decision that bears no factual resemblance to the
underlying facts of this case. Palowsky v. Campbell ,
4
Klein relies heavily on a Louisiana case involving allegations
that the judge’s law clerk had a history of intentionally destroying or concealing court
documents, that she destroyed multiple court documents related to plaintiff’s underlying
suits, and that all of the jIudd.ges ofP tahloawt csokuyrt conspired with the clerk to cover-up her alleged
document destruction. The Court consIdid.ered these to be “highly unusual and
specific allegations” meriting further investigation. at 467.
Here, Klein (again in purely conclusory fashion and only in his opposition
memorandum) claims that Judge Medley’s clerk, non-party Chelsea Hale, committed the
Palowsky v. Campbell rev’d by Palowsky v. Campbell
4
, 22-589 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/14/23), 378 So.3d 212, 216, ,
Palowsky
“exact misconduct” in this case as was alleged in by making a handwritten caption
correction on a document whose importance is never described or alleged by Klein. Even
after oral argument, the Court still has no idea what the significance of this alleged caption

correction is or was or how Klein was in any way prejudiced bPy aitlo. wTshkey argument is a classic
red herring, made solely in an attempt to align this case with . It does not align at
all – even taking Klein’s allegations as true.
It is worth noting again here that it is Klein’s burden to establish subject matter
jurisdiction, meaning it is his burden to establish to the Court’s satisfaction that the Eleventh
Amendment does not apply here to bar his official-capacity claims. His conclusory and
confusing arguments do not satisfy that burden. The Court is convinced that the Eleventh
Amendment bars his official-capacity claims against Judge Medley and that dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(1) is appropriate. Given that the Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's
claims against Judge MReodolkeeyr i-nF ehldemr oafnficial capacity, the Court does not pYrooucnegeedr to consider
the application of the doctrine or to consider whether abstention
would otheBr.w Iisned bivei dapuparl-oCparpiaatcei.t y Claims

Judge Medley also argues that any claims against her in her individual capacity or any
claims arising under state law (the existence of which are unclear), also fail because she is
entitled to absolute juSdeiec iBaal lilmarmd uvn. Witya.l l (Rec. doc. 13). The Court considers this argument

under Rule 12(b)(6). , 413 F.3d 510, 514, 520 (5th Cir. 2005) (affirming a
district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on the basis of judicial immunity).
“Judicial officers are entitled to absolute immunity fro.m” B colaydim vs. Bfoigrg dearsmages arising
284 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Such absolute immunity Smeee aMnisr ethleast v j.u Wdgaecso are “immun[e]
from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” , 502 U.S. 9, 11
(1991). Indeed, “[j]udicial immunity can be overcome only by showing that the actions

complained of were nonjudicial in natBuoryed or by showing thcaitt itnhge M aicrteiolenss were taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.” , 31 F.3d at 284 ( , 502 U.S. at 11-12).
Actions are “judicial in nature if they are ‘normally peIrdf.ormed by aM jiurdelgees’ and the parties
affected ‘dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.’” (quoting , 502 U.S. at 12).
Accordingly, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in
error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, heP whailnl bv.e H saunbejenct to
liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”M ays v. Sudderth, No.
23-20598, 2024 WL 3593902, at *1 (5th Cir. July 31, 2024) (quoting , 97

F.3d 107, 111 (5thId C.ir. 1996 S)t)u. m “pJu vd. iScpiaalr ikmmmanunity is also applicable in caPsieesr saosns evr. tRinayg civil
rights violations.” (citing , 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); , 286
U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967)). ThereforeS, eeev eMni raellleesging that a judge acted with “bad faith or
malice” d oMesc Anloets tperre cvl.u Bdreo iwmnmunity. , 502 U.S. at 11.
In , the Fifth Circuit relied upon the following four factors to
determine whether a judge was acting within his judicial jurisdiction: (1) whether the
precise act complained of, use of the contempt power, is a normal judicial function; (2)
whether the events involved occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) whether the controversy

centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) whether the confrontation
arose directly and immediately out oMf ac Avliessitte tro the judge in his official capacity. 469 F.2d
1280, 1282 (5th Cir.1972). The four factors are to be broadly construed in favor
of immunity, and immunity should not be denied where the denial carries the potential of
raising more than a frivolous concAedrna mins av . juMdcgIelh'sa nmyind that to take proper action might
expose him to personal liability. , 764 F.2d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1985)
(emphMasciAsl aedstdeerd). In some situatioInds., immunity is to be afforded even though one or more

of the factors is not met.
In this case, Klein essentially argues that the first factor – whether the precise act
complained of is a normal judicial function – is not met. The relevant inquirMy irreegleasrding this
is an examination of the “nature and function” of the act, not the act itself. , 502 U.S.
at 288. The Court is toI dlo. ok to the particular act's relation to a general function normally
performed by a judge.
The acts that Klein complains of are clearly judicial in nature. Klein contends that
Judge Medley “engaged in a pattern of summary denials of rules to show cause without

hearings,” denied a motion to enroll, issued a subpoena to Klein’s wife as part of post-
judgment discovery regarding Kleins assets, and threatened him with sanctions if he violated
her orders. (Rec. doc. 1). His claims arise out of judicial acts occurring during, or arising
from, state-court matters over which she has presided and is currently presiding. Any ruling
that Plaintiff may seek to disturb, revisit, or derive money damages from arose directly out
of Judge Medley’s official-capacity duties in light of a motion or other proceeding held in her
chambers or respective courtroom – all related to the Underlying Matter. The acts
complained of here are inescapably judicial. Palowsky

As he does in addressing the Eleventh Amendment argument, Klein relies on
to argue that Judge Medley was not acting in her adjudicatory role during the
“unconventional and unprecedented practice of SUMMARY DENIALS of all [his] motions” in
the Underlying matter. (Rec. doc. 22). As noted earlier, he argues that Judge Medley’s “serial
denials without a hearing wIde.re not ‘. . . adPjuadloicwastkioyn vs. .C .a .m ’ pbbuet laldministrative aberrations,”
not entitled to immunity. ( ). However, is not applicable here. The
Court in that case found that judicial immunity did not extend to a judge’s supervision and

Iind.vestigation of a law clerk’s activities, considering these acts to be administrative functions.
at 467. Here, the thrust of Klein’s claims arises from issuance of orders and the
management andP rciocentrol of Judge Medley’s docket—actions that are core aspects of judicial
administration. , 2020 WL 1638376, at *4. Subpoenas and summary denials without
hearings pertain to judicial acts inherent in case management and procedural oversight,
duties that lie within the authority of judges to control the orderly progression of litigation.
And Ms. Hale’s name isn’t even mentioned in the Complaint, so tethering his case against
Judge Medley to a non-articulated claim for failing to supervise her law clerk is unavailing.

Furthermore, Klein doesn’t bother to explain the nature of any the various summary denials
– what relief did the motions or rules seek and under what circumstances were they denied?
And finally, even if Plaintiff’s allegations could be read as suggesting that Judge
Medley acted with malice, it nonetheless involves Judge Medley acting in her judicial capacity
of presiding over Plaintiff’s proceedings. Based on the substance of Plaintiff’s claims, the
judge enjoyCs. aRbesoqluuetest i mfomr Purneit-yfi.l Tinhgu sIn, djuisnmctisiosanl under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.

In her Motion to Dismiss, Judge Medley also seeks an order of this Court directing that

Klein be enjoined from filing any additional pleadings or complaints in this Court, unless and
until he has obtained leave of Court from the Chief Judge. As I noted at the hearing on the
motion, while such relief is available under certain circumstances, I do not believe it
litigant’s rights cross the entire Court for the foreseeable future. That portion of the motion
will be denDie. dD wisitmhoisusta pl rWejiutdhi coer tWo iDthefoeuntd Parnet jtuod riecfei le before a District Judge.

OrHdainlea vri. lKyi, n“ga court should grant a pro se party every reasonPaebñlae vo. pUpnoitretdu nSittayt etso
amend,” , 642 F.3d 492, 503 n.36 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting ,
157 F.3d 984, 987 n.3 (5Idt.h Cir. 19s9e8e) a),l s“ou nPlreiscse it is obvious from the record that the plaintiff
has pled his best case.” at 503; , 2020 WL 1638376, at *5. Klein filed with his
Complaint twelve (12) exhibits thOaptp toostiatilo 1n2 t1o Mpaogteiosn. t(oR Decis. mdioscs. 1). He then filed ten (10)
exhibits that total 82 pages in his . (Rec. doc. 22). He has had
the benefit of oral argument and thereafter filed two more pleadings totaling some 480
pages. (Rec. doc. 28, 31). Despite these prolix filings, the precise bases for his claim for

damages against Judge Medley remain in turns vague, conclusory, and rambling. Moreover,
Klein spends most of his Complaint and other filings complaining about the actions of
GirodLoanCo and its counsel, as well as his representation of non-parties in other related
litigation, Regina Heisler and the Pittmans, neither of whom are parties even toP otshte-
AUrngduemrleynint gO bMsaetrtveart.i o nEsven after the presentation of oral argument and the filing of
, Klein does not suggest how he could ever amend the substance of
his allegations to cure the jurisdictional defects discussed above. These are not curable
defects in tEh.e CMooutrito’ns vtioe wSt.a y Discovery

Because the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims and is
dismissing this matter, the Motion to Stay Discovery will be denied as moot.
IV. CONCLUSION

For reasons known only to him, Mr. Klein has decided to forego the appellate
processes in state court and resort to this Court to redress his grievances against a state-

court judge who did no more than rule against him in her court. Following oral argument, it
is clear he seeks to substitute this Court’s jurisdiction for a state-court appeal of the rulings
he objects to. These statements are telling:
THE COURT: I'm going to ask you a question again: Why didn't
you appeal any of these orders?
Henson v. Santander
MR. KLEIN: I have seen -- I've been before 50 state judges who
have not -- who have not enforced . I've
been before 50 state court judges.

THE COURT: You're going to tell me that you think it was a waste
of time.

MR. KLEIN: Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes, I am. I have told you.

. . . .

MR. KLEIN: I am seeking what the United States Supreme Court
called prompt succor in a court that is capable of giving me
prompt succor. I have said often -- and I have said to you, Your
Honor -- filing matters in the Fourth Circuit – state court of
appeals is a vain and useless thing.

. . . .

MR. KLEIN: I do not have to tilt at windmills, Your Honor. I
don't.

(Rec. doc. 35 (Transcript) at 13, 19-20)(emphasis added).
Klein’s belief – no matter how sincerely held – that his appellate efforts would be
unsuccessful is not an excuse to run to federal court with a lawsuit against the state district
5
judge who ruled against him. This is an inappropriate and unavailing gambit, which should
come as no surprise to any lawyer with even a basic understanding of the concepts of
federalism and comity. His words reveal that Klein is apparently not one of those lawyers:
Comity and federalism are, of course, very important. But NOT
when the state court proceedings are NOT " . . . judpiaciraeln . s. .p" aatnrdia ae
multibillion dollar fleecing of Louisiana citizenry is taking place
unchecked. This Court of law and order has a
responsibility to take command and protect the vulnerable.

(Rec. doc. 22 at 8). The Court begs to differ. Comity and federalism are bedrock principles
and are always important – and they do not allow or require this Court to “take command”
of an ongoing state-court proceeding to protect a litigant who won’t even avail himself of
available state appellate processes. What they require is dismissal of this case.
FITo rI Sth OeR foDrEeRgoEiDng reasons,
GRANTED that the Motion to DDisImSMissIS oSnE SB eWhaITlf HoOf JUuTdg PeR JeEnJUniDfeIrC EM6edley (rec.
doc. 13) is IN PART. The Court DISMISSES WITH PR pElJaUinDtiIfCf’Es
claims against Judge Medley in her official capacity and DENIES
Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Medley in her indiviDdEuaNlI EcaSp AacSi tMy.O OThTe Court the
request for pre-filing injunction (rec. doc. 13) and the Motion to Stay
Discovery. (Rec. doc. 18).
5
The Court does not doubt that Klein sincerely believes that he and his clients have been wronged by the
various parties in the related cases and it’s clear that his lack of success in state court has both frustrated him
and fueled his increasingly overzealous efforts to seek redress for those alleged wrongs. But too much is too
much and suing a presiding state-court judge in federal court rather than using the state appellate process is
s6imply beyoMnidtc thheell pv.a Blea. i l ey see also Taylor v. Owens
The Fifth Circuit has made clear that a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction must bHe ammapdteo nw vit. hPoauct.
pInrve.j uMdgimcet.. Co. LLC , 982 F.3d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 2020); , 990 F.3d 493, 496 (6th
Cir. 2021) (explaining dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without prejudice);
, 869 F.3d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . . .
23rd October
New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2025.

MICHAEL B. NORTH
UNIT ED ST ATES M AGIST RATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11176718. Public record. Not legal advice.