# Britt

> District Court, W.D. Missouri · October 23, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11176628

## Case

- **Full name:** Kathleen Britt, individually and as the Surviving Parent of Jason Britt, and as Personal Representative on behalf of Jason Britt, deceased v. Agape Baptist Church Inc., d/b/a Agape Boarding School, Julio Sandoval, individually and in his role as Dean of Students for Agape Boarding School, Safe, Sound and Secure Youth Ministries, Inc., Brent Jackson, Individually and in his role as Vocational Director and Staff Member for Agape Boarding School, Scott Dumar, Individually and in his role as Medical Director, Member of the Board of Directors and Staff Member for Agape Boarding School, Jon Wilke, Individually and in his role as Staff Member for Agape Boarding School, David Wilson, Individually and in his role as Staff Member for Agape Boarding School
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** October 23, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

KATHLEEN BRITT, individually and
As the Surviving Parent of Jason Britt, and
As Personal Representative on behalf of
JASON BRITT, deceased

Plaintiffs,

v.
Case No.: 6:23-cv-03316-MDH

AGAPE BAPTIST CHURCH INC., d/b/a
AGAPE BOARDING SCHOOL,
JULIO SANDOVAL, individually and in his
role As Dean of Students for Agape Boarding
School,
SAFE, SOUND AND SECURE YOUTH
MINISTRIES, INC.,
BRENT JACKSON, Individually and in his role
as Vocational Director and Staff Member for
Agape Boarding School,
SCOTT DUMAR, Individually and in his role
as Medical Director, Member of the Board of
Directors and Staff Member for Agape Boarding
School,
JON WILKE, Individually and in his role as
Staff Member for Agape Boarding School,
DAVID WILSON, Individually and in his role
as Staff Member for Agape Boarding School,
ROBERT GRAVES, Individually and in his
role as Staff Member at Agape Boarding School,
and Individually and as Deputy Sheriff for
Cedar County, State of Missouri,
CEDAR COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT,
JAMES “JIMBOB” McCRARY, SHERIFF, in
his Individual and Official Capacity,

Defendants.
ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Robert Graves’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 121). Defendant
Graves filed Suggestions in Support (Doc. 122), Plaintiff filed Suggestions in Opposition (Doc.
129) and Defendant Graves has filed a reply (Doc. 146). The motions are now ripe for adjudication
on the merits. For reasons herein, Defendant Graves’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
This is a wrongful death action brought by Plaintiff Kathleen Britt who is the mother of

Jason Britt (“Decedent”). She brings this suit, individually and as personal representative of the
estate of Decedent, against Agape Boarding School (“Agape”), those with leadership positions at
Agape, members of the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department, and Cedar County itself. Plaintiff is
a resident of Idaho and Decedent’s estate was opened in Idaho. All Defendants are citizens of
Missouri.
Defendant Agape was a non-profit organization with its principal place of business in

Stockton, Missouri. Decedent attended Agape at the age of 16. Plaintiff alleges that Decedent was
brutalized by Defendants Jackson, Sandoval, and Wilke. Plaintiff claims Decedent was held down
and a broom/mop handle was inserted into Decedent’s rectum. After Decedent left Agape, he
allegedly developed an interest in weightlifting to protect himself from sexual assault. It is claimed
Decedent used steroids, developed a drug addiction, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression,
anxiety and suicidal tendencies. Decedent died from multi-organ failure due to steroids,
testosterone, high blood pressure and anxiety coupled with the drug addiction. Plaintiff asserts
Decedent’s death was a direct result of the abuses he suffered at Agape.
Plaintiff alleges that those associated with the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department were
aware of reports of abuse happening at Agape during this period and that Cedar County itself,
through the Sheriff’s Department, had on occasion taken actual custody and supervision of the
students after learning of abuses. Plaintiff further alleges no one at the Sheriff’s Department

reported those abuses and continued to return students to Agape without remedial action.
Defendants Sandoval and Graves allegedly worked both at Agape and as members of the Sheriff’s
Department.
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) alleges six counts against Defendant
Graves in his individual and official capacity.1 Count One is a wrongful death actions premised on
childhood sexual abuse; Count Three is a wrongful death claim based on 18 U.S.C. § 1581; Counts
Four through Six are wrongful death actions premised on negligence; and Count Eight is a

wrongful death claim based upon a violation of § 1983 claim.2
Defendant Graves seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint arguing that Plaintiff has failed to
allege sufficient facts upon which relief can be granted; Defendant Graves is entitled to qualified
immunity and official immunity; Count VIII – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails to allege sufficient facts
against Defendant Graves; and Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against Defendant Graves in
his individual or official capacity. The Court will take each in turn.

STANDARD

1 Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint is a corrected version of her Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s counsel
had misnumbered her headings. As the corrections were not substantive in nature the Court will construe Defendant
Graves’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint as applying to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended
Complaint.
2 Plaintiff also alleges Count Nine: Claims for Relief by Kathleen Britt. Count Nine is styled as a cause of action
against all Defendants but does not plead any additional cause of action. The Court in its January 2, 2025, has already
ruled to the extent it is attempting to include an additional cause of action it is insufficiently plead.
A complaint must contain factual allegations that, when accepted as true, are sufficient to
state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face. Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2010)
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The Court “must accept the allegations
contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving

party.” Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). The
complaint’s factual allegations must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level,” and the motion to dismiss must be granted if the complaint does not contain “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545
(2007). Further, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's Complaint asserts multiple counts of negligence and intentional acts against
multiple defendants resulting in the wrongful death of Jason Britt. Although there can be multiple
theories upon which a wrongful death action may be pursued, and it may be pursued against
multiple defendants, Missouri statutes allow only one claim and one recovery for the death of any
person. The damages recoverable are statutorily defined as specified damages suffered by the
Plaintiff because of the death. The statute of limitations for a wrongful death action is three years
from the date of death.

Missouri law also authorizes that in certain circumstances there can be a recovery of
damages for which the Defendants would have been liable if the claim had been pursued by the
deceased if death had not ensued. The statute of limitations which would have applied to any claim
by the deceased against the Defendants had his death not ensued would have been five years.
Plaintiff's Complaint was filed within three years of the death of Jason Britt. To the extent Plaintiff
can demonstrate a causal relationship between Defendants' actions and the death she may pursue
a wrongful death action. However, prior to the Decedent's death the statute of limitations expired

on claims which the deceased could have pursued against the Defendants. Any claim for the
damages the Decedent suffered is barred. Plaintiff may pursue a claim only for the damages
Plaintiff incurred as a read result of the death of Jason Britt. Plaintiff may not pursue a claim for
damages which Jason Britt suffered during his lifetime because of the expiration of its statute of
limitations on their claims. Regardless of the theory of negligence Plaintiff pursues she may only
recover if she is able to prove the causal link between the Defendants conduct and the death of
Jason Britt and then may only recover for the statutorily authorized damages which she can
demonstrate she suffered resulting from the death.

I. Failure to Allege Sufficient Facts Upon Which Relief Can be Granted
A. Qualified and Official Immunity

Defendant Graves argues that he was not associated with the Cedar County Sheriff’s
Department at the time Decedent attended Agape Boarding School and therefore could not have
engaged in any of the conduct alleged in his role as a deputy for the Cedar County Sheriff’s
Department. Alternatively, Defendant Graves states that even if he had been a deputy with the
Cedar County Sheriff’s Department at any time that Decedent was at Agape, he would be entitled
to immunity, and therefore, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. Plaintiff argues that it appears
that Defendant Graves was not yet a deputy when Decedent allegedly experienced the sexual
assault at Agape. Plaintiff argues that if Defendant Graves was not a public official, he would have
no immunity for his actions as an individual employee of Agape.
Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability and the burdens of
litigation unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right
of which a reasonable person would have known. Truong v. Hassan, 829 F.3d 627, 630 (8th Cir.
2016) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)).

Official immunity under Missouri state law “protects public officials sued in their individual
capacities from liability for alleged acts of negligence committed during the course of their official
duties for the performance of discretionary acts.” Hall v. Woodruff, 121 F.4th 1155, 1157 (8th Cir.
2024) (quoting State ex rel. Morales v. Alessi, 679 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Mo. banc 2023)).
Here, it appears that Defendant Graves was not employed by the Cedar County Sheriff’s
Department while Decedent attended Agape Boarding School. Plaintiff concedes in her briefing
that “[f]rom the facts gleaned thus far, it appears that Graves was not yet a deputy when Britt was

gang raped.” (Doc. 129, page 4). Because Defendant Graves was not a government official nor a
public official during the alleged sexual abuse, the doctrines of qualified immunity and official
immunity would not apply as to his actions as an individual employee of Agape. As such, the Court
finds that Defendant Graves is not entitled to qualified immunity or official immunity in this case.
For the reasons stated, Defendant Graves’s Motion to Dismiss all counts in his official capacity as
Deputy Sheriff of the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department is GRANTED and Count One –
Childhood Sexual Abuse in his individual capacity is DENIED. The Court will now analyze
Plaintiff’s negligence claims against Defendant Graves.

B. Count Four - Negligence
In Missouri, in an action for negligence, the plaintiff must establish that “(1) the defendant
had a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant failed to perform that duty; and (3) the defendant’s
breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.” Webb v. Medicalodges, Inc., 728
F.Supp.3d 1019, 1024 (W.D. Mo. 2024) (quoting Martin v. City of Wash., 848 S.W.2d 487, 493
(Mo. banc 1993).

Here, Plaintiff alleges:
Defendants had a duty to protect Plaintiff. This duty arose from:
a. Defendants’ acceptance of custody and supervision of the child.
b. The Plaintiff’s presence on property controlled by the Defendants.
c. The Defendants’ affirmative acts that placed Plaintiff in danger and in the
zone of danger.
d. Agape’s employment of Sandoval, Wilke, Wilson, Dumar, Graves and the
transport company as their agents.
e. All Defendants’ fiduciary and/or confidential relationship with the Plaintiff
and his family. Upon information and belief, Agape, by and through their
agents, servants and employees, knew or reasonably should have known of the
individual defendants’ dangerous and exploitative propensities and/ or that they
were unfit agents.
Despite such knowledge, the Defendants breached their duty to protect Plaintiff
when they failed to protect Plaintiff from the sexual abuse, physical abuse, neglect
and misfeasance described herein. As a direct result of the conduct of Agape and
the staff defendants including Sandoval, Dumar, Graves, Wilson, Wilke and
Jackson, Plaintiff lost her son.
(Complaint ¶¶ 130-133). Taking the allegations as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss,
Plaintiff has raised a right to relief above a speculative level. Plaintiff has alleged a duty on the
part of Defendant Graves, a breach of that duty, a proximate cause between the breach and the
resulting injury and actual damage to Plaintiff. Thus, at this stage of the litigation Plaintiff’s cause
of action is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated, Defendant Graves’s
Motion to Dismiss Count Four – Negligence in his individual capacity is DENIED.
C. Count Five - Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Retention, and Failure to Warn
This Count contains four theories–which arise from hiring, supervision, retention and
failure to warm–premised on negligence. See Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Mo. 1997)
(en banc) (discussing negligent hiring and retention and referencing the employer’s negligence);
Davis v. Lutheran S. High Sch. Ass’n of St. Louis, 200 S.W.3d 163, 165–166 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)
(referencing the standard elements of negligence when discussing negligent supervision”).

Here, Plaintiff alleges “Defendants failed to provide reasonable supervision of staff
members, failed to use reasonable care in investigating, hiring and retaining and supervision of its
staff members and failed to provide adequate warning to Plaintiff, and his family, of their
dangerous propensities.” (Complaint ¶ 139). As discussed prior, Defendant Graves was not an
employee of the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department when Plaintiff was at Agape Boarding School.
During this time Defendant Graves was solely acting as security personnel for Agape Boarding
School. Plaintiff fails to allege how Defendant Graves, in his capacity as security personnel for
Agape had any sort of responsibility when it came to hiring, supervision, or retention of employees

at Agape Boarding School. Further, Plaintiff additionally alleges a negligent failure to warn claim
but has failed to allege any duty Defendant Graves had that would warrant liability under that
claim. In sum, Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted as to
Defendant Graves on this count. For the reasons stated, Defendant Graves’s Motion to Dismiss
Count Five – Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Retention, and Failure to Warn in his individual
capacity is GRANTED.

D. Count Six - Negligent Failure to Supervise Children3
To state a prima facie case of negligent supervision, a plaintiff must plead “(1) a legal duty
on the part of the defendant to use ordinary care to protect the plaintiff against unreasonable risks

3 Under Missouri law there is no cause of action titled negligent failure to supervise children. Missouri does recognize
a cause of action titled negligent supervision. The Court will therefore construe this cause of action as a wrongful
death action premised on a theory of negligent supervision.
of harm; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate cause between the breach and the resulting
injury; and (4) actual damages to the plaintiff’s person or property.” Lipp v. Ginger C, L.L.C., No.
2:15-CV-04257-NKL, 2016 WL 1583663, at *10 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 19, 2016) (quoting Cook v. Smith,
33 S.W.3d 548, 553–54 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).

Plaintiff alleges:
The staff defendants – Graves, Wilke, Wilson, Sandoval, Dumar, Jackson -- each
had a duty to supervise decedent but breached those duties to protect and supervise
decedent by engaging in grooming activities, boundary violations, physical,
emotional and sexual abuse of the minor decedent as described herein. As a direct
result of the conduct of Defendants, Plaintiff[] lost [her] son. … As a direct result
of the conduct of Defendants, Decedent suffered lost future wages, lost earning
capacity, mental anguish, pain of body and mind.
(Complaint ¶¶ 155, 161 and 162). Taking the allegations as true for the purposes of a motion to
dismiss, Plaintiff has raised a right to relief above a speculative level. Plaintiff has alleged a duty
on the part of Defendant Graves, a breach of that duty, a proximate cause between the breach and
the resulting injury and actual damages to Plaintiffs. Thus, at this stage of the litigation, Plaintiff’s
cause of action is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated, Defendant
Graves’s Motion to Dismiss Count Six – Negligent Failure to Supervise Children in his individual
capacity is DENIED.
II. Count VIII – 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Defendant Graves argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint is void of any official custom or policy
that allegedly led to a constitutional deprivation. Defendant Graves further argues that the
Complaint is void of any details of when he allegedly became aware of reports of abuse, his
investigations into the abuse, and what role he had while Plaintiff was at Agape. Additionally,
Defendant Graves states the Complaint is void of any alleged responsibilities he had while Plaintiff
was at Agape and thus Plaintiff’s claims warrant dismissal. Plaintiff does not make an argument
regarding Defendant Graves 42 U.S.C. § 1983 argument.

“The essential elements of a § 1983 claim are (1) that the defendant(s) acted under color of
state law, and (2) that the alleged wrongful conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally
protected federal right.” Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 571 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing
DuBose v. Kelly, 187 F.3d 999, 1002 (8th Cir. 1999)). Only persons acting under color of state law
can be held liable under § 1983. Magee v. Trs. Of the Hamline Univ., Minn., 957 F.Supp.2d 1047,
1057 (D. Minn. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Magee v. Trs. Of Hamline Univ., Minn., 747 F.3d 532 (8th
Cir. 2014) (citing Carlson v. Roetzel & Andress, 552 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 2008)). Section 1983
therefore “secures most constitutional rights from infringement by governments, not private
parties.” Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588, 590 (8th Cir. 2004). “A

private party may be held liable under § 1983 only if it is a ‘willful participant in joint activity with
the State or its agents.’” Gibson v. Regions Fin. Corp., 557 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982)). “[A]
plaintiff seeking to hold a private party liable under § 1983 must allege, at the very least, that there
was a mutual understanding, or a meeting of the minds, between the private party and the state
actor” regarding the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Miller v. Compton, 122 F.3d
1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mere allusion to such a conspiracy
is insufficient; the conspiracy, or meeting of the minds, must be pleaded with specificity and factual
support. See Holbird v. Armstrong-Wright, 949 F.2d 1019, 1020 (8th Cir. 1991); Deck v. Leftridge,

771 F.2d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir. 1985).
As discussed above, the Court finds that Defendant Graves was not employed by the Cedar
County Sheriff’s Department during Decedent’s time at Agape Boarding School. Because
Defendant Graves was not a state actor, and Plaintiff has not pleaded with specificity that there
was a meeting of the minds necessary for liability to attach to a private party for purposes of §
1983, Defendant Graves cannot be held liable for this count. For the reasons stated, Defendant
Graves’s Motion to Dismiss Count Eight – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Failure to State a Claim in his

individual is GRANTED.
III. 18 U.S.C. § 1581
Defendant Graves seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Count Three arguing that Plaintiff does not
cite any prior criminal violation under the statute by Defendant Graves nor has Plaintiff stated any

allegation when, taken as true, would warrant relief under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 against Defendant
Graves.
Plaintiff’s Count Three is a wrongful death claim premised under 18 U.S.C. § 1581. The
Court in its January 2, 2025, Order dismissed this claim as it was barred by the statute of limitations
as noted in 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c). (Doc. 84, pages 8-9). 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c) states:
No action may be maintained under subsection (a) unless it is commenced not later
than the later of (1) 10 years after the cause of action arose; or (2) 10 years after the
victim reaches 18 years of age, if the victim was a minor at the time of the alleged
offense.
Decedent would have had to bring this claim prior to his 29th birthday on November 2, 2021. As
Decedent failed to do so this claim is barred by the statute of limitations. As such, the Court
continues to find that Plaintiff’s Count Three fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
and is once again dismissed it its entirety. For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s Count Three – Action
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1581 is DISMISSED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Graves’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amended Complaint is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendant Graves’s
Motion to Dismiss all counts in his official capacity as a Deputy Sheriff of the Cedar County
Sheriff’s Department is GRANTED. Count One – Childhood Sexual Abuse in his individual

capacity is DENIED; Count Three – 18 U.S.C. § 1581 is GRANTED; Count Four – Negligence
in his individual capacity is DENIED; Count Five – Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Retention, and
Failure to Warn in his individual capacity is GRANTED; Count Six - Negligent Failure to
Supervise Children in his individual capacity is DENIED; and Count Eight – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
his individual capacity is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 23, 2025
/s/ Douglas Harpool
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11176628. Public record. Not legal advice.