# I. Boguslavsky v. North Pocono S.D.

> Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · October 23, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11176222

## Case

- **Court:** Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 23, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Wolf
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ilya Boguslavsky, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 348 M.D. 2021
:
North Pocono School District, :
Pennsylvania Department of Education, :
State Tax Equalization Board, and :
Lackawanna County Board of :
Commissioners, :
Respondents : Submitted: September 11, 2025

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge (P.)
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE WOLF FILED: October 23, 2025

Before the Court is a “Motion for Summary Judgment” (which we treat
as an Application for Summary Relief, and hereinafter refer to as Application) filed
by Ilya Boguslavsky (Petitioner), an unrepresented litigant, in his action against the
North Pocono School District (School District), Pennsylvania Department of
Education (Department), the State Tax Equalization Board (Board, together with the
Department, Commonwealth Respondents), and the Lackawanna County Board of
Commissioners (Lackawanna County) arising under an original jurisdiction action
transferred to this Court from the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County
(Common Pleas). As there remain genuine issues of material fact, we deny
Petitioner’s Application.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 27, 2021, the instant case was transferred to this Court
from Common Pleas. Petitioner’s case originally named only the School District as
a Respondent. Before the transfer to this Court, on June 10, 2021, Common Pleas
sustained a preliminary objection by the School District, which argued that Petitioner
failed to join Respondents as indispensable parties and granted Petitioner leave to
amend his initial filing. Petitioner filed his “Amended Complaint” naming those
required parties. We treat Petitioner’s Amended Complaint as a Petition for Review
(Petition).
The facts as alleged by Petitioner in his Petition follow. In each of the
2018-19, 2019-20, and 2020-21 tax years, the School District, which is a multi-
county district located in Lackawanna and Wayne Counties, taxed Wayne County
taxpayers at a materially higher rate than Lackawanna County taxpayers. Petition at
3. The School District calculates its tax rates pursuant to Section 6-672.1(a)(1) of
the Public School Code of 1949.1 Id. at 4-5. The Board calculates inputs necessary
for the calculation mandated by Section 6-672.1(a)(1): the Common Level Ratio
(CLR) and its reciprocal Common Level Ratio Factor (CLRF), as well as valuations
for properties in various counties. Id. at 5-6. As a result of overtaxing Wayne
County taxpayers, the School District is offering refunds to Wayne County
taxpayers. Id. at 6. Petitioner elected not to accept such a refund, as he disagreed
with the calculated amount and receipt of the refund was conditioned on signing a
release. Id. at 6-7.

1
Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, added by the Act of Aug. 7, 1961, P.L. 968, as amended, 24
P.S. § 6-672.1(a)(1)

2
Petitioner alleges that the refund was miscalculated due to errors and
actions by the various Respondents. Namely, Petitioner alleges that the Board
improperly calculated Lackawanna County’s market value due to inadequate
methodology and Lackawanna County’s submitted incorrect data, which went
unidentified by the Board. Id. at 8. The Department provides the Board’s
calculations as part of a template for the School District to perform its statutorily-
mandated tax calculations. Id. at 6. Petitioner argues that the culmination of these
alleged errors is the incorrect calculation of tax rates by the School District. “Exhibit
O” to Petition.
By way of relief, Petitioner “request[s] that this Honorable Court enter
judgment against [Respondent School District] for the amount requested in the
plaintiffs {sic} refund claims, plus statutory interest . . . and the costs of this action”
and further “request[s] that this Honorable Court enter judgment against the
defendants ordering them to make Millage2 proportionate to the latest CLRF.”
Petition at 10, 12.
Following pleadings, Petitioner filed the Application now before us for
consideration.
II. ISSUES
While Petitioner seeks to raise several issues for our consideration,
more properly there is a single issue to consider before us: is Petitioner entitled to
summary relief at this time? We perform this analysis only with respect to the
prayers for relief properly pleaded in Petitioner’s Petition for Review. Petitioner’s

2
“Millage” is the tax rate used to calculate property taxes. It is a rate expressed in “mills,”
with one mill equal to 1/1,000 of a dollar. CLR and CLRF are measured and published annually
by the Board as ratios that compare assessed values to actual market values of real estate in a
county and are used to adjust assessments so that taxpayers are treated uniformly.

3
attempt to raise a further prayer for relief in his Brief is improper.3 Therefore, we
consider only whether Petitioner has shown he is entitled to the relief sought in his
Petition as a matter of law at this stage of the litigation.
In his Application, Petitioner outlines the same errors alleged in his
Petition, although he expands on some allegations. Petitioner argues that the
template provided by the Department for school districts to recalculate its tax rates
violates taxpayers’ right to equal taxation under the Uniformity Clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Pa. Const. art. VIII, § 1. He argues further that the Board
has failed to establish appropriate standards for calculating municipal property
valuations in scenarios in which a limited sample size is present, which contributes
to the erroneous calculation of inequitable tax rates, and he also contends that the
Board fabricated certain data relevant to the calculations for Lackawanna County.
Petitioner further contends that Lackawanna County failed to submit certain data,
which contributes to the errors in calculation. Petitioner also contends that this Court
can properly calculate the amount he overpaid in taxes for various tax years in order
to provide him his requested relief.
Commonwealth Respondents argue that Petitioner has failed to show
that he is entitled to summary relief, as there are genuine issues of material fact still
disputed by the parties. Along with their brief, Commonwealth Respondents
submitted an affidavit from Board Director Renee Reynolds in which she states that
the Board does not have the authority or obligation to audit the data provided to it
by various counties for use in its calculations, and denies that the Board fabricated

3
He requests that this Court “[o]rder Respondent Lackawanna County to make appropriate
filings henceforth, upon pain of having to pay all fees, costs (including attorney fees) and damages
(refunds) incurred by Wayne County taxpayers because of Lackawanna County failures to obey
the law.” Petitioner’s Brief at 3.

4
any data used in its Lackawanna County calculations. The Board also cites its “Lack
of Sales Exception”4 to contest Petitioner’s argument that the Board’s methodology
is insufficient to handle calculations where there is an insufficient sample size. They
contend that the disagreement between Respondents and Petitioner with respect to
the appropriateness of the recalculation of Petitioner’s tax rate is a dispute of material
fact.
Like Commonwealth Respondents, the School District contends that
Petitioner has failed to show that he is entitled to summary relief as there are genuine
issues of material fact. The School District also submitted affidavits from School
District employees who argue that they properly calculated Petitioner’s refund
pursuant to Section 6-672.1(a)(1).
Like the other Respondents, Lackawanna County contends that
Petitioner has failed to show that he is entitled to summary relief as there are genuine
issues of material fact. In support of this contention, they attach an affidavit of
Patrick Tobin, the Lackawanna County Director of Assessment, in which he states
that Lackawanna County has not fabricated any of the data submitted to the Board,
and that it submits the required data annually in accordance with the
Commonwealth’s requirements. Lackawanna County also argues that Petitioner
improperly seeks to expand his requests for relief in his Brief, by bringing, for the
first time, a request for relief against Lackawanna County.

4
Policy & Procedures Manual for Market Value, State Tax Equalization Board, Pa. Dep’t of
Comm. & Econ. Dev., 5, https://dced.pa.gov/download/currentsteb-policy-and-procedures-
manual-for-market-value-02-15-2018/?wpdmdl=84986 (last accessed October 22, 2025)
[hereinafter Board Manual].

5
III. DISCUSSION
Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b) governs requests for summary relief in cases filed
pursuant to this Court’s original jurisdiction. This Court has held:

Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b) provides that “[a]t any time after the
filing of a petition for review in an appellate or original
jurisdiction matter[,] the court may on application enter
judgment if the right of the applicant thereto is clear.”
Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). “An application for summary relief is
properly evaluated according to the standards for summary
judgment.” Myers v. Commonwealth, 128 A.3d 846, 849
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). That is, in ruling on a motion for
summary relief, the evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and the court may
enter judgment only if: (1) there are no genuine issues of
material fact; and (2) the right to relief is clear as a matter
of law.

Flagg v. Int’l Union, Sec., Police, Fire Pros of Am., Local 506, 146 A.3d 300, 305
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (emphasis added).
The record for the purpose of considering a motion for summary
judgment is limited to “(1) pleadings, (2) depositions, answers to interrogatories,
admissions and affidavits, and (3) reports signed by an expert witness that would, if
filed, comply with [Pa.R.Civ.P.] 4003.5(a)(1), whether or not the reports have been
produced in response to interrogatories” and “unsworn exhibits . . . are not properly
part of the record on summary judgment.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.1; Wheeler v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 493 A.2d 120, 122 (Pa. Super. 1985). In considering whether
genuine issues of material fact exist, this Court “resolve[s] all doubts as to the
existence of disputed material fact against the moving party.” Cook v. Pa. Lab. Rels.
Bd., 315 A.3d 885, 895 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022).
With respect to challenges raised under the Uniformity Clause:

6
When a taxpayer believes that he has been subjected to
unequal taxation due to an allegedly unconstitutional
statute, he generally must demonstrate that: (1) the
enactment results in some form of classification; and (2)
such classification is unreasonable and not rationally
related to any legitimate state purpose. When considering
such a challenge, reviewing courts must remain cognizant
of the General Assembly’s broad authority and wide
discretion in matters of taxation, and the presumption that,
when enacting any statute, the Legislature does not intend
to violate the Constitutions of the United States or of this
Commonwealth. Accordingly, a tax enactment will not be
invalidated unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates
the Constitution.

Clifton v. Allegheny Cnty., 969 A.2d 1197, 1211 (Pa. 2009) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Here, there are genuine issues of material facts, and therefore we cannot
grant Petitioner’s Application. While there is no dispute that the School District
incorrectly calculated Petitioner’s tax rate previously, the appropriate method of
recalculation is defined by statute and it is contested between the parties both as to
whether it was appropriately calculated (and if the necessary inputs were correctly
calculated) and whether the new rate, as calculated, imposes a substantially unequal
tax burden. The Commonwealth Respondents have offered an affidavit that the
Board correctly calculated the market value figure necessary for the School District
to recalculate its tax rates. The School District has provided affidavits that it
correctly recalculated the tax rates in accordance with the statutory provision
provided by Section 6-672.1(a)(1).
While Petitioner has argued that the new rate is calculated incorrectly
and imposes a substantially unequal tax burden, he supports his assertions almost

7
exclusively with various calculations and spreadsheets he offers as unsworn
“Exhibits” to his Petition and Application, as well as argument regarding the alleged
inadequacy of the Board’s market value calculation, and alleged issues with the data
provided by Lackawanna County and relied on by the Board in its calculations.5
However, Petitioner has not been qualified as an expert witness on the matter of
accounting and tax calculation, and even if he had, the fact remains that Respondents
have offered sworn evidence to dispute Petitioner’s own arguments. Therefore, it is
clear based upon the record properly before this Court and in consideration of the
requirement that we resolve doubts in favor of the non-moving party, that there
remain genuine issues of material fact. Accordingly, we must deny Petitioner’s
Application.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Application is denied.

_____________________________________
MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

5
In Petitioner’s Reply Brief, he argues that the Board, in calculating municipal market values
in scenarios where there may be insufficient sales data, “confuses absence with insufficiency. It
denies the possibility of a sales sample existing but not being adequate. The ‘lack of sales
exception’ deals exclusively with the situation when a sample does not exist at all . . . .”
Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 2. This does not appear to be correct—the “Lack of Sales Exception”
defined within the Board Manual provides that a “lack of or no sales occurred.” Board Manual at
5 (emphasis added). The language of this exception, on its face, appears to contemplate both the
possibilities of an absence of sales as well as an insufficient sample of sales, as it clearly considers
a “lack of” sales to be distinct from “no sales” given the presence of the conjunction “or.”

8
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ilya Boguslavsky, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 348 M.D. 2021
:
North Pocono School District, :
Pennsylvania Department of Education, :
State Tax Equalization Board, and :
Lackawanna County Board of :
Commissioners, :
Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 23rd day of October 2025, Petitioner’s July 31, 2023
“Motion for Summary Judgment” is DENIED.

_____________________________________
MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11176222. Public record. Not legal advice.