# Bradney

> District Court, W.D. Missouri · October 23, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11176668

## Case

- **Full name:** Joshua Bradney v. Cedar County Sheriff’s Department, James “JimBob” McCrary et. al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** October 23, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11176668

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming district court dismissal of county jail and sheriff’s department as parties because they are not suable entities
- stating that “departments or subdivisions” of local government are not “juridical entities suable as such”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA BRADNEY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 6:24-cv-03263-MDH

CEDAR COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT, JAMES “JIMBOB”

McCRARY et. al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants Cedar County, Missouri, Cedar County Sheriff’s
Department, Robert Graves and Sheriff James “JimBob” McCrary’s (collectively “Cedar County
Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. (Docs. 47). Cedar County
Defendants have submitted their Suggestions in Support (Doc. 48) and Plaintiff has failed to
respond. The motion is now ripe for adjudication on the merits. For reasons herein, Cedar County
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out Plaintiff’s disclosure of alleged physical and sexual abuses he suffered
by staff members or other boys at Agape Boarding School (“Agape”) to members of the Cedar
County Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Indiana and Defendants are all
residents of Missouri.
Plaintiff was a student at Agape from 2014 to 2016. Plaintiff alleges that the Cedar County
Sheriff’s Department was often at the school conducting conceal carry classes for the community
and would watch the students on Valentine’s Day. Plaintiff alleges during these events he would
tell various members of the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department of the abuses that were occurring
on the premises of Agape. Plaintiff alleges he told them that he had been physically and sexually
abused by the other boys at the school and by the staff. Plaintiff alleges he would show them the

scars from being shanked; however, no action was taken.
Plaintiff alleges he reached out to multiple members of the Cedar County Sheriff’s
Department who would tell Plaintiff to go talk to the staff. Plaintiff alleges that the sheriff’s
deputies were on the premises when one of the boys allegedly raped Plaintiff in the bathroom.
Plaintiff alleges he reported the incident immediately thereafter, but no action was taken. Plaintiff
states he was aware of five boys who ran away from Agape Boarding School and who were
returned to the school by the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department with punishments following any

reports made to law enforcement by the Agape staff.
Plaintiff brings nine counts in this action: Count One – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Train;
Count Two – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Protect; Count Three – Aiding and Abetting
Constitutional Violations; Count Four – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Supervisory Liability; Count Five –
Action under 18 U.S.C. § 1581 et seq.; Count Six – Negligence; Count Seven – Negligent Failure
to Supervise Children; Count Eight – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and Count Nine

– Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint should be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against Cedar County
Sheriff’s Department; Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to support a claim under 18 U.S.C. §
1581; Plaintiff’s tort claims are barred by sovereign immunity; Plaintiff fails to state a claim for
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants in their
official capacity. The Court will take each in turn.
STANDARD

A complaint must contain factual allegations that, when accepted as true, are sufficient to
state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face. Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2010)
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The Court “must accept the allegations
contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party.” Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). The
complaint’s factual allegations must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level,” and the motion to dismiss must be granted if the complaint does not contain “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545
(2007). Further, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
DISCUSSION
I. Cedar County Sheriff’s Department

Cedar County Defendants first argue that the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department is not a
suable entity. The Court agrees. A sheriff’s department is not a suable entity. See De la Garza v.
Kandiyohi Cty. Jail, 18 F. App’x 436, 437 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court dismissal of
county jail and sheriff’s department as parties because they are not suable entities); see also Owens
v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[C]ounty jails are not legal entities
amenable to suit.”); Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that
“departments or subdivisions” of local government are not “juridical entities suable as such”). The
Court finds no statutory authorization for the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department to sue or be sued.
For these reasons, Cedar County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Cedar County Sheriff’s
Department is GRANTED. Cedar County Sheriff’s Department is hereby dismissed from this
case.

II. 18 U.S.C. § 1581
Plaintiff brings Count Five – Action Under 18 U.S.C. § 1581 et seq. against all Defendants.
Cedar County Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not cure the deficiencies outlined in the Court’s
April 28, 2025, Order as there is no particularity as to when Cedar County Defendants received
any alleged benefit for any alleged participation in any alleged joint venture. Cedar County

Defendants further assert that there are no facts describing what benefits Cedar County Defendants
received from the participation short of an allegation that some bulletin from an unknown Sunday
service contained a comment that some unidentified Cedar County Defendants received a donation
from the church. Cedar County Defendants lastly argue that 18 U.S.C. § 1581 is a criminal statute
and thus a private party does not have standing to enforce it.
18 U.S.C. § 1595, often referred to as the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization

Act, provides a private right of action for human trafficking victims to sue their traffickers. On
December 23, 2008, this right of action was expanded, allowing suits against not only traffickers
themselves, but also those who knowingly benefit from a trafficking venture. Following the 2008
amendments, the law, in pertinent part, provides as follows:
An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action
against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, or attempts or conspires to
benefit, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a
venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in
violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and
may recover damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a)
Drew v. Householder, No. 6:22-CV-03211-MDH, 2023 WL 8789744, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 19,
2023).

Taking the allegations in the Complaint as true for the purpose of a motion to dismiss,
Plaintiff has failed to raise a right to relief above a speculative level. Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint
alleges:
Defendant Cedar County and the Cedar County Sheriff’s office received cash
donations from Agape Baptist Church d/b/a/ Agape Boarding School as shown in
their Sunday bulletins. Upon information and belief, these donations were made on
a regular basis. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff understands that Cedar
County Sheriff’s office received remuneration for the conceal carry classes that
were conducted on Agape grounds and they received permission for the firearms
classes to be held at that location. The receiving of monetary donations and an event
space for their classes constituted benefits conferred by the joint adventure between
Agape and Cedar County Sheriff’s office.
(Complaint ¶¶ 69, 70, and 72). Plaintiff’s Compliant demonstrates that Defendant Agape Baptist
Church made donations to Cedar County and the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department. However,
this does not show nor constitute a benefit from an alleged tracking venture. Plaintiff fails to state
the amount of the donations, the timing of the donations as it relates to the current action, or how
those donations were considered anything more than charity to the local county sheriff’s
department. Likewise, the renumeration for concealed carry classes are just that, payment for the
use of space. While Plaintiff may attempt to plead a cause of action that Cedar County Defendants
received a benefit for a venture in violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act, the allegations are tenuous and lack specificity for the Court to find this cause of action raises
a right to relief above a speculative level. For the reasons stated, Cedar County Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss Count Five – Action Under 18 U.S.C. § 1581 et seq. is GRANTED.
III. State Tort Claims
A. Cedar County, Missouri
Plaintiff brings Counts Six – Negligence, against Defendant McCrary and Graves in their
individual and official capacities. Plaintiff brings Count Seven – Negligent Failure to Supervise
Children;1 Count Eight – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and Count Nine – Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress against all Defendants. Cedar County Defendants argue that

Plaintiff’s Counts Six through Nine are barred by sovereign immunity. Defendants further argue
that Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts that any exception to sovereign immunity applies and
thus these counts should be dismissed.
Sovereign immunity has existed by statute in Missouri since 1977, with certain exceptions
that Missouri courts construe narrowly. Specifically, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600, provides that
municipalities generally retain sovereign immunity for both negligent and intentional tort claims
unless an express exception applies. See White v. Dulany, No. 2:21-CV-04103-MDH, 2021 WL

4303602, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Sept 21, 2021). Review of the statute demonstrates that sovereign
immunity can be waived, for example, in automobile cases and cases involving injury caused by a
dangerous condition of public property. Additionally, Missouri Courts have long held that for a
plaintiff to successfully bring a tort claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must plead specific
facts that the municipality falls under one of the statutory exceptions. White v. Dulany, No. 2:21-
CV-04103-MDH, 2021 WL 4303602, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Sept 21, 2021) (citing Epps v. City of Pine
Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 594 (8th Cir. 2003)). Although sovereign immunity is a tort protection for
government entitles, not their employees, public employees are covered by two different
government immunity doctrines: the official immunity and public duty doctrines. Southers v. City

of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. 2008), as modified on denial of reh’g (Sept. 30, 2008).

1 Under Missouri law there is no cause of action titled negligent failure to supervise children. Missouri does
recognize a cause of action titled negligent supervision. The Court will therefore construe this cause of action as a
negligent supervision claim.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to specifically plead facts demonstrating that his claims are within
an exception to sovereign immunity. Cedar County, Missouri is a political subdivision of the State
of Missouri. Defendant Cedar County, Missouri is entitled to sovereign immunity absent
specifically pleaded facts demonstrate that Plaintiff’s claim falls within an exception as defined by

Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 537.600.1 or 537.600.2. Nowhere in Plaintiff’s Complaint does he plead any
facts that would indicate that Defendant Cedar County has purchased liability insurance for tort
claims covered under Counts Seven through Nine. As such, Defendant Cedar County is entitled to
sovereign immunity against Plaintiff’s tort claims. For the reasons stated, Defendants Motion to
Dismiss Count Seven – Negligent Failure to Supervise Children, Count Eight – Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress and Count Nine – Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress is
GRANTED as to Defendant Cedar County, Missouri.

B. Defendants McCrary and Graves
i. Official Capacities with the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department
Defendants McCrary and Graves to the extent they are sued in their official capacities as

part of the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department are entitled to sovereign immunity. Sovereign
immunity bars any suits against states and their employees in their official capacities. Montin v.
Moore, 846 F.3d 289, 292 (8th Cir. 2017); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–13, 119
S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). Congress can abrogate sovereign immunity, like it has for
claims filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or states can waive sovereign immunity, but in the
absence of such abrogation or waiver, sovereign immunity bars all suits. Montin v. Moore, 846
F.3d 289, 292 (8th Cir. 2017); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54–55, 116
S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). Defendants McCrary and Graves, in their official capacities
within the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department, are employees of Cedar County, Missouri, a
political subdivision of the State of Missouri. Thus, Defendants McCrary and Graves are entitled
to sovereign immunity in their official capacities with the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department. As
sovereign immunity applies to Defendants McCrary and Graves, and Plaintiff has not shown any
abrogation or waiver of sovereign immunity, Plaintiff’s Counts Six through Nine as they apply to

Defendants McCrary and Graves in their official capacities with the Cedar County Sheriff’s
Department must be dismissed. For the reasons stated, Defendants Motion to Dismiss Count Six
– Negligence, Count Seven – Negligent Failure to Supervise Children, Count Eight – Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress and Count Nine – Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress is
GRANTED as to Defendants McCrary and Graves in their official capacities with the Cedar
County Sheriff’s Department.
ii. Individual Capacities Regarding Negligence Claims

Cedar County Defendants next argue that McCrary and Graves are entitled to official
immunity as to Plaintiff’s negligence claims against them in their individual capacities. Cedar
County Defendants state that Plaintiff’s Complaint is void of any specific allegation as to when
McCrary and Graves became aware of reports of abuse, details regarding the investigation into the
abuse, what was done in response to such knowledge, and what role McCrary or Graves were
acting in during the period of time Plaintiff was at Agape. Defendants additionally argue that

Plaintiff fails to detail when McCrary and Graves had supervision of the students at Agape.
Missouri applies the doctrine of official immunity to “protect[] public employees from
liability for alleged acts of negligence committed during the course of their official duties for the
performance of discretionary acts.” Letterman v. Does, 859 F.3d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 207) (quoting
Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. 2008)). “The official immunity
doctrine, however, does not provide public employees immunity for torts committed when acting
in a ministerial capacity.” Id. “A discretionary act requires the exercise of reason in the adaptation
of means to an end and discretion in determining how or whether an act should be done or course
pursued,” id., while a ministerial function “is one of a clerical nature which a public officer is
required to perform upon a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate

of legal authority, without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of the
act to be performed[.]” Id. Which category an act falls into is determined “on a case-by-case basis”
considering three factors: “(1) the nature of the public employee’s duties; (2) the extent to which
the act involves policymaking or exercise of professional judgment; and (3) the consequences of
not applying official immunity.” Id. However, official immunity does not apply where the
discretionary act “is willfully wrong or done with malice or corruption.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff alleges “[d]uring the times that they supervised the boys, they each learned

that boys were being abused at the school.” (Complaint ¶ 79). “Despite such knowledge, the
Defendants breached their duty to protect Joshua when they failed to protect Joshua from the
abuses, neglect and misfeasance described herein.” (Complaint ¶ 82). Plaintiff further argues that
Defendants actions in threatening to taze Plaintiff for reporting, failing to take any action when the
crimes on his body were reported, refused to make the required reports to the Children’s Division
and otherwise preventing those who could act on his behalf from leaning of or taking action created
liability.2 (Complaint ¶ 92).

Defendants McCrary and Graves are entitled to official immunity arising out of
employment as deputies of the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff has failed to allege

2 Plaintiff alleges Defendants actions in threatening to taze Joshua for reporting but nowhere in the Complaint does
Plaintiff state who made the threat other than a general allegation that “Plaintiff made so many reports to law
enforcement when they were on premises, that he reports that they threatened to taze him if he kept bothering them.”
(Complaint ¶ 24).
any ministerial capacity that would exclude Defendants McCrary and Graves from official
immunity. Missouri case law holds that the investigation of a crime and the decision to arrest a
suspect constitute discretionary acts for purposes of Missouri’s official-immunity doctrine. Jiang
v. Porter, 156 F.Supp.3d 996, 1006 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (citing Reasonover v. St. Louis Cnty., Mo.,

447 F.3d 569, 585 (8th Cir. 2006)). Further, Missouri case law states that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 210.115,
which imposes on the officers a duty to report child abuse to the Missouri Children’s Division is a
discretionary function. See K.B. v. Waddle, 764 F.3d 821, 825 (8th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff’s Complaint
also fails to allege with particularity any event that would show specifically that Defendant
McCrary or Graves actions were willfully wrong or done with malice or corruption. For the reasons
stated, Defendants McCrary and Graves are entitled to official immunity and thus Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Count Six – Negligence; Count Seven – Negligent Failure to Supervise
Children; and Count Nine – Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress are GRANTED as to
Defendants McCrary and Graves in their individual capacities.

IV. Individual Capacities Regarding Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Taking the allegations as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court finds
Plaintiff has failed to allege a right to relief above a speculative level. To state a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must plead extreme and outrageous conduct

by a defendant who intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress that results in
bodily harm.” Kyndryl, Inc. v. Cannady, No. 23-03279-CV-S-BP, 2024 WL 3102043, at *5 (W.D.
Mo. May 28, 2024), appeal dismissed sub nom. Kyndryl Holdings, Inc. v. Cannady, No. 24-2279,
2024 WL 5240820 (8th Cir. Nov. 5, 2024) (citing Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 249 (Mo.
1997)). In addition, “[t]he conduct must be intended only to cause extreme emotional distress to
the victim.” Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 249 (Mo. 1997).
Here, Plaintiff alleges:
Defendants actions in threatening to taze Joshua for reporting, failing to take any
action when the crimes on his body were reported and refusing to make the required
reports to the Children’s Division and otherwise preventing those who could act on
his behalf from learning of or taking action regarding the abuses at Agape
intentionally inflicted emotional and physical pain upon him and placed Plaintiff in
the zone of danger.
(Complaint ¶ 92). Plaintiff fails to identify who threatened to taze Plaintiff or separate out the
claims made between Defendants McCrary, Graves or other individuals acting on behalf of the
Cedar County Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff further fails to allege how Defendants McCrary and
Graves actions caused severe emotional distress that resulted in bodily harm. The Court finds this
pleading is not sufficient at this stage of the litigation to raise a right of relief above a speculative
level. For the reasons stated, Cedar County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Eight –
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as to Defendnats McCrary and Graves in their
individual capacities is GRANTED.
V. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
A. Cedar County, Missouri
Plaintiff brings Count One – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Train; Count Two – 42 U.S.C. §
1983 Failure to Protect; Count Three – Aiding and Abetting Constitutional Violations; and Count
Four – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Supervisory liability against all Defendants. Cedar County Defendants
argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint is void of any official custom or policy that allegedly led to a
constitutional deprivation. Cedar County Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint is
void of any details of when McCrary or Graves allegedly because aware of the reports of abuse,
their investigations into the abuses, what role they were in while Plaintiff was at Agape, and alleged

responsibilities while Plaintiff was at Agape.
A § 1983 action against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a claim
against the entity itself, requiring proof that an official custom or policy led to a constitutional
deprivation. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed. 2d 301 (1991). The
Complaint alleges that Defendants acted pursuant to a policy or custom of Defendant Cedar

County in:
refusing to make reports of abuse to the Children’s Division;
refusing to investigate complaints of physical and sexual abuse of children at
religious boarding schools:
allowing conflicts of interest such that individuals who were charged with abuse of
children were allowed to investigate and/or make recommendations regarding the
outcomes of those complaints;
hiding the fact of abuse from parents, the Children’s Division and all authorities
who had the ability to investigate those complaints;
allowing personnel to affirmatively aid and abet the abuse occurring at the facility;
allowing personnel to use their position as law enforcement officers to enforce
peonage, trafficking and abuse in violations of the Wilberforce Trafficking Act. G.
Other similar acts.
(Complaint ¶ 34). Plaintiff alleges that he had a right to bodily integrity and a substantive due
process right to protection during the time that Defendants had custody and control over him.
(Complaint ¶¶ 45 and 47). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Cedar County’s policy or
custom, its failure to adopt clear policies and failure to properly train its deputies were a direct and
proximate cause of the constitutional deprivation suffered by Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶ 40).
Taking the allegations as true for the purpose of a motion to dismiss Plaintiff has
sufficiently plead facts that would demonstrate a right to relief above a speculative level. Plaintiff
outlines the alleged custom/policies in his Complaint and how it led to a constitutional deprivation
of his rights. At this stage of the litigation Plaintiff is allowed to proceed on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims. For the reasons stated, Cedar County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count One – 42
U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Train, Count Two – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Protect, Count Three –
Aiding and Abetting Constitutional Violations, and Count Four – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Supervisory
Liability is DENIED as to Defendant Cedar County, Missouri.

B. Defendants McCrary and Graves in their Individual Capacities

Cedar County Defendants argue that McCrary and Graves are entitled to qualified
immunity and that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is void of any specific allegations that
would defeat qualified immunity. Specifically, Cedar County Defendants argue that Plaintiff
neither alleged any wrongful conduct by McCrary while Plaintiff was at Agape nor alleged conduct
by McCrary that violated a constitutional or clearly established right. Cedar County Defendants
argue that Plaintiff failed to allege with any particularity any conduct by Graves other than alleged
knowledge of physical and sexual abuse.
Government officials “are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they
violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was
clearly established at the time.” Johnson v. Schurman, 145 F.4th 897, 903 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting

Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63, 138 S.Ct. 577, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018)). To
determine if an individual is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must conduct a two-part
inquiry: “(1) [whether] the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate
the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) [whether] the right was clearly
established at the time of deprivation.” Ryno v. City of Waynesville, 58 F.4th 995, 1004 (8th Cir.
2023) (quoting Jones v. McNeese, 675 F.3d 1158, 1161 (8th Cir. 2012)). A right is “clearly
established” when its contours are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640,
107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). The courts have the discretion to decide which of the two
prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first. Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, 38 F.4th 684,
690 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d
1149 (2011)).

The Court will proceed first to determine whether the facts, viewed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right.
i. Defendant McCrary

Plaintiff alleges:
During his tenure with the Sheriff’s Department, McCrary became aware of and
“investigated” reports of abuse at Agape Boarding School. Sheriff McCrary took
no actions regarding the inherent conflict of interest that existed as his employees
were some of the same individuals who had reports of abuse made against them.
No effective actions were taken regarding the reports of abuse. Sheriff McCrary
maintained a policy or practice of refusing to investigate and/or report allegations
of abuse at Agape, returning children to the school for further abuse. Sheriff
McCrary failed to train his officers and deputies causing foreseeable harm to these
children.
(Complaint ¶ 5). Plaintiff further alleges that “he knew both men who became Sheriff of Cedar
County and made report to both of them – McCrary and Dwerlkotte.” (Complaint ¶ 25). Plaintiff
additionally alleges that “Defendants Sheriff, Cedar County, Graves and Cedar County Deputies
received numerous reports of physical and sexual abuse of students amounting to violations of
students’ well-established right to bodily integrity.” (Complaint ¶ 37).
Plaintiff’s allegations, taken in the light most favorable to him fail to show a deprivation
of a statutory or constitutional right of Plaintiff from Defendant McCrary. While Plaintiff alleges
the constitutional right that was violated was Plaintiff’s right to bodily integrity, it is generally
unclear how Defendant McCrary violated that right. Plaintiff’s Complaint attempts to tie
unspecified reports of abuse by students to the inaction of Defendant McCrary. However, the
Complaint does not state what were in those alleged reports of abuse, when those reports of abuse
were made, nor how they relate to Plaintiff. While Plaintiff does allege he made a report to
Defendant McCrary, the Complaint does not detail what the substance of the report was, when the
report was made, or any details that would warrant liability to Defendant McCrary for the alleged
constitutional deprivation suffered by Plaintiff.

Additionally, Plaintiff attempts to claim Defendant McCrary had supervisory
responsibilities or was a policy maker for Cedar County in the Complaint. However, the Complaint
specifically alleges that Plaintiff attended Agape from 2014-2016 and Defendant McCrary was not
elected to the position of Cedar County Sheriff until 2017. The Court finds that, even taking the
allegations in the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has failed to show a
constitutional deprivation caused by Defendant McCrary.

The Court finds Defendant McCrary is entitled to qualified immunity and will dismiss the
42 U.S.C. § 1983 counts against him in his individual capacity. For the reasons stated, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Count One – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Train; Count Two – 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Failure to Protect; Count Three – Aiding and Abetting Constitutional Violations; and Count Four
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Supervisory Liability is GRANTED as to Defendant McCrary in his individual
capacity.

ii. Defendant Graves
As to Defendant Graves, Plaintiff alleges “Graves knew of the physical and sexual abuse
of Joshua as well as others and engaged in abuse of the boys.” (Complaint ¶ 7). Plaintiff further
alleges that:
Plaintiff’s father, when he found out what was going on at Agape, also made a report
to the police. Deputy Graves told Plaintiff’s father that no evidence of abuse had
been found. Graves moonlighted at Agape as a security guard and has been alleged
to have abused children there.
(Complaint ¶ 26). Plaintiff additionally alleges that “Defendants Sheriff, Cedar County, Graves
and Cedar County Deputies received numerous reports of physical and sexual abuse of students
amount to violations of students’ well-established right to bodily integrity. (Complaint ¶ 37).

Plaintiff’s allegations, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff fail to show a
deprivation of a statutory or constitutional right of Plaintiff by Defendant Graves. Nowhere in the
Complaint does Plaintiff claim any report was made by Plaintiff to Defendant Graves. Likewise,
Plaintiff makes no mention of how Defendant Graves was responsible for the alleged constitutional
deprivation of Plaintiff other than conclusory allegations of reports with no detail on when they
were made, what the substance of those reports were, or any details that would warrant liability to
Defendant Graves. Additionally, the Complaint fails to indicate how Defendant Graves would have
any influence on the policies or customs of the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department within his role

as a Deputy Sheriff nor any alleged responsibilities he had in training officers. Thus, the Court
finds that even taking the allegations in the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
Plaintiff has failed to show a constitutional deprivation caused by Defendant Graves. For the
reasons stated, the Court finds Defendant Graves is entitled to qualified immunity in his position
as a Deputy Sheriff for Cedar County Sheriff’s Department and thus Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Count One – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Train; Count Two – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to
Protect; Count Three – Aiding and Abetting Constitutional Violations; and Count Four 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 Supervisory Liability; is GRANTED as to Defendant Graves in his individual capacity.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Cedar County Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
First Amended Complaint is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendant Cedar
County Sheriff’s Department is dismissed from the case. Cedar County Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Count One – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Train, Count Two – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to
Protect, Count Three – Aiding and Abetting Constitutional Violations, and Count Four – 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 Supervisory Liability is DENIED as to Defendant Cedar County and GRANTED as to
Defendants McCrary and Graves in their individual capacities. Cedar County Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss Count Five – Action Under 18 U.S.C. § 1581 et seq is GRANTED. Cedar County
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Six – Negligence, Count Seven – Negligent Failure to
Supervise Children, Count Eight – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Count Nine –
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress are GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 23, 2025 /s/ Douglas Harpool
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11176668. Public record. Not legal advice.